Loss of ETH for proposer when it is a contract that doesn't have fallback function.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description sendEthOrWeth is used in several locations in OptimisticListingSeaport: 1. rejectProposal - sent to proposer 2. rejectActive - sent to proposer 3. cash - sent to msg.sender This is the implementation of sendEthOrWeth: function...

LP pricing formula is vulnerable to flash loan manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The LP pricing formula used in the buyQuote, sellQuote, addQuote, removeQuote functions of Pair.sol contract is vulnerable to flash loan manipulation. Proof of Concept The baseTokenReserves calculates the current balance of base token reserves. This...

Invalid tokens can be added to the pair

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact merkleRoot is a bytes32 and it is compared to bytes230 which makes it possible for a non-zero merkleRoot to be set in the constructor and yet still all tokens will be declared as valid Proof of Concept Tools Used Manual Audit Recommended Mitigation Steps...

rejectProposal/rejectActive/cancel did not update pendingBalances

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the OptimisticListingSeaport contract, pendingBalances represents the number of Rae tokens sent to the contract by the user when creating the proposal, which can be withdrawn in the withdrawCollateral function. function withdrawCollateraladdress vault...

ERC20 TOKENS WITH DIFFERENT DECIMALS THAN 18 MAY BREAK THE LOGIC AND PROVIDE UNEXPECTED RESULTS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Note: Though it is mentioned that Rebase/fee-on-transfer tokens are not expected, however there exist other ERC20 tokens having different decimals than 18 Contracts LpToken and Pair performs calculations by using hardcoded value of decimals 18 1e18 for...

(*POTENTIAL DUPLICATE) unwrap function can be exploited to exchange lower priced NFT's for higher priced counterparts

Lines of code Vulnerability details POTENTIAL DUPLICATE - Submitted earlier but haven't received an email confirmation. Hence resubmitting - please ignore if my earlier submission was already recorded Impact nftRemove function takes an array of tokenIds and LPTokens, releases the fractional NFT...

Reentrancy issue #2: Functions remove() and sell() are vulnerable to reentrancy attack if baseToken implement a call to receiver in _beforeTokenTransfer().

Lines of code Vulnerability details It is important to be aware that I have reported two reentrancy bugs. Each of these have different ways of being activated and can be found in separate functions. Impact All calculations done in Caviar Pair are using token balance directly. For example, when...

NOT refunding excess token while adding liquidity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LP providers can lose fund Proof of Concept Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps incase of ether, return excess ether - incase of erc20, transfer only required amount - --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: 😕 1 Shun...

Pair.sol contract is susceptible to having its pricing curve (x*y = k) manipulated through a 3rd party contract calling selfdestruct() and forwarding ether.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If a pair is denominated in ether, a third party contract can forward ether to the contract using the selfdestruct function passing the pair's address. The impact of this is that the pair will allow its market making curve to be manipulated. Among other...

LP token is vulnerable to flashloan manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The addQuote function in the pair.sol smart contract utilizes a pricing formula for liquidity pools that is susceptible to exploitation through flashloan manipulation. By introducing a large quantity of...

Price manipulation by sending Ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Price manipulation by sending Ether not profitable although The function Pair.price uses Pair.baseTokenReserves uses addressthis.balance or ERC20baseToken.balanceOfaddressthis. In case addressthis.balance is used when address0 is passed, there can be price...

When user of GroupBuy is a contract, refunds will be permanently frozen.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description claim function is used in GroupBuy to mint Raes proportional to user's contribution to the purchased NFT. withdrawBalance is used to get back funds which are not part of the contribution. They both contain an unsafe call with ETH. For example:...

Possible Reentrancy Vulnerability

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Add function, in case of non Eth Base Token, LP Tokens are minted for LP Provider before transferring the Base Token from Provider to Contract. In remove function, Fractional Tokens are Transferred to LP Provider before Burning the LP Token. In wrap...

Any user which holds Raes tokens can infinitely freeze NFT in OptimisticListingSeaport

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description OptimisticListingSeaport exposes propose method to create new proposal, and rejectProposal to remove a listing in proposal stage. In propose, proposer commits a certain amount of collateral: // Sets collateral amount to pending balances for withdraw...

Attacker can DOS OptimisticListing with very low cost

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The only check on a new proposal is that it is priced lower than the existing proposal. It does not constrain on the collateral supplied except it will revert in verifyBalance if set to 0. Anyone can block normal proposal creation by creating a proposal...

A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the lpToken's pricePerShare to take an unfair share of future users' deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A well known attack vector for almost all shares based liquidity pool contracts, where an early user can manipulate the price per share and profit from late users' deposits because of the precision loss caused by the rather large value of price per share...

Frontrunning initial liquidity adding

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Creation of the pair does not add initial liquidity which leads to situation where attacker can front-run creator and execute sandwich attack against the creator. Exploitation Scenario: 1. Alice creates pair and wants to add liquidity 2. Bob front-runs...

Attacker can make group pay for tokenID that is not intended.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description purchase in GroupBuy.sol executes the purchase call for the group. There are two possibilities for which tokenIDs can be bought in GroupBuy: 1. If the group is for a specific NFT, the tokenID is the value in pool.merkleRoot variable. 2. If the group...

Pair.sol:close() does not recover any of the base token / liquidity tokens before destroying it

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If pair hold any of the native or any other liquidity tokens, that never be recovered if the pair is destroyed. Proof of Concept owner has special rights to destroy the pair if it is compromised. But before destroy, it does not recover any of of the toke...

Anyone can use funds in GroupBuy.sol to buy the NFTs for themselves

Lines of code Vulnerability details The GroupBuy contract allows users to pool their funds in order to buy specific NFTs once enough funds have been raised. The purchace function does not do any caller authorization and allows the caller to pass in an arbitrary address for executing the buy. The...

Attacker can delay proposal rejection

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In OptimisticListingSeaport.rejectProposal, it revert if proposedListing.collateral if proposedListing.collateral proposedListing.collateral -= amount; Proof of Concept 1. Attacker propose at 10000 collateral at a very low price 2. Bob try to reject it b...

contribute() locks too much ETH from the user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the contribute function of the GroupBuy contract, even if the filledQuantity is less than quantity, all the ETH provided by the user is locked in the contract, and the user can only call claim to get it back after purchasing NFT or Pool expires, which...

Attacker can steal the amount collected so far in the GroupBuy for NFT purchase.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description purchase in GroupBuy.sol executes the purchase call for the group. After safety checks, the NFT is bought with market's execute function. Supposedly it deploys a vault which owns the NFT. The code makes sure the vault is the new owner of the NFT and...

MISSING HANDLE FOR DIRECT SEND OF TOKEN

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current implementation of the protocol does not handle situations when tokens are sent directly to the pair contract. Tokens directly send to the contract can affect the calculation of baseTokenReserves which affect buyQuoute and sellQuoute. Below is...

Upgraded Q -> M from #163 [1671458931869]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 163 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: TOKEN TRANSFERS DO NOT VERIFY THAT THE TOKENS WERE SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFERRED Some tokens like zrx do not revert the transaction when the transfer/transferfrom fails and return false, which requires us to check the...

Bids are wrongly ordered when prices and quantities are equal.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In GroupBuy, when total amount of Raes is filled up with purchases, users start competing with higher price offers. Their bids are laid out in a min priority queue structure implemented in MinPriorityQueue.sol. The docs clearly state that when two...

User can send a proposal and instantly take back their collateral, keeping the proposal active without risking any Raes amount.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In OptimisticListingSeaport.sol, users call propose to set a new proposal. The pendingBalance is updated immediately for the calling proposer: // Sets collateral amount to pending balances for withdrawal pendingBalancesvaultproposedListing.proposer ...

Tokens are expected to have 18 decimals but not all have them

Lines of code Vulnerability details Tokens are expected to have 18 decimals but not all have them Summary Pairs doesn't consider tokens with less or more than 18 decimals Impact Tokens not compatible Proof of Concept Mitigation Don't use hardcoded 18 decimals --- The text was updated successfully...

Rounding down leads to breakage of the xy curve calculation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When needing to calculate the inputAmount required to receive a certain amount of fractional tokens called outputAmount, we are deriving from the xy = k curve used on the Uniswap V2 protocol. Proof of Concept Some maths: The so-called curve equation is: ...

Price manipulation if baseToken have transfer hook

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Pair calculate the price by dividing the fractional token reserve with base token reserve. If the token have a before transfer hook, there would be a time where the fractional token reserves changed but the base token reserve have not, where the executio...

Unlimited minting of fractional tokens by calling Pair.wrap() multiple times

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User can mint an unlimited amount of fractional tokens and break the protocol by selling the tokens. Proof of Concept NFTs can be traded for 1e18 fractional tokens by calling the function wrap. Wrap calls validateTokenIdstokenIds, proofs which in turn ru...

buyQuote should be rounded up

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The buyQuote is not rounded up, which can cause a leak of value, due to the buyQuote being underestimated. Proof of Concept The function Pair.buyQuote does not round up, which can cause the issue described under Impact: function buyQuoteuint256...

xyk invariant does not hold after calls to buy() and sell()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Functions buyQuote and sellQuote are defined like this in Pair.sol: /// @notice The amount of base tokens required to buy a given amount of fractional tokens. /// @dev Calculated using the xyk invariant and a 30bps fee. /// @param outputAmount The amount...

Reentrancy issue #1: Functions buy() and add() are vulnerable to reentrancy attack through tokensToSend() hook of ERC777

Lines of code Vulnerability details It is important to be aware that I have reported two reentrancy bugs. Each of these have different ways of being activated and can be found in separate functions. Impact All calculations done in Caviar Pair are using token balance directly. For example, when...

Earlier bidders get cut out of future NFT holdings by bidders specifying the same price.

Lines of code LOC: Vulnerability details Description In GroupBuy module, users can call contribute to get a piece of the NFT pie. There are two stages in transforming the msg.value to holdings in the NFT. 1. filling at any pricesupply is not yet saturated uint256 fillAtAnyPriceQuantity =...

Malicious users can block listing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the OptimisticListingSeaport contract, any user with the Rae token corresponding to this Vault can call the propose function to create a listing proposal, which can be used for listing when the proposal exists over PROPOSALPERIOD. function listaddress...

Users that send funds at a price lower than the current low bid have the funds locked

Lines of code Vulnerability details If a user contributes funds after there is no more supply left, and they don't provide a price higher than the current minimum bid, they will be unable to withdraw their funds while the NFT remains unbought. Impact Ether becomes stuck until and unless the NFT i...

Centralization Risks, Rug pull vectors

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Owner can mint or burn unlimited tokens, functions can be used to rug pull the project. Proof of Concept Although owner role is supposedly not malicious, if owner's wallet keys are compromised, an attacker could rug the project. Based on the fact that we...

GroupBuys that are completely filled still don't raise stated target amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description createPool in GroupBuy.sol creates a new contribution pool around an NFT. It specifies a target initialPrice as minimum amount of ETH the NFT will cost, and totalSupply which is the number of Raes to be minted on purchase success. minBidPrices is...

there is no check for ensure closeTimestamp is not bigger than timestamp

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact logic issue Proof of Concept if closeTimestamp be bigger than timestamp logic will break, there is no check Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps check that closeTimestamp is not bigger than timestamp --- The text was updated successfully, but these...

Users could receive 0 LPTokens when calling add

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The addQuote function in Pair.sol calculates the amount of LPTokens received for the amount of baseTokens and fractionalTokens sent. If LPToken's supply 0 then the min amount of baseTokenShare and fractionaTokenShare is used. When the add function is use...

Proposal can be infinitely DOSed with no additional conditions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description OptimisticListingSeaport.sol is easily DOSable due to the following conditions: 1. A new proposal overrides the existing proposal 2. The deposited collateral can be any non-zero amount 3. Only requirement is that pricePerToken is lower than before. ...

## MALICIOUS OWNER CAN CLOSE AND WITHDRAW AS HE WANT

Lines of code Vulnerability details MALICIOUS OWNER CAN CLOSE AND WITHDRAW AS HE WANT These functions below are set some emergency scenarios. But caviar.Owner able to triggered these functions as he want. Need to set some require statement in order to actually check these scenarios before his...

Bidding data structure is corrupted, leading to unfair removal from queue.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description processBidsInQueue in GroupBuy handles integrating a new bid into the existing structure. If bumps out lower-paying bids until the new bid is completely fulfilled or the remaining bids are too high. When the lowest paying bid has higher quantity tha...

Protocol's fractional token assumes that each NFT in a collection has the same value

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User can cheat the system by wrapping getting fractional tokens a low value NFT and unwrapping a high value NFT selling the same fractional tokens. Pair creator might lose out. Proof of Concept Pair.wrap takes in an array of tokenIds and an array of...

MEV searchers can capture slippage tolerance on pool creation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the current Caviar protocol, anybody can supply initial liquidity to a newly created pool. An LP who intends to create a new pool and add liqiduity could execute the following transactions: 1. LP transaction 1: pair = Caviar.create 2. LP transaction 2...

there is no max value for min lp in add function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact breaking logic, ... Proof of Concept there is no check Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps ad checks to ensure min lp amt is have max --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: 👎 2 Shungy and soosh1337 reacted with thum...

User didn't get an lpToken when trying to add liquidity to the pair with some baseTokenAmount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User didn't get an lpToken when trying to add liquidity to the pair with some baseTokenAmount. The user lost their asset since they didn't get any lpToken Proof of Concept Inside Pair.sol contract, the add function exist for adding liquidity to the pair...

Upgraded Q -> M from #334 [1671456734920]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 334 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Collateral.withdraw allows the manager to withdraw an arbitrary amount of baseToken from Collateral. The only check is in the ManagerWithdrawHook.hook call, where it checks the withdrawal does not drop the amount of...

[M-0] Unhandled return values of transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details c4udit Report Issues found M-0 Unhandled return values of transfer Impact Some implementations of transfer could return ‘false’ on failure instead of reverting. Findings: src\Pair.sol::85 = transferFrommsg.sender, addressthis, fractionalTokenAmount;...