-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
SuSE Security Announcement Package: Live CD 9.1 Announcement-ID: SuSE-SA:2004:011 Date: Thursday, May 6th 2004 22:30 MEST Affected products: SUSE LINUX 9.1 Personal Edition Live CD Vulnerability Type: remote root access Severity (1-10): 8 SuSE default package: yes Other affected systems: none Content of this advisory: 1) security vulnerability resolved: Live CD 9.1 problem description, discussion, solution and upgrade information 2) pending vulnerabilities, solutions, workarounds 3) standard appendix (further information)
1) problem description, brief discussion, solution, upgrade information
The freshly released SUSE LINUX 9.1 comes in two variants: * SUSE LINUX 9.1 Professional (5 CD-ROMs, 2 double sided DVDs, printed manuals, for Intel i386 32Bit platform and 1 DVD for the AMD 64Bit platform) * SUSE LINUX 9.1 Personal (2 CD-ROMs: 1 installable CD-ROM, 1 Live CD-ROM for running SUSE LINUX on your PC without actually installing the system.) This SUSE Security Announcement targets the Live CD that comes with the SUSE LINUX 9.1 Personal edition. The Live CD can boot and run on any PC that has a CD-ROM drive, offering a convenient opportunity for users who want to try out SUSE Linux without any modification to the system that is installed on the computer. Similar CD-ROM iso images have been available for download from our ftp server with each release of the SUSE LINUX home user product for years. Upon boot, the Live CD will automatically configure a network card if one has been detected. It requires user interaction for dialup network access. A configuration error on the Live CD allows for a passwordless, remote root login to the system via ssh, if the computer has booted from the Live CD and if it is connected to a network. Since the CD-ROM is a read-only medium by definition, there is no solution for this error that would be persistent over a reboot from the Live CD. Manually killing all running instances of the secure shell daemon ("killall sshd" as root) after each boot cures the problem, while still exposing the vulnerability in the time window between startup and the killing of the sshd process. It is a policy for a fresh install of SUSE LINUX products to enable the user to log on to the system using secure shell (ssh). During the installation of the system, the user is prompted for a root password. The Live CD does not install any system on a medium and therefore does not ask for a root password. By consequence, passwordless logins should be denied on the system, regardless of whether the account in question is the super user account or not. The Live CD 9.1 suffers from this misconfiguration. Our permanent fix for the vulnerability is to download the iso image of the fixed Live CD 9.1 from the URL as listed below and to burn it on a CD-R using a CD-burner and the software that comes with the SUSE LINUX 9.1 Personal or Professional (cdrecord, k3b). The new image still runs a secure shell daemon for remote login, but it does not allow remote logins on a zero-length password account, and it denies remote root login attempts, independently from the password. We thank Patrick Kranefeld and Fabian Franz who have reported the configuration neglectfulness on the SUSE LINUX 9.1 Live CD to SUSE Security. Image authenticity verification: The file LiveCD-9.1-01.iso has a length of 706349056 bytes. If you run the command "md5sum LiveCD-9.1-01.iso" after you have downloaded the file, the md5sum command should print the following md5sum: 9f4ed1bc6b3ee582bf593fde75d5db43 This md5 sum is also contained in the file MD5SUMS in the same directory as the LiveCD-9.1-01.iso file. Its signature (by firstname.lastname@example.org) is contained in the file MD5SUMS.sig. The download location: ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/i386/live-cd-9.1/LiveCD-9.1-01.iso 9f4ed1bc6b3ee582bf593fde75d5db43 A note: Please use a mirror for downloading the SUSE LINUX 9.1 Live CD. Mirrors close to you can be found at http://www.suse.com/us/private/download/ftp/int_mirrors.html
2) Pending vulnerabilities in SuSE Distributions and Workarounds:
- canna New canna packages are available on our ftp servers, fixing tmp race conditions. - xchat A buffer overflow in the SOCKS5 code of the XChat program has been fixed. New packages are available on our ftp servers. - tcpdump The tcpdump program contained a remote DoS condition in its ISAKMP packet handling (CAN-2004-0183 and CAN-2004-0184). Fixed packages are available on our ftp servers. - lha A buffer overflow in the header parsing routines of lha has been fixed. Additionally lha did not properly handle pathnames within archives (CAN-2004-0234 and CAN-2004-0235). Fixed packages are available on our ftp servers.
3) standard appendix: authenticity verification, additional information
Package authenticity verification:
SuSE update packages are available on many mirror ftp servers all over the world. While this service is being considered valuable and important to the free and open source software community, many users wish to be sure about the origin of the package and its content before installing the package. There are two verification methods that can be used independently from each other to prove the authenticity of a downloaded file or rpm package: 1) md5sums as provided in the (cryptographically signed) announcement. 2) using the internal gpg signatures of the rpm package.
1) execute the command md5sum <name-of-the-file.rpm> after you downloaded the file from a SuSE ftp server or its mirrors. Then, compare the resulting md5sum with the one that is listed in the announcement. Since the announcement containing the checksums is cryptographically signed (usually using the key email@example.com), the checksums show proof of the authenticity of the package. We disrecommend to subscribe to security lists which cause the email message containing the announcement to be modified so that the signature does not match after transport through the mailing list software. Downsides: You must be able to verify the authenticity of the announcement in the first place. If RPM packages are being rebuilt and a new version of a package is published on the ftp server, all md5 sums for the files are useless.
2) rpm package signatures provide an easy way to verify the authenticity of an rpm package. Use the command rpm -v --checksig <file.rpm> to verify the signature of the package, where <file.rpm> is the filename of the rpm package that you have downloaded. Of course, package authenticity verification can only target an uninstalled rpm package file. Prerequisites: a) gpg is installed b) The package is signed using a certain key. The public part of this key must be installed by the gpg program in the directory ~/.gnupg/ under the user's home directory who performs the signature verification (usually root). You can import the key that is used by SuSE in rpm packages for SuSE Linux by saving this announcement to a file ("announcement.txt") and running the command (do "su -" to be root): gpg --batch; gpg < announcement.txt | gpg --import SuSE Linux distributions version 7.1 and thereafter install the key "firstname.lastname@example.org" upon installation or upgrade, provided that the package gpg is installed. The file containing the public key is placed at the toplevel directory of the first CD (pubring.gpg) and at ftp://ftp.suse.com/pub/suse/pubring.gpg-build.suse.de .
SuSE runs two security mailing lists to which any interested party may subscribe:
email@example.com - general/linux/SuSE security discussion. All SuSE security announcements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <firstname.lastname@example.org>.
email@example.com - SuSE's announce-only mailing list. Only SuSE's security annoucements are sent to this list. To subscribe, send an email to <firstname.lastname@example.org>.
For general information or the frequently asked questions (faq) send mail to: <email@example.com> or <firstname.lastname@example.org> respectively.
===================================================================== SuSE's security contact is <email@example.com> or <firstname.lastname@example.org>. The <email@example.com> public key is listed below. =====================================================================
The information in this advisory may be distributed or reproduced, provided that the advisory is not modified in any way. In particular, it is desired that the cleartext signature shows proof of the authenticity of the text. SuSE GmbH makes no warranties of any kind whatsoever with respect to the information contained in this security advisory.
Type Bits/KeyID Date User ID pub 2048R/3D25D3D9 1999-03-06 SuSE Security Team <firstname.lastname@example.org> pub 1024D/9C800ACA 2000-10-19 SuSE Package Signing Key <email@example.com>
mQGiBDnu9IERBACT8Y35+2vv4MGVKiLEMOl9GdST6MCkYS3yEKeueNWc+z/0Kvff 4JctBsgs47tjmiI9sl0eHjm3gTR8rItXMN6sJEUHWzDP+Y0PFPboMvKx0FXl/A0d M+HFrruCgBlWt6FA+okRySQiliuI5phwqkXefl9AhkwR8xocQSVCFxcwvwCglVcO QliHu8jwRQHxlRE0tkwQQI0D+wfQwKdvhDplxHJ5nf7U8c/yE/vdvpN6lF0tmFrK XBUX+K7u4ifrZlQvj/81M4INjtXreqDiJtr99Rs6xa0ScZqITuZC4CWxJa9GynBE D3+D2t1V/f8l0smsuYoFOF7Ib49IkTdbtwAThlZp8bEhELBeGaPdNCcmfZ66rKUd G5sRA/9ovnc1krSQF2+sqB9/o7w5/q2qiyzwOSTnkjtBUVKn4zLUOf6aeBAoV6NM CC3Kj9aZHfA+ND0ehPaVGJgjaVNFhPi4x0e7BULdvgOoAqajLfvkURHAeSsxXIoE myW/xC1sBbDkDUIBSx5oej73XCZgnj/inphRqGpsb+1nKFvF+rQoU3VTRSBQYWNr YWdlIFNpZ25pbmcgS2V5IDxidWlsZEBzdXNlLmRlPohcBBMRAgAcBQI57vSBBQkD wmcABAsKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyl8sAJ98BgD40zw0GHJHIf6d NfnwI2PAsgCgjH1+PnYEl7TFjtZsqhezX7vZvYCIRgQQEQIABgUCOnBeUgAKCRCe QOMQAAqrpNzOAKCL512FZvv4VZx94TpbA9lxyoAejACeOO1HIbActAevk5MUBhNe LZa/qM2JARUDBRA6cGBvd7LmAD0l09kBATWnB/9An5vfiUUE1VQnt+T/EYklES3t XXaJJp9pHMa4fzFa8jPVtv5UBHGee3XoUNDVwM2OgSEISZxbzdXGnqIlcT08TzBU D9i579uifklLsnr35SJDZ6ram51/CWOnnaVhUzneOA9gTPSr+/fT3WeVnwJiQCQ3 0kNLWVXWATMnsnT486eAOlT6UNBPYQLpUprF5Yryk23pQUPAgJENDEqeU6iIO9Ot 1ZPtB0lniw+/xCi13D360o1tZDYOp0hHHJN3D3EN8C1yPqZd5CvvznYvB6bWBIpW cRgdn2DUVMmpU661jwqGlRz1F84JG/xe4jGuzgpJt9IXSzyohEJB6XG5+D0BiF0E ExECAB0FAjxqqTQFCQoAgrMFCwcKAwQDFQMCAxYCAQIXgAAKCRCoTtronIAKyp1f AJ9dR7saz2KPNwD3U+fy/0BDKXrYGACfbJ8fQcJqCBQxeHvt9yMPDVq0B0W5Ag0E Oe70khAIAISR0E3ozF/la+oNaRwxHLrCet30NgnxRROYhPaJB/Tu1FQokn2/Qld/ HZnh3TwhBIw1FqrhWBJ7491iAjLR9uPbdWJrn+A7t8kSkPaF3Z/6kyc5a8fas44h t5h+6HMBzoFCMAq2aBHQRFRNp9Mz1ZvoXXcI1lk1l8OqcUM/ovXbDfPcXsUVeTPT tGzcAi2jVl9hl3iwJKkyv/RLmcusdsi8YunbvWGFAF5GaagYQo7YlF6UaBQnYJTM 523AMgpPQtsKm9o/w9WdgXkgWhgkhZEeqUS3m5xNey1nLu9iMvq9M/iXnGz4sg6Q 2Y+GqZ+yAvNWjRRou3zSE7Bzg28MI4sAAwYH/2D71Xc5HPDgu87WnBFgmp8MpSr8 QnSs0wwPg3xEullGEocolSb2c0ctuSyeVnCttJMzkukL9TqyF4s/6XRstWirSWaw JxRLKH6Zjo/FaKsshYKf8gBkAaddvpl3pO0gmUYbqmpQ3xDEYlhCeieXS5MkockQ 1sj2xYdB1xO0ExzfiCiscUKjUFy+mdzUsUutafuZ+gbHog1CN/ccZCkxcBa5IFCH ORrNjq9pYWlrxsEn6ApsG7JJbM2besW1PkdEoxak74z1senh36m5jQvVjA3U4xq1 wwylxadmmJaJHzeiLfb7G1ZRjZTsB7fyYxqDzMVul6o9BSwO/1XsIAnV1uuITAQY EQIADAUCOe70kgUJA8JnAAAKCRCoTtronIAKyksiAJsFB3/77SkH3JlYOGrEe1Ol 0JdGwACeKTttgeVPFB+iGJdiwQlxasOfuXyITAQYEQIADAUCPGqpWQUJCgCCxwAK CRCoTtronIAKyofBAKCSZM2UFyta/fe9WgITK9I5hbxxtQCfX+0ar2CZmSknn3co SPihn1+OBNyZAQ0DNuEtBAAAAQgAoCRcd7SVZEFcumffyEwfLTcXQjhKzOahzxpo omuF+HIyU4AGq+SU8sTZ/1SsjhdzzrSAfv1lETACA+3SmLr5KV40Us1w0UC64cwt A46xowVq1vMlH2Lib+V/qr3b1hE67nMHjysECVx9Ob4gFuKNoR2eqnAaJvjnAT8J /LoUC20EdCHUqn6v+M9t/WZgC+WNR8cq69uDy3YQhDP/nIan6fm2uf2kSV9A7ZxE GrwsWl/WX5Q/sQqMWaU6r4az98X3z90/cN+eJJ3vwtA+rm+nxEvyev+jaLuOQBDf ebh/XA4FZ35xmi+spdiVeJH4F/ubaGlmj7+wDOF3suYAPSXT2QAFEbQlU3VTRSBT ZWN1cml0eSBUZWFtIDxzZWN1cml0eUBzdXNlLmRlPokBFQMFEDbhLUfkWLKHsco8 RQEBVw4H/1vIdiOLX/7hdzYaG9crQVIk3QwaB5eBbjvLEMvuCZHiY2COUg5QdmPQ 8SlWNZ6k4nu1BLcv2g/pymPUWP9fG4tuSnlUJDrWGm3nhyhAC9iudP2u1YQY37Gb B6NPVaZiYMnEb4QYFcqv5c/r2ghSXUTYk7etd6SW6WCOpEqizhx1cqDKNZnsI/1X 11pFcO2N7rc6byDBJ1T+cK+F1Ehan9XBt/shryJmv04nli5CXQMEbiqYYMOu8iaA 8AWRgXPCWqhyGhcVD3LRhUJXjUOdH4ZiHCXaoF3zVPxpeGKEQY8iBrDeDyB3wHmj qY9WCX6cmogGQRgYG6yJqDalLqrDOdmJARUDBRA24S0Ed7LmAD0l09kBAW04B/4p WH3f1vQn3i6/+SmDjGzUu2GWGq6Fsdwo2hVM2ym6CILeow/K9JfhdwGvY8LRxWRL hn09j2IJ9P7H1Yz3qDf10AX6V7YILHtchKT1dcngCkTLmDgC4rs1iAAl3f089sRG BafGPGKv2DQjHfR1LfRtbf0P7c09Tkej1MP8HtQMW9hPkBYeXcwbCjdrVGFOzqx+ AvvJDdT6a+oyRMTFlvmZ83UV5pgoyimgjhWnM1V4bFBYjPrtWMkdXJSUXbR6Q7Pi RZWCzGRzwbaxqpl3rK/YTCphOLwEMB27B4/fcqtBzgoMOiaZA0M5fFoo54KgRIh0 zinsSx2OrWgvSiLEXXYKiEYEEBECAAYFAjseYcMACgkQnkDjEAAKq6ROVACgjhDM /3KM+iFjs5QXsnd4oFPOnbkAnjYGa1J3em+bmV2aiCdYXdOuGn4ZiQCVAwUQN7c7 whaQN/7O/JIVAQEB+QP/cYblSAmPXxSFiaHWB+MiUNw8B6ozBLK0QcMQ2YcL6+Vl D+nSZP20+Ja2nfiKjnibCv5ss83yXoHkYk2Rsa8foz6Y7tHwuPiccvqnIC/c9Cvz dbIsdxpfsi0qWPfvX/jLMpXqqnPjdIZErgxpwujas1n9016PuXA8K3MJwVjCqSKI RgQQEQIABgUCOhpCpAAKCRDHUqoysN/3gCt7AJ9adNQMbmA1iSYcbhtgvx9ByLPI DgCfZ5Wj+f7cnYpFZI6GkAyyczG09sE= =LRKC - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Roman Drahtmüller, SuSE Security.
iQEVAwUBQJqjyney5gA9JdPZAQFmQQf8Cb/2SHM1JrFXwYII6Kq54AH3MCLfIraf LNsStCt2PKRFOFThP5dpiez+Q8pGZMgkwTBE47Af6zo6/I2T6Y/IJguTWBv29HUf 99lh1bFj7dXjyjQ70FbhDhLp6U7PoIMI/jTbkGABw9MvLpNSCEZMyu5hn46yRT1B tvsjGJvV0IH+1neZI4rsT1H0t1aBhmH2RHN15uOBEazv6fXnQsefPqWcSAYqnMpV A/RkuMOSyJRN+DPs00uWpTmTvn77/fhPmq332D1nAU5q+XBjT/zIzLs/RFam801u H7DBWJkzVtHV7bhdNWWOQCUAll2DtUZXErwbM/EVLTmmeYGJ9boIdg== =araV -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----