DOS on operation execution

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious proposer can keep on cancelling all pending operations so that none of the transactions get executed. Admin also has no way to remove the malicious proposer Proof of Concept 1. Proposer A calls schedule function to schedule an operation 2...

Round down in previewWithdraw() may result in withdrawing asset using zero share.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In wfCashERC4626.previewWithdraw function, when fCash has matured, shares is calculated using convertToShares. But convertToShares function rounded down in division. This may lead to the case that user can use zero share to withdraw asset. It has been...

attacker can burn anyones tokens and steal everyones money

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact attacker can burn tokens and balance of contract is an amount of less or greater in sendtokenreciver function and if receiver is me then tokentransfer can be more than i lended or borrwing,withdrawing and gain me extra tokens. burn function is called...

Users Might Not Be Able To Purchase Or Redeem SetToken

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Whenever a setToken is issued or redeemed, the moduleIssueHook and moduleRedeemHook will be triggered. These two hooks will in turn call the redeemMaturedPositions function to ensure that no matured fCash positions remain in the Set by redeemin...

wfCashERC4626.sol#redeem() Lack of slippage control for market sell

Lines of code Vulnerability details function redeem uint256 shares, address receiver, address owner public override returns uint256 // It is more accurate and gas efficient to check the balance of the // receiver here than rely on the previewRedeem method. uint256 balanceBefore =...

cause users to revet right after deployment so they cant lend or borrow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact because of deployment hasMatured is false mintInternal reverts then cause users' to loose money on gas and users' cant lend which could lead to worse things and cause more attack vectors. Recommended Mitigation Steps check for delay after deployment or g...

PortcalFacet.repayAavePortal() can trigger an underflow of routerBalances

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The caller of repayAavePortal can trigger an underflow to arbitrarily increase the caller's balance through an underflow. Proof of Concept // Relevant code sections: // PortalFacet.sol function repayAavePortal address local, uint256 backingAmount, uint25...

Upgraded Q -> M from 294 [1654474576938]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 294 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Owner can frontrun exercise to increase fees A malicious owner account can observe and frontrun calls to exercise and extract 100% of the strike price as a protocol fee. Scenario: A malicious owner observes a ca...

_verifyProof allows empty proofs (allows malleable transactions)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact verifyProof allows empty proofs and in that case it expects the leaf to equal the root, because no hashing and iteration is taking place. The purpose of the tree is to hold multiple accepted tokenIds, where the consideration contains one and proving its...

Users will lose all of their money during pool migration

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users will lose all of their money when they migrate by calling PoolMigrationZap.migrate Proof of Concept File: protocol/contracts/zaps/PoolMigrationZap.sol 1 52 function migrateaddress oldPoolAddress public override 53 ILiquidityPool oldPool =...

RewardHandler.soland FeeBurner.sol will fail due to inexistent AddressProvider.sol getter functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact FeeBurner.burnToTarget and RewardHandler.burnFees will fail every time because addressProvider.getSwapperRouter, addressProvider.getBKDLocker and addressProvider.getFeeBurner are not implemented in AddressProvider.sol. Proof of Concept getSwapperRouter,...

call() should be used instead or transfer() on an address payable

Lines of code Vulnerability details This is a classic Code4rena issue: code-423n4/2021-04-meebits-findings2 code-423n4/2021-10-tally-findings20 code-423n4/2022-01-openleverage-findings75 Impact The use of the deprecated transfer function for an address will inevitably make the transaction fail...

Fees from delisted pool still in reward handler will become stuck after delisting

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unclaimed fees from pool will be stuck Proof of Concept When delisting a pool the pool's reference is removed from address provider: Burning fees calls a dynamic list of all pools which no longer contains the delisted pool: Since the list no longer...

Restricted Trades Vulnerable to Stolen Items Being Traded

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current contract does not check for stolen items. Traditionally, Opensea has frozen items that are stolen based on its stolen item policy. It was possible to do so on Opensea at the UI level. However, with Seaport, anyone can list a restricted trade...

More than 1 zero address token in burnToTarget may lead to draining of FeeBurner.sol

Lines of code FeeBurner.solL43-L88 Vulnerability details Impact The burnToTarget function in FeeBurner.sol allows any array of tokens to be used. If the tokens array contains more than 1 zero address, the swapAll function for the swapperRouter will be called more than once with the same msg.value...

_aggregateValidFulfillmentConsiderationItems() can be tricked to accept invalid inputs

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The aggregateValidFulfillmentConsiderationItems function aims to revert on orders with zero value or where a total consideration amount overflows. Internally this is accomplished by having a temporary variable errorBuffer, accumulating issues found, and...

Governance can arbitrarily burn VeToken from any address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Governance can burn any amount of VeToken from any address. Unlike VE3Token which is minted when users deposit veAsset and burned when users withdraw, the burn function in the governance token VeToken.sol is unnecessary and open up the risk of...

totalSupplyAtEpoch will revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The line for uint256 i = epoch; i + 1 != 0; i-- relies on uint256 underflow and overflow, which would revert in solidity ^0.8.0 Proof of Concept function totalSupplyAtEpochuint256 epoch external view returns uint256 supply uint256 epochStart =...

deposit function of VeAssetDepositor.sol will be failed if stakeAddress is set.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Wrong contract variable is used, so transaction cannot be executed. Proof of Concept This line is trying to call ERC20 function from minter contract. The minter is not ERC20 token, and does not have safeApprove function. So this will revert transaction...

_cancel function should check order status

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the cancel function of the OrderValidator contract, orderStatusorderHash.isValidated is not checked. This is to allow users to cancel unverified private orders. This is not a good solution. For unverified private orders, the user can verify and cancel...

Owner's delegates should be decreased in _burn()

Lines of code Vulnerability details function burnuint tokenId internal requireisApprovedOrOwnermsg.sender, tokenId, "caller is not owner nor approved"; address owner = ownerOftokenId; // Clear approval approveaddress0, tokenId; // TODO add delegates // Remove token removeTokenFrommsg.sender,...

Repeated calls to deliverBribes() risks draining bribe of assets into Gauge

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Funds drain from Bribe prematurely with repeated calls to deliverBribes Proof of Concept Calling deliverBribes calls deliverRewards which transfers the amount specified as the rewards due and sends to gauge. Repeated calls to deliverBribes makes repeated...

Unauthorized notifyRewardAmount

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Anyone can trick Bribe and Gauge contracts by calling notifyRewardAmount with arbitrary tokens until MAXREWARDTOKENS is reached. However, later team can replace these fake tokens by calling swapOutRewardToken. However, still, a malicious actor can force...

Incorrect msg.value usage could lead to fund loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The burnToTarget function is using msg.value in a loop which is passed to swapAll function of swapperRouter. Since msg.value amount will not change within loop, contract will end up using its own ETH Proof of Concept 1. User calls burnToTarget function...

Attacker can block LayerZero channel

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact According to the LayerZero docs, the default behavior is that when a transaction on the destination application fails, the channel between the src and dst app is blocked. Before any new transactions can be executed, the failed transaction has to be retri...

unsafe call using msg.value in loop

Lines of code Vulnerability details description with the function burnToTarget in FeeBurner.sol, a malicious user can swap more funds than they input in ETH if they include multiple address0 in the addresses tokens parameter during the function call, there is a for loop that loops through tokens...

Multi-hop routes will leave a dust trail

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact By calling RubiconMarket.buyid, quantity as a consequence of L239 and L241 with quantity = currentAmount - currentAmount expectedMarketFeeBPS / 10000 ...the fee calculated by the buy function amounts to: currentAmount - currentAmount expectedMarketFeeBPS...

BathToken.sol#_deposit() attacker can mint more shares with re-entrancy from hookable tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details BathToken.soldeposit calculates the actual transferred amount by comparing the before and after balance, however, since there is no reentrancy guard on this function, there is a risk of re-entrancy attack to mint more shares. Some token standards, such as ERC77...

CrvDepositor.sol Wrong implementation of the 2-week buffer for lock

Lines of code Vulnerability details uint256 unlockAt = block.timestamp + MAXTIME; uint256 unlockInWeeks = unlockAt/WEEKWEEK; //increase time too if over 2 week buffer ifunlockInWeeks.subunlockTime 2 IStakerstaker.increaseTimeunlockAt; unlockTime = unlockInWeeks; In lockCurve, unlockInWeeks -...

AuraClaimZap's claimRewards can permanently freeze user Aura funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details If claimRewards is called with depositCvxMaxAmount 0 and Options.LockCvx == false, the up to depositCvxMaxAmount AURA tokens are pulled from the user, but never get staked. There looks to be no way to retrieve Aura tokens ended up on AuraClaimZap balance this...

[WP-H2] Always use a 1:1 ratio for all the underlyingTokens when calculating the collateral value is flawed and can cause systemic failure when one of the underlyingTokens is depegged

Lines of code Vulnerability details function normalizeUnderlyingTokensToDebtaddress underlyingToken, uint256 amount internal view returns uint256 return amount underlyingTokensunderlyingToken.conversionFactor; function totalValueaddress owner internal view returns uint256 uint256 totalValue = 0;...

TransmuterBuffer.sol calls depositUnderlying with no slippage bounds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Loss of funds in TransmuterBuffer Proof of Concept If the buffer is called during and unfavorable time then a large portion of deposited funds may be lost due to slippage because deposit is called with 0 as the minimum out allowing any level of slippage...

Excluded user who added liquidity and then was unexcluded can block the withdrawals

83 comment Warden: throttle Excluded user who added liquidity didn't account for totalLiquidty increase. Later, if he is removed from excluded list and tries to remove liqudity, totalLiquidty will be subtracted which can lead to DoS for other user who want to remove liquidity Not sure if this is...

If totalShares for a token falls to zero while there is pendingCredit the contract will become stuck

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It is possible for the contract to become stuck and unable to perform any actions if the totalShares of a yield token fall to zero while there is some pendingCredit still to be paid. It will then be impossible to call deposit or withdraw functions, mints...

Reward Manager of the Convex Base Reward Pool Can DoS processYield()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The ConvexCurveLPVault.sol contract allows users to earn a yield on curve token deposits. Rewards are paid out in native CRV and CVX tokens but the reward manager of the base pool may opt to add extra rewards. Because the reward manager has the ability t...

Slippage check is too strict when withdrawing ETH collateral from LidoVault

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When withdrawing ETH collateral from LidoVault with withdrawCollateral, stETH is exchanged to ETH via Curve while using a slippage value of 2% 200, L136. The resulting exchanged amount receivedETHAmount is then validated to be larger than the requested...

Loss of funds due to beneficiary override to address(0) during transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Premiums or proceeds earned after the transfer will accrue to the zero address, instead of to the new vault owner, and the funds will be irrecoverable. Proof of concept vaultBeneficiariesvaultId is overridden to the zero address during transfer: File: Cally.sol...

Loss of asset due to improperly setting dutchAuctionReserveStriked

Lines of code Vulnerability details The Option writer Victim believes they will be writing a call option, but ends up selling their asset at a discount. Proof of Concept If dutchAuctionReserveStrike is improperly set, the writer is effectively writing a call option that is immediately in the mone...

Inefficiency in the Dutch Auction due to lower duration

Lines of code Vulnerability details The vulnerability or bug is in the implementation of the function getDutchAuctionStrike The AUCTIONDURATION is defined as 24 hours, and consider that the dutchAuctionReserveStrike or reserveStrike will never be set to 0 by user. Now if a vault is created with...

Missing powerThreshold validation in function updateValset(in Gravity.sol) could cause the contract non-functional

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When the cumulative power of validators in newValset is less than or equal to statepowerThreshold, the checkValidatorSignatures function would fail. Eventually, submitBatch, submitLogicCall & updateValset would fail for the new set of validators. This wi...

Admin can rug users, withdraw all the locked funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details function withdrawERC20 address tokenAddress external requirecudosAccessControls.hasAdminRolemsg.sender, "Recipient is not an admin"; uint256 totalBalance = IERC20tokenAddress.balanceOfaddressthis; IERC20tokenAddress.safeTransfermsg.sender , totalBalance; The...

Incorrect accounting on transfer-on-fee/deflationary tokens in Gravity contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The sendToCosmos function of Gravity transfers amount of tokenContract from the sender using the function transferFrom. If the transferred token is a transfer-on-fee/deflationary token, the actually received amount could be less than amount. However, sin...

it's possible that validators don't have enough power

Lines of code Vulnerability details newValset parameter in updateValset can have validators that don't have enough power combined for passing the threshold. Recomendation mitigation steps check that the validators power combined is bigger than the threshold --- The text was updated successfully,...

Centralisation Risk: Admin can withdraw all ERC20 held in the bridge and all deployed CosmosERC20 tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function withdrawERC20 allows an admin to withdraw any ERC20 tokens help in the bridge. The impact of this is significant as the function deployERC20 will create a new CosmosERC20 token with MAXUINT256 supply minted to the Gravity smart contract. The...

Unchecked return value of transferFrom() leading to zero cost RewardFunding

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to unchecked return value of transferFrom in https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-05-factorydao/blob/main/contracts/PermissionlessBasicPoolFactory.solL144 , it is possible to fund a pool during creation without transferring tokens to use as rewardToken...

If A User Mistakenly Provides Too Much Ether To The passThruGate() Function, This Additional Amount Will Be Forever Locked Within The Contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The passThruGate function acts as a proxy function to the beneficiary address by attaching Ether to the call. If an excess of Ether is provided to the call, only gate.ethCost will be sent to the beneficiary. Excess Ether will be forever be locked in the...

SpeedBumpPriceGate does not refund excess ETH payment

Lines of code Vulnerability details The FixedPricePassThruGate accepts ETH amounts greater than or equal to the calculated price, and forwards the full amount to the gate's configured beneficiary address. However, there is no mechanism to refund these excess payments, and no guarantee that the...

Fee-On-Transfer Tokens Are Not Supported

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The FactoryDAO suite of contracts interact with any arbitrary ERC20 token. Because of this, there is a specific instance and likely several others where a fee-on-transfer token will not be correctly handled. PermissionlessBasicPoolFactory.fundPool will...

Excess ETH is not returned to sender

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In passThruGate function, msg.value is checked to be greater than the required cost, but the excess amount is not returned to the sender. Proof of Concept function passThruGateuint index, address override external payable Gate memory gate = gatesindex;...

Admin can manipulate nft prices by _setNftPriceOracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details impact setNftPriceOracle is an admin-only function which can set a new nftOracle. But there is no restriction in this function. An admin can set any oracle unconditionally. It could be used to manipulate nft prices in liquidateCalculateSeizeNfts. Proof of Conce...