10190 matches found
Derivative Pool Issue can Lead to Loss User Funds when Unstaking
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In all withdraw functions of derivatives, there is no check for sending zero Ether back to the safEth contract. It is important to note that the addressmsg.sender.callvalue: 0"" function returns true even when transferring a zero value. On the other hand...
deposit function of WstEth not working correctly
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The deposit function doesnt seem to work at all, or correctly at all. Its missing some code, etc. Please see my natspec notes below for more clarity: Apologies, this is 10mins before contest ends, so I'm just going to copy my NatSpec notes here: function...
Division before multiplication truncate minOut and incurs heavy precision loss and result in insufficient slippage protection
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When Calcuting the minOut before doing trade, Division before multiplication truncate minOut and incurs heavy precision loss, then very sub-optimal amount of the trade output can result in loss of fund from user because of the insufficient slippage...
Incorrect parameter in withdraw function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An incorrect parameter is used in the withdraw function in SfrxEth.sol. The amount variable is used when the frxEthBalance variable should be used to calculate minOut. The amount that gets swapped at the FRXETHCRVPOOLADDRESS is the frxEthBalance, not the...
sFrxEth may revert on redeeming non-zero amount
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unstaking is blocked. Proof of Concept When unstaking the withdraw of each derivative is called. SfrxEth.withdraw calls IsFrxEthSFRXETHADDRESS.redeemamount, addressthis, addressthis;. This function may revert if amount is low due to the following line in...
Hardcoded slippage can lead to user's transactions being front run
Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Impact Since all the main function that the user execute implement slippage, attackers can front run any user transaction since the slippage amount is set to 1% on all the lines of code listed above. This can lead to sandwich attacks. Proo...
And all this assembly shall know that the OWNER SafEth not with derivatives: for the derivative is the OWNER'S, and he will rebalanceToWeights it into his EOA.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The owner of SafEth can at any time steal all staked funds. Proof of Concept SafEth.addDerivative allows the owner to add any derivative contract, such as one where he can withdraw all IDerivative.deposit-ed funds. SafEth.adjustWeights allows the owner t...
All the STeth balance of WstEth contract can be drained by a malicious user.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The impact of this finding is severe, as it can result in the complete loss of STeth tokens held by the WstEth contract. This could lead to a significant financial loss for the contract and its users. Proof of Concept For demonstration purpose, Alice is...
Users might lose their stETH rebased reward due to the weights change
Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Let's consider the following scenario: Bob deposits 10eth with the weights: stETH: weights0 = 90e18, rETH: weights1 = 5e18. sfrxETH: weights2 = 5e18 Now, since the Lido has 80% of liquid staking market, Asymmetry Finance decides to adjust...
Reth flashloan attack
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using a flashloan to manipulate rETH/ETH price a hacker can receive more SafEth shares for the same amount of ether, thus draining all three derivative contracts rETH, SfrxEth and WstEth. Proof of Concept Reth.poolPrice depends on UniswapV3 pool.slot0...
MuteBond.sol: price discount can be manipulated which undermines its purpose of reflecting demand
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The bondPrice in the MuteBond contract increases linearly during the epochDuration from startPrice in the beginning to maxPrice in the end. The bondPrice determines how many MUTE tokens a user receives for bonding his LP tokens. The higher the bondPrice...
[H-01] RETH oracle manipulation allows attacker to steal funds
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Asymmetry SafEth protocol aims to help diversify and decentralize liquid staking derivatives, exchanging ether staked in the protocol for staked ether derivative tokens based on some relative weighting. A function exposed by these derivative wrapper...
An attacker can manipulate the preDepositvePrice to steal from other users.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first user that stakes can manipulate the total supply of sfTokens and by doing so create a rounding error for each subsequent user. In the worst case, an attacker can steal all the funds of the next user. Proof of Concept When the first user enters...
First stake inflation attack
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first staker can steal the next staked funds. Proof of Concept As the first one to stake, the attacker stakes minAmount ETH, for which minAmount or slightly less due to slippage SafEth tokens are minted. The attacker immediately unstakes the entire...
Spot UniswapV3 pricing for rETH when staking in SafEth can lead to loss of user funds
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can craft a set of transactions so that when they are depositing funds in the SafEth contract, using the stake function, they can understate the value of existing deposits preDepositPrice value, while overstating the value of their deposit...
Incorrect minOut calculation in SfrxEth.withdraw()
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Final value of mintOut will be lower or higher according to the SFRXETH/FRXETH price ratio. This can result in higher slippage where user can loss funds. Else in other case the slippage will be low and transaction gets reverted unexpectedly Proof of...
Ether Locked when Attempting to Call stake() during Setup
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact During the period between the deployment of the SafEth contract and the addition of derivatives, there is a possibility for users to send Ether to the contract using the stake payable function. In this scenario, the funds will become locked and...
Ether trapped in contract if no derivates exist
Lines of code Vulnerability details Ether can get stuck in staking contract if there are no derivatives Impact If the SafEth contract is deployed and there are no derivatives added to the contract and a user tries to call the stake function, then this could result in a loss of funds for the user...
Upgradeability completely breaks decentralization
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Owner of SafEth can steal all staked funds. Proof of Concept SafEth is an upgradeable ERC20 contract that handles the conversion between ETH and whatever derivatives that are implemented. But it also has access to the staked funds through the derivatives...
SfrxEth slippage and fee stealing
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The SfrxEth derivative contract calculates the maximum slippage for buying SfrxEth from curve pool by using the current price in the pool at runtime, without considering the price at which the user submitted the transaction to the mempool: uint256 minOut...
Potential reentrancy in unstake function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact there is a potential reentrancy vulnerability in the unstake function. After the user's safETH tokens are burned, the function sends ETH to the user's address using the call method. If the receiving address is a contract and it has a fallback function th...
A staker might be still be able to stake after staking is over.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. A staker might be still be able to stake after staking is over. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrate...
Burning rETH at the unstake might revert
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unstaking is blocked. Proof of Concept When unstaking the withdraw of each derivative is called. Reth.withdraw withdraws by calling RocketTokenRETHInterfacerethAddress.burnamount. But RocketTokenRETH.burn reverts if the ETH balance is insufficient for th...
DOS attack to RedeemTo() and GetUnderlyingTokens(), leading to loss of funds.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. An attacker can launch a DOS attack to RedeemTo and GetUnderlyingTokens so that it will always fail for a particular account, say Bob. In this way, Bob will not be able to redeem the MuteToken locked...
Upgraded Q -> 3 from #74 [1679875886032]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 74 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: Exchange Rate can be manipulated if positions are big enough for a long enough time --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #179 [1679871876484]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 179 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-14 Lack of access control in setVault function leave it vulnerable to frontrunning attack --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #99 [1679874011180]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 99 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 02 VaultToken.setVault FUNCTION IS CALLABLE BY ANYONE, AND DEV TEAM'S VaultToken.setVault TRANSACTION CAN BE FRONTRUN BY MALICIOUS ACTOR --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #83 [1679850055838]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 83 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 PauseModifier is not used in KangarooVault --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #60 [1679803335439]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 60 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: LiquidityPool.sol: If the fee recipient is not set then all LP operations such as deposits and withdrawals will fail. Consider making fee transfers optional depending on whether a fee recipient and percentage is set -...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #87 [1679862910687]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 87 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Uninitialized variables --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #229 [1679864317254]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 229 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 VaultToken.setVault can be front-run --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #211 [1679804504433]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 211 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-8 VaultToken setVault initialization can be front-runned --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #215 [1679863603573]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 215 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L1 + L2 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #88 [1679874664641]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-6 Spamming deposit and withdraw queues --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #211 [1679800480796]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 211 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-4 LiquidityPool processWithdraws overwrites returnedAmount for withdrawals processed in multiple steps The returnedAmount field in the QueuedWithdraw struct is incorrectly overwritten when the withdraw is processed...
Upgraded Q -> 3 from #88 [1679874647648]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-2 Invalid and stale prices from Synthethix are not validated --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 3 from #60 [1679803414194]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 60 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: LiquidityPool.sol: The deposit queue processing in processDeposits reads the price of the liquidity token only once at the start of the loop so this means that some queued deposits may not incur price slippage dependi...
Upgraded Q -> 3 from #88 [1679874652791]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-3 KangarooVault.removeCollateral doesn't remove the collateral from the position --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #88 [1679874611177]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1 Vault assignment in VaultToken can be frontrunned --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #39 [1679850456945]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 39 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: N-05 Fees are not being set in the constructor --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #98 [1679803209669]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 98 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: QA-01 PauseModifier is implemented in the KangarooVault.sol contract but isn't used due to not being apart of core functionality --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #215 [1679863647530]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 215 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: NC1 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #83 [1679850012658]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 83 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 There is no way to disapprove a collateral --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #29 [1679672352018]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 29 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: M-02 Division before multiplication incurs unnecessary precision loss 29 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...
Upgraded Q -> 2 from #773 [1679568911031]
Judge has assessed an item in Issue 773 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: LACK OF SLIPPAGE PROTECTIONS FOR EOA IN FUNCTIONS LIKE ReaperVaultERC4626.deposit, ReaperVaultERC4626.mint, ReaperVaultERC4626.withdraw, AND ReaperVaultERC4626.redeem --- The text was updated successfully, but these...
Uneven deduction of performance fee causes some KangarooVault users to lose part of their token value
Lines of code Vulnerability details In KangarooVault.resetTrade, a performanceFee is charged upon closing of all positions, on the premiumCollected. This is inconsistent with getTokenPrice as premiumCollected is factored in the token price computation, while the performanceFee is not. This leads ...
Implementation error in Namespace.fuse() leads to a wrong unicode representation
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The font class of a tile will be always considered as 0 emoji when a user registers a name. Proof of Concept To register a name, fuse is used taking as input the data of the characters. The name to register is a string created by converting the character...
Namespace fuse ignores font class attribute from tile data
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The fuse function present in the Namespace contract mints a new Namespace NFT based on the given character data that references Tray tiles owned by the caller. For each character, the implementation will use the characterToUnicodeBytes function from the...
LiquidityPool.sol#L657 : setFees() could be abused to steal the funds when there is huge transacion is happening.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Set fee functions can be set to any arbitrary value when the transaction is happening. There are more possibility that user could lose most of all of their hard earned funds. Proof of Concept Below functions can be called by autheraised person to fix the...
Unlimited minting of Canto Bio NFT
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no max limit on the number of Bio NFT that can be minted by a user. This allows an attacker to mint himself any amount of Bio NFT he want. Proof of Concept function testMint public string memory bio = "TEST BIO"; vm.prankalice; for uint i = 0; i...