10190 matches found
Default Admin Role will be empty after ownership transfer .
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After an ownership transfer of the protocol , the DEFAULTADMINROLE role will be empty.Protocol cannot function properly without DEFAULTADMINROLE cause this is the single most important role in the protocol . Functionalities that only DEFAULTADMINROLE can...
A WHALE CAN DoS A NORMAL USER FROM MINTING AND REDEEMING THE USDe BY MAKING THE MINT AMOUNT AND REDEEM AMOUNT PER BLOCK, EXCEEDING THE maxMintPerBlock AND maxRedeemPerBlock RESPECTIVELY
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The EthenaMinting.mint function and EthenaMinting.redeem function both have defined modifiers belowMaxMintPerBlock and belowMaxRedeemPerBlock to ensure the mint amount per block and redeem amount per block are limited to upper bounds set by the...
Vesting amount is calculated incorrectly in StakedUSDe contract
Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The description says vestingAmount is the contract balance + any unvested remainder at that time but it is set incorrectly in the code. /// @notice The amount of the last asset distribution from the controller contract into this /// contract + any...
Wrong estimation of acceptable risk of the protocol losses
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol losses in case compromised MINTERS or REDEEMERS can be higher than expected due to the GATEKEEPER suppression. Attacker can frontrun the GATEKEEPER and fill block limit with own transactions while it is profitable. Average losses can be more...
Compromised minter can change route to misdirect user funds
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current security assumption revolves around the compromise of a minter, wherein they mint 200k USDe tokens for themselves and subsequently redeem them within the contract. Under this assumption, as long as the gatekeeper key remains secure, the minte...
hardcoded route ratio might hcause verify route return false continously instead use >=
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact hardcoded rout ratio might cause verify route to return false continuously the verifyroute in ethenaminting.sol is an if that checks whether the route ratio is 10000 or not and the ratio is going to be somewhere around that but what if it actually up wit...
The _transferToBeneficiary() incorrectly assumes Native ETH amount and ERC20 Token amount as 1:1.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The transferToBeneficiary function of EthenaMinting.sol incorrectly assumes Native ETH amount and ERC20 Token amount as 1:1. Proof of Concept The transferToBeneficiary function is used in redeem function of EthenaMinting.sol. Though, you are not allowed ...
Minter can censor GATEKEEPER and mint uncollateralized for a prolonged period of time
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ethena explicitly mentions their protection against a compromised minter, the mentioned maximum loss is $100.000. The protection against a compromised minter rests on the GATEKEEPER role which is a system running on AWS set to remove the minter if mints...
Lack of functionality to distribute the yield to the USDe stakers.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User will not get the benefit of the yield which is output of their USDe staking. Outcome of yield is the core feature of staking. we are submitting this as high. Proof of Concept An user who is not black listed is allowed to stake their USDe by calling...
Wrong errors degradate UX
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the beneficiary of the order is address0, it will revert popping up the error InvalidAmount. This is bad as the UI will show the users they put wrong either the collateral amount or the USDe amount, when those values may be correct. Proof of Concept...
There is no check for collateral token in mint matches same in withdraw
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While we understand that usde is the base token here, we see that on minting used token you would need to transfer some tokens to the contract and get some used minted to you and on redemption get usde burnt to get a token sent back to you. The implicati...
SOFT_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE is able to withdraw stUSDe for USDe even if it shouldnt
Lines of code Vulnerability details As the readme mentions, SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE shouldnt be able to deposit or withdraw their USDe/stUSDe: Due to legal requirements, there's a SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE and FULLRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE. The former is for addresses based in countries we are not...
USER WILL SEND TRANSACTION GAS WHICH IS ONLY ENOUGH TO EXECUTE StakedUSDeV2.unstake FUNCTION SUCCESFULLY BUT NOT ENOUGH TO FULLY EXECUTE THE silo.withdraw THUS LOSING ALL USER FUNDS
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The StakedUSDeV2.unstake function is used to claim the staking amount after the cooldown period has finished. The unstake function will reset the userCooldown.cooldownEnd and userCooldown.underlyingAmount parameters to 0 for the msg.sender once the cool...
precision issue EthenaMinting:mint() allows users to steal fund.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the EthenaMinting:mint function of the contract, a call is made to the transferCollateral function. This function calculates the transfer amount using the formula uint256 amountToTransfer = amount ratiosi / 10000;. However, it does not account for...
replay exploitation in StakedUSDeV2's unstake function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability in the unstake function of the StakedUSDeV2 contract allows the receiver to claim assets without considering the specific round from which they should receive the assets. The receiver can claim assets from a different round than intende...
Users will retain possession of their USDe after redeeming collateral
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users will retain possession of their USDe after redeeming their collateral this can lead to theft/loss of funds. Proof of Concept See belo for the coded POC. The benefactor and the beneficiary in the Order struct containing order details and confirmatio...
Reentrancy opened for any contract that calls the withdraw function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Reentrancy opened for any contract that calls the withdraw function in the stakedUSDeV2.sol which would drain of ether. Proof of Concept function withdrawaddress to, uint256 amount external onlyStakingVault USDE.transferto, amount; In this scenario, the...
Vulnerability in in rescueTokens and _beforeTokenTransfer Functions Allows Self-Transfer of ERC20 Tokens
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The rescueTokens function and the beforeTokenTransfer hook in the provided Solidity contract lack checks to ensure that the destination address is not the same as the sender from. This oversight can result in tokens being transferred to the same address,...
StakedUSDe contract allows attackers to steal staked USDe tokens of soft-restricted users
Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The modifier called checkMinShares that is used to ensure that there is always a small non-zero amount of shares in circulation. This is to prevent a donation attack, where an attacker donates a small amount of USDe tokens to the contract and then...
A user with SOFT_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE can earn yield.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user blacklisted with SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE role can earn yield by buying stUSDe token from open market and unstake stUSDe for USDe token on the StakedUSDeV2.sol contract. Proof of Concept The unstake function calls the internal withdraw function...
bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order So basically the contracts are doing orders by users RFQ to system whether by API or front end. and make the mint process the problem is in the contract...
DoS of the staking functionality due to the check of minimum total supply
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The StakedUSDe contract can be accidentally blocked if the all shares will be redeemed before the VESTINGPERIOD end. The checkMinShares function will then revert for any eligible deposits. The same result will be in case of asset transferring to the...
bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact bad Actor can block the operation of mint by creating duplicate order by frunt runing original order So basically the contracts are doing orders by users RFQ to system whether by API or front end. and make the mint process the problem is in the contract...
Malicious user can completely prevent all users or users without large funds from staking
Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details To prevent the issue with the first-depositor attack donation attack as written in the comments of checkMinShares in StakedUSDe.sol to the staking vault, the checkMinShares function is implemented in the StakedUSDe.sol contract when...
EthenaMinting.sol#_setMaxRedeemPerBlock() - Function doesn't enforce any constraints
Lines of code Vulnerability details Explanation The EthenaMinting.solsetMaxMintPerBlock function is responsible for setting the maximum limit for minting USDe tokens in a single block. function setMaxMintPerBlockuint256 maxMintPerBlock external onlyRoleDEFAULTADMINROLE...
Shares Manipulation DoS Vulnerability in StakedUSDe
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The StakedUSDe contract is vulnerable to manipulation by a malicious actor, leading to a permanent interruption of operations through a Denial-of-Service DoS attack. This vulnerability also impacts StakedUSDeV2 due to its inheritance of the StakedUSDe...
Temporary DOS attack on users minting and redeeming big amount using EthenaMinting.sol
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The users redeeming and minting using EthenaMinting.sol with a large amount can be vulnerable to DOS attack. Proof of Concept There is a limit on the max amount to redeem and mint in a block. This can be crucial to the users that are minting or redeeming...
StakedUSDe.totalSupply() may decrease below MIN_SHARES by StakedUSDe.redistributeLockedAmount.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact StakedUSDe runs checkMinShares in deposit and withdraw to keep the totalSupply more than MINSHARES, 1e18. It is to prevent an ERC4626 inflation attack. However, StakedUSDe.redistributeLockedAmountuser, address0 burns all the user's shares and decreases t...
removeDelegatedSigner() will not undelegate address for signing.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Impact is critical as delegator addresses will still retain delegator roll even after the removeDelegatedSigner is called by user. Proof of Concept function setDelegatedSigner is used to set delegation function setDelegatedSigneraddress delegateTo extern...
stakers can withraw reward without waiting the vesting period
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact stakers can frontrun a reward giving transaction by monitoring the mempool for the function transferInRewards, and stake before it, and then unstake after to get rewards, if the cooldown is off. Proof of Concept imagine a scenario where the cooldown peri...
A fully blacklisted user can withdraw their funds
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A fully blacklisted user should not have access to any function of the protocol, but it is possible for a user to withdraw their funds right before being blacklisted. A fully blocked user is capable of frontrunning the addToBlacklist call by calling the...
Circumvention of soft staking restrictions in StakedUSDeV2 through indirect ERC20 token transfers
Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The StakedUSDeV2 in the Ethena protocol is designed to allow users to stake USDe tokens and earn rewards. The protocol includes roles and restrictions to manage the staking process, such as SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE and FULLRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE. However,...
Limits on mint and redeem per block of USDe will lead to paralysis
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the number of mint and redeem per block is limited, attackers can use scripts to squeeze out the quota with their own addresses. Thena cannot determine whether it is a normal user address or an attack address, causing the contract to be paralyzed. ...
Borrower cannot close their market
Lines of code Vulnerability details The WildcatMarket::closeMarket cannot be executed by a borrower because the WildcatMarketController contract does not implement any function calling it. Proof of Concept The closeMarket is supposed to be called by a borrower to close their market, set the...
Borrower escapes delinquency penalty if no intermittent action happens
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Once the market goes below required reserves, it is marked as delinquent only if an updateState action happens. Actions like market.updateState, executeWithdrawal, deposit, etc. have to happen else the protocol remains unaware of the market's delinquency...
Permanent DoS on Market Creation Failure
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Permanent DoS of creating a market if anything fails in the market constructor. Within a create2 call, instead of failing when a revert occurs in the constructor being run, it just returns address0. If this occurs within a market that's being created the...
Uninitialized State Variables
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact in The resetTmpMarketParameters function is an internal function, which means it can only be called from within the WildcatMarketController contract itself. If a child contract inherits from WildcatMarketController and calls resetTmpMarketParameters befo...
Incompatibility with Rebase tokens
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Borrowers can choose whatever token they want to be the underlying token for a market. The problem comes when those tokens are Rebasing tokens such as Ampleforth. The balances of those tokens are changed rebased by a certain algorithm depending on the...
wrong implementation of bipDiv.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps function...
closeMarket() can only be called by the market controller but the controller has no function to close a market.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Due to the restriction on the closeMarket function, only the controller is able to use it, but the controller contract has no way to call it. Impact Since the borrower becomes unable to close a market once it opened, it becomes a big issue as the...
Underflow can be occurred in codebase
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because of the lack of the input validation, underflow can be occurred in the code. Proof of Concept function getRegisteredBorrowers uint256 start, uint256 end external view returns address memory arr uint256 len = borrowers.length; end = MathUtils.minen...
An underflow occurred during the token transfer.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An underflow can occur during a token transfer when there is insufficient allowance. Proof of Concept function transferFrom address from, address to, uint256 amount external virtual nonReentrant returns bool uint256 allowed = allowancefrommsg.sender; //...
Deploying a market with a non-ERC20 asset can cause incorrect interaction with asset
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The market contract may expect certain ERC20 functions to be present and behave in a specific way. If the asset contract does not adhere to the ERC20 standard, the market may behave unexpectedly, resulting in incorrect token balances, pricing, or other...
Lack of access control on overrideSanction(), any user can override sanctioned address
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Without proper access control, any address can call the overrideSanction function and override the sanction status of an account. This can potentially be exploited by malicious actors to bypass sanctions and carry out unauthorized actions, putting the...
DoS Any Market by Frontrunning Creation with a Codehash Change
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any market contract can be DoSed by sending a 1 wei transaction to the market address that will be created for a user. When an account has no code and has never been interacted with, the codehash will be bytes320. This will result in market creation...
Denial of service to closeMarket.
Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary No mechanism to close the market. Impact Denial of service to closeMarket. Vulnerability Details Only controller can call closeMarket but there is no implementation to close market in controller. Tools Used Manual Review Recommended Mitigation Steps Add...
TRANSFERING FUNDS TO YOURSELF INCREASES YOUR BALANCE
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If transferred to yourself, it will cause your balance to increase, thus growing the token balance infinitely. Proof of Concept File: src/market/WildcatMarketToken.sol 54: transferfrom, to, amount; 74: accountsfrom = fromAccount; 78: accountsto =...
_blockAccount doesn’t transfer asset correctly getting portion of funds locked permanently
Lines of code Vulnerability details Description When blockAccount is called and the account that is getting blocked has balance in the market, escrow contract is created and balance of the user is transferred to this contract by updating accounts mapping. When the account is unsanctioned, the...
New approved lender can receive other peoples accrued interest fees
Lines of code Vulnerability details A new approved Lender by the borrower, getting into the market at the right time can make huge profits in the market due to activity in the market of others, and accruing interest, which make the lender withdraw immediately, without being in the market for a lo...
potential DOS cause of rounding up at rayMul and rayDiv
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In rayMul and rayDiv , there is always rounding up ,cause of that , there will be potential DOS Proof of Concept function normalizeAmount MarketState memory state, uint256 amount internal pure returns uint256 return amount.rayMulstate.scaleFactor; functi...