Erc20.transfer() return value is ignored

Handle pants Vulnerability details According to the ERC-20 Token Standard, the function transfer returns false on failure. However, the return value of Erc20.transfer is ignored 8 times: 1. In Swivel.exitVaultFillingZcTokenExit, line 313. 2. In Swivel.exitVaultFillingZcTokenExit, line 315. 3. In...

Funds in the pool could be stolen by exploiting flashSwap in HybridPool

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can call the bento.harvest function during the callback function of a flash swap of the HybridPool to reduce the number of input tokens that he has to pay to the pool, as long as there is any unrealized profit in the strategy contract of th...

HybridPool's flashSwap gives the total fee to barFeeTo

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In HybridPool's flashSwap function there's a transfer to barFeeTo transfertokenIn, fee, barFeeTo, false; Here fee = amountIn swapFee / MAXFEE is the total swap fee. However it should transfer out only a fraction of it barFee/MAXFEE otherwise liquidity...

There is no corresponding setResume() for setHalted()

Handle 0xRajeev Vulnerability details Impact There is no function for setting halted to false, i.e. to resume the halted protocol, unlike pause/unpause. It appears that halted is actually permanent shutdown here. If so, this should be documented clearly. If not, setHalted should take a boolean to...

PostAuctionLauncher.sol#finalize() Adding liquidity to an existing pool may allows the attacker to steal most of the tokens

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details PostAuctionLauncher.finalize can be called by anyone, and it sends tokens directly to the pair pool to mint liquidity, even when the pair pool exists. An attacker may control the LP price by creating the pool and then call finalize to mint LP token with unfai...

DAO proposals can be executed by anyone due to vulnerable TimelockController

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The GovernorAlpha inherits from a vulnerable TimelockController. This TimelockController allows an EXECUTOR role to escalate privileges and also gain the proposer role. See details on OZ and the fix here. The bug is that executeBatch chec...

Reentrancy Bug in TimelockController.sol

Handle leastwood Vulnerability details Impact Notional's governance framework utilises a fork of Compound's Governor Alpha and ERC20 token. These are denoted specifically as the GovernorAlpha.sol and NoteERC20.sol contracts. However, the GovernorAlpha.sol has a key difference when compared to...

reputation risk via upgradable contracts

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact The contract SwappableYieldSource is upgradable. This means the owner could upgrade and change the contract so any new functionality. Amongst others the owner could retrieve all the tokens of the Yieldsource and transfer them out. The project could sti...

Allowance cannot be reset once it is set to the maximum

Handle shw Vulnerability details Impact The approve functions of the pool LP tokens and synths do nothing if the allowances is already the maximum number, i.e., typeuint256.max. Therefore, Alice cannot change her allowance to Bob once she approved him with the maximum approval. Proof of Concept...

how to protect for weird erc20 tokens

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact The protocol only works as expected when the ERC20 tokens are well behaved. If rebasing tokens or malicious token contracts are used then unexpected results can happen. I don't see any code to restrict the tokens or verify the tokens. Proof of Concept...

Funds can be stolen because of approval + send

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The fulfill transaction on the receiving chain first approves the txData.callTo contract with the toSend amount. It then tries to call the addFunds and execute actions on txData.callTo. When any of the calls reverts, the funds are sent to...

Wrong trading pricing calculations

Handle 0xsanson Vulnerability details Impact In the Pricing contract, an agent can manipulate the trading prices by spamming an high amount of trades. Indeed an agent can create an high amount of orders at an arbitrary price and with a near-zero amount so the agent doesn't even need large funds;...

executeTrade can be frontrun

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact An attacker could monitor the mempool and see an executeTrade transaction. He then could checkout the parameters and see if a better trade is possible for himself. He might even create and sign a new trade and then submit the new trade via an...

YearnV2YieldSource wrong subtraction in withdraw

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details YearnV2YieldSource.withdrawFromVault uses a wrong subtraction. When withdrawing from the vault one redeems yTokens for tokens, thus the token balance of the contract should increase after withdrawal. But the contract subtracts the currentBalance from the...

Potential griefing with DoS by front-running vault creation with same vaultID

Handle 0xRajeev Vulnerability details Impact The vaultID for a new vault being built is required to be specified by the user building a vault via the build function instead of being assigned by the Cauldron/protocol. An attacker can observe a build as part of a batch transaction in the mempool,...

Witch can't give back vault after 2x grab

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact The witch.sol contract gets access to a vault via the grab function, in case of liquidation. If the witch.sol contract can't sell the debt within a certain amount of time, a second grab can occur. After the second grab, the information of the original...

Randomnesss can be manipulated

Handle adelamo Vulnerability details Here you have more info: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Handle transfers of different ERC20 tokens

Handle paulius.eth Vulnerability details Impact Some ERC20 transfers have require checks, e.g.: requireiERC20token.transfermember, amount; some don't, e.g.: iERC20token.transferrecipient, amount; It is a good practice to think about all the possible variations of ERC20s see: . Recommended...

Add a timelock to functions that set key variables

Handle s1m0 Vulnerability details Impact Functions like setLeveragePercent and setLiquidationThresholdPercent for both IsolatedMarginTrading and CrossMarginTrading should be put behind a timelock because they would give more trust to users. Now the owner could call them whenever he wants and a...

The First User To Borrow a Particular Token Can Drain Funds In MarginSwap by Making An Undercollateralized Borrow Using Flash Loans

Handle jvaqa Vulnerability details The First User To Borrow a Particular Token Can Drain Funds In MarginSwap by Making An Undercollateralized Borrow Using Flash Loans Impact This attack can be performed with any two ERC20 tokens, where one of them has not yet been borrowed on MarginSwap. Since an...

marginTo when opening a position increases slippage

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Providing marginTo when opening position will not increase premium but be stolen by MeV. This can be mitigated by providing amountOutMin in swap params but the protocol should guarantee proper swap. Proof of Concept When opening a position a borrower can...

Delisted wLp still could be used for collateralization by changing position mode

Lines of code Vulnerability details Protocol governor address has the power to whitelist and delist wLp addresses using the ConfigsetWhitelistedWLps function. Only whitelisted wLp tokens are allowed to collateralize and de-collateralize users' positions: File: InitCore.sol 244: function...

setPosMode function doesn't check if wLp is whitelisted

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept Using setPosMode function owner of position can change it's mode. When the function is called, then there are a lot of checks, like if current mode allows to decollateralize and if new mode allows to collateralize. Also it's checked, that all...

Increase liquidity in close position may not cover original borrowed liquidity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary When a position is closed, there is no check to ensure that the effective added liquidity covers the original borrowed liquidity from the LP. Impact Closing a position in the Particle LAMM protocol must ensure that the borrowed liquidity gets fully adde...

When the returnNative parameter is set to true in the _params provided to MoneyMarketHook.execute, it is not handled properly and could disrupt user expectations

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When param.returnNative is set to true while calling MoneyMarketHook.execute, users expect the returned token from the withdraw operation to be in native form and sent to the caller. However, in the current implementation, this is not considered and coul...

An artPiece with a creator address set to address(0) leads to a pseudo-permanent DoS if it ends up being auctioned.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Description There is a potential for a DoS in the AuctionHouse contract related to the buyToken call from the ERC20TokenEmitter. This is due to the buyToken using the mint function to all the addresses that are stored on the creators array...

MaxHeapify: find children with large value and swap

Lines of code Vulnerability details Input Validation: - The maxHeapify function assumes that pos is a valid position within the heap. - Similar to the swap function, you should consider adding a check to verify that pos is within the bounds of your heap. requirepos size, "Invalid position...

Missing access control on critical functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details The broad admin role enables arbitrary manipulation of the heap without restrictions. Recommendation: Implement granular access control and privilege separation. Implement an access control system such as OpenZeppelin AccessControl to restrict access to these...

If the borrower enters token blacklist, LP may never be able to retrieve Liquidity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Currently, there are two ways to retrieve Liquidity 1. borrower actively close position : call closePosition 2. be forced liquidation leads to close position : liquidatePosition - closePosition No matter which one, if there is a profit in...

Interest still accuring when repayment is paused, creating debt that cannot be repaid

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Interest still accuring when repayment is paused Proof of Concept When the admin pause the lending pool repayment, as timestamp elapses, interest still accuring /// @inheritdoc ILendingPool function accrueInterest public uint lastAccruedTime =...

TEST HIGH

Lines of code L1 Vulnerability details TEST --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Unsafe use of approve() with IERC20

Lines of code 321, 215, 184, 450, 761, 217, 157, 234, 339, 386https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/t...

addRewardToken() does note remove old entries before adding new ones

Lines of code 455, 280, 378, 411 Vulnerability details Each time addRewardToken is called, new entries are added to the array, but doing so does not remove any old entries. By calling the function multiple times, an attacker can can increase their voting power indefinitely, without having to...

plsss

Lines of code L12 Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps...

test

Lines of code L14 Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps lemme...

Invalid WETH inclusion for Curve's Tricrypto pools.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact For some of Curve's Tricrypto pools, CurveTricryptoAdapter will not be working. Proof of Concept address wethAddress = ICurveTricryptoprimitive.coins2; zToken = calculateOceanIdaddress0x4574686572, 0; // hexadecimalascii"Ether" indexOfzToken = 2;...

Usage of _safeMint in NextGenCore@_mintProcessing allows an attacker to reenter when onERC721Received is called

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can : Exceed the per address allowance in Fixed Price Sale, Exponential Descending Sale and Linear Descending Sale modes. Cause a loss for another user in Burn-to-Mint mode by accepting an offer when onERC721Received is triggered. Proof of...

Lack of Validation and Potential Overflow in _fetchInteractionId Function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The lack of validation on interactionType could allow invalid values, potentially leading to unexpected interaction IDs. Additionally, if interactionType exceeds 8 bits, it could cause an overflow issue, potentially altering the token address within the...

Wrapping ether with Ocean.doMultipleInteractions() reverts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Wrapping ether with doMultipleInteractions reverts. This is the case if one or more of the interactions is handling ether. If we look at the internal helper function, doMultipleInteractions, it includes the following: if msg.value != 0...

addRewardToken() does note remove old entries before adding new ones

Lines of code 455, 280, 378, 411 Vulnerability details Each time addRewardToken is called, new entries are added to the array, but doing so does not remove any old entries. By calling the function multiple times, an attacker can can increase their voting power indefinitely, without having to...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #491 [1701115520323]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 491 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-03 While StakedUSDeV2.cooldownDuration is changed from non-zero to zero, stakers should be able to call StakedUSDeV2.unstake to withdraw assets regardless of userCooldown.cooldownEnd File: While...

Unchecked redeemUnderlying failure allows burning asD without redeeming NOTE, breaking peg.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The burn function does not validate the return code from redeemUnderlying. This means if redeeming fails, asD tokens could be burned without redeeming the underlying NOTE, breaking 1:1 peg. Attacker burns asD tokens and receives NOTE, but contract fails ...

Cannot withdraw 1:1

Lines of code Vulnerability details function testX public uint256 mintAmount = 10e18; NOTE.mintalice, mintAmount; vm.startPrankalice; NOTE.approveaddressasdToken, mintAmount; asdToken.mintmintAmount; uint256 newExchangeRate = 1.1e28; cNOTE.setExchangeRatenewExchangeRate; vm.startPrankowner;...

Malicious shares can't be paused or stopped after creation, so users will continue use them

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In case if share creator is a malefactor he can try to do multiple malicious operations: Pump and Dump attack with price manipulation, artificially increase fees for NFT minting. Proof of Concept Both attacks described in my other reports and unfortunate...

Lost fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Buyers do not get any split of the fees. It is instead to be distributed to holders. But holder splits on successive buys are partially lost to the contract and cannot be recovered. Proof of concept The buyer's rewardsLastClaimedValueidmsg.sender is...

asD::withdrawCarry assumes wrong number of decimals returned by exchangeRateCurrent which will cause owner to not be able to withdraw revenue

Lines of code Vulnerability details tl;dr asD::withdrawCarry assumes that the exchange rate returned by the cNote contract will be scaled by 1e28, but in reality it will be only scaled by 1e18. It will cause withdrawCarry to always revert with Integer Underflow, which means that owner won't ever ...

First deposit of 1 Wei will block further rsETH minting

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the initial deposit in the DepositPool is 1 wei of any supported token rETH, cbETH, or stETH, 1 wei of rsETH will be minted for the first depositor. However, subsequent rsETH minting will be prevented because the rsethAmountToMint will always round do...

Missing slippage check in deposit function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Users depositing in the protocol have no control over the amount of RSETH minted in return for their deposit. Impact The depositAsset function present in the LRTDepositPool contract allows users to deposit any of the supported assets into the protocol i...

Potential drain of EthCrowdFund contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the emergencyExecute function in the EthCrowdFundBase contract, the external call msg.value is decided by the user input which could lead to draining of funds by compromised wallet or human error. Also there is no check if the value of amoutnEth is at...

Host(s) + majority can steal assets of minority+other hosts without any option for minority(+otherhosts) to ragequit.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ragequit functionality is put in place to protect the rights of the minority, who are not in support of a proposal, and allow them to withdraw their share of assets and exit the party. In some cases, minority will not have the opportunity to ragequit...