Author: Stan Bubrouski (firstname.lastname@example.org) Date: February 20, 2001 Package: Chili!Soft ASP Versions affected: 3.5.2 and possibly previous versions. Severity: (1) A remote user could potentially view sensative information and take remote control of the server. (2) The installer installs a default username and password for the adminstrative console if auto-detect of settings is used. (3) There are also several serious file permissions problems.
(1) Chili!Soft ASP ships with samples scripts which are located in /opt/casp/caspsamp by default and are installed on webservers by default accessable via http://<server>/caspsamp/ A sample script named codebrws.asp prolly taken from IIS/4.0 originally is vulnerable to a "../" attack allowing sensative information to be revieled to remote users. During brief testing I was only able to get the script to read files on directory above the caspsamp directory which is the /opt/casp directory by default. This directory contains database usernames/passwords, the server logs, and the username/password to administration console. With the password to the administrative console a remote user with web access can remotely manage the server thus openning endless possibilies since the console runs as root.
It appears they attempted to prevent people from viewing files outside the samples directory because when I tried with an url not containing /caspsamp/ at the begining it would fail and warn me that I'm not allowed to view files outside the samples directory.
(2) The installer program installs a default username and password for adminstration console which is remotely accessable via the web. The username/password are stored in the file /opt/admin/conf/service.pwd which is probably the only file installed with the correct permissions (in this case mode 600).
(3) There are several files installed mode 666 which is a serious no-no as some logs and configuration files are affected by this. On my system the following files were installed mode 666:
/opt/casp/logs/install_summary /opt/casp/logs/install /opt/casp/logs/register /opt/casp/logs/server-3000 /opt/casp/logs/component /opt/casp/caspsamp/401K/database/QEDBF.INI /opt/casp/caspsamp/friendship/agent/database/QEDBF.INI /opt/casp/caspsamp/friendship/client/database/QEDBF.INI /opt/casp/caspsamp/QEDBF.INI /opt/casp/chilicom/lib/hkey.current.user /opt/casp/chilicom/lib/hkey.local.machine /opt/casp/INSTALL/.webserver-cache /opt/casp/.installed_db /opt/casp/admin/conf/hkey.current.user /opt/casp/admin/conf/hkey.local.machine /opt/casp/admin/logs/server
This may seem bad it gets worse. Most of the files dealing with databases such as global_odbc.ini and odbc.ini are all world-readable and thus by default expose passwords administrators may lator install to local users. All configuration files for the server and subsequent other services offered Chili!Soft ASP are also world-readable exposing even more useful information to local users.
Examples: http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../admin/conf/service.pwd http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../global_odbc.ini http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../admin/logs/server http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../LICENSE.LIC http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../logs/server-3000
Solution: Remove all references to the sample ASP file in your httpd.conf and replace the default admin account. Then change file permissions in /opt/casp as your system security dictates (in other words figure it out for yourself)
Vendor Status: Vendor was e-mailed these problems on December 30, 2000.
Copyright ©2001 Stan Bubrouski