Mitigation of M-06: See comments

Mitigation of M-06: See comments Link to Issue: code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings770 Comments Sponsor decided not to mitigate the issue with the following comment: This is as expected I agree that the issue is TOO broad and some of the described scenarios don't make sense at all e.g. the...

verifyWithdrawalCredentialsAndBalance does not verify that oracleBlockNumber is the latest block number.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After participating in Ethereum Staking, you may receive shares based on your balance when it was 32 ETH, even though you may have suffered a certain level of slashing at 32 ETH. Until some conscientious watcher proves the slashing in the Consensus Layer...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #763 [1682682097179]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 763 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: In line 87 there's a check for a pause setting. If staking is currently paused, the operation will fail. Similar to the edge case described above, line 88 verifies that msg.value != 0. The division in the weighted...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #883 [1682591277339]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 883 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: As such, if deposit or withdraw reverts for any derivative, stake and unstake will fail. This could cause stake and unstake to permanently revert for an prolonged period of time, as it is possible for deposit and...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #17 [1681332048307]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 17 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-07 First user that stakes again after a period without stakers receives too many rewards The MuteAmplifier contract pays out rewards on a per second basis. Let's assume there is only 1 staker which is Bob. Say Bob...

An edge case in amplifier allows user to stake after end time, causing reward to be locked in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept Observe that if nobody has staked after the period has ended, it's still possible for a single user to stake even though the period has ended. if firstStakeTime == 0 firstStakeTime = block.timestamp; else requireblock.timestamp if...

MuteAmplifier.rescueTokens() checks the wrong condition for muteToken

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There will be 2 impacts. The reward system would be broken as the rewards can be withdrawn before starting staking. Some rewards would be locked inside the contract forever as it doesn't check totalReclaimed Proof of Concept rescueTokens checks the below...

Award is still distributed when there aren't any stakers, allowing users to get reward without staking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept Consider the update modifier for the amplifier. modifier update if mostRecentValueCalcTime == 0 mostRecentValueCalcTime = firstStakeTime; uint256 totalCurrentStake = totalStake; if totalCurrentStake 0 && mostRecentValueCalcTime endTime uint256...

Reth deposit conditionally relies on unreliable price source.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Deposits are exposed to unnecessary risk by using Uni v3 Weth/Reth Pool as an oracle. It is also possible for staking to be inoperable due to over/underflow. Proof of Concept In the event of !poolCanDepositmsg.value in Reth.sol deposit, this derivative...

poolPrice() is vulnerable to price manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The output of poolPrice, which is used to determine the price of rETH, can be manipulated to become extremely small or large. An attacker abuse this to gain large amounts of SafETH during staking. Vulnerability Details In the Reth contract, poolPrice...

[H-01] RETH oracle manipulation allows attacker to steal funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Asymmetry SafEth protocol aims to help diversify and decentralize liquid staking derivatives, exchanging ether staked in the protocol for staked ether derivative tokens based on some relative weighting. A function exposed by these derivative wrapper...

Swap deadline for Reth derivative cannot be specified and used for staking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When calling the following Reth.deposit function, uint256 amountSwapped = swapExactInputSingleHopWETHADDRESS, rethAddress, 500, msg.value, minOut can be executed. Calling the Reth.swapExactInputSingleHop function below then calls...

Spot UniswapV3 pricing for rETH when staking in SafEth can lead to loss of user funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can craft a set of transactions so that when they are depositing funds in the SafEth contract, using the stake function, they can understate the value of existing deposits preDepositPrice value, while overstating the value of their deposit...

Ether trapped in contract if no derivates exist

Lines of code Vulnerability details Ether can get stuck in staking contract if there are no derivatives Impact If the SafEth contract is deployed and there are no derivatives added to the contract and a user tries to call the stake function, then this could result in a loss of funds for the user...

Reth.poolCanDeposit checks only two out of three conditions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking is blocked. Proof of Concept When staking the deposit of each derivative is called. Reth.deposit deposits in the Rocket Pool directly if possible. To decide if this is possible it uses Reth.poolCanDeposit which returns whether the deposit pool si...

A staker might be still be able to stake after staking is over.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. A staker might be still be able to stake after staking is over. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrate...

Users might lose their stETH rebased reward due to the weights change

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Let's consider the following scenario: Bob deposits 10eth with the weights: stETH: weights0 = 90e18, rETH: weights1 = 5e18. sfrxETH: weights2 = 5e18 Now, since the Lido has 80% of liquid staking market, Asymmetry Finance decides to adjust...

Rewards calculation is unfair and leads to stakers losing rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details User rewards are updated upon staking actions ie stake or withdraw: File: contracts/staking/NeoTokyoStaker.sol 1225: // Grant the caller their total rewards with each staking action. 1226: IByteContractBYTES.getRewardmsg.sender; Which are computed as follows:...

Users cant withdraw S1 or S2 Citizens if no timelockEndTime is associated with it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users cant withdraw S1 or S2 Citizens if no timelockEndTime is associated with it. As the same logic is applied in the withdrawLP function, this is not intended behavior. Currently, there are no allowances for a S1 or S2 Citizen to withdraw their asset i...

ZERO TRUNCATION COULD LEAD TO UNEXPECTED RESULTS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Precision issue leading to zero truncation due to numerator smaller than denominator in a ratio or a division happens readily in Solidity if extra cares have not been given to it. Arithmetic operations running into this incident are typically associated...