RewardTokens can be locked in MultiRewardStaking contract when the rewardsEndTimestamp of the rewardsTokens are different.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact To claim reward tokens from the MultiRewardStaking contract deployed, a user must call claimRewardsaddress user, IERC20 memory rewardsTokens. The rewardsTokens array is populated with getAllRewardsTokens which returns all the reward Tokens the...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #615 [1675724239375]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 615 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Unbounded gas usage in claim function of Quest contract The claim function has an unbounded gas usage that traverses different arrays many times. The call to RabbitHoleReceipt.getOwnedTokenIdsOfQuest iterates all...

_updateReceiverStates CAN WORK INCORRECTLY WHEN CURRENT RECEIVER AND NEW RECEIVER MATCHES WITH UPDATED DRIP TIMES

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact States can be incorrectly updated. Proof of Concept In updateReceiverStates method of Drips.sol, I noticed a different pattern of Using addDeltaRange when current receiver and new receiver matches with updated drip times. To Remove an existing drip, the...

AddressRegistry might have non-actual record

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact AddressRegistry might has non-actual record, which leads to inconsistent AddressRegistry state, and might affect possible consumers. Proof of Concept To register favorite NFT user calls register function from AddressRegistry. Then he sold this NFT to...

Reentrancy in callBatched

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The Caller contract implements callBatched function in order to execute a batch of calls within one call. The function has payable declaration to be able to send ETH inside the call. The NATSPEC is also provided in parallel; /// @notice Execute...

Reentrancy due to lack of check-effect-interact pattern by valid Driver users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In a Re-entrancy attack, a malicious contract calls back into the calling contract before the first invocation of the function is finished. This may cause the different invocations of the function to interact in undesirable ways, especially in cases wher...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #854 [1675461747744]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 854 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: When the protocol is paused, all the multisigs are disabled:, However, it is still possible to call startRewardsCycle in the RewardsPool, however, the execution will revert because the enabled count is 0: --- The tex...

Support for fee-on-transfer tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The AddressDriver.sol do not support fee-on-transfer tokens. If the asset is a fee-on-transfer token, tokens received from users could be less then the amount specified in the transfer. The protocol could suffer a loss of funds. Proof of Concept function...

Other users cannot help a CIDNFT holder add subprotocols to the NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Other users cannot approve and help CIDNFT holders add subprotocols to the NFT, breaking protocol specifications. Proof of Concept In the video walkthrough, around the 8 minute mark, it is mentioned that users can help NFT holders add subprotocols to the...

ERC721 safeTransferFrom is not enough to safeguard a subprotocol NFT

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept There is a safeguard mechanism to ensure that no transfers of the subprotocol NFT happen after said NFT is tied to the CID NFT. Without it, someone could transfer or even burn the subprotocol NFT while it is still associated. // The CID Protoco...

Malicious user can create a dummy Lendgine contract by mimicing a salt with same encoding format but using a malicious AMM invariant function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lendgine contract address is created using a salt that is generated by a hash of pool parameters in Factory.sol. A malicious user can create a Lendgine exploit contract that uses the salt generated by exact same encoding but this contract inherits a Pair...

Possible Reentrance & Unexpected Behaviour Vulnerabilities

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. No protection against reentrancy attacks, for example, the pay function called in the mintCallback function does not check for reentrancy before performing an external call. No checking of return values...

QuestFactory is suspicious of the reorg attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The createQuest function deploys a quest contract using the create, where the address derivation depends only on the QuestFactory nonce. At the same time, some of the chains Polygon, Optimism, Arbitrum to which the QuestFactory will be deployed are...

ONLYMINTER MODIFIER WILL NOT REVERT WHEN MSG.SENDER IS NOT MINTERADDRESS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact onlyMinter in RabbitHoleReceipt.sol and RabbitHoleTickets.sol is noted to be housing only msg.sender == minterAddress in its code logic. RabbitHoleReceipt.solL58-L61 RabbitHoleTickets.solL47-L50 modifier onlyMinter msg.sender == minterAddress; ; It will...

withdraw() function uses faulty burn() function for transfer and it has no access control implemented.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The withdraw function has no access control implemented and can be called by anyone. It also uses the burn function to transfer funds. A Malicious actor can withdraw the balance of Lendgine.sol. Proof of Concept Alice a malicious actor uses a contract to...

The onlyMinter modifier checks the wrong condition.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In RabbitHoleReceipt.sol and RabbitHoleTicket.sol, receipts and tickets can be minted by anyone. Proof of Concept The first line inside the modifier can be passed without reverting for any callers. modifier onlyMinter msg.sender == minterAddress; ; Tools...

User's claim can revert when attackers call withdrawFee several times

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact withdrawFee can be called several times, so attackers can use this to drain Erc20Quest's balance. Proof of Concept When the admin calls withdrawRemainingTokens, protocolFee + unclaimedTokens left in the Erc20Quest contract. If unclaimedTokens =...

Mitigation of M-06: Issue not mitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details The sponsor disputes the issue, but never follows up after judge's comments, so the same issue remains in the new code. --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

driverID can make same userID registered under different different driverID's leading to loss of funds and ultimately the trust of people.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact driverID can make same userID registered under different different driverID's leading to loss of funds and ultimately the trust of people. Proof of Concept In contract dripsHub their is no mechanism to check a user already registered under driverID or no...

Mitigation of M-02: Issue not mitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Mitigation of M-02: Issue not mitigated --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Loss of ETH for proposer when it is a contract that doesn't have fallback function.

Lines of code Vulnerability details The issue that is described in code-423n4/2022-12-tessera-findings40 was not mitigated and still applies like it is described there. --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Timeswap Options has no reentry check and is providing a set of flashloan with no fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details high-flashloan-provider @timeswap Impact In the file /package/v2-option/TimeswapV2Option.sol, There are a range of functions that has no Reentry check. As a consequence, when the contract call back msg.sender, an attacker can then reeentry in his own callee...

_currentIndex is incorrectly updated; breaking the ERC1155 enumerable implementation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When minting and burning tokens,the ERC1155Enumerable implementation does not correctly update the following states: uint256 private allTokens; mappinguint256 = uint256 private allTokensIndex; mappingaddress = uint256 internal currentIndex; In particular...

STORAGE LOCATION OF liquidityPosition OF ONE USER IS OVERWRITEN BY THE liquidityPosition OF ANOTHER USER

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the pool.sol contract under the transferFees function, the pool liquidity position of the msg.sender is assigned to the storage variable liquidityPosition. And this liquidityPosition is updated for new fee allocation and fee burning. The transaction f...

Lack of access control in certain functions within TimeswapV2LiquidityToken & TimeswapV2LiquidityToken contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The TimeswapV2Token & TimeswapV2LiquidityToken contracts lack proper access control in sensitive functions such as mint, burn, collectFees, and updateFees. There is no modifier or "require" to check if the caller is allowed to call these functions. This...

In TimeswapV2LiquidityToken.sol and TimeswapV2Token.sol, different positions might be minted to the same id.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In this protocol, all positions should have unique ids to track and update their status. Currently, different positions might be minted to the same id and the main logic for the positions will be broken. Proof of Concept TimeswapV2LiquidityToken.mint set...

Upgraded Q -> M from #449 [1674665297296]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 449 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L‑03 MintableIncentivizedERC721 does not implement ERC721.safeTransferFrom properly MintableIncentivizedERC721 is described as: 27: @notice Basic ERC721 implementation which will be used as a parent contract for...

Upgraded Q -> M from #445 [1674423223201]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 445 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: 5 Function crossChain in GovNFT should have limit for maximum tokens allowed to be transferred, because of gas limit in the dest chain. if a user transferred a lot of tokens because there was two loop inside each oth...

Upgraded Q -> M from #268 [1674418407759]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 268 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 Front running attacks by the owner Project has one possible attack vectors by the onlyOwner: dao.Fees , burnsFees , referralFees , botFees variable; It determines the fees rate The default deposit fees equal zer...

Upgraded Q -> M from #658 [1674423108320]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 658 as M risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 MARGIN ASSET TOKENS WITH MORE THAN 18 DECIMALS ARE NOT SUPPORTED As shown below, arithmetic operations of the StableVault.deposit, StableVault.withdraw, Trading.handleDeposit, and Trading.handleWithdraw function...

Possible Unauthorized Redemption of Collateral ERC20 Tokens due to Lack of Proper Check in redeem() Function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker who is not authorized by the smart contract could potentially redeem more tokens than they are entitled to. This could cause a loss of funds for the smart contract and its users, as well as potentially destabilizing the overall ecosystem...

attacker can make stakeRate to be 1 in the StRSR contract and users depositing tokens can lose funds because of the big rounding error

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact code calculates amount of stake token and rsr token based on stakeRate and if stakeRate was near 1e18 then division error is small but attacker can cause stakeRate to be 1 and that can cause users to loss up to 1e18 token during stake and unstake. Proof ...

settleAuction() Check for status errors

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact ClearingHouse.safeTransferFrom to execute successfully even if there is no bid Proof of Concept settleAuction is called at the end of the auction and will check if the status is legal function settleAuctionuint256 collateralId public if...

Proper use of dependecy

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using safeTransferFrom of solmate. There is no checking the token address is exist Proof of Concept After consulting the dev, the only check for making sure the token exist is a list on the UI/fontend side. A highly motivated attacker can easily disable...

Front-run Initializer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In function: function initialize Authority AUTHORITY, ICollateralToken COLLATERALTOKEN, ILienToken LIENTOKEN, ITransferProxy TRANSFERPROXY, address VAULTIMPL, address SOLOIMPL, address WITHDRAWIMPL, address BEACONPROXYIMPL, address CLEARINGHOUSEIMPL...

Comparison Of Different Types Might Lead to Inconsistent Behavior

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Comparison Of Different Types Might Lead to Inconsistent Behavior Proof of Concept The comparison here compares two different types , i.e. uint88 withdrawReserve and uint256 withdrawBalance. This type of mismatched might induce unwanted behavior If a bug...

Solmate's ERC20 does not check for token contract's existence

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Not checking for token existence is a know issue for Solmate. This can cause unexpected contract functionality for transfers implemented in the codes. Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all...

Reentrancy in safeTransferFrom() in ClearingHouse.sol allows the attacker to withdraw the collateral, while still owning the borrowed assets.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Calling the function safeTransferFrom and passing in a custom, attacker controlled payment token allows the malicious actor to perform reentrancy. the following function clears the attacker of all debt,...

Signatures can be misused to reverify

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It is possible to remove the KYC status of any user by using the removeKYCAddresses function. This could be easily overridden by user using the addKYCAddressViaSignature function as shown below Proof of Concept 1. User KYC is approved and he is provided...

Upgradeable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the contract OndoPriceOracle.sol is a critical contract it should have room to be upgrade, either use the library @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable or leave a storage gap. An example of this would be to add this line: uint25650 private gap; Proof...

CASH token cannot be transferred among users and accounts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since the CASH token cannot be transferred unless it is explicitly allowed, the users cannot send tokens between accounts, trade it on DEXes, or integrate it into their protocols. This is a non-standard behavior that should be reported to them. Proof of...

Upgraded G -> 3 from #90 [1673938387276]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 90 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: fenkge;gk --- The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: All reactions...

Potential DOS in utilizationRate() function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Potential DOS IN UTILIZATIONRATE utilizationrate = borrows / cash + borrows - reserves. if cash+ borrows = reserves this goes to infinity so that utilizationrate reverts. Also if cash + borrows Tools Used Vs code Recommended Mitigation Steps Define...

Attacker can take control over each SmartAccount proxy and steal all users' funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Attacker can take control over each SmartAccount proxy and steal all users' funds Impact All users' funds can be stolen by a single attacker tx gas cost only Proof of Concept There are 2 main reasons for this vulnerability: The .checkSignatures in...

Theft of funds under relaying the transaction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The execTransaction function is designed to accept a relayed transaction with a transaction cost refund. At the beginning of the function, the startGas value is calculated as the amount of gas that the relayer will approximately spend on the...

Calling execute() and executeBatch() functions in SmartAccount.sol from the EntryPoint will fail

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function requireFromEntryPointOrOwner is being called within the execute and executeBatch functions to check if the msg.sender is either the owner or the EntryPoint contract, but these functions have onlyOwner modifier, which will only allow the owne...

SmartAccount implementation contract can be destroyed by anyone

Lines of code Vulnerability details SmartAccount implementation contract can be destroyed by anyone Impact Locking all user's funds forever due to DoS for all functions. Proof of Concept There are 2 main reasons for this vulnerability: 1. The expected behaviour of interacting with the...

getStakers() and getMinipools() could return wrong values (Access Control)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking.sol and MinipoolManager.sol contracts use the eternal storage pattern. The contracts are a key-value store that all protocol contracts can write to and read. more info: Functions getStakers.staking and getMinipools.MinipoolManager are implemented...

Funds of Node Operators can be nullified by any attacker

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The MinipoolManager.createMinipool function do not validate the caller's address due to which any address can invoke the createMinipool function with any nodeID existing or new as input. For any existing nodeID the function can be invoked as long as the...

There is no way to extract fees when someones wants to reduce a debt by paying with underlying tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a user is buying the debt of an account or its own debt, it either have the choice to use the reduceDebt function in order to pay with PAPR tokens, or by paying in underlying tokens can be USDC, WETH, .... A protocol that would choose to...