Users who call expressReceiveTokenWithData or expressReceiveToken can griefed to pay for fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A user or service who calls expressReceiveTokenWithData or expressReceiveToken generally waits for an event associated with either callContractWithInterchainToken or sendToken to be emitted on a second chain. When they see this event, they will call...

MID-Risk Vulnerabilities in the Axelar Smart Contracts

Lines of code s://github.com/code-423n4/2023-07-axelar/tree/main/contracts/cgp/governance/AxelarServiceGovernance.solL73 Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerabilities that I have identified could have a significant impact on the Axelar network. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by an...

Using controlled delegatecall could in calling _deployTokenManager.tokenManagerDeploy()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The use of delegatecall in this context poses a security risk. When using delegatecall, the called contract's code is executed within the context of the calling contract. This means that the deployTokenManager function is executed as if it is part of the...

The is no way for native tokens to get sent to InterchainProposalExecutor

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Proposals that require value cannot be executed as native tokens on the other side of the bridge cannot be provided. Proof of Concept Proposals have a value parameter, which allows users to specify what amount of native tokens should be passed when calli...

balance of the recipient to is updated after the token transfer (safeTransferFrom function) could lead to reentrancy attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The balance of the recipient to is updated after the token transfer safeTransferFrom function. If the safeTransferFrom function triggers an external contract, and that contract, in turn, calls back to this contract, it can result in a reentrancy attack...

Voter/caller's eth will be stuck in contracts if the proposal fails to pass

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Voters of AxelarServiceGovernance.sol:executeMultisigProposal or callers of Multisig.sol:execute will have their eth stuck in the contract if they can't make the proposal/call pass the vote count checks in onlySigners. Proof of Concept...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #392 [1689707598962]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 392 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 4 - The liquidator can be frontrunned while is depositing prizeTokens to the prizePool The liquidator should introduce prizeTokens to the prizePool before he calls the Vault.liquidate function. The problem is that a...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #422 [1689707351452]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 422 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 01 In the function PrizePool.setDrawManager, anyone can frontrun it and become the drawManager Reading the documentation of the Prize Pool contract, the following is specified: The Prize Pool allows a 'draw manager'...

M-07 Unmitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details The fix addresses the scenarios when collaterals are removed between the crafting of the minAmountsOut list and the submission of the transaction. Then, we will have amounts.length minAmountOuts.length, meaning that the following line causes a revert: if...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #93 [1689707967381]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 93 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 - no check on the deployedVaults mapping in the VaultFactory can lead to duplicate vaults being created Mitigation - add an if check to not recreate the same vault: ifdeployedVaultsvault revert.... --- The text w...

Attacker can brick redemptions by donating a small amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While the fix properly fixes the issue of collateralization ratio overflows that can no longer occurs, it enables DoS attacks on the redemption mechanism: Issue description Consider the example that was already provided code-423n4/2023-06-angle-findings9...

M-04 Unmitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details While the fix improves the APR estimation for the case that is described in the finding, it significantly worsens it for other scenarios which may happen in practice when we assume underlying staking protocols with relatively constant APRs. For instance, consid...

Guardian can brick SavingsVest contract accidentally

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The fix to M-06 introduces a new vulnerability, as it turns a missing validation that previously was recoverable i.e., only a minor thing into an irrecoverable error, resulting in a permanent loss of funds. Proof of Concept Consider the scenario where th...

The _currentExchangeRate of the Vault contract can't increase, and always be lower than or equal to _assetUnit

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The currentExchangeRate of the Vault contract can not increase, and always be lower than or equal to assetUnit. Therefore, when the vault is undercollateralized currentExchangeRate assetUnit, it can't be further collateralized. Proof of concept function...

LSP8CompatibleERC721's approve() deviates from ERC-721 specification

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description The LSP8CompatibleERC721 contract is a wrapper around LSP8 that is meant to function similarly to ERC-721 tokens. One of its implemented functions is ERC-721's approve: LSP8CompatibleERC721.solL155-L158 function approveaddress operator, uint256...

_totalWithdrawn VALUE DOES NOT INCLUDE THE _fee AMOUNT THUS INTRODUCING ACCOUNTING ERROR

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the PrizePool.ClaimPrize function is used to claim the rewards of the verified winner. Here when sending the Prize amount to the winner a fee amount is deducted from it as shown below: uint256 amount = tierLiquidity.prizeSize - fee; And this amount is...

mintYieldFee function does not check for the maxMint amount.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Theoretically, it is possible to mint more than the maxMint amount using the mintYieldFee function in the Vault contract. Proof of Concept The functions in Vault contract like mint, mintWithPermit call the beforeMint function which checks whether shares...

Potential Reversion in Transfer due to LSP1 Interface Support Check

Lines of code Vulnerability details SORRY I HAVFE PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED THIS ISSUE WITHOUT THE FIX... FIRST TIME WARDEN FORGIVE ME Impact The transfer function in LSP7DigitalAssetCore & LSP8DigitalAssetCore includes a mandatory hook, notifyTokenSender, which verifies if the sender supports...

Possible centralization issue in PrizePool.closeDraw

Lines of code Vulnerability details The winning random number is chosen by DrawManager, which will lead to centralization risk. Despite haventt really deep dive in codebase of this issue, but if DrawManager ,can somehow calculate which random number can make their controlled address is winner wit...

Allowed calls in LSP6KeyManager doesn't allow calls with empty calldata

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description Whenever a controller attempts to call a LSP0 account's execute function without the relevant SUPER permissions, LSP6ExecuteModule will check that the call is one of the whitelisted allowed calls. If the controller is trying to perform a call wi...

Using supportsERC165InterfaceUnchecked() might break LSP functionality for certain contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description Throughout the codebase, the protocol uses the supportsERC165InterfaceUnchecked function from Openzeppelin's ERC165Checker.sol to check for the support of ERC-165 interface IDs. However, supportsERC165InterfaceUnchecked only checks if the call t...

Pending owner can be the wrong recipient of ownership

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can call the acceptOwnership function with their address as the pending owner before the legitimate pending owner has a chance to call the function Proof of Concept The transferOwnership function allows the current owner to set a pending owne...

possible revert due to improper subtraction in _extendableMsgData() of LSP17Extension.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact in extendableMsgData of LSP17Extension.sol there is an arithmetic calculation msg.data:msg.data.length - 52; msg.data.length may be smaller than 52 in some instances. this can cause reverts in solidity Proof of Concept function extendableMsgData internal...

Avoid using the same ERC-165 interface ID for URDs and their callers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description Contracts that implement the LSP-1 standard include INTERFACEIDLSP1 in their supportsInterface function. This means that they have a universalReceiver function that calls a Universal Receiver Delegate URD, such as LSP1UniversalReceiverDelegateUP...

_deployCreate()/_deployCreate2() will not work on ZKSync Era

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In the contest's Scoping Details, the sponsor states that Universal Profiles might eventually be deployed across multiple chains: Is it multi-chain? LUKSO itself is not a multi-chain. The lsp-smart-contracts are initially intended to be used on...

Malicious Yield Vault could deny Pool Together withdrawing assets

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since vaults can be created by anyone as long as they provide an ERC-4626 compliant yield source, an attacker could set up a malicious ERC-4626 contract and set that as the yield source for a newly created Vault. The attacker could then have the maliciou...

Incorrect Interface ID for LSP0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The interface ID stated for LSP0 in LSP0Constants.sol and LIP-0 is 0x3e89ad98, which will affect related logics. Proof of Concept According to LIP-0, this ID is derived from the XOR of the following: selector of batchCalls IDs of the following standards:...

Sponsor function allows voiding some elses chance to win

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone can delegate someone elses balance to the sponsorship address, increasing their own likelihood of winning, while voiding the victims chance. Proof of Concept The issue is in the call-chain starting with Vault.sponsor: //Vault function sponsoruint2...

A Storage Write Removal Bug in contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary In fallbackLSP17Extendable, Calling functions that conditionally terminate the external EVM call using the assembly statements return... may result in incorrect removals of prior storage writes. Impact In LSP17Extendable.sol, fallbackLSP17Extendable is...

Adding balance to accumulator does not depend on the current drawId, while documentation says it does

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In documentation protocol states that : To compute the allocated contribution for a draw d we'd compute the integral of curve cd=−t∗lnα∗α^d from lastdraw dold to dnew, and which is equal to −t∗ α^dold + t∗ α^dnew. Which clearly shows that contribution on...

Unsecure and predictable random number generation in closeDraw.winningRandomNumber_()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unsecure and predictable random number generation in closeDraw.winningRandomNumber can lead to external influence by malicious attackers. Leading to undermining of the fairness and security and unpredictability of the draw function. Both the timestamp an...

Two-step ownership transfer process in LSP0ERC725AccountCore can be bypassed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description To transfer ownership of the LSP0ERC725AccountCore contract, the owner has to call transferOwnership to nominate a pending owner. Afterwards, the pending owner must call acceptOwnership to become the new owner. When called by the owner,...

_amountOut is representing assets and shares at the same time in the liquidate function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the liquidate function from the Vault contract, the input argument amountOut is used as if it was representing a value of asset amount and share amount at the same time which is impossible a there a conversion rate between them, this error will make...

The liquidate function lets the caller mint amountOut tokens without providing any

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ther are a lot of check to ensure the parameters of the liquidate function are correct. However, it does not checki for amountIn to NOT be 0, thus it lets the caller proceed and mint amountOut tokens to account without providing any Proof of Concept...

balanceOf method can be manipulate to liquidated vault

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Deriving price from balanceOf can be manipulated to liquidate vault see example Attacker can provide ERC20 token to the vaultAsset and mint vault shares. The deposited tokens will then be withdrawn with having same shares in the vault. The shares then wi...

Malicious claimer could arbitrage the prize-claiming functionality

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The feePerClaim is a user controlled parameter which tops at tierLiquidity.prizeSize for a given tier see here for that. That means the CLAIMER can set arbitrary fees for a given call to claimPrize to increase maliciously the collected fees with //...

Potential Ownership Issues Due to External Calls in LSP0ERC725AccountCore's execute and executeBatch Functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the LSP0ERC725AccountCore contract, the execute and executeBatch functions use the LSP20CallVerification standard. In some cases, you may need to use verifyCallAfter. However, because an external call is made between verifyCall and verifyCallAfter, th...

withdrawReserve will revert when withdrawing tokens with on chain tx fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function will revert when reserve is equal to amount, when the token being transferred is a fee on transfer token. Proof of Concept function withdrawReserve address to, uint104 amount external onlyDrawManager function withdrawReserve address to, uint104...

user with ADDEXTENSIONS and CHANGEEXTENSIONS will remove extension unintentional

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Adding extension use 4 bytes function selector to add new extension, and if user with ADDEXTENSIONS permission also has CHANGEEXTENSIONS permission and wants to add new extension and there is an extension with that function selector, extension will be...

deposit function does not check for the maxMint amount.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It is theoretically possible for the deposit amount to mint shares more than the maxMint amount Proof of Concept The deposit function has a check for maxDeposit and reverts if the deposit value is more than maxuint96. But, it does not check the shares to...

CONFIGURING ALLOWANCE TO ZERO FOR THE _previousLiquidationPair CAN BE FRONT RUN

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Vault.setLiquidationPair is used to change the liquidationPair address to a new address. In the process it sets the allowance of the previousLiquidationPair to zero as shown below: if previousLiquidationPair != address0...

Unrestricted Name and Symbol Modification in LSP7 and LSP8 Digital Assets

Lines of code Vulnerability details I HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED THIS ISSUE HOWEVER I MESSED UP THE LINKS FOR IT. CAN YOU PLEASE DISREGARD THE PREVIOUS SUBMISSION? Impact The owner of a contract in LSP8IdentifiableDigitalAsset and LSP7DigitalAsset can arbitrarily change the name and symbol of a token...

tx.origin may be removed in future and its usage is not recommended

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a chance that tx.origin will be removed from the Ethereum protocol in the future, so code that uses tx.origin must be avoid for the authentication purpose. There is also some EIPs being proposed for change/remove of tx.origin. ethereum/EIPs637 I...

Users with DEPLOY permission can grief each other through CREATE2

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In ERC725XCore.sol, the deployCreate2 function uses Openzeppelin's Create2.deploy to deploy new contracts: ERC725XCore.solL253-L267 function deployCreate2 uint256 value, bytes memory creationCode internal virtual returns bytes memory newContract...

Depositors might lose funds due to the lack of zero share check

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Depositors might lose funds due to the lack of checking whether the shares to be minted is equal to zero. When this happens, the assets will be deposited into the vault, but the depositors will receive zero shares. This is independent from the initial...

Yield fee can be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The yieldFeeRecipient can claim some of the fees earned in the vault by calling mintYieldFee. The function has no access control so anyone can call the function and claim the yield fee for themselves. Proof of Concept In the below test an attacker Alice...

An identical vault can be deployed with existing values, the logic controlling this is missing

Lines of code Vulnerability details VaultFactory. The deployVault function deploys a new vault with 10 arguments, but does not check if there is a vault already deployed with the same arguments This seems to have been preferred as a design, but malicious people with copy safes can direct users to...

Anyone can mint to themselves type(uint96).max if _isVaultCollateralized() returns true

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no check that ensures the caller to mint is a trusted one. Moreover, there is a flaw which lets anyone to mint typeuint96.max number of shares Proof of Concept First, the mint function does not implement any check for the caller to be someone wi...

Vault.mintYieldFee FUNCTION CAN BE CALLED BY ANYONE TO MINT Vault Shares TO ANY RECIPIENT ADDRESS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Vault.mintYieldFee external function is used to mint Vault shares to the yield fee recipient. The function is an external function and can be called by anyone since there is no access control. The function will revert only under following two...

No access control on mintYieldFee

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lack of access-control allows anyone to mint the yield fee to himself. Proof of Concept Vault.mintYieldFee does not restrict the recipient yield fees: function mintYieldFeeuint256 shares, address recipient external requireVaultCollateralized; if shares...