SherlockClaimManager: Incorrect amounts needed and paid for escalated claims

Handle GreyArt Vulnerability details Impact When escalating claims, the documentation states that the protocol agent is required to pay and stake a certain amount for the process. If the covered protocol is proven correct, then the amount specified by the claim will be paid out. They will also...

DoS and stealing users' USDC

Handle OriDabush Vulnerability details Sherlock.sol An attacker can DoS the system and steal user's USDC if he manages to stake his USDC first i.e. minting token ID 1. It can be done by calling the initialStake with every amount let's say amount = 1 for example. Let's assume the lock period is...

Zero value shown for stake & price in SherBuy.viewCapitalRequirements() when SherAmount between 1~1000 SherTokens.

Handle 0xwags Vulnerability details Impact stakeusdc staked and priceusdc to be paid will display zerowhen SherAmt is between one - four digit for eg, 1-1000if SHERDECIMALS is used as the divisor. I'm sure there is no limitation on the amount of Sher that one can buy or is it that there should be...

Creating rewardTokens without streaming depositTokens

Handle bitbopper Vulnerability details Impact stake and withdraws can generate rewardTokens without streaming depositTokens. It does not matter whether the stream is a sale or not. The following lines can increase the reward balance on a withdraw some time after stake: // accumulate reward per...

unstreamed not updated in withdraw()

Handle gpersoon Vulnerability details Impact The function stake increases unstreamed, however the function withdraw, that does the inverse of stake doesn't decrease unstreamed. The function withdraw does update all the other relevant variables so this seems to be an omission. Thus the value of...

onUnbond calculations incorrect leading to lost funds

Handle harleythedog Vulnerability details Impact Consider the stake padding example given in the contest description here: . At the end of the example, User A has 100 bonded LP and has 100 stake padding. User B has 100 bonded LP and 200 stake padding. There are 300 in rewards in the system. For...

FSDVesting.updateVestedTokens doesn't have any control modifiers and anyone can increase vested amount for a beneficiary

Handle hyh Vulnerability details Impact In current implementation all vesting beneficiaries can increase their vested amounts unlimitedly by calling updateVestedTokensmyfsdvestingaddress, anyamounttobeaddedtovesting. Beneficiary can then surpass vesting schedule by calling claimVestedTokens It wi...

CVE-2021-42764

The Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus protocol through 2021-10-19 allows an adversary to cause a denial of service delayed consensus decisions, and also increase the profits of individual validators, via short-range reorganizations of the underlying consensus chain...

CVE-2021-42765

The Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus protocol through 2021-10-19 allows an adversary to leverage network delay to cause a denial of service indefinite stalling of consensus decisions...

CVE-2021-42766

The Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus protocol through 2021-10-19 allows an adversary to cause a denial of service long-range consensus chain reorganizations, even when this adversary has little stake and cannot influence network message propagation. This can cause a protocol stall, or an...

Design/Logic Flaw

The Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus protocol through 2021-10-19 allows an adversary to leverage network delay to cause a denial of service indefinite stalling of consensus decisions...

CVE-2021-42764

The Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus protocol through 2021-10-19 allows an adversary to cause a denial of service delayed consensus decisions, and also increase the profits of individual validators, via short-range reorganizations of the underlying consensus chain...

CVE-2021-42764

Technical details (affected components, root cause, impacted versions, fixes) are not publicly available in the provided documents; monitor for updates.

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensus 安全漏洞

Proof-Of-Stake is a consensus mechanism used by the Ethereum Foundation's blockchain network to achieve distributed consensus. Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus has a security vulnerability, the exploitation of which can lead to denial-of-service attacks...

Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum consensus 安全漏洞

Proof-Of-Stake is a consensus mechanism used by the Ethereum Foundation's blockchain network to achieve distributed consensus. Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus has a security vulnerability, the exploitation of which can lead to denial-of-service attacks...

Proof-Of-Stake 安全漏洞

Proof-Of-Stake is a consensus mechanism used by the Ethereum Foundation's blockchain network to achieve distributed consensus. Proof-of-Stake PoS Ethereum consensus has a security vulnerability, the exploitation of which can lead to denial-of-service attacks...

Cannot claim reward

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPoolManager.claimReward requires stake.initialized but it is never set. It also performs a strange computation as 128 - incentive.secondsClaimed which will almost always underflow and revert the transaction. Impact One cannot claim...

Possibility to Stake Twice

Handle verifyfirst Vulnerability details Impact Potential for some users to double-stake their Yaxis. Proof of Concept // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT pragma solidity 0.6.12; import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol"; import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/SafeERC20.sol"; // yAx...

Incorrect internal balance bookkeeping

Handle walker Vulnerability details type: Incorrect Assumptions on External Systems The sherlock smart contract system uses internal bookkeeping of arbitrary ERC20 token balances. It doesn't assert that the ERC20 doesn't implement some non-standard behaviour. For example, deflationary tokens, or...

Hypervisor.stake does not transfer tokens

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details Vulnerability Details The Hypervisor's stake action states: token transfer: transfer staking tokens from msg.sender to vault But no tokens are ever transferred. Impact Anyone with a permission can lock any amount of tokens. Recommended Mitigation Steps Transfe...