Legitimate token / USD pairs with more than 8 decimals are not handled correctly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The decimals returned by the Chainlink oracles are assumed to be 8 throughout this protocol. However, there are legitimate token / USD pairs that have the corresponding Chainlink oracles to return more than 8 decimals; for example, the AMPL / USD pair's...

Getting collateral value by calling previewRedeem can be manipulated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The code in EscrowLib is trying to calculate the value of a collateral by calling the previewRedeem method of an ERC4626 vault, when the collateral is a token from such a vault. The EIP4626 specification explicitly says The preview methods retu...

Oracle’s price is not checked for staleness

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The code makes use of Chainlink’s latestRoundData method but it does no validations on the input from it. The protocol has handling for price that is negative or zero in the methods that call getLatestAnswer but it is missing a check for...

[NAZ-M2] Lack of Price Freshness Check In Oracle.sol#latestRoundData() Allows A Stale Price To Be Used

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Oracle.sol should use the updatedAt value from the Oracle.sollatestRoundData function to make sure that the latest answer is recent enough to be used. Proof of Concept In the current implementation of Oracle.sollatestRoundData, there is no freshness chec...

call() should be used instead of transfer() on address payable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The use of the deprecated transfer function for an address will inevitably make the transaction fail when: 1. The claimer smart contract does not implement a payable function. 2. The claimer smart contract does implement a payable fallback whic...

Borrower can close non-existent credit line positions to effectively force the overall status to REPAID

Lines of code Vulnerability details The LineOfCredit.close function is used to close a credit line position. Both the lender of a specific credit position and the borrower can call this function. However, the function does not check if the given id belongs to a credit line position in the credits...

When lender consents before borrower in ETH credit token, all the lent funds are permanently lost.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The addCredit function transfers money from lender to a LineOfCredit contract, and opens a credit account. increaseCredit transfers additional funds to an existing credit account contract. Both functions are payable and guarded by mutualConsent, whi...

Unlimited length of LineOfCredit.ids: storage collisions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are no restrictions for ids length So malicious borrower may create many credits and replace storage slot data at some position Proof of Concept 1. LineOfCredit.ids saves array size in slot Oracle data feed is insufficiently validated in Oracle.sol...

LineLib.sendOutTokenOrETH() may not be compatible with contract receiver because of use of transfer()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LineLib.sendOutTokenOrETH may revert when its receiver is a contract, preventing it from receiving ETH, and thus from much of the functionality of the protocol. Proof of Concept LineLib.sendOutTokenOrETH is as follows. / @notice - Send ETH or ERC20 token...

Unlimited length of LineOfCredit.ids: out of gas

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are no restrictions for ids length But there are many loops through ids. So if length will be bigger then some max value, loops may fail because of consuming all gas Proof of Concept Functions LineOfCredit.updateOutstandingDebt and...

Repaying a line of credit with a higher than necessary claimed revenue amount will force the borrower into liquidation

Lines of code Vulnerability details A borrower can repay parts of a credit line with the SpigotedLine.useAndRepay function. This function will use amount of unusedTokenscredit.token as a repayment. However, if amount exceeds the principal and the accrued interest, credit.principal will underflow...

Not checking amount of received ERC20 tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description There are ERC20 tokens, which apply intenal fee on transfers such as USDT, so that amount of received tokens could differ from requested amount. There is a line where contract receives facilityFee as an amount of tokens. The same variable is used on...

useAndRepay function can be used to underflow the principal debt of a credit

Lines of code Vulnerability details The function useAndRepay present in the SpigotedLine contract doesn't check that the amount is within the debt limit and can be used by a malicious lender to underflow the principal variable and manipulate the debt of a credit. Impact A malicious lender can use...

Wrong marketplace address in SeaportProxy.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The marketplace variable in SeaportProxy was initialized in the constructor, however since SeaportProxy will only be used in a delegatecall, such initialization in the constructor will be useless as it...

Arbitrary call order to handle mutual consent can lead to unrecoverable native ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Creating new credits and increasing the credit deposit requires both parties, the lender and the borrower, to agree. This is implemented by having both call the same function with the same call data. However, as it's possible to use native ETH as a credit token...

Users are unable to revoke consents

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Neither lenders nor borrowers can revoke mutualConsents. This can pose an issue if a lender has given consent to lend funds but a borrower has proven untrustworthy either through actions in another credit line or some other public way. A lender should be...

No sanity check on _l1Token can lead into a bad deployment on the bridge

Lines of code Vulnerability details No checks on l1Token can lead into a bad deployment on the bridge Impact deployL2Token calls bridgeInitialize which is only callable one time for token as it uses initializer modifier. There are no checks for 0 address which can be assigned by error as it is a...

No Checks On Withdraw Function For _amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If bridgeburn function is a faulty function or a contract that uses older version of solidity the variable the balance may overflow due to lack of checks. Proof of Concept In the function there should be a check balanceOfmsg.sender=amount to mitigate...

Unsafe Initializations Of Bridge Contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details During the zkSync initialization process, several complicated tasks would be required to execute. Incorrect configurations in some tasks could lead to unexpected vulnerabilities. One task of the zkSync initialization process is deploying a...

Not possible to DiamondCut in frozen status

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact DiamondCut's executeDiamondCutProposal executes the proposed diamondCut calldata in the Diamond is unfrozen condition. However, if there are any possible situations that require restriction implementation in which the upgrade should be executed in a froz...

uint16 type for the facet position and selector position

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In the Diamond library there is uint16 type used for the facet position and selector position in the FacetToSelectors and SelectorToFacet structs. That creates a restriction that the number of facets is limited by 2^16. In case when the number of...

1) THERE IS CONFLICT IN REQUIRE STATMENT. IN finalizeDeposit FUNCTION CHECKS require (msg.sender == l1Bridge, "mq"). IN bridgeMint FUNCTION IMPLEMENTATIONS onlyBridge Modifier CHECKS require(msg.sender == l2Bridge).

Lines of code Vulnerability details 1. Impact Let assume if we calling bridgeMint from finalizeDeposit function the msg.sender is l1bridge . if the msg.sender is not l1bridge can't run the finalizeDeposit but as per bridgeMint the msg.sender should be l2bridge. So it will cause the conflict . the...

L1ERC20Bridge does not have an emergency stop mechanism to pause the bridge in case of any problems found.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Right now, L1ERC20Bridge implements nonReentrant and access control mechanism to improve security. However, there is not any emergency stop mechanism that can be triggered by an authorized account to pause the bridge in case of some problems. It is highl...

Mssing Crucial Checks When Unlocking funds for Withdraw Requests from L2

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Atomicity literally does not exist when users from L2 initiate a withdrawal by burning funds on the contract and sending the message to L1. This is giving malicious attackers plenty of time to stealthily launch a series of small and yet sizable forgery o...

_safeMint should be used to work with smart contract address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Fix safeMint should be used if you are sending the minted token to a Contract that is capable to manage NFTs or not. This is to prevent tokens to be lost. Recommended Mitigation Steps Replace mint with safeMint. Tools Used Manual review --- The text was updated...

No commitment to data passed as input to the init contract during the execution of the diamond cut proposal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description There is a function executeDiamondCutProposal in the DiamondCutFacet contract. It checks that proposal data passed as input to this call is equal to the data that is declared when the creation of this proposal using the following logic: require...

WHEN EVER CALLING bridgeMint OR bridgeBurn FUNCTIONS NEED TO CHECK THE STATUS OF THE TRANSACTIONS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If not checking the status of the bridgeMint and bridgeBurn functions we don't know the the transactions are success or not. If function breaks any of the reasons we don't what happened and what is the status of the transactions. there is no solutions...

Validator can revert block at no cost.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Validator can revert block at no cost. Proof of Concept the validator should only call this function on Executor.sol to revert the unexecuted blocks if the block is not really not executable. /// @notice Reverts unexecuted blocks /// @param newLastBlock...

No Allowlist For Bridgeable ERC-20 Tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details We noticed that the deposit function of the L1ERC20Bridge contract code snippet 1 permits a user to bridge any ERC-20 tokens including deflationary and rebase tokens from the L1 to the L2 network. We considered that permitting non-standard...

Governor ownership can be lost because of not sanity check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Governor ownership can be lost because of no checks Impact Sanity checks are important to not affect reputation / flows and users of the protocol when a mistake is done. 0 address should be checked for important address assignments in this case, only done in th...

ERC20 and ETH might be returned back to the wrong originator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Assume the address of erc20EnabledLooksRareAggregator was maliciously changed to fakeerc20EnabledLooksRareAggregator during an execution of LooksRareAggregator.execute then, the malicious user might for...

Uninitializing Bridge Contracts' State Variables

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The L1ERC20Bridge and L1EthBridge are implementation contracts that would be delegatecalled by their corresponding proxy contracts. In other words, all state variables and assets would be stored in the proxy contracts. In contrast, the...

Potential DoS in unbounded for loop

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The function facets in Getters.sol iterates over the DiamondStorage facets array. In Diamond.sol we can see that by calling diamondCut in a way that saveFacetIfNew gets called, the diamond owner can add an indefinite amount of entries. If this ...

BLOCK_PERIOD is incorrect

Lines of code Vulnerability details The BLOCKPERIOD is set to 13 seconds in Config.sol. uint256 constant BLOCKPERIOD = 13 seconds; Since moving to Proof-of-Stake PoS after the Merge, block times on ethereum are fixed at 12 seconds per block slots. . Impact This results in incorrect calculation of...

L2 deposits might be reverted

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact L1ERC20Bridge and L1EthBridge contracts have claimFailedDeposit function to withdraw funds from the initiated deposit, which failed when finalizing on L2. However, if the caller is allowed in senderCanCallFunction modifier, this function can be used to...

Can't cancel bid when in the reveal period.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Expected: Only allow bid cancellations while not finalized or in the reveal period. Actual: Can't cancel bid when in the reveal period. Recommended Mitigation Steps Change the code in to if a.data.lowestQuote != typeuint128.max || block.timestamp...

SizeSealed.withdraw will revert on mulDivDown if a.data.lowest is the value zero, which can prevent withdraws for an auction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The call to mulDivDown on L377 will revert if the third argument denominador is the value zero. See Solmate implementation. It's possible for a.data.lowestBase to receive the value zero, which will prevent the transfers from L381 and L384. Impa...

Malicious seller can finalize his/her auction without changing data.lowestQuote , then auction's state will not be updated to States.finalized and this seller can repeat finalize or cancel auction to steal tokens from contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerable details In contract, an auction's state will beStates.Finalized if data.lowestQuote of this auction is different from typeuint128.max. L33-34 data.lowestQuote is assigned to equal clearingQuote when seller finalize auction. L238 This value will be...

Bid can be cancelled after being finalized

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The SizeSealed contract's cancelBid function can be called after auction has been finalized, thereby allowing the bidder to withdraw their quoteToken after bid is finalized This is possible by bypassing the if a.data.lowestQuote != typeuint128.max ||...

Arbitrage Opportunity for Non-Sellers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Non-sellers can flood the system with arbitrage auctions. Proof of Concept The seller can wait until 1 instant minute? before the end of the auction. Now the seller places a bid a couple percent above the current market price, enough to cover the seller'...

Seller can stole users assets by create and then cancel the auction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Seller can stole users assets by create and cancel auction Proof of Concept Seller can create an auction, then wait for people to participate in auction bidding, finally the seller cancel the auction and get the users assets. This scenario can happen wit...

Providing the same address for the "base" and the "quote" tokens creates a risk of fund loss for the seller.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The "createAuction" function requires the seller to input the address of a base and a quote token. However, there is no statement that checks whether or not these two provided addresses are the same. As a result, the seller could accidentally fill in an...

Some bidders can withdraw would claim moreof the baseToken when auction CliffPercent value is 1

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If an auction is created with a.timings.cliffPercent set to 1 , then during withdrawal of baseTokens after auction ends, the some bidders to withdraw would claim more tokens than others of the baseToken amounts. Proof of Concept 1. Auction A is created...

Refinalization with theft of funds from other auctions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Description There is a finalize function in the SizeSealed smart contract. The function traverses the array of the bids sorted by price descending. There is a prevention of the refinalization by the modifier atStateidToAuctionauctionId,...

Attacker can steal any funds in the contract by state confusion (no preconditions)

Lines of code Vulnerability details HIGH: Attacker can steal any funds in the contract by state confusion no preconditions LOC: Description Auctions in SIZE can be in one of several states, as checked in the atState modifier: modifier atStateAuction storage a, States state if block.timestamp...

Bidder can abuse the bidIndices[] in finalize()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact finalize could be called by anyone, and the input array bidIndices is not sanity checked. Some malicious bidder can trick the bidIndices to always get the reserveQuotePerBase price. The seller would incur some loss. The other bidders are grieved, wasting...

[PNM-001] finalize with malicious input may allow multiple calls leading to fund draining

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The finalize function of the contract SizeSealed is used to finalize an auction, allowing the auctioner or seller to be paid quote tokens and also eventually allowing successful bidders to withdraw base tokens. Once the finalize function is called,...

baseToken AND quoteToken CAN BE THE SAME ERC20 TOKENS, RESULTING IN TRICKING BIDDERS TO LOSE THEIR TOKENS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact createAuction can be called by anyone to create auctions. One of the input parameter that this function requires is auctionParams. Since the createAuction function doesn't check that baseToken AND quoteToken are same or not, an Adversary can create an...

Use of abi.encodePacked on SizeSealed.computeMessage can cause auctions to never finalize

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The usage of abi.encodePacked on the SizeSealed.computeMessage function might cause an incorrect packing of baseAmount and the random salt for some specific combinations of bid/salt, which will cause SizeSealed.finalize to always revert with...

Low level call returns true if the address doesn’t exist

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact the low-level functions call, delegatecall and staticcall return true as their first return value if the account called is non-existent, as part of the design of the EVM. Account existence must be checked prior to calling if needed. Proof of Concept...