QA Report

See the markdown file with the details of this report here. --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Unchecked transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The return value of an external transfer/transferFrom call is not checked Proof of Concept you can check Vulnerability in code here: Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps Use SafeERC20, or ensure that the transfer/transferFrom return value is checked...

Medium: Giant pools are prone to user griefing, preventing their holdings from being staked.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description batchRotateLPTokens in GiantMevAndFeesPool allows any user to rotate LP tokens of stakingFundsVaults around. function batchRotateLPTokens address calldata stakingFundsVaults, LPToken calldata oldLPTokens, LPToken calldata newLPTokens, uint256 callda...

Medium: Users receive an incorrect account of their accumulated ETH in GiantMevAndFeesPool.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description GiantMEVAndFeesPool exposes previewAccumulatedETH for users to view how much ETH they have accumulated through the vault: function previewAccumulatedETH address user, address calldata stakingFundsVaults, LPToken calldata lpTokens external view retur...

potential reentrancy risk in _distributeETHRewardsToUserForToken

Lines of code Vulnerability details potential reentrancy risk in distributeETHRewardsToUserForToken Impact Reentrancy risk can potentially be demaging Proof of Concept distributeETHRewardsToUserForToken, which in turn calls bool success, = recipient.callvalue: due"";. As recipient of ETH, the...

batchRotateLPTokens in GiantMevAndFeesPool can be used to steal LPTokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact real LPTokens can be transferred out of GiantMevAndFeesPool through fake stakingFundsVaults provided by an attacker. Proof of Concept batchRotateLPTokens takes in stakingFundsVaults, oldLPTokens, newLPTokens and rotate amounts from old to new tokens. The...

withdrawETHForKnot is vulnerable to reentrancy attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The withdrawETHForKnot is vulnerable to reentrancy because the transfer is done before an important state change. Proof of Concept function withdrawETHForKnotaddress recipient, bytes calldata blsPublicKeyOfKnot external requirerecipient != address0, "Zer...

SLOT owners lose half their value when there is no sETH deposited to the Syndicate.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The Syndicate contract uses total balance as collateral for both sETH accumulatedETHPerFreeFloatingShare and SLOT rewards accumulatedETHPerCollateralizedSlotPerKnot. They are updated in the following function: function updateAccruedETHPerShares publ...

EOAs and system contracts can be blocked from some actions by continuously transferring them zero LP tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LPToken contains the map lastInteractedTimestamp which maps addresses to timestamps and is updated for from and to addresses after a token transfer. Many operations will check the last interaction time of an address and revert if it's too recent to comba...

HIGH: ETH is forever locked in GiantMevAndFeesPool due to unaccepted burn()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description GiantMevAndFeesPools and StakingFundsVault implement beforeTokenTransfer transfer hooks. StakingFundsVault.sol: function beforeTokenTransferaddress from, address to, uint256 external override address syndicate = liquidStakingNetworkManager.syndicate...

ERC20 return values not checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 'token' is a ERC20 from LPToken.sol The ERC20.transfer and ERC20.transferFrom functions return a boolean value indicating success. This parameter needs to be checked for success. Some tokens do not revert if the transfer failed but return false instead...

Upgraded Q -> M from #209 [1668684399391]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 209 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: SINGLE POINT OF FAILURE --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from #164 [1668687728737]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 164 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 01 Lack of check if dust ether transfer is successful --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from #74 [1668688523897]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 74 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Low-7 EXCHANGE & SWAP are able to transfer any user funds to other addresses --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

The function _execute could be called externally

Lines of code Vulnerability details Author: rotcivegaf Impact The execute use a modifier to only can called internally, also specified in the documentation of the function: Must be called internally. But this modifier can be pass if a contract call the execute or bulkExecute and in the returnDust...

Upgraded Q -> M from #446 [1668468223347]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 446 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 There should be an upper limit for LBFactory.flashLoanFee If the admin sets the flashLoanFee too high, the flash loan functionality might be useless as users won't use it. --- The text was updated successfully,...

unconventional reentrant structure can result in reentrance into _returnDust

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact unconventional nonreentrant code structure allows for reentrance from returnDust Proof of Concept Once execute finishes execution, the reentrancy guard is reset to be not in effect, and the flow goes into returnDust. Now caller's receive function can cal...

Upgraded Q -> M from #215 [1668468272191]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 215 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 7. No max fee is set on setFlashLoanFee function There is no max fee set. This allows a malicious owner to set a very high amount of flashloan fee , which allows the malicious admin to grief other users. He can also...

EVERY TIME ONCE _execute FUNCTION COMPLETED NEED TO SET isOpen TO 0. OTHERWISE WE CAN CALL EXECUTE FUNCTIONS MULTIMPLE TIMES.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact IN THIS WAY WE CAN CALL AND EXECUTE FUNCTIONS MULTIPLE TIMES . EVERY TIME BEFORE CALL EXECUTE NEED TO CALL INITIALIZE FUNCTIONS. Proof of Concept function executeInput calldata sell, Input calldata buy public payable reentrancyGuard internalCall...

Upgraded Q -> M from #75 [1668466949988]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 75 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Line 237, beforeTokenTransferaddress0, account, id, amount; should be beforeTokenTransferaccount, address0, id, amount; --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from #381 [1668467789168]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 381 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: There is no limit for FlashLoanFee function setFlashLoanFeeuint256 flashLoanFee external override onlyOwner uint256 oldFlashLoanFee = flashLoanFee; if oldFlashLoanFee == flashLoanFee revert...

Counterparty can cancel subsequent orders within ETH or token transfer callback.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The scenario is when a caller uses bulkExecute to request a sequence of executions on the Exchange. The caller will generally expect that all orders valid prior to calling bulkExecute will be valid during the execution of bulkExecute. However, a...

Upgraded Q -> M from #451 [1668467945427]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 451 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: THRESHOLD LIMIT CHECKS Certain parameters of the contracts can be configured to invalid values, causing a variety of issues and breaking expected interactions between contracts. setFlashLoanFee allows the owner of...

Trader can still execute the order even after cancelling the order

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are no checks to verify whether the order has been cancelled or not in execute function. This will enable traders to place the order even after cancellation Proof of Concept Execute cancelOrder function with Order data Include the Order in input of...

On _returnDust, call opcode's return value not checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The call opcode's return value not checked, which could leads to the originator lose funds. Proof of Concept The caller of Exchange.sol::execute or Exchange.sol::bulkExecute could be a contract who may not implement the fallback or receive function, when...

Upgraded Q -> M from #471 [1668464969039]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 471 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: The whole report --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Pool is not initialized correctly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Pool has no owner and will be un-upgradeable. Proof of Concept Pool does not provide an initialize interface to initialize the owner, so the owner will never be set. Pool as a UUPSUpgradeable can not be upgraded without a valid owner. Tools Used n/a...

Exchange.sol has payable functions but no way of withdrawing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Exchange.sol has payable functions but no way of withdrawing Impact Functions are payable: IExchange.execute Exchange.execute Exchange.bulkExecute Exchange.execute UUPSUpgradeable.upgradeToAndCall But there is no way of withdrawing, so funds can be lost PoC But...

Counterparty-exchange owner may alter policy manager in execution callback, altering the price of subsequent order matching

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the context of bulkExecute, with a sqeuence of executions requested, transferring ETH, ERC721 or ERC1155 may result in a hook/callback to a counterparty on receipt of ETH or one of these tokens. If this counterparty is also the exchange owner, or is...

Upgraded Q -> M from #205 [1668464751854]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 205 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 108 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from #336 [1668467652322]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 336 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1: Volatility accumulator can be be prevented from decaying by way of dust transactions There is no required minimum swap amount for updating the volatility accumulated. The fp.time is always updated during a swap...

Anyone can take the remaining ETH in the Exchange (proxy) contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone can take the remaining ETH in the Exchange proxy contract Proof of Concept Because returnDust just send all ETHs of the Exchange balance to caller, anyone can call bulkExecuteexecutions with 1wei and an empty executions list to drain the contract:...

Exchange owner can consume all orders at arbitrary price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The choice of policy to use for a transaction is determined by the listingTime. The listingTime can be supplied by the caller of execute/bulkExecute and can be arbitrary as along as it passes validation. And the policy of a given order is used to determi...

RETURN STATEMENT OF THE transferFrom FUNCTION ALWAYS RETURN TRUE EVEN THE TRANSFER IS FAILED . IF RETURN TRUE FOR ALL TRANSACTIONS IT WILL CAUSE A PROBLEM AND LOSE OF AMOUNT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When ever we calling transfer from function it will return true even the transfer failed. So as per function we think the transfer is success. But in real that transfer may or may not be failed. We don't get the exact status of the transfer Proof of...

The setupExecution is reentrancy attack vulnerable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The setupExecution can be re-entered by calling bulkExecute inside an execution. Because the global state remainingETH and isInternal are modified reset to 0 and flase after the latter reentrant call, the previous call is affected: 1. all subsequent...

A malicious user can steal all the excess balance on the pool by calling the execute function with higher amount than the selling amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When an order is matched, the Buyer has the option to pay in either ETH, WETH or via the Pool contract. The Exchange smart contract implements a function returnDust which returns the extra ETH to the user, if she overpays. The function is implemented in...

Tokens transfers do not verify that the tokens were successfully transferred

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Some tokens like zrx do not revert the transaction when the transfer/transferfrom fails and return false instead, which requires us to check the return value after calling the transfer/transferfrom function. Even though, the exchange seems to only suppor...

Upgraded Q -> M from #348 [1668468155840]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 348 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L01 Wrong parameter order inside beforeTokenTransfer in LBtoken::burn call should be beforeTokenTransferaccount, address0, id, amount; --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All...

Attacker can spoof remainingETH and double-spend their input ETH to Exchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description remainingETH is an important state variable in Exchange.sol, which keeps track of how many ETH have yet to be used as payment from the current msg.value. The setupExecution modifier sets the value before and after execution: modifier setupExecution...

Recipients Can Steal Remaining ETH from Exchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This vulnerability allows recipients to reenter the Exchange contract, stealing remaining ETH. When a batch of orders are matched using the bulkExecute method a malicious recipient of assets may reenter the bulkExecute method, stealing ETH that would've...

Unintended code path execution by modifying user controlled input

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unintended code path execution by modifying user controlled input. The deal maker gets to pick if buyer or seller matching policy are executed. The actual impact of this vulnerability would depend on the matching policy. Any where from wasted gas to loss...

Upgraded Q -> M from #449 [1668465456097]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 449 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Error when calling beforeTokenTransfer in the LBToken burn function | Low | 1 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Admin can drain user funds from the Pool or buy assets for free

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact We assume that the admin is honest, however there is still possibility of exploiting asset policy contract to and set price to 0 in oder to buy an asset for free - or even worse - drain user funds by setting the price really high in...

Direct theft of buyers ETH funds.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Most severe issue: A Seller or Fee recipient can steal ETH funds from the buyer when he is making a single or bulk execution. Direct theft of funds. Additional impacts that can be caused by these bugs: 1. Seller or Fee recipient can cause next in line...

Upgraded Q -> M from #403 [1668467487185]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 403 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. No upper limit check on flash loan fee No upper limit check on setFlashLoanFee. Although only admin can set this, human error can lead to higher percente swap, leading to excess swap and gas fee. Or admin can rug...

Susceptible to reorg attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When reorg happens, it is possible that the cancelled order by the taker be executed by the maker. Proof of Concept Suppose userA is seller and userB is buyer, seller is maker, and buyer is taker. After some time, userB the buyer cancels the order by...

Exchange's _returnDust() does not validate return value of call() to send excess ETH to sender.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a caller to Exchange's execute or bulkExecute includes more ETH than is required to complete the transactions, returnDust is intended to return this excess back to the caller. However, returnDust does not validate that the call it performs to return...

Signature Malleability in case of using EVM built-in ecrecover()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ecrecover function which is used verify a signature. The built-in EVM precompile ecrecover is susceptible to signature malleability because of non-unique s and v values which could lead to replay attacks. Proof of Concept Tools Used Manual Analysis...

_returnDust does not revert ether transfer failure

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function returnDust the return value of call is not checked for success. If a user had sent excess ether or if an order in a bulk order had failed, and if the call fails ether will remain in the contract. Users who execute orders later will be able to...

Upgraded Q -> M from #407 [1668467735071]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 407 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Incorrect parameters for beforeTokenTransfer hook In LBToken.sol, the beforeTokenTransfer hook has the following parameters: 317: /// @param from The address of the owner of the token 318: /// @param to The address o...