Unclaimed rewards will be stuck unrecoverable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability relies in: unchecked uint256 share = points PRECISION / pool.totalPoints totalReward; uint256 daoShare = share pool.daoTax / 100 DIVISOR; share /= PRECISION; daoShare /= PRECISION; return share - daoShare, daoShare; The problem is that ...

_withdrawLP is not re-setting the lpPosition.points when lpPosition.amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User can withdraw their LP tokens without affecting their lpPosition.points. Since the lpPosition.points could not deducted then and there whenever the LP token is drawn out, user can use the old lpPosition.points and new lpPosition.points value to...

Malicious users can claim BYTES rewards after withdrawing all of their LP stake

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users are able to continue claiming BYTES rewards indefinitely on their initials points after withdrawing all of their LP stake. Proof of Concept A user can withdraw all of their LP staked tokens in multiple steps with an amount 1e16. If the amount is...

Vault staked along with "Hands of the Citadel" does not have any effect but still be locked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function stakeS1Citizen, when the S1 citizen has class Hands of Citadel, it will ignore the vault staked but still transfer the vault into Staking contract. It will effectively lock the vault for timelockDuration but does not have any effect on...

Updating a pool's total points doesn't affect existing stake positions for rewards calculation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking rewards are calculated based on the user's share of total points in the corresponding asset pool, this is the sum of the points associated to the staker's positions divided by the total points from all positions in the pool. We can see this...

LP tokens without 18 decimals are not supported

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the LP token used does not have 18 decimals, staking rewards for LP tokens will be much more or much less than intended. Vulnerability Details In stakeLP and withdrawLP, the formulas for calculating points are as shown: NeoTokyoStaker.solL1155 uint256...

User can call getReward multiple times causing 51% attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Neo Tokyo staking program operates as follows: The staker is a competitive system where stakers compete for a fixed emission rate in each of the S1 Citizen, S2 Citizen, and LP token staking pools. Stakers "may" choose to lock their assets for some...

User Rewards will be lost in case of Withdraw

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User loses his unclaimed rewards If user withdraw all of his staked tokens he won't be able to claim rewards Proof of Concept the point is used to calculate user rewards and when a user withdraw all of its staked tokens the point will be set to zero and...

Ability to receive LP rewards without having any LP staked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The impact of this is high as a user is able to first stake LP tokens, then craftily withdraw them in specific increments without any change to their staking rewards. The user is able to get to a state in which they have 0 LP tokens staked, but have 0 LP...

Wrong accounting of share leading to incorrect amount of BYTES be minted per second

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NeoTokyoStaker, staker is a competitive system where stakers compete for a fixed emission rate in each of the S1 Citizen, S2 Citizen, and LP token staking pools. For each staking pool, there are some reward windows. Each reward window has different...

BYTES can be used to increase points by staking them immediately before withdrawing them

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When staking BYTES, users don't need to lock them for any specific time. BYTES are locked in a Citizen, and they are withdrawn together with the Citizen. Users can stake all the BYTES they own before withdrawing the citizen, increasing their points in th...

Newly staked LP tokens' end time can overwrite previously staked LP tokens' end time

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When the following NeoTokyoStaker.stakeLP function is called for the first time to stake some LP tokens, stakerLPPositionmsg.sender.timelockEndTime = block.timestamp + timelockDuration is executed. Then, calling this function for a second time to stake...

Risk of flashloan attacks in the Staking contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can steal a large amount of rewardsToken from the Staking contract by using flashloans, thus all the users will receive less rewards for their staked amounts. Proof of Concept In the Staking contract any user can stake a given amount of...

Loss of funds when buying tickets with no frontend

Lines of code Vulnerability details When tickets are bought, the protocol allows to specify a frontend that will receive a percentage of the ticket fee as rewards 10% for the current setup. However, if this input is left empty during purchase, frontend rewards will still be counted and associated...

Reentrancy in staking function exit

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The user on calling exit calls the updateReward function twice. Proof of Concept First entry is in function withdraw burn Calling the Hook beforeTokenTransfer Which in turn calls updateReward Second Entry getReward call updateReward directly Tools Used...

Malicious owner can steal funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact if the owner is malicious, he can drain all funds to his wallet Proof of Concept Tools Used manual review Recommended Mitigation Steps 1. Transfer funds to special trusted contract so funds can be locked and safe. 2. amount input value limit so there...

Rewards for the Staking.sol contract may be stolen via the first staker

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The return amount of the function rewardPerToken may be inflated for the first in the Staking.sol contract. Proof of Concept The Staking.sol contract is designed for the LOT token holders to be able to stake their native tokens. Thus, the token holders...

Division before multiplication lead to truncation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Calculation could result in truncation. Proof of Concept Staking.solL60-L64 : function earnedaddress account public view override returns uint256 earned return balanceOfaccount rewardPerToken - userRewardPerTokenPaidaccount / 1e18 + rewardsaccount; above...

Inexistent Prevention of Duplicates

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The CollateralConfig::initialize function which instantiates the contract's state does not prevent duplicate collateral entries from being specified which can occur undetected. If the system is setup with duplicate collateral entries, the Ethos Core...

Early staker can disable staking by issuing and sending a bit to Furance

Lines of code Vulnerability details This one is caused by mitigation to issue M-05 Impact Early issuer can issue less than one wad e.g. 9e17 wei and send it to the Furnace contract, then whenever anyone is trying to issue more RTokens melt would be called, since there’s less than 1 wad in total...