Upgraded Q -> 3 from #161 [1699466057671]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 161 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 Prime.updateScores will revert if users are added after updating nextScoreUpdateRoundId Vulnerability Details In Prime contract: the updateScores function is meant to update scores of a batch of users when a new...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #593 [1699463205259]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 593 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: Prime.sol: Users with issued tokens can instantly re-enter the protocol if they were in the 90 days waiting period If an user is issued a prime token while waiting for the claim period, his stakedAt is not zeroed. If...

interest is still accuring when the market is paused, force user to incur debts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact interest is still accuring when the market is paused, force user to incur debts Proof of Concept when the function accure is called the interest is accured after the interest rate is calculated uint256 interestRate = IIRMirm.getInterestRateaddressthis,...

paucheTranche state can be set to arbitrary value

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact paucheTranche state can be set to arbitrary value Proof of Concept the protocol has this concept of tranche id and borrower tier, the higher borrower tier means high risk lower borrower tier means low risk but when liquidation happens if the...

SocializeLoss can does not reduce the user deposit share

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact SocializeLoss can does not reduce the user deposit share Proof of Concept SocializeLoss can revert in underflow so the admin cannot socalize loss properly In the current implementation of the socialize loss uint256 amount = Math.ceilDivshare...

share update function in OmniToken.sol has accounting issue in transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Transfer share function in OmniToken.sol can be abused Proof of Concept there is a function, transfer in OmniToken.sol function transferuint96 subId, bytes32 to, uint8 trancheId, uint256 shares external nonReentrant returns bool requiretrancheId...

Chainlink oracle will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer / max answer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Chainlink oracle will return the wrong price for asset if underlying aggregator hits minAnswer / max answer and the deposit asset can be wrongly valued, leads to overborrowing Proof of Concept Chainlink aggregators have a built in circuit breaker if the...

Users can't repay their debts if the OmniPool contract is paused which can cause users to fall into liquidation and lose their collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users can't repay their debts if the OmniPool contract is paused which can cause users to fall into liquidation and lose their collateral Proof of Concept The OmniPool::repay function has implemented the whenNotPaused modifier, which will prevent the...

SocializeLoss can revert in underflow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact SocializeLoss can revert in underflow so the admin cannot socalize loss properly Proof of Concept SocializeLoss can revert in underflow so the admin cannot socalize loss properly In the current implementation of the socialize loss uint256 amount =...

After the market configuration expires or when borrow value greater than deposit value, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details = Impact After the market configuration expires, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount Proof of Concept After the market configuration expires or when borrow value greater than deposit value, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount when liquidation ...

Users pay higher fee than intended

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Protocol mints incorrect depositAmount and depositShare to protocol. Such that reserveFee is higher than defined. Suppose following scenario: 1. Tranche 2 has 20% APR, has 5000 borrowed 2. Tranche 1 has 10% APR, has 10000 borrowed 3. ReserveFee is 10% 4...

There is no check that price from Chainlink hits min/max answer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Chainlink aggregator has bounds minAnswer and maxAnswer within which the price can be set. In a case like LUNA, Chainlink will return minAnswer instead of real asset value, overvaluing it. Proof of Concept Here is explained that current Aggregators have...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #203 [1699029806392]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 203 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1 Function updateScores spends all gas and reverts if a user has score updated Summary Function updateScores incorrectly handles case when a user’s score is already updated. Vulnerability Details There is a for loo...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #320 [1699029580772]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 320 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 2. The governor setting not reliable The initial setting for the voting period in ODGovernor is 15 block, which can be too tight for the governance. Based on Arbitrum block time, which is about 0.26 seconds, which ca...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #300 [1699029650174]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 300 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 transferSAFEOwnership does not reset users allowed to modify a safe on behalf of an owner transferSAFEOwnership is not deleting potential allowed users in safeCan upon transferring a safe ownership. This could...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #320 [1699029592172]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 320 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 3. Testnet address being used In CamelotRelayer, CAMELOTFACTORY is assigned with Goerli testnet address, which may cause issue during the mainnet launch address internal constant CAMELOTFACTORY =...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #193 [1699029806458]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 193 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Missing functions in the BasicActions to reach ODSafeManager Description Both functions allowing other users and handlers to manage the safe are restricted with access control. Only callable by the owner of the safe...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #345 [1699029532851]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 345 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Low-01 When a User-1 sell/transfer a safe to User-2, during transfer allowance is not clear in case of User-1 safeCan is a mapping which set allowance for other addresses, by which they can perform action on behalf o...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #246 [1699029732469]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 246 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-03 The tokenURI is not compatible with the ERC721 standard Description function tokenURIuint256 safeId public view override returns string memory uri uri = nftRenderer.rendersafeId; tokenURI will call nftRenderer...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #518 [1699029907154]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 518 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 StakedAt time is not deleted during the issuance of prime tokens When a directly revocable token is issued, the stakedAt time of the user is deleted delete stakedAtusersi. This is not done when an irrevocable...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #430 [1699028562977]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 430 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: It’s not clear which token the OD token will be paired with in order to determine the price in the uniV3Relayer contract. Then the following lines are problematic: baseAmount = uint12810...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #165 [1699030252844]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 165 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Allowed user have too much priviledge Links to affected code Impact Allowed user can revoke approval of other allowed address. Proof of Concept The allowed user can allow other user. If allowed address is compromised...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #165 [1699030231989]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 165 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Clear safeCan in transferSAFEOwnership Links to affected code Impact Old approval remains even if user gets SAFE again. Proof of Concept There is no removal safeCan at transferSAFEOwnership . When the user gets SAFE...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #246 [1699029716295]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 246 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 Use the factory constant address of the testnet Description import UNISWAPV3FACTORY, GOERLIUNISWAPV3FACTORY from '@script/Registry.s.sol'; contract UniV3Relayer is IBaseOracle, IUniV3Relayer // --- Registry ---...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #385 [1699029474432]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 385 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-03 UniV3Relayer contract works only with tokens of decimals = 18 Details When the UniV3Relayer contract is deployed; the multiplier state variable that’s going to be used to parse the price result from the aggregat...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #175 [1699029356616]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 175 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 Initial values for GovernorSettings are very low ODGovernor is a OZ Governor with some plugins. It sets up its parameters in the constructor: ODGovernor::constructor: File: src/contracts/gov/ODGovernor.sol 41:...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #659 [1699030291397]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 659 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 updateScores will result in DoS if pass a user with an already updated score Impact If updateScores is called for a user who is already updated in the same round, the function will misbehave, causing it to repea...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #221 [1699029747725]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 221 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 Handling missing for case where ERC20 token has decimal 18 in CamelotRelayer & UniV3Relayer oracles Description In the constructor token decimals of an ERC20 is assumed to be = 18 which can be wrong for some...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #617 [1699030085781]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 617 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 continue before loop variable increment In updateScores function, the rest of the loop execution is skipped with continue if a user’s score has already been updated. But the updation of the loop variable occurs...

testing submission form - IGNORE

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps Assessed...

MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused Proof of Concept this report tries to combine a few issue 1. when OmniPool is paused, interest is still accuring 2. when OmniPool is paused, user cannot repay 3...

accure interest function is likely failed to accure interest for token with low decimal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact loss of precision is too high when accuring interest Proof of Concept When intereste accures, we are calling uint256 interestAmount; uint256 interestRate = IIRMirm.getInterestRateaddressthis, trancheIndex, totalDeposit, totalBorrow; interestAmount =...

After market expires, user can still repay / deposit, but fund are lost

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After market expires, user can still repay / deposit, but fund are lost Proof of Concept In OmniToken.sol or OmniTokenNoBorrow.sol user can deposit any time If user borrows token, user can repay from OmniPool.sol any time but the problem is that, after a...

tranche id check has off-by-one error

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact tranche id check has off-by-one error Proof of Concept In TestOmniPool.t.sol, we add the following POC function testSetTrancheCountPOC public for uint256 i = 4; i 256; i++ pool.setTrancheCountaddressoToken, uint8i; oToken.deposit0, 255, 1 ether; we run t...

Testing form

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps Assessed...

Wrong errors degradate UX

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the beneficiary of the order is address0, it will revert popping up the error InvalidAmount. This is bad as the UI will show the users they put wrong either the collateral amount or the USDe amount, when those values may be correct. Proof of Concept...

Wrong vest logic

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The judgment on line 90 results in that the interval between two transferInRewards must be greater than or equal to 8 hours, otherwise it will be reverted. Proof of Concept Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps Delete 90 lines of judgment. Assessed typ...

Circumvention of soft staking restrictions in StakedUSDeV2 through indirect ERC20 token transfers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary The StakedUSDeV2 in the Ethena protocol is designed to allow users to stake USDe tokens and earn rewards. The protocol includes roles and restrictions to manage the staking process, such as SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE and FULLRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE. However,...

There is no check for collateral token in mint matches same in withdraw

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While we understand that usde is the base token here, we see that on minting used token you would need to transfer some tokens to the contract and get some used minted to you and on redemption get usde burnt to get a token sent back to you. The implicati...

Minter can censor GATEKEEPER and mint uncollateralized for a prolonged period of time

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ethena explicitly mentions their protection against a compromised minter, the mentioned maximum loss is $100.000. The protection against a compromised minter rests on the GATEKEEPER role which is a system running on AWS set to remove the minter if mints...

Rewards transfer In fail

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact the rewards transfer in will fail when current VESTINGPERIOD is not finished. Proof of Concept "function getUnvestedAmount public view returns uint256" is used to calculate the rest rewards in current VESTINGPERIOD. if the period is finished, the result...

Reentrancy opened for any contract that calls the withdraw function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Reentrancy opened for any contract that calls the withdraw function in the stakedUSDeV2.sol which would drain of ether. Proof of Concept function withdrawaddress to, uint256 amount external onlyStakingVault USDE.transferto, amount; In this scenario, the...

hardcoded route ratio might hcause verify route return false continously instead use >=

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact hardcoded rout ratio might cause verify route to return false continuously the verifyroute in ethenaminting.sol is an if that checks whether the route ratio is 10000 or not and the ratio is going to be somewhere around that but what if it actually up wit...

removeDelegatedSigner() will not undelegate address for signing.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Impact is critical as delegator addresses will still retain delegator roll even after the removeDelegatedSigner is called by user. Proof of Concept function setDelegatedSigner is used to set delegation function setDelegatedSigneraddress delegateTo extern...

Lack of functionality to distribute the yield to the USDe stakers.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User will not get the benefit of the yield which is output of their USDe staking. Outcome of yield is the core feature of staking. we are submitting this as high. Proof of Concept An user who is not black listed is allowed to stake their USDe by calling...

replay attack in StakedUSDe's redistributeLockedAmount function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability in the redistributeLockedAmount function of the StakedUSDe contract allows an admin user to redistribute tokens from a restricted address to another address. However, if a user let's call them User A is removed from the blacklist and...

Unrestricted access to critical admin functions in StakedUSDe due to extremely flawed implementation in SingleAdminAccessControl

Lines of code Vulnerability details Summary There is a critical vulnerability in the StakedUSDe CA, allowing an attacker to manipulate the state of the CA and/or drain assets without proper authorization. Vulnerability Detail The StakedUSDe inherits from the SingleAdminAccessControl CA, which...

Malicious user can completely prevent all users or users without large funds from staking

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details To prevent the issue with the first-depositor attack donation attack as written in the comments of checkMinShares in StakedUSDe.sol to the staking vault, the checkMinShares function is implemented in the StakedUSDe.sol contract when...

Risky use of Static Address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact We see a native token address used as 0xEeeeeEeeeEeEeeEeEeEeeEEEeeeeEeeeeeeeEEeE which is fine to use to denote native ether, but if this contract were to be deployed in another chain like Polygon, this would cause inconsistency issues. Proof of Concept...

A user with SOFT_RESTRICTED_STAKER_ROLE can earn yield.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user blacklisted with SOFTRESTRICTEDSTAKERROLE role can earn yield by buying stUSDe token from open market and unstake stUSDe for USDe token on the StakedUSDeV2.sol contract. Proof of Concept The unstake function calls the internal withdraw function...