Unbreakable Enterprise kernel security update

[4.1.12-124.15.2]

• KVM: SVM: Move spec control call after restore of GS (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Fix the parameters alignment and missing void (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Make cpu_show_common() static (Jiri Kosina) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Fix __ssb_select_mitigation() return type (Jiri Kosina) {CVE-2018-3639}
• Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanups (Borislav Petkov) {CVE-2018-3639}
• proc: Use underscores for SSBD in ‘status’ (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/speculation: Make ‘seccomp’ the default mode for Speculative Store Bypass (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
• seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
• seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• prctl: Add force disable speculation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
• proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
• nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task (Kees Cook) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/IBRS: Disable SSB (RDS) if IBRS is sslected for spectre_v2. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86: thread_info.h: move RDS from index 5 to 23 (Mihai Carabas) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• prctl: Add speculation control prctls (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell (Thomas Gleixner) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Expose /sys/…/spec_store_bypass (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family (Piotr Luc) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/cpu: Rename Merrifield2 to Moorefield (Andy Shevchenko) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/IBRS: Warn if IBRS is enabled during boot. (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/IBRS: Use variable instead of defines for enabling IBRS (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/bugs/IBRS: Turn on IBRS in spectre_v2_select_mitigation (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• x86/msr: Add SPEC_CTRL_IBRS… (Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk) {CVE-2018-3639}
• scsi: libfc: Revisit kref handling (Hannes Reinecke)
• scsi: libfc: reset exchange manager during LOGO handling (Hannes Reinecke)
• scsi: libfc: send LOGO for PLOGI failure (Hannes Reinecke)
• scsi: libfc: Issue PRLI after a PRLO has been received (Hannes Reinecke)
• libfc: Update rport reference counting (Hannes Reinecke)
• amd/kvm: do not intercept new MSRs for spectre v2 mitigation (Elena Ufimtseva)
• RDS: null pointer dereference in rds_atomic_free_op (Mohamed Ghannam) [Orabug: 27422832] {CVE-2018-5333}
• ACPI: sbshc: remove raw pointer from printk() message (Greg Kroah-Hartman) [Orabug: 27501257] {CVE-2018-5750}
• futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation (Li Jinyue) [Orabug: 27539548] {CVE-2018-6927}
• net: ipv4: add support for ECMP hash policy choice (Venkat Venkatsubra) [Orabug: 27547114]
• net: ipv4: Consider failed nexthops in multipath routes (David Ahern) [Orabug: 27547114]
• ipv4: L3 hash-based multipath (Peter Norlund) [Orabug: 27547114]
• dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy() (Hou Tao) [Orabug: 27677556] {CVE-2017-18203}
• NFS: only invalidate dentrys that are clearly invalid. (NeilBrown) [Orabug: 27870824]
• net: Improve handling of failures on link and route dumps (David Ahern) [Orabug: 27959177]
• mm/mempolicy: fix use after free when calling get_mempolicy (zhong jiang) [Orabug: 27963519] {CVE-2018-10675}
• drm: udl: Properly check framebuffer mmap offsets (Greg Kroah-Hartman) [Orabug: 27963530] {CVE-2018-8781}
• xfs: set format back to extents if xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree (Eric Sandeen) [Orabug: 27963576] {CVE-2018-10323}
• Revert ‘mlx4: change the ICM table allocations to lowest needed size’ (Hakon Bugge) [Orabug: 27980030]
• Bluetooth: Prevent stack info leak from the EFS element. (Ben Seri) [Orabug: 28030514] {CVE-2017-1000410} {CVE-2017-1000410}