There is no way to recover from error state

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no way to recover from error state Proof of Concept To address report M-3, in PR, The finishFailedMinipoolByMultisig method removed, while this does not block user from withdraw the fund in the error state in the current implementation. I think...

Slashed amount may not be cover the staker reward payout

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Slashed amount may not be cover the staker reward payout Proof of Concept In the current fix, If the staked balance cannot cover the slashed amount, seize the staked balance. Staking staking = StakinggetContractAddress"Staking"; if staking.getGGPStakeown...

StRSR: attacker can steal excess rsr that is returned after seizure

Lines of code Vulnerability details Note: This issue deals with excess rsr that was seized from stRSR but is returned again. The M-12 issue also deals with excess rsr. However M-12 deals with the fact that not all rsr is returned to stRSR, whereas this issue deals with the fact that an attacker c...

amountAvailableForStaking() not fully utilized with compoundedAvaxNodeOpAmt easily forfeited

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The mitigated step is implemented at the expense of economic loss to both the node operators and the liquid stakers if compoundedAvaxNodeOpAmt ggAVAX.amountAvailableForStaking after all due to situations like liquid stakers have been actively calling...

Deficiency of slashed GGP amount should be made up from node operator's AVAX

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If staked GGP doesn't cover slash amount, slashing it all will not be fair to the liquid stakers. Slashing is rare, and that the current 14 day validation cycle which is typically 1/26 of the minimum amount of GGP staked is unlikely to bump into this...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #510 [1675932817801]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 510 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: If the current state is Withdrawable, you can still call createMinipool This will result in: 1:recreateMinipool can be front-run by executing recordStakingEnd to get back the stake first, and then executing...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #214 [1675930440482]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 214 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: cenario 2 - Use node of node operator In this scenario the NodeOp registers for a duration longer then 14 days. The hacker will hijack the minipool after 14 days and earn rewards on behalf of the node operators node...

Vault creator can prevent users from claiming staking rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Vault creator can prevent users from claiming rewards from the staking contract. This can boost his liquidity and lure depositors to stake vault tokens. He can present a high APY and low fee percentage which will incentivize stakers When the staking...

Re-entrancy in MultiRewardStaking.claimRewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If an ERC-777 token is used as reward token for any Staking contract in the system, that reward token can be completely drained from the Staking contract. Proof of Concept Re-entrancy can be done in the MultiRewardStaking.claimRewards function because of...

MinipoolManager: node operator can avoid being slashed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When staking is done, a Rialto multisig calls MinipoolManager.recordStakingEnd . If the avaxTotalRewardAmt has the value zero, the MinipoolManager will slash the node operator's GGP. The issue is that the amount to slash can be greater than the GGP balan...

The owner minipool count is not decreased in the case of a staking error

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a node operator creates a new pool or the recreateMinipool function is called the minipool count of the owner is increased by 1 and when the staking ends the multisig calls the recordStakingEnd function which will decrease the owner minipool count b...

Malicious user can use previously used nodeID to prevent user(s) from withdrawing minipool funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details In createMinipool, an event is emitted with details of a newly created minipool. This includes relevant information that a subsequent user can utilise to create another minipool.The only condition that prevents a minipool from being created again with the same...

Possible to block withdrawal of staked funds after recordStakingEnd or stakingError

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Node operators can lose their staked AVAX after stakingEnd or stakingError. Funds will be locked in the Staking contract, but impossible to withdraw. A bad actor does need to supply 1000 AVAX which he gets back and has not have real incentive to do it, b...

NODE OPERATORS CAN WITHDRAW ALL THEIR GGP COLLATERAL BEFORE VALIDATION PERIOD ENDS THEREBY AVOIDING SLASHING.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 1. Node operators can avoid slashing, thus no penalties. 2. Node operators can withdraw their entire GGP collateral before the validation period is over. Proof of Concept The withdrawGGP function in Staking.sol transfers back to node operator excess GGP...

Upgraded Q -> M from #400 [1670236078897]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 400 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L03 - LiquidStakingManager.dao can rug node operators with executeAsSmartWallet 202: function executeAsSmartWallet 203: address nodeRunner, 204: address to, 205: bytes calldata data, 206: uint256 value 207: external...

Upgraded Q -> M from #205 [1669936745167]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 205 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L01 - No check if EOARepresentative or EOARepresentativeOfNodeRunner is an EOA or a smart contract Impact A smart contract can end up being assigned as a smartWalletRepresentative. Such smart contract might not have...

Upgraded Q -> M from #121 [1669815281189]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 121 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Require - always false contracts/liquid-staking/LiquidStakingManager.sol:280 isNodeRunnerWhitelistednodeRunner comparing to itself requireisNodeRunnerWhitelistednodeRunner != isNodeRunnerWhitelistednodeRunner,...

Users of StakingFundsVault can never redeem their LP token once staking has started

Lines of code Vulnerability details The burnLPToken of a Fees & MEV vault allow users to burn LP tokens in exchange of ETH. Quoting the documentation Every user has a right to leave the LSD network at anytime. A depositor/staker can simply sell their LP tokens to someone else or burn to redeem ET...

HIGH : The Giant pools can be drained by any user.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In GiantSavETHVaultPool.sol, batchDepositETHForStaking is used to deposit held funds to savETHPool vault: function batchDepositETHForStaking address calldata savETHVaults, uint256 calldata ETHTransactionAmounts, bytes calldata blsPublicKeys, uint256...

Medium: Giant pools are prone to user griefing, preventing their holdings from being staked.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description batchRotateLPTokens in GiantMevAndFeesPool allows any user to rotate LP tokens of stakingFundsVaults around. function batchRotateLPTokens address calldata stakingFundsVaults, LPToken calldata oldLPTokens, LPToken calldata newLPTokens, uint256 callda...