Diamond upgrade proposition can be falsified

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Diamond is to be upgraded after a certain delay to give time to the community to verify changes made by the developers. If the proposition can be falsified, the contract admins can exploit the contract in any way of their choice. Proof of Concept To...

Router Owner Could Be Rugged By Admin

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Assume that Alice's router has large amount of liquidity inside. Assume that the Connext Admin decided to remove a router owned by Alice. The Connext Admin will call the RoutersFacet.removeRouter function, and all information related to Alice's...

Malicious relayer could exploit sponsor vaults

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Sponsor vaults drained Proof of Concept reimburseRelayerFees uses SponsorVault funds to repay users the fees they pay to relayers. A malicious relayer could create a large number of transactions with the max reimbursed relay fee specified in SponsorVault...

_transferNFTs can end up transferring nothing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Malicious maker can list an NFT that conforms to ERC-165, but reports that it's neither ERC721, nor ERC1155, i.e. both supportsInterface0x80ac58cd and supportsInterface0xd9b67a26 are false. In all other regards it can be fully valid NFT, for example having...

Taker can provide several instances of the cheapest ERC-1155 item in a multi item bundle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Maker bid for a bundle of ERC-1155 items can be tricked into successful execution by providing several instances of the cheapest item instead of the required bundle. This way a malicious taker can receive full maker's price, providing several instances of the...

_transferNFTs doesn't revert for bad tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact transferNFTs checks if an item is ERC721 or ERC1155 by using IERC165item.collection.supportsInterface.... function transferNFTs address from, address to, OrderTypes.OrderItem calldata item internal if IERC165item.collection.supportsInterface0x80ac58cd...

matchOneToManyOrders doesn't consider numItems of the orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An order can specify a numItems in MakerOrder.constraints0. This number is the min/max number of items the order wants to buy/sell. For example a buy order can provide a list of nfts and say that wants to buy only 3 of them from that list. The function...

Multiple items order can be matched to many same items order

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Let's consider an example. Alice makes an order for an ERC1155, where she wants to buy 10 items with id=1 and 10 with id=2. This order can be matched using matchOneToManyOrders with two orders that sell both 10 items with id=1. Basically Alice gets 20 id...

User may lose funds if msg.value > totalPrice

Lines of code InfinityExchange.solL300-L328 InfinityExchange.solL336-L364 Vulnerability details Impact When using InfinityExchange.sol:takeMultipleOneOrders or InfinityExchange.sol:takeOrders, if currency == address0 and a user has a msg.value totalPrice the overspent ETH is left in the contract...

Funds(ETH) permanent lock on InfinityStaker.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The rescueETH function does not work as expected and if the contract receives ETH, it gets stuck in the contract Proof of Concept If an addresswallet or contract send ETH to the InfinityStaker.sol contract, the owneradmin can't rescue the ETH because the...

Incorrect accounting results in loss of user stake

Lines of code InfinityStaker.solL116-L131 InfinityStaker.solL290-L325 Vulnerability details Impact In InfinityStaker.sol, when calling the unstake function updateUserStakedAmounts is called to readjust the user staked amounts. If a user stakes an amount in a duration and has an already vested amo...

Wrong implementation of rescueETH, causing the fees in native tokens to be frozen in the contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details /// @dev used for rescuing exchange fees paid to the contract in ETH function rescueETHaddress destination external payable onlyOwner bool sent, = destination.callvalue: msg.value''; requiresent, 'failed'; Recommendation Change to: /// @dev used for rescuing...

Rescue ETH at InfinityExchange.sol is incorrectly implemented

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Admins are unable to recover any ETH locked in the contract PoC The function rescueETHInfinityExchange.sol is incorrectly implemented. It is using msg.value instead of the balance of the contract function rescueETHaddress destination external payable...

Accidental ETH transfers to InfinityStaker cannot be withdrawn

Lines of code Vulnerability details The rescueETH function is meant to allow the contract owner to withdraw ETH accidentally sent to the contract. However, it will forward the exact ETH amount sent by the caller to the given destination address, rather than withdraw ETH from the contract balance:...

ETH mistakenly sent over with ERC20 based takeOrders and takeMultipleOneOrders calls will be lost

Lines of code Vulnerability details takeOrders and takeMultipleOneOrders are the main user facing functionality of the protocol. Both require currency to be fixed for the call and can have it either as a ERC20 token or ETH. This way, the probability of a user sending over a ETH with the call whos...

nonReentrant modifier is not added to all functions that generate state changes, there is a possibility of re-entry.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. I noticed that the nonReentrant modifier only adds some of the functions that generate state changes to the InfinityExchange.sol contract, which provides the feasibility of reentrancy between multiple...

Executor and miner collusion and gas price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The MATCHEXECUTOR can choose tx.gasprice and take the gas cost from a buyer. An executor can make a overly costly tx mined by a friendly miner and take extra profits. Proof of Concept and similar functions... Recommended Mitigation Steps There's no...

The amount of gas calculation for refunding is incorrect

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact While matching the orders the gas cost is calculated so that it can be refunded back to the contract. The calculation for this gas is incorrect. The function keeps track of the gasleft at the beginning of the loop and adds additional amount of gas for pr...

User can accidentally permanently freeze the staked funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details User facing changeDuration function allows for setting any newDuration of a stake. However, only THREEMONTHS, SIXMONTHS and TWELVEMONTHS durations are visible to the system in all the subsequent logic. If a user accidentally sets any other duration, the...

NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee() CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs

Lines of code Vulnerability details NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs In InfinityExchange.sol, there is no timelock on setProtocolFee. This is the fee that is applied in orders, and determines how much the Exchange receives in fee VS how much the seller receives...

Admin can set arbitrarily high exchange fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Admins can attack users by frontrunning them Poc In the function setProtocolFeeInfinityExchange.sol function setProtocolFeeuint16 protocolFeeBps external onlyOwner PROTOCOLFEEBPS = protocolFeeBps;@audit medium emit NewProtocolFeeprotocolFeeBps; Admins ca...

Protocol fee rate can be arbitrarily modified by the owner and the new rate will apply to all existing orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details function matchOneToOneOrders OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders1, OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders2 external uint256 startGas = gasleft; uint256 numMakerOrders = makerOrders1.length; requiremsg.sender == MATCHEXECUTOR, 'OME';...

Issues beyond expected behavior.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. function unstakeuint256 amount external override nonReentrant whenNotPaused requireamount != 0, 'stake amount cant be 0'; uint256 noVesting = userstakedAmountsmsg.senderDuration.NONE.amount; uint256...

In execute() the amount routers pay is what user signed, but in _reconcile() the amount routers get is what nomad sends and this two amount are not necessary equal because of slippage in original domain

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact routers pay for transaction in destination domain then nomad messages come and routers get paid again. but the amount routers pay in execute are what transaction sender signed and the amount routers receive is what nomad sends and handles in reconcile bu...

routerBalances[msg.sender][_local] can be inflated in repayAavePortal due to underflow in unchecked math

Lines of code Vulnerability details function repayAavePortal address local, uint256 backingAmount, uint256 feeAmount, uint256 maxIn, bytes32 transferId external uint256 totalAmount = backingAmount + feeAmount; // in adopted uint256 routerBalance = s.routerBalancesmsg.senderlocal; // in local //...

Swaps done internally will be not be possible

Lines of code Vulnerability details Affected functionsthat rely on swapAsset are: swapAsset facilitates two swaps, either using the internal or external pool. But if an internal pool exists, a swap will be unsuccessful because the call to s.swapStoragescanonicalId.swapInternal takes two incorrect...

in reimburseLiquidityFees() of SponserVault contract swaps tokens without slippage limit so its possible to perform sandwich attack and it create MEV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact when code swaps tokens it should specify slippage but in reimburseLiquidityFees code contract calls tokenExchange.swapExactIn without slippage and it's possible to perform sandwich attack and make contract to swap on bad exchange rates and there is MEV...

attacker can perform griefing for process() in PromiseRouter by reverting calls to callback() in callbackAddress

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact process in PromiseRouter is used for process stored callback function and anyone calls it gets callbackFee and it calls callback function of callbackAddress. but attacker set a callbackAddress that reverts on callback and cause process caller griefing...

_handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. Moreover, if it is failed, fund may be locked forever.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. As duplicated fee is applied to fee on transfer token when executing a arbitrary call message passing request. Moreover, the Executor contract increase allowance on that token...

Tokens with decimals larger than 18 are not supported

Lines of code Vulnerability details For tokens with decimals larger than 18, many functions across the codebase will revert due to underflow. function getPriceFromDexaddress tokenAddress public view returns uint256 PriceInfo storage priceInfo = priceRecordstokenAddress; if priceInfo.active uint25...

BridgeFacet's _executePortalTransfer ignores underlying token amount withdrawn from Aave pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details executePortalTransfer can introduce underlying token deficit by accounting for full underlying amount received from Aave unconditionally on what was actually withdrawn from Aave pool. Actual amount withdrawn is returned by IAavePools.aavePool.withdraw, but...

Did Not Approve To Zero First Causing Certain Token Transfer To Fail

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Some tokens like USDT do not work when changing the allowance from an existing non-zero allowance value. For example Tether USDT's approve function will revert if the current approval is not zero, to protect against front-running changes of...

Precision Loss During Division

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Assume that toSwap = 10 DAI and pathLen = 3 in this example. Therefore, the bridge will pull 10 DAI from the RouterFacet contract. However, within the BridgeFacet.handleExecuteLiquidity function, due to precision loss when solidity handles...

Malicious Relayers Could Favor Their Routers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details Assume that a malicious relayer operates a router in Connext providing fast-liquidity service. A malicious relayer could always swap the routers within the execute calldata with the routers owned by malicious relayer, and submit it to the...

Owner cannot transfer ETH balance of the exchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details User called takeOrders and takeMultipleOneOrders functions accumulate native token fees over time. These fees end up being frozen on the contract balance. There is only one way for an owner to transfer them, a rescueETH function, that isn’t able to access ETH...

diamondCut doesn't validate _init and _calldata

Lines of code Vulnerability details Malicious or compromised governance can send a different init and calldata payload than the one that was proposed. This is dangerous as they will be used for a delegatecall operation. An attacker can pretend to propose a safe upgrade and later execute a...

The owner can set arbitrarly high fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The owner of InfinityExchange contract can set arbitrarly big fees, and coul stole funds from seller. Proof of Concept When an order is executed the payment and the transfer from buyer to seller and viceversa are done by transferNFTsAndFees function wich...

Overpaying ETH in InfinityExchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A user of the InfinityExchange contract can accidentally send more ETH than needed without the possibility to get the overpaid amount refunded. Proof of Concept if isMakerSeller && currency == address0 requiremsg.value = totalPrice, 'invalid total price'...

Extra msg.value in takeOrders

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In takeOrders, msg.sender can pay the items in ether or other native coins. // check to ensure that for ETH orders, enough ETH is sent // for non ETH orders, IERC20 safeTransferFrom will throw error if insufficient amount is sent if isMakerSeller &&...

Consistently check account balance before and after transfers for Fee-On-Transfer discrepancies

Lines of code Vulnerability details As arbitrary ERC20 tokens can be passed, the amount here should be calculated every time to take into consideration a possible fee-on-transfer or deflation. Also, it's a good practice for the future of the solution. Affected code:...

Diamond can be updated without proposing the change

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The diamond shall be monitored externally to remove the need of trust to developers. If a timelock can be bypassed, it poses a threat as people who weren't trusted can exploit the system. Additionally, the contract can immediately perform any delegatecal...

Maker buy order with no specified NFT tokenIds may get fulfilled in matchOneToManyOrders without receiving any NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details The call stack: matchOneToManyOrders - matchOneMakerSellToManyMakerBuys - execMatchOneMakerSellToManyMakerBuys - execMatchOneToManyOrders - transferMultipleNFTs Based on the context, a maker buy order can set OrderItem.tokens as an empty array to indicate that...

Malicious Relayer Can Replay Execute Calldata On Different Chains Causing Double-Spend Issue

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept This issue is only applicable for fast-transfer. Slow transfer would not have this issue because of the built-in fraud-proof mechanism in Nomad. First, the attacker will attempt to use Connext to send 1000 USDC from Ethereum domain to Optimism...

Missing whenNotPaused modifier

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In StableSwapFacet.sol, two swapping functions contain the whenNotPaused modifier while swapExactOut and addSwapLiquidity do not. All functions to swap and add liquidity should contain the same modifiers to stop transactions while paused. Proof of Concep...

Timelock able to be bypassed because of wrong check in LibDiamond

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the walkthrough video, it said that the upgrades of Diamond must go through a proposal window with a delay of 7 days. Upgrade should be done by first call proposeDiamondCut and then wait 7 days and call diamondCut. But this timelock can be bypassed...

Accumulated ETH fees of InfinityExchange cannot be retrieved

Lines of code Vulnerability details ETH fees accumulated from takeOrders and takeMultipleOneOrders operations are permanently frozen within the contract as there is only one way designed to retrieve them, a rescueETH function, and it will work as intended, not being able to access ETH balance of...

LibDiamond.diamondCut() should check diamondStorage().acceptanceTimes[keccak256(abi.encode(_diamondCut))] != 0

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Normally, diamondStorage.acceptanceTimeskeccak256abi.encodediamondCut will be set in LibDiamond.proposeDiamondCut. Then in LibDiamond.diamondCut, it checks that diamondStorage.acceptanceTimeskeccak256abi.encodediamondCut function proposeDiamondCut...

Ether can get lock on functions takeMultipleOneOrders and takeOrders

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ether send by the user cang gets locks when taking order/s Proof of Concept If Bob use function takeMultipleOneOrders or takeOrders to buy and sends more ETH that it supposes to remaing ETH will be lost, also if the seller is selling for other token and...

rescueETH function doesn't works as expected

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The rescueETH function is implemented to collect any unexpected ETH transferred to the infinityExchange.sol contract, But this function will not work as expected. The function is supposed to return the eth from the contract to the specified destination...

Bridging could be temporarily disrupted when setConnext is called without deactivating sponsorVault

Lines of code Vulnerability details When a sponsor wants to stop sponsoring bridge fees, it's possible that they call SponsorVault.setConnext to stop allowing Connext to reimburse fees, but forgot to inform the Connext team. This will cause bridging executions to be temporarily disrupted. For fee...