Upgraded Q -> 2 from #862 [1675430218943]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 862 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1 Function requireNextActiveMultisig always returns the first Multisig Affected code MultisigManager.requireNextActiveMultisig is supposed to return the next enabled Multisig. However it always returns the first...

Same identity can be assigned to multiple users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the contest details it is mentioned that identity can be transferable even if it's currently assigned to address in AddressRegistry. However, I would assume that if another address registers it, the identity should be removed from the previous owner...

Multiple accounts can have the same identity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Users can register their on-chain identity ie their CID NFT by calling AddressRegistry.register File: src/AddressRegistry.sol 42: function registeruint256 cidNFTID external 43: if ERC721cidNFT.ownerOfcidNFTID != msg.sender 44: // We only guarantee that a CID NF...

DIVISION BY _AMT_PER_SEC_MULTIPLIER AT EACH STEP OF THE ARITHMETIC OPERATION BEFORE MULTIPLICATION RESULTS IN ROUNDING ERROR

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the drippedAmt function of the Drips.sol contract, the assembly is used to calculate the amount dripped over a time range. Inside the assembly amtPerCycle is calculated by multiplying cycleSecs and amtPerSec and dividing by AMTPERSECMULTIPLIER to remo...

Signature replay attacks possible if deployed on multiple chains

Lines of code Vulnerability details Caller.callSigned operates using an EIP-712 signature which verifies the signed data to be used in a call on behalf of the signer. The problem with this method lies in the fact that it doesn't specify the chain ID, and thus if the contract is ever deployed to...

DoS with block gas limit in squeezeDrips

Lines of code Vulnerability details Squeezing drips requires verifying the entire history of that drip. This means iterating over an unbounded loop of the size of the history for uint256 i = 0; i dripsHistory.length; i++ DripsHistory memory drips = dripsHistoryi; bytes32 dripsHash =...

Attacker can frontrun a victim's mint+add transaction to steal NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact High - an attacker can steal deposited NFTs from victims using the mint + add functionality in CidNFT.sol Proof of Concept One of the core features of CID Protocol is the ability for users to attach Subprotocol NFTs to their CidNFT. The CidNFT contract...

Upgraded Q -> M from #694 [1675343502331]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 694 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: there is no check that duration of the Minipool is bigger than 14 days and a malicious node runner can set duration as 0 day and if he fails the calculated slash amount would be 0. --- The text was updated...

ERC721 safeTransferFrom is not enough to safeguard a subprotocol NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept There is a safeguard mechanism to ensure that no transfers of the subprotocol NFT happen after said NFT is tied to the CID NFT. Without it, someone could transfer or even burn the subprotocol NFT while it is still associated. // The CID Protoco...

Attacker can steal subprotocol NFT from user who use mint and add

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact CidNFT.mintbytes allow user to mint and add subprotocol NFTs directly after minting. The addList args to the add call include the cidNFTID param, which can change if there are other mint before the user's transaction. Additionally, CidNFT.add only check ...

DOS mint and add by frontrunning

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact CidNFT.mintbytes allow user to mint and add subprotocol NFTs directly after minting. The addList args to the add call include the cidNFTID param, which can change if there are other mint before the user's transaction. Proof of Concept An attacker can DOS...

cidFeeWallet can be address(0)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact TLDR; the cidFeeWallet can be assigned to address0, in which case fees would be burned but otherwise the system operates as expected. In the constructor for both SubprotocolRegistry and CidNFT, a wallet is assigned to which fees will be sent. This applie...

Use abi.encode instead of abi.encodePacked to prevent data collisions for object hashing

Lines of code Vulnerability details M-01 Use abi.encode instead of abi.encodePacked Impact hash collisions on the data stored for object hashing Proof of Concept From the solidity documentation: If you use keccak256abi.encodePackeda, b and both a and b are dynamic types, it is easy to craft...

Solmate's safeTransfer can result in failed transfer with low level call and won't revert as it does not check the codesize of to address, which may lead to loss of funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details The following contract use solmate's SafeTransferLib : solmate/utils/SafeTransferLib.sol Solmate's safeTransfer / safeTransferFrom uses inline assembly call to transfer ether from contract to receiver. According to Solidity Docs the call may return true even if...

Critical Vulnerability exposed Reentrancy attack allowing unlimited Fund Withdrawals.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function register where it transfers a fixed amount of $NOTE tokens 100 $NOTE to the cidFeeWallet address without checking the reentrancy status. An attacker can repeatedly call this function to drain the contract balance...

[H-01] Reentrancy attack is possible when using ERC777 tokens in DripsHub

Lines of code Vulnerability details H-01 Reentrancy attack is possible when using ERC777 tokens in DripsHub Impact: Some ERC20 tokens implement the EIP 777 interface including the tokensToSend hook, which performs a callback to the user from which tokens will be transferred before the tokens are...

Upgraded Q -> H from #694 [1675343512989]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 694 as H risk. The relevant finding follows: there is no check that duration of the Minipool is less than 365 days and if user by mistake set very high value for duration and fails to run node properly user would lose very large number of his GGP collaterals...

Fee can be transferred to the zero address while subprotocol registeration

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Everytime user register a new subprotocol to the registry contract, the registry contract transfer the fee to the cidFeeWallet from the registrar. There is missing vaildation that the transfer should not goes to zero address. If no address has been set f...

Unchecked External Call Vulnerability in ownerOf Function Call.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the worst-case scenario, if the ownerOf function call reverts due to a security vulnerability in the ERC721 contract, the caller's data could be manipulated, and their funds could be at risk. This could lead to a loss of funds for users who have...

An approved operator of a CID NFT owner can steall any subprotocol NFTs from the CID NFT Owner and his other approved operators.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. An approved operator of a CID NFT owner, if becomes malicious or compromised, can steal any subprotocol NFTs from the CID NFT Owner and his other approved operators. This is possible because: after...

SubprotocolRegistry is vulnerable to malicious names

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious subprotocol can register a name that looks the same as any other protocol. Users may use the malicious subprotocol because they can't distinguish the names, and be cheated out of subprotocolFee. Proof of Concept Any subprotocol can be...

Locked Ether

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Contract with a payable function, but without a withdrawal capacity. Impact Every Ether sent to LendgineRouter will be lost. Proof of Concept File: src/periphery/LendgineRouter.sol 142: function mintMintParams calldata params external payable...

Anyone can withdraw contract funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a critical impact that an attacker could drain the entire eth balance of the contract by calling this refundETH function which lacks a modifier. The funds will go always to the caller of the function. Proof of Concept It is not a complex attack ...

Unchecked that address to is not 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Sanity checks checking that funds are not going to the burn address should be done. In this case in the function swap, funds will not burn because you have to return the flashloan but the check should be made Tools Used manual Recommended Mitigation Step...

ERC20 TRANSFER AND TRANSFERFROM ARE NOT CHECKING FOR THE ZERO ADDRESS OF to AND from, DURING EXECUTION

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ERC20 standard tokens check for the != address0 condition in the transfer and transferFrom functions for the to address and from address in order to make sure funds are not transfered to zero address and balance is not updated in the balanceOf mapping fo...

Unchecked Return Values in SwapHelper.swap.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact SafeTransferLib.safeTransfertokenIn, msg.sender, amount0Delta 0 ? uint256amount0Delta : uint256amount1Delta; If the pool does not have enough liquidity, the UniswapV2Library functions will return a failure, but the SwapHelper.swap function does not...

First liquidity provider will suffer from revert or fund loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The first liquidity depositor should supply three input values amount0Min, amount1Min, liquidity via AddLiquidityParams but these three values should meet an accurate relationship, or else the depositor will suffer from revert or fund loss Proof of Conce...

Upgraded Q -> M from #819 [1675276661349]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 819 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: Scenarios 3 & 4 are basically the same and valid. Duplicate of 569 --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Mint to without check for zero address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Mint to without check for zero address. This can lead to lost of token Proof of Concept Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps add check to be sure that address to is not empty --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: Al...

The LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback() might be exploited to steal funding from another user when the factory contract is compromised.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback might be exploited to steal funding from another user due to three issues: 1. LiquidityManager.pairMintCallback is a callback function for the addLiquidity, which...

First depositor can manipulate the invariant of a pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact someone can call deposit upon pool creation, with a custom liquidity variable and small first deposit to change the behaviour of the pool, as a way to attack the protocol. even if a pool is setup and initialized correctly, there is not guaranteed that th...

A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the share price to take an unfair share of future users' deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the share price to take an unfair share of future users' deposits. The first minter can manipulate the supply of LP tokens and baseToken-fractional ratio, hindering small liquidity providers from interacting...

Mint function should have a pause

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Even if a market is paused due to insolvency/bugs, there will still be minting going on. This leaves no protection against mining in such case. Tools Used VS code Recommended Mitigation Steps Check in function mint that the market is not paused. For...

Lendgine contract can be drained through mint() function due to lack of Access Control

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anybody can call the mint function on lendgine.sol and enter any amount of collateral. This allows them to mint any number of tokens to their address for free. Proof of Concept The mint function in lendgine.sol is external with no additional modifiers or...

Make calculation using 1e18 but protocol allows tokens with different scale

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Make calculation using 1e18 but protocol allows tokens with different scale. Proof of Concept Method: Calculation: Factory: Here in factory user can add tokens with scale from 6 to 18. Tools Used Static analytics Code reading Recommended Mitigation Steps...

No-check taht amounts are less than reserves

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is no check that the amount for the flashloan is actually available in the contract. It is checked that it should be 0 but not than reserves. Eventually, the function will revert because the funds are not there and the funds are not in the contract...

Unprotected Ether Withdrawal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description Due to missing or insufficient access controls, malicious parties can withdraw some or all Ether from the contract account. This bug is sometimes caused by unintentionally exposing initialization functions. By wrongly naming a function intended to b...

Malicious user can create a dummy Lendgine contract by mimicing a salt with same encoding format but using a malicious AMM invariant function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lendgine contract address is created using a salt that is generated by a hash of pool parameters in Factory.sol. A malicious user can create a Lendgine exploit contract that uses the salt generated by exact same encoding but this contract inherits a Pair...

Lendgine#mint gifts the borrower liquidity and both underlying token as well which bricks contract functionality

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Borrower of liquidity can just keep borrowing liquidity as he will also get token0 and token1, draining the protocol funds. Proof of Concept Lendginemint calls Pairburn before calling mint to mint the number of ERC20 power tokens. totalLiquidityBorrowed ...

Fee on transfer tokens will not behave as expected

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Numoen, it does not specifically restrict the type of ERC20 collateral used for borrowing. If fee on transfer tokens is/are entailed, it will specifically make mint revert in Lendgine.sol when checking if balanceAfter balanceBefore + collateral. Proof...

No-check liquidity is != 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Proof of Concept Tools Used manual Recommended Mitigation Steps --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Lack of slippage protection when swapping on Uniswap v2/v3

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lack of slippage protection when swapping on Uniswap v2/v3. It'll create the potential to be sandwiched by MEV bots and result in user loss. Proof of Concept In the LendgineRouter.mint function, the contract would swap all the token0 to token1 in...

Lack of access control in Lendgine.sol.withdraw()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because the function does not check if the person has access to it, anyone can call it. After calling the function the malicious user can increase his position. 175: positions.updatemsg.sender, -SafeCast.toInt256size, rewardPerPositionStored; He can then...

Unchecked that the to address is nto the address of the tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the swap function, it is unchecked that the to address is not the address of the tokens. This will not lead to a loss of funds because the flashloan will actually revert, but sanity checks like this one should be made following for instance uniswap...

ANYONE CAN STEAL ETH THROUGH METHODS IN Payment.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Payment.sol contract, there is no access control on unwrapWETH, sweepToken and refundETH. So anyone can call these method to steal the Eth. Proof of Concept File: src/periphery/Payment.sol function unwrapWETHuint256 amountMinimum, address recipient...

Possible Reentrance & Unexpected Behaviour Vulnerabilities

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. No protection against reentrancy attacks, for example, the pay function called in the mintCallback function does not check for reentrancy before performing an external call. No checking of return values...

Multiple combinations of token0/token1 for a given liquidity exist to satisfies the custom variant of AMM pool. A naive LP or Power token holder can transfer more token0/token1 then necessary when minting & burning respectively

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact LP's need to provide a combination of token0 / token 1 for a given liquidity that satisfied a custom variant that satisfies 2 conditions 1. scale1 = c + d where a, b, c, d are functions of token0/ token1 , liquidity and upper bound The relationship betwe...

Losses in Pair and LendgineRouter can be generated if used with ERC20 Tokens with fee on transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Losses in Pair and LendgineRouter can be generated if used with ERC20 Tokens with fee on transfer Summary Some tokens token1, token0, ... are used over the code that can be any kind of ERC20 token. If this token includes fees on transfer, some operations will...

refundETH has no access control and be called repeatedly or Can be Front runned to steal WETH funds from Contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function refundETH has no access control and called be called anyone resulting in a loss of WETH funds if address0 is entered as the recipient for removeLiquidity Proof of Concept Consider the scenario if bob calls removeliquidity which returns WETH...

Unsafe cast on uniswapV3SwapCallback can get all assets in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Unsafe cast on uniswapV3SwapCallback can get all assets in the contract Summary Type cast with overflows doesn't throw an error / revert therefore, value can be transferred out just by calling the method. Contracts that inherit from SwapHelper:...