Short Call Maker Asset Can Be Frozen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The fillOrder function only checks that the floorAssetTokenIds.length must be 0 when a taker fill a short call order. In other words, it does not check whether order.floorTokens.length is 0 or not, which means that if the maker includes any address in...

getBorrowRate must return rate per block but currently return rate per year

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact getBorrowRate must return rate per block as defined in compound interest rate model but currently return rate per year. Defined here: Proof of Concept This is definition / @notice Calculates the current borrow interest rate per block @param cash The tota...

Sending 1 wei of cNote to the treasury can malfunction sweepInterest()

Lines of code Vulnerability details function sweepInterest external override if msg.sender != admin revert SenderNotAdminmsg.sender; //Total balance of Treasury = Note + CNote Balance, Exp memory exRate = Expmantissa: cnote.exchangeRateStored; //used stored interest rates in determining amount to...

Upgraded G -> M from 49 [1656600225781]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 49 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Failed transfer with low level call won't revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details In BaseV1-periphery.sol, the function safeTransferCANTO is as follows: function safeTransferCANTOaddress to, uint value internal bool success, = to.callvalue:valuenew bytes0; requiresuccess, "TransferHelper: ETHTRANSFERFAILED"; This function is utilized in a fe...

getSupplyRate returns rate per year instead of per block

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact According to the documentation in InterestRateModel, getSupplyRate has to return the supply rate per block and the function supplyRatePerBlock in CToken directly returns the value of getSupplyRate. However, the rate per year is returned for NoteInterest...

BURNER_ROLE can burn any amount of ERC20MinterBurnerDecimals from an arbitrary address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Proof of Concept Using the burnCoins function of ERC20MinterBurnerDecimals, an address with BURNERROLE can burn an arbitrary amount of tokens from any address. We believe this is unnecessary and poses a serious centralization risk. A...

Upgraded Q -> M from 413 [1656340156818]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 413 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from 194 [1656339935656]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 194 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> H from 207 [1656344605107]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 207 as High risk. The relevant finding follows: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Upgraded Q -> M from 161 [1656344885887]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 161 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Fund migration should trigger a rebase to prevent missing out on potential rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Rebasing allows the protocol to "distribute" profit/rewards to Yieldy and Foxy token holders by increasing the supply of tokens and increasing the balance of each token holder relative to the token balance creditBalances. The order of rebasing and...

removeAddress doesn't decrease the contracts.length

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The contracts length will always increase because the removeAddress function just deleting the value inside the array and never decrease the length by calling pop method. This can lead to Dos when calling functions that doing loop on contracts storage:...

Transfer the original underlying token back to the user but actually transfer from lender to redeemer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Transfer the original underlying token back to the user but actually transfer from lender to redeemer. Underlying token may be locked forever and user may not receive their fund after redeeming. Proof of Concept // Transfer the original underlying token...

[H-05] Not minting iPTs for lenders in several lend functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using any of the lend function mentioned, will result in loss of funds to the lender - as the funds are transferred from them but no iPTs are sent back to them! Basically making lending via these external PTs unusable. Proof of Concept There is no mintin...

Upgraded Q -> M from 104 [1656258768065]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 104 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: L01: Silent overflow of fCashAmount Line References Description If a fCashAmount value that is greater than uint88 is passed into the mint function, downcasting it to uint88 will silently overflow. Recommended...

Unable to redeem from Notional

Lines of code Redeemer.solL193 Vulnerability details Impact The maxRedeem function is a view function which only returns the balance of the Redeemer.sol contract. After this value is obtained, the PT is not redeemed from Notional. The user will be unable to redeem PT from Notional through...

Staking.setCurvePool() doesn't approve allowance when changes CURVE_POOL.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking.setCurvePool doesn't approve allowance when changes CURVEPOOL. It will affect when users exchange asset through CURVEPOOL. Proof of Concept When initialize the contract, Staking contract approves CURVEPOOL here. But when admin updates CURVEPOOL...

User fund lose in addLiquidity() of LiquidityReserve by increasing (totalLockedValue / totalSupply()) to very large number by attacker

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function addLiquidity suppose to do add Liquidity for the staking Token and receive lrToken in exchange. to calculate amount of IrToken codes uses this calculation: amountToMint = amount lrFoxSupply / totalLockedValue but it's possible for attacker to...

No check for set with address(0)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact can mint and get approve from address 0. Proof of Concept function setMarketPlaceaddress m external authorizedadmin returns bool if marketPlace != address0 revert ExistsmarketPlace; marketPlace = m; return true; Tools Used None Recommended Mitigation Ste...

Illuminate PT redeeming do not return underlying to a user

Lines of code Vulnerability details In the second step of two step redeeming process, the underlying funds should be located in the Redeemer contract as external system burned the shares the Redeemer obtained from the Lender contract and returned underlying to Redeemer. Then Redeemer's Illuminate...

Issue with TWAV calculation.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact To calculate time weighted average value, current valuation is used. This is not appropriate way to decide the TWAV while other locations considers only time. This might not be the stable one. Proof of Concept uint256 currentValuation =...

Reentrancy bug in Basket's withdraw multiple tokens function which gives attacker ability to transfer basket ownership and spend it but withdraw all the tokens out of basket

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Basket is used for keep multiple tokens in contract and mint one NFT token to represent their ownership. Basket only allows for owner of NFTid=0 to withdraw tokens from Basket address. users can deposit multiple tokens in one Basket and then create a...

Upgraded Q -> H from 285 [1655952312863]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 285 as High risk. The relevant finding follows: 1. Excess ether sent to FixedPricePassThruGate is lost low passThruGate redirects to a beneficiary only gate.ethCost, requiring that msg.value = gate.ethCost. As there are no other ways to access native tokens hel...

Transition notBoughtOut -> boughtOut -> notBoughtOut possible because of updateTWAV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Because rejectBuyout uses the TWAV, which is time-weighted and updateTWAV can be called, it is possible that notBoughtOut is true at first, then boughtOut is true, and then notBoughtOut is true again. See Proof of Concept for how one can construct such a...

Attacker can frontrun calling _mint_to_Accountant() which mints the entire supply to the caller, and sets them as _accountant and admin

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact By leaving minttoAccountant with no access control when accountant = address0 it allows an attacker to call the function, mint the entire supply to themselves, and gain the accountant and admin roles. Additionally, the parameter "address...

repayAmountFinal is not considered while calculating actualRepayAmount while calling doTransferIn(payer, repayAmount)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact repayAmountFinal is not used inside repayBorrowFresh The computation for actualRepayAmount doesnot account for repayAmountFinal in L111. Proof of Concept function repayBorrowFreshaddress payer, address borrower, uint repayAmount internal override...

Block.timestamp is always growing in epoch seconds and observation.timestamp needs to be called is its very unlikely to for it to be equal each other Bypassing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Block.timestamp is always growing in epoch seconds and observation.timestamp needs to be called is its very unlikely to for it to be equal each other Bypassing observation and gets it to be wrong length which could cause logic brakes and worse because your not...

Only the state() of the latest proposal can be checked

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact state function cannot view the state from any proposal except for the latest one. Proof of Concept requireproposalCount = proposalId && proposalId initialProposalId, "GovernorBravo::state: invalid proposal id"; Currently proposalCount needs to be bigger ...

BridgeFacet's _executePortalTransfer ignores underlying token amount withdrawn from Aave pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details executePortalTransfer can introduce underlying token deficit by accounting for full underlying amount received from Aave unconditionally on what was actually withdrawn from Aave pool. Actual amount withdrawn is returned by IAavePools.aavePool.withdraw, but...

Executor and miner collusion and gas price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The MATCHEXECUTOR can choose tx.gasprice and take the gas cost from a buyer. An executor can make a overly costly tx mined by a friendly miner and take extra profits. Proof of Concept and similar functions... Recommended Mitigation Steps There's no...

_handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. Moreover, if it is failed, fund may be locked forever.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. As duplicated fee is applied to fee on transfer token when executing a arbitrary call message passing request. Moreover, the Executor contract increase allowance on that token...

Relayer Will Not Receive Any Fee If execute Reverts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Connext relies on the relayer to trigger the BridgeFacet.execute function on the destination domain to initiate the token transfer and calldata execution processes. Relayers pay for the gas cost to trigger the execute function, and in return fo...

Ether can get lock on functions takeMultipleOneOrders and takeOrders

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ether send by the user cang gets locks when taking order/s Proof of Concept If Bob use function takeMultipleOneOrders or takeOrders to buy and sends more ETH that it supposes to remaing ETH will be lost, also if the seller is selling for other token and...

Router Owner Could Be Rugged By Admin

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Assume that Alice's router has large amount of liquidity inside. Assume that the Connext Admin decided to remove a router owned by Alice. The Connext Admin will call the RoutersFacet.removeRouter function, and all information related to Alice's...

Wrong implementation of withdrawAdminFees() can cause the adminFees to be charged multiple times and therefore cause users' fund loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details function withdrawAdminFeesSwap storage self, address to internal IERC20 memory pooledTokens = self.pooledTokens; for uint256 i = 0; i pooledTokens.length; i++ IERC20 token = pooledTokensi; uint256 balance = self.adminFeesi; if balance != 0 token.safeTransferto,...

NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee() CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs

Lines of code Vulnerability details NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs In InfinityExchange.sol, there is no timelock on setProtocolFee. This is the fee that is applied in orders, and determines how much the Exchange receives in fee VS how much the seller receives...

Protocol fee rate can be arbitrarily modified by the owner and the new rate will apply to all existing orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details function matchOneToOneOrders OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders1, OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders2 external uint256 startGas = gasleft; uint256 numMakerOrders = makerOrders1.length; requiremsg.sender == MATCHEXECUTOR, 'OME';...

Owner cannot transfer ETH balance of the exchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details User called takeOrders and takeMultipleOneOrders functions accumulate native token fees over time. These fees end up being frozen on the contract balance. There is only one way for an owner to transfer them, a rescueETH function, that isn’t able to access ETH...

Maker order buyer is forced to reimburse the gas cost at any tx.gasprice

Lines of code Vulnerability details uint256 gasCost = startGasPerOrder - gasleft + wethTransferGasUnits tx.gasprice; // if the execution currency is weth, we can send the protocol fee and gas cost in one transfer to save gas // else we need to send the protocol fee separately in the execution...

Taker can provide several instances of the cheapest ERC-1155 item in a multi item bundle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Maker bid for a bundle of ERC-1155 items can be tricked into successful execution by providing several instances of the cheapest item instead of the required bundle. This way a malicious taker can receive full maker's price, providing several instances of the...

routerBalances[msg.sender][_local] can be inflated in repayAavePortal due to underflow in unchecked math

Lines of code Vulnerability details function repayAavePortal address local, uint256 backingAmount, uint256 feeAmount, uint256 maxIn, bytes32 transferId external uint256 totalAmount = backingAmount + feeAmount; // in adopted uint256 routerBalance = s.routerBalancesmsg.senderlocal; // in local //...

Malicious Relayer Could Cause A Router To Provide More Liquidity Than It Should

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Assume this is a fast-transfer path and the sequencer has a good reason e.g. some sophisticated liquidity load balancing algorithm to assign 3 routers to provide liquidity for a transfer of 90 DAI Therefore, each of them will provide 30 DAI...

Upgraded Q -> M from 225 [1655654402923]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 225 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: C4-011 : Centralization Risk On The teamSummon Function - LOW Impact - LOW With the teamSummon function, owner can mint unlimited warriors. This poses a security risk. The max/min limit should be implemented at...

Precision Loss During Division

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Assume that toSwap = 10 DAI and pathLen = 3 in this example. Therefore, the bridge will pull 10 DAI from the RouterFacet contract. However, within the BridgeFacet.handleExecuteLiquidity function, due to precision loss when solidity handles...

_transferNFTs() functions doesn't reverts if the transfer item doesn't supports interface for both ERC721 and ERC1155

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The transferNFTs function use ERC165 to check if the itemnft supports ERC721 interface or ERC1155 interface and execute transfer accordingly. But if it doesn't supports either, it just exits the functionno revert. Proof of Concept in...

Funds(ETH) permanent lock on InfinityStaker.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The rescueETH function does not work as expected and if the contract receives ETH, it gets stuck in the contract Proof of Concept If an addresswallet or contract send ETH to the InfinityStaker.sol contract, the owneradmin can't rescue the ETH because the...

nonReentrant modifier is not added to all functions that generate state changes, there is a possibility of re-entry.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. I noticed that the nonReentrant modifier only adds some of the functions that generate state changes to the InfinityExchange.sol contract, which provides the feasibility of reentrancy between multiple...

_sendTokenToBribesProcessor() doesn't check bribesProcessor's address. Could cause permanent loss of fund

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In sendTokenToBribesProcessor, it sends tokens to bribesProcessor. It seems to be ok because claimBribesFromHiddenHand will confirm that bribesProcessor is not address0. sweepRewardToken also triggers sendTokenToBribesProcessor. But it doesn’t check...

Missing slippage protection for autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA requires multiple swaps auraBAL - BAL/ETH BPT - WETH - AURA within MyStrategy.harvest. The swaps are at risk of being front-run / sandwiched, resulting in a loss of funds. Since MEV is very prominent I think the...