Griefing risk in mint

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact CidNFT.mint has an optional parameter addList that enables users to register subprotocol NFTs to the CID NFT right after the mint. However, there is no guarantee that the cidNFTID encoded in addList is the same ID as the newly minted NFT. If there is a...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #653 [1675442664703]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 653 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. Funds are locked if Rialto use function finishFailedMinipoolByMultisig Detail Function finishFailedMinipoolByMultisig did not transfer any funds or doing any data change, only updating state of minipool to Finishe...

CidNFT: Broken tokenURI function

Lines of code Vulnerability details CidNFTtokenURI does not convert the uint256 id argument to a string before interpolating it in the token URI: /// @notice Get the token URI for the provided ID /// @param id ID to retrieve the URI for /// @return tokenURI The URI of the queried token path to a...

Multiple accounts can have the same identity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Users can register their on-chain identity ie their CID NFT by calling AddressRegistry.register File: src/AddressRegistry.sol 42: function registeruint256 cidNFTID external 43: if ERC721cidNFT.ownerOfcidNFTID != msg.sender 44: // We only guarantee that a CID NF...

AddressRegistry.sol#getCID() may return an nft id that is no longer valid

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The inability of AddressRegistry.solgetCID to return a valid value makes the AddressRegistry functionality meaningless. Other contracts that use the cid protocol will get the wrong data, which may produce various abnormal situations and may even lead to...

Other users cannot help a CIDNFT holder add subprotocols to the NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Other users cannot approve and help CIDNFT holders add subprotocols to the NFT, breaking protocol specifications. Proof of Concept In the video walkthrough, around the 8 minute mark, it is mentioned that users can help NFT holders add subprotocols to the...

Unchecked External Call Vulnerability in ownerOf Function Call.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the worst-case scenario, if the ownerOf function call reverts due to a security vulnerability in the ERC721 contract, the caller's data could be manipulated, and their funds could be at risk. This could lead to a loss of funds for users who have...

Upgraded Q -> M from #694 [1675343502331]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 694 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: there is no check that duration of the Minipool is bigger than 14 days and a malicious node runner can set duration as 0 day and if he fails the calculated slash amount would be 0. --- The text was updated...

[H-01] Reentrancy attack is possible when using ERC777 tokens in DripsHub

Lines of code Vulnerability details H-01 Reentrancy attack is possible when using ERC777 tokens in DripsHub Impact: Some ERC20 tokens implement the EIP 777 interface including the tokensToSend hook, which performs a callback to the user from which tokens will be transferred before the tokens are...

ERC721 safeTransferFrom is not enough to safeguard a subprotocol NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept There is a safeguard mechanism to ensure that no transfers of the subprotocol NFT happen after said NFT is tied to the CID NFT. Without it, someone could transfer or even burn the subprotocol NFT while it is still associated. // The CID Protoco...

Use abi.encode instead of abi.encodePacked to prevent data collisions for object hashing

Lines of code Vulnerability details M-01 Use abi.encode instead of abi.encodePacked Impact hash collisions on the data stored for object hashing Proof of Concept From the solidity documentation: If you use keccak256abi.encodePackeda, b and both a and b are dynamic types, it is easy to craft...

Attacker can frontrun a victim's mint+add transaction to steal NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact High - an attacker can steal deposited NFTs from victims using the mint + add functionality in CidNFT.sol Proof of Concept One of the core features of CID Protocol is the ability for users to attach Subprotocol NFTs to their CidNFT. The CidNFT contract...

Upgraded Q -> H from #694 [1675343512989]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 694 as H risk. The relevant finding follows: there is no check that duration of the Minipool is less than 365 days and if user by mistake set very high value for duration and fails to run node properly user would lose very large number of his GGP collaterals...

DOS mint and add by frontrunning

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact CidNFT.mintbytes allow user to mint and add subprotocol NFTs directly after minting. The addList args to the add call include the cidNFTID param, which can change if there are other mint before the user's transaction. Proof of Concept An attacker can DOS...

Attacker can steal subprotocol NFT from user who use mint and add

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact CidNFT.mintbytes allow user to mint and add subprotocol NFTs directly after minting. The addList args to the add call include the cidNFTID param, which can change if there are other mint before the user's transaction. Additionally, CidNFT.add only check ...

An approved operator of a CID NFT owner can steall any subprotocol NFTs from the CID NFT Owner and his other approved operators.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. An approved operator of a CID NFT owner, if becomes malicious or compromised, can steal any subprotocol NFTs from the CID NFT Owner and his other approved operators. This is possible because: after...

Solmate's safeTransfer can result in failed transfer with low level call and won't revert as it does not check the codesize of to address, which may lead to loss of funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details The following contract use solmate's SafeTransferLib : solmate/utils/SafeTransferLib.sol Solmate's safeTransfer / safeTransferFrom uses inline assembly call to transfer ether from contract to receiver. According to Solidity Docs the call may return true even if...

SubprotocolRegistry is vulnerable to malicious names

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious subprotocol can register a name that looks the same as any other protocol. Users may use the malicious subprotocol because they can't distinguish the names, and be cheated out of subprotocolFee. Proof of Concept Any subprotocol can be...

cidFeeWallet can be address(0)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact TLDR; the cidFeeWallet can be assigned to address0, in which case fees would be burned but otherwise the system operates as expected. In the constructor for both SubprotocolRegistry and CidNFT, a wallet is assigned to which fees will be sent. This applie...

Critical Vulnerability exposed Reentrancy attack allowing unlimited Fund Withdrawals.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function register where it transfers a fixed amount of $NOTE tokens 100 $NOTE to the cidFeeWallet address without checking the reentrancy status. An attacker can repeatedly call this function to drain the contract balance...

Fee can be transferred to the zero address while subprotocol registeration

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Everytime user register a new subprotocol to the registry contract, the registry contract transfer the fee to the cidFeeWallet from the registrar. There is missing vaildation that the transfer should not goes to zero address. If no address has been set f...

Locked Ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Contract with a payable function, but without a withdrawal capacity. Impact Every Ether sent to LendgineRouter will be lost. Proof of Concept File: src/periphery/LendgineRouter.sol 142: function mintMintParams calldata params external payable...

Malicious user can create a dummy Lendgine contract by mimicing a salt with same encoding format but using a malicious AMM invariant function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lendgine contract address is created using a salt that is generated by a hash of pool parameters in Factory.sol. A malicious user can create a Lendgine exploit contract that uses the salt generated by exact same encoding but this contract inherits a Pair...

Fee on transfer tokens will not behave as expected

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Numoen, it does not specifically restrict the type of ERC20 collateral used for borrowing. If fee on transfer tokens is/are entailed, it will specifically make mint revert in Lendgine.sol when checking if balanceAfter balanceBefore + collateral. Proof...

Make calculation using 1e18 but protocol allows tokens with different scale

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Make calculation using 1e18 but protocol allows tokens with different scale. Proof of Concept Method: Calculation: Factory: Here in factory user can add tokens with scale from 6 to 18. Tools Used Static analytics Code reading Recommended Mitigation Steps...

Anyone can withdraw contract funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a critical impact that an attacker could drain the entire eth balance of the contract by calling this refundETH function which lacks a modifier. The funds will go always to the caller of the function. Proof of Concept It is not a complex attack ...

No-check liquidity is != 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Proof of Concept Tools Used manual Recommended Mitigation Steps --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from #819 [1675276661349]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 819 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Scenarios 3 & 4 are basically the same and valid. Duplicate of 569 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

The LendgineRouter.burn() will always REVERT due to the callback function forgot to send the due token0 back.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The LendgineRouter.burn will always REVERT due to the callback function forgot to send the due token0 back. The callback function pairMintCallback is supposed to send back amount0 amount of token0 back ...

Payment multiple functions do not check the caller

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Multiple functions in the Payment contract do not check the caller, for example, an attacker can directly call refundETH to transfer assets in the contract function refundETH external payable //@audit if addressthis.balance 0...

Unchecked that address to is not 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Sanity checks checking that funds are not going to the burn address should be done. In this case in the function swap, funds will not burn because you have to return the flashloan but the check should be made Tools Used manual Recommended Mitigation Step...

ERC20 TRANSFER AND TRANSFERFROM ARE NOT CHECKING FOR THE ZERO ADDRESS OF to AND from, DURING EXECUTION

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ERC20 standard tokens check for the != address0 condition in the transfer and transferFrom functions for the to address and from address in order to make sure funds are not transfered to zero address and balance is not updated in the balanceOf mapping fo...

Loss of funds - User has control of the fallback function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Imapct: Lendengine check the balanceBefore and after of token1, after sending tokens via a mintFallback function. During this fallback the user has access to theses tokens so far as it's returned + collateral the fallback is satisfied. A attacker can take out...

TOKEN BALANCE OF A PARTICULAR ADDRESS IS NOT CHECKED AGAINST THE REQUESTED TRANSFER AMOUNT INSIDE TRANSFER AND TRANSFERFROM FUNCTIONS IN ERC20.sol CONTRACT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact transfer and transferFrom functions do not check for the available erc20 token balance of the from address and the msg.sender respectively against the requested transfer amount. Hence if the balanceOffrom and balanceOfmsg.sender in the transferFrom and...

DIVISION BEFORE MULTIPLICATION ERROR IN CALCULATING INTEREST CAN LEAD TO LARGER PRECISION LOSS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a division before multiplication bug in accrueInterest method of Lendgine.sol which may result in loss of interest being accrued due to huge precision loss. There is same error in invariant method of Pair.sol as well which can cause larger...

Unchecked Return Values in SwapHelper.swap.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact SafeTransferLib.safeTransfertokenIn, msg.sender, amount0Delta 0 ? uint256amount0Delta : uint256amount1Delta; If the pool does not have enough liquidity, the UniswapV2Library functions will return a failure, but the SwapHelper.swap function does not...

No support non-18 decimals token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function is dependent on the token being of 18 decimals for correct calculation. If the project wants to use other tokens then it underlying native token. It would have to relaunch to accommodate this, or it can be forgotten and lead to future wrong...

Everyone can call mint function (no checks for msg.sender)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Everyone can call mint function. There is no checks for msg.sender. I am not sure that this is okay and by method design. Proof of Concept Tools Used Static analytics Recommended Mitigation Steps Think about how to protect method --- The text was updated...

refundETH has no access control and be called repeatedly or Can be Front runned to steal WETH funds from Contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function refundETH has no access control and called be called anyone resulting in a loss of WETH funds if address0 is entered as the recipient for removeLiquidity Proof of Concept Consider the scenario if bob calls removeliquidity which returns WETH...

Lack of slippage protection when swapping on Uniswap v2/v3

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lack of slippage protection when swapping on Uniswap v2/v3. It'll create the potential to be sandwiched by MEV bots and result in user loss. Proof of Concept In the LendgineRouter.mint function, the contract would swap all the token0 to token1 in...

Unprotected Ether Withdrawal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw some or all Ether from the contract account. This bug is sometimes caused by unintentionally exposing initialization functions. By wrongly naming a function intended to b...

Lack of access control in Lendgine.sol.withdraw()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because the function does not check if the person has access to it, anyone can call it. After calling the function the malicious user can increase his position. 175: positions.updatemsg.sender, -SafeCast.toInt256size, rewardPerPositionStored; He can then...

Lendgine#mint gifts the borrower liquidity and both underlying token as well which bricks contract functionality

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Borrower of liquidity can just keep borrowing liquidity as he will also get token0 and token1, draining the protocol funds. Proof of Concept Lendginemint calls Pairburn before calling mint to mint the number of ERC20 power tokens. totalLiquidityBorrowed ...

Unprotected payable functions in Payment.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Payment.sol contract unwrapWETH and sweepToken functions are without any access control. They are public and and doesn't validate that it's being called by any permissioned account. The result is that anyone can steal tokens. Proof of Concept 25:...

Precision loss in the invariant function can lead to loss of funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can steal the funds without affecting the invariant. Proof of Concept We can say the function Pair.invariant is the heart of the protocol. All the malicious trades should be prevented by this function. Pair.sol 52: /// @inheritdoc IPair 53:...

First liquidity provider will suffer from revert or fund loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first liquidity depositor should supply three input values amount0Min, amount1Min, liquidity via AddLiquidityParams but these three values should meet an accurate relationship, or else the depositor will suffer from revert or fund loss Proof of Conce...

Unsafe cast on uniswapV3SwapCallback can get all assets in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Unsafe cast on uniswapV3SwapCallback can get all assets in the contract Summary Type cast with overflows doesn't throw an error / revert therefore, value can be transferred out just by calling the method. Contracts that inherit from SwapHelper:...

The LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback() might be exploited to steal funding from another user when the factory contract is compromised.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback might be exploited to steal funding from another user due to three issues: 1. LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback is a callback function for the addLiquidity, which...

mint() function logic will break with fee-on-transfer(deflationary) tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact with deflationary token mint function never succeed Proof of Concept mint function checking if balanceAfter totalLiquidity revert CompleteUtilizationError; // next check is for the case when liquidity is borrowed but then was completely accrued if...

No-check taht amounts are less than reserves

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no check that the amount for the flashloan is actually available in the contract. It is checked that it should be 0 but not than reserves. Eventually, the function will revert because the funds are not there and the funds are not in the contract...