[Lines of code](https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry/blob/44b5cd94ebedc187a08884a7f685e950e987261c/contracts/SafEth/derivatives/Reth.sol#L156-L204) # Vulnerability details ## Impact Deposits are exposed to unnecessary risk by using Uni v3 Weth/Reth Pool as an oracle. It is also possible for staking to be inoperable due to over/underflow. ## Proof of Concept In the event of !poolCanDeposit(msg.value) in Reth.sol deposit(), this derivative uses a singular hard-coded pool to retrieve a price from uniswap v3. In the case of a single volatile event in that pool, a user will receive far less SafEth than expected in return. These calculations are also exposed to "non divisible by 0" occurrences due the spot price. ## Recommended Mitigation Steps Get the TWAP Price or use an external oracle like Chainlink. Example TWAP: function consult(address pool, uint32 secondsAgo) external view returns (int24 arithmeticMeanTick, uint128 harmonicMeanLiquidity) { require(secondsAgo != 0, 'BP'); uint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[](2); secondsAgos[0] = secondsAgo; secondsAgos[1] = 0; (int56[] memory tickCumulatives, uint160[] memory secondsPerLiquidityCumulativeX128s) = IUniswapV3Pool(pool).observe(secondsAgos); int56 tickCumulativesDelta = tickCumulatives[1] - tickCumulatives[0]; uint160 secondsPerLiquidityCumulativesDelta = secondsPerLiquidityCumulativeX128s[1] - secondsPerLiquidityCumulativeX128s[0]; arithmeticMeanTick = int24(tickCumulativesDelta / int56(int32(secondsAgo))); // Always round to negative infinity if (tickCumulativesDelta < 0 && (tickCumulativesDelta % int56(int32(secondsAgo)) != 0)) arithmeticMeanTick--; // We are multiplying here instead of shifting to ensure that harmonicMeanLiquidity doesn't overflow uint128 uint192 secondsAgoX160 = uint192(secondsAgo) * type(uint160).max; harmonicMeanLiquidity = uint128(secondsAgoX160 / (uint192(secondsPerLiquidityCumulativesDelta) << 32)); } function getQuoteAtTick( int24 tick, uint128 baseAmount, address baseToken, address quoteToken ) external pure returns (uint256 quoteAmount) { uint160 sqrtRatioX96 = TickMath.getSqrtRatioAtTick(tick); // Calculate quoteAmount with better precision if it doesn't overflow when multiplied by itself if (sqrtRatioX96 <= type(uint128).max) { uint256 ratioX192 = uint256(sqrtRatioX96) * sqrtRatioX96; quoteAmount = baseToken < quoteToken ? FullMath.mulDiv(ratioX192, baseAmount, 1 << 192) : FullMath.mulDiv(1 << 192, baseAmount, ratioX192); } else { uint256 ratioX128 = FullMath.mulDiv(sqrtRatioX96, sqrtRatioX96, 1 << 64); quoteAmount = baseToken < quoteToken ? FullMath.mulDiv(ratioX128, baseAmount, 1 << 128) : FullMath.mulDiv(1 << 128, baseAmount, ratioX128); } } --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions

Reth deposit conditionally relies on unreliable price source.