Tray Owner Will Not be Able to Burn any Tray

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 1. There are two issues here, the check namespaceNFT != msg.sender && trayOwner != msg.sender && getApprovedid != msg.sender && !isApprovedForAlltrayOwner, msg.sender will only revert CallerNotAllowedToBurn if all of the conditions are true which is very...

Missing totalFunds update in LiquidityPool's OpenShort(), causing LiquidityPool token holder to lose a portion of their token value

Lines of code Vulnerability details The function openShort in LiquidityPool.sol is missing an update to totalFunds, to increase LiquidityPool funds by the collected net fees. Impact As a result of the missing increment to totalFunds, the availableFunds in the LiquidityPool will be lower. This wil...

Need to check with quantity also in _beforeTokenTransfers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Tray.sol, we can see tokenId checking in beforTokenTransfers. In the current code, it assumes that quantity is 1. But we need to take care with bunch transfer. Proof of Concept function beforeTokenTransfers address, / from/ address to, uint256...

The KangarooVault liquidity providers receive a wrong vault token amount because an error in the processDepositQueue() function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The KangarooVault.sol::processDepositQueue function helps to process the queued deposits. The deposits are queued if the KangarooVault vault doesn't have registered positions. The processDepositQueue function calls the getTokenPrice function to be able t...

Registering non-emoji domains doesn't work

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When registering a name containing a non-emoji tile, all the tiles are mapped to emoji tiles before registering a name, so the registered name is invalid. This ruins the protocol, the users can't use it to register the desired names unless they are purel...

A user can override a namespace created by another user, using the same name

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Let's say: Julian, and Juliet minted separate trays of characters in the Tray contract Julian approves Alice to mint a Namespace subprotocol NFT with the name Ali😀 Juliet also approves Alite to mint a Namespace subprotocol NFT with the name Ali😀 If a...

Namespace: Fusing will only result in namespaces containing font class 0, irrelevant of fused tiles

Lines of code Vulnerability details H-02 Namespace: Fusing will only result in namespaces containing font class 0, irrelevant of fused tiles After minting trays, a user can fuse tiles from multiple trays into a namespace. A tray tile specifies a character font class, the character's index and the...

Attacker can artificially inflate the token price and and gets more profit

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Attacker can cause the artificial inflation in token price and gets more profit Proof of Concept Let assume the inital values totalFunds = 10000000000 , VAULTTOKEN.totalSupply = 100000000000 , totalQueuedWithdrawals= 1000000 function initiateDepositaddre...

Potential front-running attacks in buy function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The buy function generates new trays and stores them in the tiles mapping based on the value of lastHash. Since the value of lastHash is publicly accessible and can be predicted, an attacker could potentially front-run other users to mint specific trays...

Multiple Mint of PFP with same NFTID

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Malicious user having only one NFT can mint PFP severally. Hence one user with only one NFT but multiple PFP. This isn't the intended implementation. Proof of Concept Is self-understandable. POC not required Recommended Mitigation Steps storing used NFT'...

sybil attack vulnerability (via Shitcoin)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Attacker can create worthless shitcoin/NFT to mint PFP and as much as possible. Thereby acquiring outrageous and undeserved amount of PFP . Hence attacker is well positioned for further sybil attack/ farming. This is unhealthy to the contract and its...

Namespace fuse ignores font class attribute from tile data

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The fuse function present in the Namespace contract mints a new Namespace NFT based on the given character data that references Tray tiles owned by the caller. For each character, the implementation will use the characterToUnicodeBytes function from the...

Underflow if enough amount is sent to the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function withdraw function withdrawaddress l1Receiver external payable override uint256 amount = msg.value; // Silent burning of the ether unchecked balanceaddressthis -= amount; totalSupply -= amount; they are using unchecked to decrease balances. Th...

Incorrect calculation of gasToPay due to dividing before multiplying, rounding error.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Solidity, it is an error to divide before multiplying because of lots of rounding errors that can come from that. In this case: uint256 pubdataLen; unchecked pubdataLen = message.length + 31 / 32 32 + 64; uint256 gasToPay = pubdataLen...

Malicious or hacked admin can steal all ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In L2EthToken.sol we have transferFromTo It is possible malicious or hacked admin to steal the ETH. Proof of Concept As can be seen from the code snippet below, nothing can stop malicious or hacked admin to steal all ETH. He can use address from and send...

A user can mint a PFP NFT multiple times using the same _nftId

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A user might unintentionally "intentionally" try to take advantage of the mint function in ProfilePicture.sol Proof of Concept The pfp mapping stores the pfp data per NFT, L31-32 of Profilepicture.sol /// @notice Stores the pfp data per NFT mappinguint25...

No check for checking the "to" address to not be zero address in _execute() function of DefaultAccount.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The "to" address can be zero address while converting from uint256 to uint160. Proof of Concept // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0 pragma solidity ^0.8.0; contract Test uint256 public to = 2160; function check external view assertaddressuint160to ==...

Here are some potential security vulnerabilities that I have identified in this particular contract (BytecodeCompressor.sol)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 1. Integer overflow: In the publishCompressedBytecode function, the check dictionary.length = 2 16 8 is intended to ensure that the dictionary does not become too large, but it is not sufficient to prevent an integer overflow. If dictionary.length exceed...

Default accounts cannot pay transaction fees due to DefaultAccount not calling MsgValueSimulator

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Default accounts cannot pay the transaction fees to the bootloader. It's not clear whether the attempts to do so will silently succeed or revert because the behaviour of the CALL opcode in the zkSync Era virtual machine isn't explained in the description...

Anyone can steal funds in the Contract Deployer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If ContractDeployer.sol ever holds funds, it could potentially be drained via the chained creation of new contracts. Proof of Concept When creating a contract the create/create2 functions will be called inside the contract deployer here: , which after...

The "totalRequiredBalance()" function in the TransactionHelper.sol library can compute address(uint160(_transaction.paymaster) as zero address even when _transaction.paymaster is non-zero

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A user may provide a non-zero entry for the "transaction.paymaster" field for a transaction to ensure they do not have to pay the gas fees. However, certain values of "transaction.paymaster" = 2^160 can result in addressuint160transaction.paymaster to be...

EVM Elliptic Curve Recovery Discrepancy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Ecrecover.yul file meant to simulate the ecrecover mechanism as executed by traditional ETH 1.0 consensus mechanisms is incorrect. In detail, it does not conform to the "Homestead" update which introduced an upper-bound check for s values of an r, s,...

NonceHolder.setValueUnderNonce lack of validation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact NonceHolder.setValueUnderNonce can set the nonce value for key has already being used. Proof of Concept Quoting to the document NonceHolder part: It provides a function validateNonceUsage which the bootloader uses to check whether the nonce has been used...

L2EthToken.withdraw can be underflow with little cost

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact calculating balanceaddressthis within unchecked will cause underflow. Say if balanceaddressthis == 1 and msg.value == 2, after calling withdraw, balanceaddressthis will be typeuint256.max Proof of Concept function underFlowuint a, uint b public pure...

My Findings

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact 1. Integer overflow: In the publishCompressedBytecode function, the check dictionary.length = 2 16 8 is intended to ensure that the dictionary does not become too large, but it is not sufficient to prevent an integer overflow. If dictionary.length exceed...

Loss of funds when msg.value > 2**128

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a user try to transfer an amount of ether 2128 an invariant is broken where instead of reverting the transaction the affected code just return. Proof of Concept The following is the affected code where it returns instead of reverting. if value != 0...

Unsafe cast

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In AccountCodeStorage.sol we have function getCodeHash and getCodeSize Due to an insecure cast, it is possible to get an integer overflow. Solidity version 0.8.0 provide SafeMath, but casting operations are not safe and can overflow. Proof of Concept As...

[Medium - 2] A force deployed contract may be stuck in the constructor forever

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The forceDeployOnAddress function in the ContractDeployer contract may be used to redeploy contracts at a specified address. Very useful in the case of precompiles or system contracts upgrades for instance. In the deployment parameters, multiple values c...

Incorrect argument passed to "Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes" in "Namespace.fuse"

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function Namespace.fuse uses Utils.characterToUnicodeBytes to get the unicode bytevalue for a given Tile. The first argument of characterToUnicodeBytes is an uint8 value representing the font class. Instead of passing the font class in the tile data,...

Contracts are susceptible for Head Overflow Bug in Calldata

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ABI-encoding a tuple with a statically-sized calldata array in the last component would corrupt 32 leading bytes of its first dynamically encoded component. Proof of Concept The functions are taking input arguments as calldata. Following contracts are...

Unsafe system contract verification

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact On the following function: function isSystemContractaddress address internal pure returns bool return uint160address = uint160MAXSYSTEMCONTRACTADDRESS; it does check whether an address is a system contract by checking whether it is smaller than...

DefaultAccount will add system call flag to any call with msg.value

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As mentioned in the repo's README.md documentation: isSystem flag. Whether the call intends a system contracts' function. While most of the system contracts' functions are relatively harmless, accessing some with calldata only may break the invariants of...

L2EthToken.sol balance[address(this)] COULD UNDERFLOW

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ethereum balance of the L2EthToken.sol contract can underflow thus breaking the accounting of the protocol for L2-L1 fund transfers. Proof of Concept L2EthToken.sol contract has the withdraw function to transfer funds to L1 for withdrawal. In the...

NonceHolder.setValueUnderNonce does not increase the minNonce when using sequential account nonce ordering

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current available nonce can't be synchronized to the client and rpc resp in real time. As a result, the client can't use the correct nonce to signature transaction. Proof of Concept If the nonceOrdering type of the account is...

Wrong Implementation of EIP-712

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The EIP-712 uses several parameters. Those parameters are exactly: EIP712Domain string name; string version; uint256 chainId; address verifyingContract; As you can see on the following Domain, ZkSync, is missing one parameter: bytes32 constant...

Users pay excessive gas cost for sending bytecode hashes to L1

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When deploying new contracts, users are forced to pay more gas than is required to publish the bytecode hash to the L1. Proof of Concept When users deploy new smart contracts, the protocol marks the hashes of the bytecodes of the contracts as known and...

deploying contracts with forceDeployOnAddress will break contracts when callConstructor is false

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact when function forceDeployOnAddress used for deploying contract and callConstructor is false, then contract's bytecodehash would stay in constructing state and calling the contract won't be possible. it can cause protocol and other contracts that are usin...

bootloader doesn't add tighter gas limit to the IAccount.validateTransaction call

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As mentioned in the competition details: Important, while the bootloader is out of scope, we may reward an additional bounty for valid bugs found in it by our judgement! As mentioned in the dev document, , there are some limitations of the verification a...

ProfilePictureData is not stored, which will cause serious logic errors

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact All data minted by the contract will not be stored, paralyzing the entire contract Proof of Concept code snippet： function mintaddress nftContract, uint256 nftID external uint256 tokenId = ++numMinted; if ERC721nftContract.ownerOfnftID != msg.sender reve...

[bootloader] A bytecode hash without the bytecode (preimage) can be marked as known, breaking the prover

Lines of code Vulnerability details This is a report of a finding in bootloader.yul. While the file is out of scope of the contest, the sponsor stated that they would still accept findings in the file and would judge them separately from the contest. Impact A bytecode hash for which the bytecode...

[Medium - 1] Ecrecover precompile doesn't behave the same as the one from Ethereum

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact According to the Ethereum yellow paper and in the specifications of the ecrecover precompile, it is stated that if the ecrecover doesn't return anything denoted by ∅, then the return should be 0 as well. If we take a look at the current ecrecover...

function _nonSystemDeployOnAddress() should try another nonces when getNewAddressCreate() result is in kernel space otherwise some logics would be broken

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function createAccount Deploys a contract account with similar address derivation rules to the EVM's CREATE opcode. the deployed contract address is calculated based on sender deployed nonce. code uses nonSystemDeployOnAddress to deploy the contract to n...

Unchecked msg.value will lead to losing funs inside the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While paying for the transaction, function payForTransaction bytes32, // txHash bytes32, // suggestedSignedHash Transaction calldata transaction external payable ignoreNonBootloader ignoreInDelegateCall //@audit-issue no checks that actulayy there is...

NonceHolder.setValueUnderNonce does not check if the nonce has been used before

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Already used nonces or the nonces less than the specified minimal nonce can be used by the NonceHolder.setValueUnderNonce function. It can lead to some unique conflicts and even replay attacks on some of dapps which are based on the values under nonces...

Unsafe safeTransfer function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The safeTransfer function of the SafeERC20.sol contract check that the target is actually a contract before calling it, this is to avoid calls to address with no code that will always return succes = true. For exemple if you use token.safeTransfer and...

Gas check inaccuracy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the gas forwarded will be limited to 63/64 of the total gasleft, L1 transactions will be vulnerable of being reverted. To achieve 1:1 partity with the EVM, the ZKEVM should account for 1/64 rule. Please refer to the 1/64 rule here. The actual amoun...

Incorrect usage of EIP-150

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps --- The...

User may lose ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User may lose ETH Proof of Concept If a non-existent function is called , the protocol may enter MsgValueSimulator.fallback.Inside the fallback function ,the protocol will transfer ETH from one address to another. If user calls a function that doesn't...

The call to MsgValueSimulator with non zero msg.value will call to sender itself which will bypass the onlySelf check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact First, I need to clarify, there may be more serious ways to exploit this issue. Due to the lack of time and documents, I cannot complete further exploit. The current exploit has only achieved the impact in the title. I will expand the possibility of...

User transactions can call system contracts directly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User transaction can call system contracts directly, which shouldn't be allowed to not invoke potentially dangerous operations. Proof of Concept The DefaultAccount.executeTransaction executes a user transaction after it was validated. The function calls...