CultureIndex.sol#_vote() - Creators of certain piece can vote for their piece

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In CultureIndex there is a function vote that allows users to vote for a piece to get sold on the auction house. Each piece has creators that get cut of the sale. The problem is that there is no checks if the user voting for a certain piece is it's own...

The builderReferral, purchaseReferral and deployer can never be equal to address(0), which leads to the revolutionRewardRecipient stealing their rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details HIGH The builderReferral, purchaseReferral and deployer can never be equal to address0, which leads to the revolutionRewardRecipient stealing their rewards Description: revolutionRewardRecipient will receive the rewards of the builderReferral, purchaseReferral...

If the NFT is because the auction is not met the reservePrice in _settleAuction() function, during the auction the totalSupply of erc721VotingToken is get in the quorumVotes, leading that the piece cannot be drpped

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps Assessed...

reclaimLiquidity() Malicious borrowers can force LPs to be unable to retrieve Liquidity by closing and reopening the Position before it expires.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details If LP wants to retrieve the Liquidity that has been lent out, it can set a renewalCutoffTime through reclaimLiquidity. If the borrower does not voluntarily close, liquidatePosition can be used to forcibly close the position after the loan...

changing LOAN_TERM changes terms for existing loans

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the protocol updates the loan terms, this will affect existing loans taken under different terms. Proof of Concept LOANTERM is a guarantee for the lender liquidity provider to eventually get their liquidity back. After loan term has passed the lender...

Missing access control on critical functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details The broad admin role enables arbitrary manipulation of the heap without restrictions. Recommendation: Implement granular access control and privilege separation. Implement an access control system such as OpenZeppelin AccessControl to restrict access to these...

Signature Verification for voteForManyWithSig Function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Potential Risk: The voteForManyWithSig function in the CultureIndex contract allows users to vote on multiple pieceIds using a provided signature. While it attempts to verify the signature, there are some potential risks associated with signature verification...

_safeMint() should be used rather than _mint() wherever possible

Lines of code 139, 178, 204 Vulnerability details mint is discouraged in favor of safeMint which ensures that the recipient is either an EOA or implements IERC721Receiver. Both OpenZeppelin and solmate have versions of this function. In the cases below, mint does not call...

Only ensure the Lp is repaid when close the position invites MEV bot

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Only ensure the Lp is repaid when close the position invites MEV bot Proof of Concept in the function closePosition function closePosition DataStruct.ClosePositionParams calldata params, DataCache.ClosePositionCache memory cache, Lien.Info memory lien,...

Using block.timestamp as the deadline/expiry invites MEV

Lines of code 307 Vulnerability details Passing block.timestamp as the expiry/deadline of an operation does not mean "require immediate execution" - it means "whatever block this transaction appears in, I'm comfortable with that block's timestamp". Providing this value means that a malicious mine...

The owner is a single point of failure and a centralization risk

Lines of code 56, 109, 127, 172, 219, 250, 115, 131, 154, 116, 131https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapiocaz-audit/blob/bcf61f79464cfdc0484aa272f9f6e28d...

Unchecked return value of low-level call()/delegatecall()

Lines of code 120, 141, 411, 184, 160, 189, 152, 444, 625, 638https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapioca-bar-audit/blob/2286f80f928f41c8bc189d0657d74ba83286c668/contract...

Unsafe use of transfer()/transferFrom() with IERC20

Lines of code 377, 509, 491, 530, 42, 50 Vulnerability details Some tokens do not implement the ERC20 standard properly but are still accepted by most code that accepts ERC20 tokens. For example Tether USDT's transfer and transferFrom functions on L1 do not return booleans as the specification...

The owner is a single point of failure and a centralization risk

Lines of code 56, 109, 127, 172, 219, 250, 115, 131, 154, 116, 131https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/tapiocaz-audit/blob/bcf61f79464cfdc0484aa272f9f6e28d...

Return values of transfer()/transferFrom() not checked

Lines of code 377, 509, 491, 530, 42, 50 Vulnerability details Not all IERC20 implementations revert when there's a failure in transfer/transferFrom. The function signature has a boolean return value and they indicate errors that way instead. By not checking the return value, operations that shou...

No slippage check while removing liquidity from Curve Pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The hardcoded value of 0 for the minamount parameter in the removeliquidityonecoin function of the Curve pool can have significant effects on user funds. When users are removing liquidity from the curve pool, the minamount parameter represents the minimu...

Unwrapping function emits event with incorrect values.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The etherUnwrap function in the smart contract does not correctly emit the EtherUnwrap event. The issue arises when calculating and emitting the fee and transfer amounts. The current implementation deducts the fee, transfers the calculated amount, and...

ERC721 and ERC1155 Reentrancy Guard is Incomplete and Wrongly Implemented

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Whether there is a ERC721 and ERC1155 Interaction clash or not, or if there is an inadequate transfer callback, all this would not matter as reversion would not occur due to absence of proper validation during wrap of ERC721 and ERC1155 in the Ocean.sol...

[H-02] The Ocean contract and the onERC721Received function is vulnerable to read-only re-entrancy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The contract.function called Ocean.onERC721Received is vulnerable to read-only re-entrancy. The read-only re-entrancy is possible if the contract function is called externally from another contract. What follows are the functions that are traversed throu...

Handling Potential Slippage Due to Truncation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The potential slippage issue arises from the precision loss during decimal conversion in the primitiveOutputAmount function. When interacting with the Curve Tricrypto Pool, especially involving tokens with different decimal precisions, truncation can lea...

owner can brick unwrapping by setting unwrap devisor = 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol does not handle when Ocean.changeUnwrapFee sets unwrapFeeDivisor = 0 gracefully. When setting unwrapFeeDevisor = 0, the function Ocean.calculateUnwrapFee will revert due to a division by 0. This function is used in the callstacks related to:...

Unverified Primitives

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Interacting with unverified or malicious Ocean primitives could result in loss of funds or incorrect computations. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates...

latestAnswer() may return stale values

Lines of code 121, 122, 123, 124, 51 Vulnerability details latestAnswer only returns the latest answer or zero, and thus there is no way to tell whether the value is stale or not. Use latestRoundData instead, and check whether the latest timestamp is within your protocol's limits. File:...

Contracts are vulnerable to fee-on-transfer accounting-related issues

Lines of code 359, 448, 509, 530, 42, 797, 162 Vulnerability details The functions below transfer funds from the caller to the receiver via transferFrom, but do not ensure that the actual number of tokens received is the same as the input amount to the transfer. If the token is a fee-on-transfer...

Excess funds sent via msg.value not refunded

Lines of code 201 Vulnerability details Impact The code below allows the caller to provide Ether, but does not refund the amount in excess of what's required, leaving funds stranded in the contract. The condition should be changed to check for equality, or the code should refund the excess. File:...

Return values of transfer()/transferFrom() not checked

Lines of code 377, 509, 491, 530, 42, 50 Vulnerability details Impact Not all IERC20 implementations revert when there's a failure in transfer/transferFrom. The function signature has a boolean return value and they indicate errors that way instead. By not checking the return value, operations th...

Array is push()ed but not pop()ed, and is iterated over

Lines of code 96, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485, 485https://github.com/Tapioca-DAO/ta...

asD TOKEN CREATOR CAN PROFIT UNFAIRLY FROM THE cNote TOKENS DIRECLTY TRANSFERRED TO THE asD.sol CONTRACT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The asD.withdrawCarry function is used to withdraw the interest that accrued in the asD contract in the form of NOTE tokens. Only the owner of the asD token is able to withdraw the interest accrued since the withdrawCarry is controlled by the onlyOwner...

Unchecked redeemUnderlying failure allows burning asD without redeeming NOTE, breaking peg.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The burn function does not validate the return code from redeemUnderlying. This means if redeeming fails, asD tokens could be burned without redeeming the underlying NOTE, breaking 1:1 peg. Attacker burns asD tokens and receives NOTE, but contract fails ...

Reentrancy leads to minting/burning/buying without paying the correct amount of fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Fee calculations depends on shareDataid.tokenCount, which is updated AFTER doing the transfer of token. That means, if the token is an ERC777 compatible token, users can reenter the function paying, for example, less fees on a buy operation. Proof of...

Too small deposits will result in no rsEth mint for the

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User will get nothing if the deposit amount is too small . Proof of Concept The getRsETHAmountToMint is for getting the conversion rate of asset to rsEth . /// @return rsethAmountToMint Amount of rseth to mint function getRsETHAmountToMint address asset,...

Changing rsETH address breaks contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact manipulating rsETH price Proof of Concept admin can change rsETH token address, while total supply of rsETH is used to calculate its price changing rsETH address changes its price. Tools Used Manual Review Recommended Mitigation Steps prevent changing...

rsETH can return incorrect price because of future EigenLayer strategies

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact How currently rsETH price is calculated? totalEthLocked is divided by rsETH supply. How totalEthLocked is calculated? It sums 3 amounts per every asset: 1 balance of LRTDepositPool.sol, 2 balance of all node delegators, 3 already deposited amount of asse...

A malicious contributor can increase voting power maliciously and eventually steal funds!

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unlimited voting power for attacker and stealing of funds ! Proof of Concept All of the contribute functions uses msg.value to calculate the votingpower . For example , contribute function looks like this : function contribute uint256 tokenId, address...

decreaseVotingPower() can be front-ran by an attacker to claim an amount of assets from the TokenDistributor more than he should be able to claim or withdraw more assets than he should be able to claim through rageQuit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Overview of the vulnerability / PoC The function decreaseVotingPower in PartyGovernanceNFT does not have a front-running protection against a user claiming his share of a distribution or a user ragequitting using a token which is going to get it's voting power...

No validation for the partyFactory contract !

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Malicious party contract can be deployed ! Proof of Concept Party contracts are created by the proxyFactory contract . In the initialize function , the proxyFactory contract address is provided by the user which may bring catastrophic consequences . This...

anyone can burn the governance NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Impact The impact of this finding centers on the PartyGovernanceNFT.sol smart contract, specifically within the context of the burnuint256 tokenId function. This critical function operates without any access control mechanisms in place. Consequently, it...

Unbounded iteration over all index

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The transactions could fail if the array get too big and the transaction would consume more gas than the block limit. This will then result in a denial of service for the desired functionality and break core functionality. Proof of Concept Functions like...

Stale preciousListHash state variable permanently prevents a party from executing non-unanimous arbitrary call proposals and poses a high security risk.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Overview of the execute function in PartyGovernance Before diving into the details of the vulnerability, I need to explain how the execute function works in the PartyGovernance.sol contract. The execute is the function responsible for executing a proposal after...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #617 [1699030085781]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 617 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 continue before loop variable increment In updateScores function, the rest of the loop execution is skipped with continue if a user’s score has already been updated. But the updation of the loop variable occurs...

It is possible to prematurely unlock assets that should still be locked up by setting the cooldown duration to 0.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It undermines the security of the cooldown period. Specifically: • Users who have assets locked up in the cooldown period could immediately withdraw them if the admin sets the duration to 0. This violates the intent of having a cooldown period to begin...

Taking deposits hostage

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An initial attacker can gain the power to hold subsequent deposits into StakedUSDeV2 hostage, and release them at will e.g. for a ransom. Proof of concept The checkMinShares requirement called after any withdrawal and deposit function checkMinShares...

Invalid asset address can result to malicious Market Address and loss of fund

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The computeMarketAddress function is used to calculate the address where a market contract for a specific asset would be deployed. If an invalid asset address is passed, it could potentially lead to a collision with a valid market contract address, causi...

Permanent DoS on Market Creation Failure

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Permanent DoS of creating a market if anything fails in the market constructor. Within a create2 call, instead of failing when a revert occurs in the constructor being run, it just returns address0. If this occurs within a market that's being created the...

Since the build function in 'Vault721' allows anyone to deploy a new ODProxy for any user without proper checks, it creates a potential exploit.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ability to freely deploy ODProxy contracts through the Vault721 contract's build function represents a significant security vulnerability. Exploitation of this vulnerability could lead to: Unauthorized Actions: Malicious actors could deploy proxies f...

correct use of safeAllowed modifier

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or any other relevant proof that illustrates the concept. Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps function...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #272 [1698254247989]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 272 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: ERC1155 can be inflated if the token doesn’t revert on failed transfer --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

ODProxy is flawed due to delegatecall to ODSafeManager which render system inoperable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability arises from the use of delegatecall to interact with the ODSafeManager contract, which is designed to store the context of the safe manager. However, the data inside ODSafeManager is never properly updated when ODProxy uses delegatecall...

Centralisation risk

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol has a onlyGovernor role with privileged rights to perform administrator tasks that can affect users. Proof of Concept The governorhave control over crucial function that can be updated and change according to the governor discretion. functio...

Price inflation pump

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact AfEth price can be inflated until severe rounding errors occur. Proof of concept Deposit in AfEth such that totalValue == 1 and thus 1 afEth is minted. Then AfEth.price will be in the open interval $1,2$ AfEth.price $= 1$ is extremely unlikely. Deposit i...