Derivative Pool Issue can Lead to Loss User Funds when Unstaking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In all withdraw functions of derivatives, there is no check for sending zero Ether back to the safEth contract. It is important to note that the addressmsg.sender.callvalue: 0"" function returns true even when transferring a zero value. On the other hand...

Adding a new derivate will splits new user's underlying shares in the new derivate to older users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Impact After a derivate is added to the protocol. Older users will take some new user's share in the new derivate. The addDerivative function add a new derivate to the protocol. The newly added derivate has zero underlying balance. Users w...

poolPrice in Reth.sol can overflow and revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact To determine the value of sqrtPriceX96 that will cause an overflow, we need to analyze the calculation in the function: sqrtPriceX96 uintsqrtPriceX96 1e18 96 2 The maximum value for a uint256 is 2^256 - 1. An overflow occurs when the result of the...

WstEth.withdraw() improper implementation of slippage check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the current implementation of withdraw, the amount is not controlled by minOut. Impact: Users can get rekt. Proof of Concept function withdrawuint256 amount external onlyOwner IWStETHWSTETH.unwrapamount; uint256 stEthBal =...

In stake() function shares increase exponentially for the same amount of deposit as the totalSupply() increases, causing the loss for the initial stakers relative to later ones.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Stake function don not allocate the safEth according to the totalShares, instead as more user deposit, later depositers get higher share of the value as compared to ealy depositers. Proof of Concept Consider Alice, Bob and Jenny want to stake their eth...

dMute.sol: Attacker can push lock items to victim's array such that redemptions are forever blocked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This report deals with how an attacker can abuse the fact that he can lock MUTE tokens for any other user and thereby push items to the array of UserLockInfo structs of the user. There are two functions in the dMute contract that iterate over all items i...

Upgradeability completely breaks decentralization

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Owner of SafEth can steal all staked funds. Proof of Concept SafEth is an upgradeable ERC20 contract that handles the conversion between ETH and whatever derivatives that are implemented. But it also has access to the staked funds through the derivatives...

Reth deposit conditionally relies on unreliable price source.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Deposits are exposed to unnecessary risk by using Uni v3 Weth/Reth Pool as an oracle. It is also possible for staking to be inoperable due to over/underflow. Proof of Concept In the event of !poolCanDepositmsg.value in Reth.sol deposit, this derivative...

Reth.poolCanDeposit checks only two out of three conditions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking is blocked. Proof of Concept When staking the deposit of each derivative is called. Reth.deposit deposits in the Rocket Pool directly if possible. To decide if this is possible it uses Reth.poolCanDeposit which returns whether the deposit pool si...

MuteBond.sol: deposit function reverts if remaining payout is very small due to >0 check in dMute.LockTo function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact I will show in this report how the MuteBond.deposit function can experience a temporary DOS. The attacker or just any other user by mistake or by not knowing about it can receive a payout from the deposit function that puts the payoutTotal of the current...

Users might lose their stETH rebased reward due to the weights change

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Let's consider the following scenario: Bob deposits 10eth with the weights: stETH: weights0 = 90e18, rETH: weights1 = 5e18. sfrxETH: weights2 = 5e18 Now, since the Lido has 80% of liquid staking market, Asymmetry Finance decides to adjust...

Reth flashloan attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using a flashloan to manipulate rETH/ETH price a hacker can receive more SafEth shares for the same amount of ether, thus draining all three derivative contracts rETH, SfrxEth and WstEth. Proof of Concept Reth.poolPrice depends on UniswapV3 pool.slot0...

the depositor can get sanwich attack when call stake in SafEth and deposit in RETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. users who stake eth from call function stake in will get sandwich attack, which users will lose money Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or an...

Division before multiplication truncate minOut and incurs heavy precision loss and result in insufficient slippage protection

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When Calcuting the minOut before doing trade, Division before multiplication truncate minOut and incurs heavy precision loss, then very sub-optimal amount of the trade output can result in loss of fund from user because of the insufficient slippage...

deposit function of WstEth not working correctly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The deposit function doesnt seem to work at all, or correctly at all. Its missing some code, etc. Please see my natspec notes below for more clarity: Apologies, this is 10mins before contest ends, so I'm just going to copy my NatSpec notes here: function...

Burning rETH at the unstake might revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unstaking is blocked. Proof of Concept When unstaking the withdraw of each derivative is called. Reth.withdraw withdraws by calling RocketTokenRETHInterfacerethAddress.burnamount. But RocketTokenRETH.burn reverts if the ETH balance is insufficient for th...

Spot UniswapV3 pricing for rETH when staking in SafEth can lead to loss of user funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can craft a set of transactions so that when they are depositing funds in the SafEth contract, using the stake function, they can understate the value of existing deposits preDepositPrice value, while overstating the value of their deposit...

Reth griefing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The maximum slippage when buying rETH from the Uniswap V3 pool is calculated in Reth derivative contract by taking the current price in the Uniswap V3 pool at runtime, without taking into account the price at which the user sent the transaction to the...

Swap deadline for Reth derivative cannot be specified and used for staking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When calling the following Reth.deposit function, uint256 amountSwapped = swapExactInputSingleHopWETHADDRESS, rethAddress, 500, msg.value, minOut can be executed. Calling the Reth.swapExactInputSingleHop function below then calls...

First stake inflation attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first staker can steal the next staked funds. Proof of Concept As the first one to stake, the attacker stakes minAmount ETH, for which minAmount or slightly less due to slippage SafEth tokens are minted. The attacker immediately unstakes the entire...

REth token price can be manipulated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Currently, all deposit operations split the received ETH between derivatives. One of them is rETH, trading on Pool 0xa4e0faA58465A2D369aa21B3e42d43374c6F9613 with around 1500 ETH in liquidity for each side. The price calculation for splitting deposits in...

Potential reentrancy in unstake function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact there is a potential reentrancy vulnerability in the unstake function. After the user's safETH tokens are burned, the function sends ETH to the user's address using the call method. If the receiving address is a contract and it has a fallback function th...

Hardcoded poolFee in deposit() Function Cause Liquidity Depth Issue for Swap

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In deposit function we are using the hardcoded value of poolFee as 500 which limits the ability of liquidity providers to select the appropriate fee tier, potentially reducing the returns for liquidity providers. IWETHWETHADDRESS.depositvalue: msg.value;...

DOS attack to RedeemTo() and GetUnderlyingTokens(), leading to loss of funds.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. An attacker can launch a DOS attack to RedeemTo and GetUnderlyingTokens so that it will always fail for a particular account, say Bob. In this way, Bob will not be able to redeem the MuteToken locked...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #74 [1679875886032]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 74 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: Exchange Rate can be manipulated if positions are big enough for a long enough time --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #60 [1679803335439]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 60 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: LiquidityPool.sol: If the fee recipient is not set then all LP operations such as deposits and withdrawals will fail. Consider making fee transfers optional depending on whether a fee recipient and percentage is set -...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #83 [1679850055838]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 83 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 PauseModifier is not used in KangarooVault --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #211 [1679804504433]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 211 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-8 VaultToken setVault initialization can be front-runned --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #179 [1679871876484]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 179 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-14 Lack of access control in setVault function leave it vulnerable to frontrunning attack --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #215 [1679863647530]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 215 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: NC1 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #88 [1679874652791]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-3 KangarooVault.removeCollateral doesn't remove the collateral from the position --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #88 [1679874647648]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-2 Invalid and stale prices from Synthethix are not validated --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #83 [1679850012658]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 83 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 There is no way to disapprove a collateral --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #39 [1679850456945]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 39 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: N-05 Fees are not being set in the constructor --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #99 [1679874011180]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 99 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 02 VaultToken.setVault FUNCTION IS CALLABLE BY ANYONE, AND DEV TEAM'S VaultToken.setVault TRANSACTION CAN BE FRONTRUN BY MALICIOUS ACTOR --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #87 [1679862910687]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 87 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Uninitialized variables --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #60 [1679803414194]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 60 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: LiquidityPool.sol: The deposit queue processing in processDeposits reads the price of the liquidity token only once at the start of the loop so this means that some queued deposits may not incur price slippage dependi...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #229 [1679864317254]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 229 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 VaultToken.setVault can be front-run --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #211 [1679800480796]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 211 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-4 LiquidityPool processWithdraws overwrites returnedAmount for withdrawals processed in multiple steps The returnedAmount field in the QueuedWithdraw struct is incorrectly overwritten when the withdraw is processed...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #98 [1679803209669]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 98 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: QA-01 PauseModifier is implemented in the KangarooVault.sol contract but isn't used due to not being apart of core functionality --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #88 [1679874611177]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1 Vault assignment in VaultToken can be frontrunned --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #215 [1679863603573]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 215 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L1 + L2 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #88 [1679874664641]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 88 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-6 Spamming deposit and withdraw queues --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #29 [1679672352018]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 29 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: M-02 Division before multiplication incurs unnecessary precision loss 29 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #773 [1679568911031]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 773 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: LACK OF SLIPPAGE PROTECTIONS FOR EOA IN FUNCTIONS LIKE ReaperVaultERC4626.deposit, ReaperVaultERC4626.mint, ReaperVaultERC4626.withdraw, AND ReaperVaultERC4626.redeem --- The text was updated successfully, but these...

Unprotected setVault function can be frontrun to set the attacker controlled vault address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unprotected setVault function from VaultToken.sol can be frontrun to set the attacker controlled vault address. Once attacker controlled vault address is set as a vault, attacker can mint large amount of tokens for himself and also able to burn other use...

Users will be able to purchase fewer NFTs than the project had anticipated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Users will be able to purchase fewer NFTs than the project had anticipated. The project had expected that users would be able to purchase a range of variations using both text and emoji characters...

SVG script injection in Bio.tokenURI

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Bio.tokenURI function returns an encoded SVG that is supposed to be parsed by a browser or another tool. A hacker can inject a malicious script in the SVG element by minting Bio NFT with a bio with a javascript .... Depending on how this SVG element is...

Missing totalFunds update in LiquidityPool's OpenShort(), causing LiquidityPool token holder to lose a portion of their token value

Lines of code Vulnerability details The function openShort in LiquidityPool.sol is missing an update to totalFunds, to increase LiquidityPool funds by the collected net fees. Impact As a result of the missing increment to totalFunds, the availableFunds in the LiquidityPool will be lower. This wil...

Potential lose of Vault control

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If by any means this function is not called first by the creators anyone can be the one to define it forever since there is no verification, after that the attacker will have complete control over the mint and burn functions. Proof of Concept function...