Zero amount withdrawals of SafEth or Votium will brick the withdraw process

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Withdrawals of amount zero from both SafEth and VotiumStrategy have issues downstream that will cause the transaction to revert, potentially bricking withdrawals from being executed. Impact Withdrawals in AfEth undergo a process to account for any...

M-04 MitigationConfirmed

Lines of code Vulnerability details In the previous implementation RewardableERC20claimAndSyncRewards rewardsPerShare += delta one / totalSupply; Some rewards might be locked inside the contract due to the rounding loss. Mitigation PR 896 Recalculated balanceAfterClaimingRewards to remove the...

VotiumStrategy withdrawal queue fails to consider available unlocked tokens causing different issues in the withdraw process

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Withdrawals in VotiumStrategy are executed in queue since CVX tokens are potentially locked in Convex. However, the implementation fails to consider the case where unlocked assets are already enough to cover the withdrawal, leading to different issues...

Missing circuit breaker checks in ethPerCvx() for Chainlink's price feed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description The ethPerCvx function relies on a Chainlink oracle to fetch the CVX / ETH price: VotiumStrategyCore.solL158-L169 try chainlinkCvxEthFeed.latestRoundData returns uint80 roundId, int256 answer, uint256 / startedAt /, uint256 updatedAt, uint80 /...

Intrinsic arbitrage from price discrepancy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The up to 2 % price discrepancy from Chainlink creates an intrinsic arbitrage. Especially, it makes withdrawals worth more than deposits in the sense that one can immediately withdraw more than just deposited. Proof of Concept When depositing ETH into...

Missing deadline check for AfEth actions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary AfEth main actions execute on-chain swaps and lack an expiration deadline, which enables pending transactions to be maliciously executed at a later point. Impact Both AfEth deposits and withdrawals include on-chain swaps in AMM protocols as part of thei...

sellCVX(0) reverts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A withdrawal cannot be finalised if requested at a time when AfEth had only safEth, and that owed share of safEth is permanently lost. Proof of Concept It is possible that AfEth holds at most dust amounts of vAfEth if ratio = 100 %. The amounts of vAfEth...

Swap functionality to sell rewards is too permissive and could cause accidental or intentional loss of value

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary While the intention is to use the 0x protocol to sell rewards, the implementation doesn't provide any basic guarantee this will correctly happen and grants the rewarder arbitrary control over the tokens held by the strategy. Impact Rewards earned in the...

Withdrawal requests do not check if the amount of unlockable CVX is sufficient for withdrawals

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In AfEth.sol, whenever a user calls requestWithdraw to queue a withdrawal, the time that they can withdraw is determined by withdrawTime: AfEth.solL175-L176 function requestWithdrawuint256 amount external virtual uint256 withdrawTimeBefore =...

The current vlCVX balance is not freezed, when withdrawal has been requested

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details After some deposits/withdrawals being made by users, the following edge case might occur: Let's say, n = totalLockedBalancePlusUnlockable, before iterating over the lockedBalances. t1 = lockedBalance0.unlockTime t2 =...

price() in AfEth.sol doesn't take afEth held for pending withdrawals into account

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In AfEth.sol, the price function returns the current price of afEth: AfEth.solL133-L141 function price public view returns uint256 if totalSupply == 0 return 1e18; AbstractStrategy vEthStrategy = AbstractStrategyvEthAddress; uint256...

Missing slippage control while depositing rewards in SafEth and VotiumStrategy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Deposits to SafEth and VotiumStrategy coming from rewards lack slippage control, making them susceptible to sandwich attacks by MEV bots, which can result in a loss of funds for the protocol. Impact Rewards coming from the VotiumStrategy contract are...

Forced relock in VotiumStrategy withdrawal causes denial of service if Convex locking contract is shutdown

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The VotiumStrategy withdrawal process involves relocking CVX tokens, which can potentially lead to a denial of service and loss of user funds if the underlying vlCVX contract is shutdown. Impact When withdrawals are executed in VotiumStrategy, the...

Lack of access control and value validation in the reward flow exposes functions to public access

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Some functions that are part of the Votium reward flow are left unprotected and can be accessed by anyone to spend resources held by the contract. Impact Rewards coming from the Votium protocol are claimed and compounded back in AfEth. This flow consist...

VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards() leaves unlimited allowance on tokens.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards gives unlimited allowance on its claimed rewards tokens. It is not thereafter reset and there is not even any way to reset the allowance. It is dangerous to trust the spenders indefinitely in case they are compromised...

Inflation attack in VotiumStrategy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The VotiumStrategy contract is susceptible to the Inflation Attack, in which the first depositor can be front-runned by an attacker to steal their deposit. Impact Both AfEth and VotiumStrategy acts as vaults: accounts deposit some tokens and get back...

M-04 Unmitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The previously identified vulnerability of potential rounding issues during reward calculations has not been fully mitigated. The current strategy to keep remainders and use them in subsequent claimAndSyncRewards calls does not adequately address the iss...

Sole depositor in the VotiumStrategy contract can inflate cvxPerVotium() to steal subsequent deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In VotiumStrategyCore.sol, the cvxInSystem function returns the total amount of CVX in the protocol: VotiumStrategyCore.solL133-L138 function cvxInSystem public view returns uint256 uint256 total, , , = ILockedCvxVLCVXADDRESS.lockedBalances...

Missing slippage control when directly interacting with the VotiumStrategy contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary Direct deposits and withdrawals within VotiumStrategy lack any slippage controls, which opens up the possibility of sandwich attacks and Miner Extractable Value MEV exploits. Impact Interactions in the AfEth protocol often require the exchange of ETH fo...

AfEth price calculation doesn't factor locked tokens held in contract balance

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary When withdrawals are enqueued in AfEth, the implementation will remove the tokens from the caller and lock these in the contract until the withdrawal is made effective. These tokens still count in the supply, and must not be considered during price...

VotiumStrategy.requestWithdraw() doesn't check whether totalLockedBalancePlusUnlockable is already enough to cover withdrawal being requested

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The totalLockedBalancePlusUnlockable is being used to calculate an amount that's ready to be withdrawn. In case, if totalLockedBalancePlusUnlockable = cvxUnlockObligations already before iterating over the lockedBalances, the withdrawal...

Lack of slippage protection for depositRewards() in AfEth.sol makes it susceptible to sandwich attacks

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In VotiumStrategyCore.sol, the buyCvx function calls exchangeunderlying of Curve's ETH / CVX pool to buy CVX: VotiumStrategyCore.solL233-L240 ICrvEthPoolCVXETHCRVPOOLADDRESS.exchangeunderlying value: ethAmountIn 0, 1, ethAmountIn, 0 // this is...

M-05 MitigationConfirmed

Lines of code Vulnerability details In the previous implementation when stakingContract.totalAllocPoint = 0 stakingContract.withdraw and stakingContract.deposit will div 0 , revert This results in StargateRewardableWrapper no longer being able to execute StargateRewardableWrapper.withdraw The...

Unsafe use of balanceOf(address(this))

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact AfEth.deposit can be bricked. Proof of Concept AfEth makes use of its own balance of afEth as a temporary store of afEth for withdrawal requests. On requestWithdraw afEth is transferred to the AfEth contract and these are then burned on withdraw. The...

Withdrawals will be permanently DOSed if VLCVX's owner decides to shutdown the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In VotiumStrategy.sol, the relock function is used to withdraw all unlockable CVX and then lock an appropriate amount of CVX again. It does so by calling lock of the VLCVX contract: VotiumStrategy.solL145-L148 if cvxAmountToRelock 0...

Reward sandwiching in VotiumStrategy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The reward system in VotiumStrategy can be potentially gamed by users to enter just before rewards are deposited and request an exit after that. Depending on the withdrawal queue, users may exit as early as the next epoch and avoid waiting the normal 16...

Users can deposit() even when Chainlink's price feed for CVX is stale

Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In VotiumStrategy.sol, the price of vAfEth is determined by the price function: VotiumStrategy.solL31-L33 function price external view override returns uint256 return cvxPerVotium ethPerCvxfalse / 1e18; As seen from above, it calls ethPerCVX wit...

AfEth deposits could use price data from an invalid Chainlink response

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The current price implementation for the VotiumStrategy token uses a potentially invalid Chainlink response. This price is then used to calculate the price of AfEth and, subsequently, the amount of tokens to mint while depositing. Impact The price of...

VotiumStrategy.price() does not validate Chainlink response

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact AfEth.deposit may mint an incorrect amount of afEth. VotiumStrategy.price may return an incorrect price of vAfEth. AfEth.price may return an incorrect price of afEth. Proof of Concept VotiumStrategy.price function price external view override returns...

It might not be possible to applyRewards(), if an amount received is less than 0.05 eth

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Upon claiming Votium rewards, applyRewards is intended to be invoked bi-weekly in order to exchange the tokens for eth and put the eth received back into the strategies. Based on the current ratio it either stakes the amount into safETH or...

Potential rewards stealing by manipulating CVX/ETH pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Upon claiming Votium rewards, applyRewards is intended to be invoked in order to exchange the tokens for eth and put the eth received back into the strategies. Based on the current ratio it either stakes the amount into safETH or obtains...

Attacker can mint afEth with cheaper price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Attacker can mint afEth with cheaper price and then withdraw. Proof of Concept When user would like to buy some amount of afEth tokens, then price is calculated. This price will be used to calculate amount of tokens to mint. function price public view...

Last stakers may not receive funds back

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Last stakers may not receive funds back. Proof of Concept When user wants to withdraw, then he needs to initiate requestWithdraw. As some part of funds are locked as cvx token inside vlcvx that means that they should be withdrawn. When you lock cvx then...

VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards can be sandwhiched

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards can be sandwhiched, so users rewards will be lost. Proof of Concept VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards will be used in order to swap all rewards to eth and then distribute eth to the safEth or vEth. The problem here is that...

AfEth withdrawing will not work when ratio will be 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact AfEth withdrawing will not work when ratio will be 0. It will be not possible to withdraw. Proof of Concept Any ratio for the 2 tokens of afEth can be set by owner. AfEth.withdraw function will not work in case if ratio will be 0, which means that safEth...

VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards can be sandwhiched to make profit

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards can be sandwhiched to make profit. Proof of Concept VotiumStrategyCore.applyRewards function will swap all rewards of contract into eth and then stake them into safEth or vEth contract. As result price of afEth token will...

VotiumStrategy.withdrawTime doesn't expect that balance can be already unlocked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact VotiumStrategy.withdrawTime doesn't expect that balance can be already unlocked. As result user can wait more time to witdraw. Proof of Concept When user wants to withdraw, then he needs to initiate requestWithdraw. As some part of funds are locked as cv...

Stale cvx price can be used while depositing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Stale cvx price can be used while depositing Proof of Concept When user deposits, then price of afEth token is calculated. It's needed to know how many tokens user will receieve. This price consists of safEth price and vEth price. This is how price is...

Leaky faucet

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Leaking is bad. Proof of Concept Turn off faucet, it leaks! Tools Used Hands Recommended Mitigation Steps Teflon tape. Assessed type Other --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #506 [1695291399781]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 506 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L‑01 The admin wont be able to burn rUSDY if the address is blacklisted/sanctioned and not on the allowlist The burn function in rUSDY.sol allows the admin to seize rUSDY if the user is not legally allowed to own it...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #86 [1695205999296]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 86 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: QA-02. BondingManager.withdrawFees doesn’t create checkpoint --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Vulnerability: An Attacker can steal Tranche Tokens and Drain the Pool / Contract: InvestmentManager.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An Attacker can mint Tranche Tokens for free and use them to Drain the Pool and steal the user's money. Proof of Concept Let's imagine that some users deposit money in the pool and mint tranches but they didn't redeem/withdraw their tokens, one of the...

Any user can drain the escrow contract by calling decreaseDepositRequest with more amount than they deposited into the escrow while requesting.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the protocol, users submit deposit requests to the Centrifuge gateway for depositing assets into the Liquidity Pools. There is also a mechanism to decrease this deposit order by calling LiquidityPool::decreaseDepositRequest which decreases their depos...

Some Outgoing functions are not supported on the gateway

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The gateway serves both outgoing and incoming calls, All incoming calls should have corresponding outgoing calls and vice versa However, some incoming calls like addPool , allowPoolCurrency , addTranche have no corresponding calls via the gateway contrac...

https://github.com/code-423n4/2023-09-centrifuge/blob/main/src/InvestmentManager.sol#L467-L480

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In this function InvestmentManager.deposit, the require statement calls the lPool.transferFrom function with an arbitrary from address. This means that the attacker can control who the tokens are transferred from. Proof of Concept Tools Used manuel revie...

Malicious RestrictionManger can be used to verify Tranche Members

Lines of code Vulnerability details The ability to file a new Restriction Manger after deployment can actually be utilized by a rouge ward and deploy a malicious version of the RestrictionManger that implements almost the same thing as the originals, but just tweaked to return the SUCCESSMESSAGE...

Incorrent approval for escrow tokens, not allowing to burn on redeem

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Liquidity pool approval for burning escrow tokens is not correctly assigned when pool is deployed on PoolManager deployLiquidityPool lines: EscrowLikeescrow.approveliquidityPool, addressinvestmentManager, typeuint256.max; // Approve investment manager on...

addPauser should be a two-step process in PauseAdmin.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Adding new pauser should me two-step proccess. The identified issue pertains to the absence of a two-step process for adding a new pauser in the smart contract. This vulnerability could potentially allow an unauthorized entity to gain control over pausin...

The maxMint check should be cumulatively applied to ensure it's effectiveness

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Circumvention of the maximum minting restriction, since all a receiver need to do is not specify the whole amount of tokens in one attempt and then claim more than the maximum amount Proof of Concept Take a look at LiquidityPool.solL145-L157 /// @notice...

There is no concept of a requestDeposit, requestRedeem receipt made on the source chain, resulting in no recovery proces escrowed funds in the event of bridge or Centrifuge fall.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no kind of request receipt on the EVM chain at all. The InvenstmentManagerrequestDeposit simply puts users tokens in the escrow and then the request gets routed to the Gateway and later to the outgoingRouter. The flow goes as follows 1.Buyer cal...