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MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2009-004 Original release: 2010-01-12
Topic: integer underflow in AES and RC4 decryption
CVE-2009-4212 integer underflow in AES and RC4 decryption
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
CVSSv2 Base Score: 10
Access Vector: Network Access Complexity: Low Authentication: None Confidentiality Impact: Complete Integrity Impact: Complete Availability Impact: Complete
CVSSv2 Temporal Score: 7.8
Exploitability: Proof-of-Concept Remediation Level: Official Fix Report Confidence: Confirmed
Integer underflow bugs in the AES and RC4 decryption operations of the crypto library of the MIT Kerberos software can cause crashes, heap corruption, or, under extraordinarily unlikely conditions, arbitrary code execution. Only releases krb5-1.3 and later are vulnerable, as earlier releases did not contain the functionality implemented by the vulnerable code.
This is an implementation vulnerability in MIT krb5, and is not a vulnerability in the Kerberos protocol.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can, by inducing the decryption of an invalid AES or RC4 ciphertext, cause a crash or heap corruption, or, under extraordinarily unlikely conditions, arbitrary code execution. A successful code-execution attack against a KDC can compromise all services relying on that KDC for authentication. However, the most probable outcome is a crash due to a memory fault or abort() call. An attacker with a valid account in the relevant Kerberos realm has a marginally higher chance of success to execute arbitrary code, but the probability is still very low. Therefore, the given Confidentiality Impact and Integrity Impact metrics of "Complete" represent theoretical worst-case scenarios and are both more realistically characterized as "Partial".
KDC and application servers in MIT krb5-1.3 and later releases are vulnerable. Earlier releases did not contain the functionality implemented by the vulnerable code.
Third-party applications linked with the libraries from vulnerable releases are also vulnerable.
The upcoming krb5-1.7.1 and krb5-1.6.4 releases will contain a fix for this vulnerability.
For the krb5-1.7 release, apply the patch available at:
A PGP-signed patch is available at
A PGP-signed patch is available at
This announcement is posted at:
This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:
The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:
CVE: CVE-2009-4212 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-4212
The MIT Kerberos Team security contact address is <firstname.lastname@example.org>. When sending sensitive information, please PGP-encrypt it using the following key:
pub 2048R/D9058C24 2009-01-26 [expires: 2010-02-01] uid MIT Kerberos Team Security Contact <email@example.com>
The greatest risk is from AES decryption of invalid ciphertexts, which can theoretically lead to arbitrary code execution under extraordinarily unlikely conditions. Other scenarios are more likely to lead to denial of service.
This advisory makes some reasonable assumptions about the platform. We assume that attempts to invoke malloc() to allocate nearly SIZE_MAX bytes will fail, which is reasonable for conventional memory architectures. We also assume that the process has less than UINT_MAX contiguous bytes of heap address space mapped, which is reasonable given likely hardware and operating system configurations.
The Kerberos protocol specifications define the format of valid ciphertexts encrypted with AES (in RFC 3962) or RC4 (in RFC 4757) ciphers. Valid ciphertexts have a minimum length, as they include HMAC values and random confounders. The implementation of the AES and RC4 decryption operations does not adequately check that the provided ciphertext meets the minimum length requirements of the ciphertext format, and proceeds as if the minimums were already satisfied. The decryption operations perform integer subtractions that underflow when the minimums are not satisfied.
The integer underflows can cause the AES decryption operation to write to memory located before the caller's output buffer. This behavior represents the highest risk for execution of arbitrary code, but this risk is still fairly small. On platforms where malloc(0) (a request to allocate zero bytes) returns a null pointer, this behavior will not occur, because this null pointer result triggers adequate error handling.
The data written during this event is the result of the AES-CTS decryption of the 32 bytes preceding the input buffer. The attacker might not be able to directly influence the contents of the 32 bytes preceding the input buffer, and might not know the encryption key that will be used. Without knowledge of the encryption key, the attacker has effectively no chance to predict which byte values will be written. Due to the strong cryptographic properties of AES, for an attacker who knows the encryption key but who does not have perfect knowledge of the bytes to be decrypted, the probability of producing the desired bytes is one in the number of possible uncontrolled values of the bytes to be decrypted.
Other possible consequences of the integer underflow in the AES decryption code include a crash due to an explicit abort() call inside a section of code that checks (imperfectly) for invalid lengths.
The related integer underflow in the RC4 decryption code can cause an attempt to copy nearly UINT_MAX bytes from the decryption buffer to the output buffer, most likely causing a crash from a memory fault. In the unlikely event that the copy does not fault (only really possible on 64-bit platforms), there is a risk of heap corruption and arbitrary code execution.
On 64-bit platforms, where an attempt to malloc() nearly UINT_MAX bytes is more likely to succeed, the decryption code may attempt to decrypt nearly UINT_MAX bytes, leading to either an ordinary (correctly handled) error condition due to (almost certain) HMAC validation failure or to a crash due to a memory fault (if decrypting beyond the end of the input buffer crosses over into invalid address space).
2010-01-12 original release
Copyright (C) 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.8 (SunOS)
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