Counterparty-exchange owner may alter policy manager in execution callback, altering the price of subsequent order matching

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the context of bulkExecute, with a sqeuence of executions requested, transferring ETH, ERC721 or ERC1155 may result in a hook/callback to a counterparty on receipt of ETH or one of these tokens. If this counterparty is also the exchange owner, or is...

Admin can drain user funds from the Pool or buy assets for free

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact We assume that the admin is honest, however there is still possibility of exploiting asset policy contract to and set price to 0 in oder to buy an asset for free - or even worse - drain user funds by setting the price really high in...

Anyone can take the remaining ETH in the Exchange (proxy) contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone can take the remaining ETH in the Exchange proxy contract Proof of Concept Because returnDust just send all ETHs of the Exchange balance to caller, anyone can call bulkExecuteexecutions with 1wei and an empty executions list to drain the contract:...

Upgraded Q -> M from #446 [1668468223347]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 446 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 There should be an upper limit for LBFactory.flashLoanFee If the admin sets the flashLoanFee too high, the flash loan functionality might be useless as users won't use it. --- The text was updated successfully,...

Upgraded Q -> M from #407 [1668467735071]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 407 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Incorrect parameters for beforeTokenTransfer hook In LBToken.sol, the beforeTokenTransfer hook has the following parameters: 317: /// @param from The address of the owner of the token 318: /// @param to The address o...

Signature Malleability in case of using EVM built-in ecrecover()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ecrecover function which is used verify a signature. The built-in EVM precompile ecrecover is susceptible to signature malleability because of non-unique s and v values which could lead to replay attacks. Proof of Concept Tools Used Manual Analysis...

Exchange's _returnDust() does not validate return value of call() to send excess ETH to sender.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a caller to Exchange's execute or bulkExecute includes more ETH than is required to complete the transactions, returnDust is intended to return this excess back to the caller. However, returnDust does not validate that the call it performs to return...

Upgraded Q -> M from #194 [1668467876517]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 194 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-04 Should be a upper-bound on Flash-loan fee There are 1 instances of this issue: File : = Recommended Mitigation There should be a upper bound of Flash-loan fee define in contract so that owner can't able to set f...

Exchange refund operation will return all ETH stored in the contract instead of the remaining amount from the exchange operation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Exchange refund operation will return all ETH stored in the contract instead of the remaining amount from the exchange operation The function that refunds remaining ETH in the Exchange contract will send back all the balance present in the contract instead of...

Upgraded Q -> M from #348 [1668468155840]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 348 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L01 Wrong parameter order inside beforeTokenTransfer in LBtoken::burn call should be beforeTokenTransferaccount, address0, id, amount; --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All...

Upgraded Q -> M from #403 [1668467487185]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 403 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. No upper limit check on flash loan fee No upper limit check on setFlashLoanFee. Although only admin can set this, human error can lead to higher percente swap, leading to excess swap and gas fee. Or admin can rug...

RETURN STATEMENT OF THE transferFrom FUNCTION ALWAYS RETURN TRUE EVEN THE TRANSFER IS FAILED . IF RETURN TRUE FOR ALL TRANSACTIONS IT WILL CAUSE A PROBLEM AND LOSE OF AMOUNT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When ever we calling transfer from function it will return true even the transfer failed. So as per function we think the transfer is success. But in real that transfer may or may not be failed. We don't get the exact status of the transfer Proof of...

Upgraded Q -> M from #70 [1668468349340]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 70 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Flash loan fee can be set to 100% Contract: Issue: In setFlashLoanFee function, If Admin has set flashloan fee to 100% then user taking X amount as flashloan has to pay a fee equal to X which does not make sense...

Pool is not initialized correctly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Pool has no owner and will be un-upgradeable. Proof of Concept Pool does not provide an initialize interface to initialize the owner, so the owner will never be set. Pool as a UUPSUpgradeable can not be upgraded without a valid owner. Tools Used n/a...

On _returnDust, call opcode's return value not checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The call opcode's return value not checked, which could leads to the originator lose funds. Proof of Concept The caller of Exchange.sol::execute or Exchange.sol::bulkExecute could be a contract who may not implement the fallback or receive function, when...

User's assets can be drained without payment due to invalid signature check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Exchange::execute uses validateSignatures function to verify if an order is signed by both parties. However, this function does not verify the signature when order.trader == msg.sender. Hence, malicious actor can prepare a bundle of all seller's Orders...

Upgraded Q -> M from #334 [1668467418003]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 334 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 2. Rug vectors by the owner A malicious owner can call setLBPairImplementation, setFeeRecipient, setFlashLoanFee , setFeesParameters and forceDecay to advantage himself at expenses of the users...

Upgraded Q -> M from #75 [1668466949988]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 75 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Line 237, beforeTokenTransferaddress0, account, id, amount; should be beforeTokenTransferaccount, address0, id, amount; --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

EVERY TIME ONCE _execute FUNCTION COMPLETED NEED TO SET isOpen TO 0. OTHERWISE WE CAN CALL EXECUTE FUNCTIONS MULTIMPLE TIMES.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact IN THIS WAY WE CAN CALL AND EXECUTE FUNCTIONS MULTIPLE TIMES . EVERY TIME BEFORE CALL EXECUTE NEED TO CALL INITIALIZE FUNCTIONS. Proof of Concept function executeInput calldata sell, Input calldata buy public payable reentrancyGuard internalCall...

Trader can still execute the order even after cancelling the order

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are no checks to verify whether the order has been cancelled or not in execute function. This will enable traders to place the order even after cancellation Proof of Concept Execute cancelOrder function with Order data Include the Order in input of...

Theft of ETH that was not used for the successful execution of orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description There are execute and bulkExecute functions in Exchange smart contract. There is the refund of any ETH that was unused for example that was left due to the unsuccessful order execution at the end of its execution flow: returnDust; returnDust functio...

_returnDust does not revert ether transfer failure

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function returnDust the return value of call is not checked for success. If a user had sent excess ether or if an order in a bulk order had failed, and if the call fails ether will remain in the contract. Users who execute orders later will be able to...

Susceptible to reorg attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When reorg happens, it is possible that the cancelled order by the taker be executed by the maker. Proof of Concept Suppose userA is seller and userB is buyer, seller is maker, and buyer is taker. After some time, userB the buyer cancels the order by...

deposit and withdraw emit the same event than mint and burn in ERC20 and can affect to Dapps

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Deposit and Withdraw emit the same event than burn and mint than ERC20 so it's not possible to distinguish in a DAPP than deposit and withdraw are not mint or burn and could affect to the DAPP logics. For example, cointracking.info could understand in a...

LooksRareProxy is missing the fee mechanism, protocol may loss the revenue from fee

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LooksRareProxy is missing the fee mechanism, the protocol may lose revenue from the fee. Even if you intend to have a free fee, the fee mechanism should be implemented in case you need to enforce the fee in the future. Proof of Concept function execute...

It is possible for a user's ETH to be trapped inside the contracts.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It is possible that a user's ETH will be trapped inside the contracts. returnETHIfAnyoriginator; But in the implementation of the returnETHIfAny function, it will just silently return even the returning ETH transaction fails. As a result, even if the use...

Seller can steal ETH which is for other orders of the bulk

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The 'bulkExecute' and 'returnDust' functions are susceptible to reentrancy attack. Seller can exploit it to steal ETH which is for other orders of the bulk. Proof of Concept Key steps for successful attack 1 set fee rate to 100% 2 reentrancy call...

Native funds on the aggregator contract balance is a free grab

Lines of code Vulnerability details Native funds on the aggregator contract balance is a free grabLooksRareAggregator's execute returns the native balance of the contract to the caller even when nothing was provided with the call. This happens when LooksRareAggregator's execute is called directly...

_returnETHIfAny() can silently fail, leading to an originator not getting the expected refund

Lines of code Vulnerability details The execute function refunds the unused ETH back to the originator through returnETHIfAny. This internal function uses a low-level call to transfer the ETH. The issue is that the return value of the call is not checked. As per the Solidity documentation...

No Revert on Failure, an order can be execute successfully by disguising them as NFTs.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ERC20 tokens don't throw a error when failed in transfer. A malicious user can pretend to be sending an ERC721 token while it is something else. Orders are getting executed inside LooksRareProxy.sol, an attacker as a maker can make an BasicOrder that has...

Tokens and ETH can be sweeped from LooksRareAggregator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Tokens and ETH can be sweeped from LooksRareAggregator Proof of Concept A malicious user may transfer out any tokens or ETH that are owned by LooksRareAggregator. To do so, a such user has to call execute - and make the trade. After executing of order...

Unsafe ERC20 operations due to lack of contract length check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Functions executeERC20DirectTransfer and executeERC20TransferFrom replicates solmate libraries methods. The problem with this is that these functions does not check existence of code at the token address. If executeERC20DirectTransferand...

Anyone can get access to ERC20 tokens in LooksRareAggregator contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The TokenRescuer contract helps to rescue eth and erc20 tokens and can only be called by the owner. However, any trapped eth or erc20 tokens can actually be taken out by anyone. Essentially the function and access control of the TokenReceiver contract ca...

Left ERC20/ETH can be withdrawn by anyone

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any remaining balance can be used by anyone. This can impact on users who transfers directly to the protocol by mistake. Proof of Concept If any user by mistake transfers ERC20/ETH directly not through the ERC20EnabledLooksRareAggregator or execute...

LowLevelETH: _returnETHIfAny; _returnETHIfAny; _returnETHIfAnyWithOneWeiLeft do not check if call was successful

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This means that the caller won't receive ETH but the transaction will continue, this could specially affects to function LookRareAggregator.execute, which use returnETHIfAnyaddress function, leading to originator lose of funds or mess up its state...

ETH could be locked in LooksRareAggregator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ETH is returned to originator at the end of function LooksRareAggregatorexecute.... However, this logic does not check for returned value from originator in case originator is a contract and reverts when receiving ether. The result is that the transactio...

OwnableTwoStep delay not set

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contract TokenRescuer inherits the contract OwnableTwoSteps but does not set any delay. There should be a constructor in TokenRescuer responsible for setting the delay as described in the comments of the OwnableTwoSteps contract. Without any delay,...

It is possible for ETH to be trapped inside LooksRareAggregattor contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If a user purchases NFTs with ETH or ETH and ERC20 tokens but with limited gas fees, it is possible that all purchase transactions are successful and have some ETH or ETH and ERC20 tokens left. The left ETH may be trapped inside the contract and the user...

Missing check of return value of ETH transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When users uses ETH to batch buy NFTs, if the transaction fails, the aggregator contract will call the function returnETHIfAny to return the ETH to the user. This function transfers all the balance in the contract to the recipient through call, but there...

internalCall modifier can be circumvented with execute / bulkExecute

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The internalCall modifier ensures that public functions can only be called from another public function and not directly. It is implemented like that: modifier internalCall requireisInternal, "This function should not be called directly"; ; The modifier...

The owner of the contract can broke the storage of the LooksRareAggregator contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The owner of the contract can broke the storage of the LooksRareAggregator contract Proof of Concept The addFunction function - can be called by the owner to to set proxy address and function selector for the function to be called inside this proxy. This...

User can drain all ether from LooksRareAggregator contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone could drain all ether from this contract. Proof of Concept function execute TokenTransfer calldata tokenTransfers, TradeData calldata tradeData, address originator, address recipient, bool isAtomic external payable nonReentrant if recipient ==...

calling execute() may lead to stealing funds if some ETH is stuck on the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact if some Ether is sent erroneously or not to the contract, anyone that calls correctly LooksRareAggregator.execute will be able to steal those coins. to execute the function using ethers as payment, these conditions must be true: there is at least a trade...

Vampire attack on the LooksRareAggregator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The LooksRareAggregator project is almost stateless and most of its code is open. Someone may fork it and make a lower fee for the users or even add other incentives. Unlike Uniswap, the aggregator doesn't have a network effect, so it is economicall...

Without strictly verifying the attribution of balance and the size of the balance when refunding, hackers may use the attack to steal all ERC20 tokens！

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When using any ERC20 token to purchase NFT, after the purchase is successful, the 108th line of code in the contract LooksRareAggregator determines whether there are any remaining unused ERC20 tokens. If there is any remaining, it will be returned to the...

Seaport proxy is missing ERC20 approval, so it can't buy any order that is listed using an ERC20

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Seaport proxy is missing ERC20 approval, so it can't buy any order that is listed using an ERC20. Proof of Concept function execute BasicOrder calldata orders, bytes calldata ordersExtraData, bytes calldata extraData, address recipient, bool isAtomic,...

The attacker can steal the ETH of users that wanted to buy an NFT by sandwiching the victim transaction.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The attacker can steal the ETH of users that wanted to buy an NFT by sandwiching the victim transaction. Proof of Concept In non-atomic some of the orders could fail and funds should return and the end of execute function - . But the returnETHIfAny...

ETH amount that is trapped in LooksRareAggregator contract can be withdrawn by user who is not LooksRareAggregator's owner

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When ETH amount is trapped in the LooksRareAggregator contract, such as when someone accidentally sends some ETH to it, the owner of the LooksRareAggregator contract has the privilege to call the rescueETH function to transfer such amount to a proper...

Any user can collect tokens trapped in the aggregator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user can execute a trade on the aggregator to collect trapped tokens. Which should be an action only allowed by the owner. The issue is in how returnERC20TokensIfAny gets the amount to send back by checking the balances of the contract. Proof of...

Contract LooksRareAggregator does not verify the proxy has code when delegatecall() is called on the proxy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Delegatecall will return ‘True’ for the status value if it is called on an address that is not a contract and so has no code. This can cause bugs if code expects delegatecall functions to return False when they have to perform special logic. If, for some...