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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/04/04 12:00 a.m.18 views

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #17 [1680620718364]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 17 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-05 Check that staking cannot occur when endTime is reached The MuteAmplifier.stake function should require that the current timestamp is smaller than endTime even when the call to stake is the first that ever...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/04/03 12:00 a.m.22 views

The first stake is possible after endTime

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users can stake after endTime due to the wrong check. Proof of Concept When a user stakes LP tokens using MuteAmplifier.stake, stake is not allowed after endTime which is set in initializeDeposit by an admin. requireblock.timestamp endTime,...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.13 views

Missing critical check of amount minted tokens in stake() -> deposit()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact No require to ensure that SfrxEth or WstEth is minted when calling in SafEth.sol stake - IDerivative.deposit function Proof of Concept In the deposit function in Reth.sol has a require statement to ensure that the token was actually minted. But there is ...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.24 views

Ether Locked when Attempting to Call stake() during Setup

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact During the period between the deployment of the SafEth contract and the addition of derivatives, there is a possibility for users to send Ether to the contract using the stake payable function. In this scenario, the funds will become locked and...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.14 views

In stake() function shares increase exponentially for the same amount of deposit as the totalSupply() increases, causing the loss for the initial stakers relative to later ones.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Stake function don not allocate the safEth according to the totalShares, instead as more user deposit, later depositers get higher share of the value as compared to ealy depositers. Proof of Concept Consider Alice, Bob and Jenny want to stake their eth...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.12 views

Adding a new derivate will splits new user's underlying shares in the new derivate to older users

Lines of code Vulnerability details Vulnerability details Impact After a derivate is added to the protocol. Older users will take some new user's share in the new derivate. The addDerivative function add a new derivate to the protocol. The newly added derivate has zero underlying balance. Users w...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.13 views

the depositor can get sanwich attack when call stake in SafEth and deposit in RETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. users who stake eth from call function stake in will get sandwich attack, which users will lose money Proof of Concept Provide direct links to all referenced code in GitHub. Add screenshots, logs, or an...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.17 views

Reth griefing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The maximum slippage when buying rETH from the Uniswap V3 pool is calculated in Reth derivative contract by taking the current price in the Uniswap V3 pool at runtime, without taking into account the price at which the user sent the transaction to the...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/30 12:00 a.m.18 views

Reth flashloan attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using a flashloan to manipulate rETH/ETH price a hacker can receive more SafEth shares for the same amount of ether, thus draining all three derivative contracts rETH, SfrxEth and WstEth. Proof of Concept Reth.poolPrice depends on UniswapV3 pool.slot0...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/15 12:00 a.m.14 views

Updating a pool's total points doesn't affect existing stake positions for rewards calculation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Staking rewards are calculated based on the user's share of total points in the corresponding asset pool, this is the sum of the points associated to the staker's positions divided by the total points from all positions in the pool. We can see this...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/15 12:00 a.m.10 views

Huge over calculating user rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Huge over calculating user rewards When user claim rewards for the first time rewards over calculated Proof of Concept getPoolReward function uses ''uint256 timeSinceReward = block.timestamp - lastRewardTime'' formula to calculate period of time that...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/15 12:00 a.m.13 views

User can cause the points of their LP stake position to underflow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This vulnerability allows a user to cause their LP position points to underflow which will then allow a user to receive a massively disproportionate amount of the emission rewards relative to their stake because they now practically have an infinite amou...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/03/06 12:00 a.m.24 views

closeTrove never nulls trove.stake

Lines of code Vulnerability details // Auditor's note: not 100% sure if this is intentional, but I have reason to believe it's a mistake. Description When a trove gets liquidated, its stake gets set to 0 through removeStake, called eg here. However, when a trove gets closed gratiously through...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/02/13 12:00 a.m.17 views

Deficiency of slashed GGP amount should be made up from node operator's AVAX

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If staked GGP doesn't cover slash amount, slashing it all will not be fair to the liquid stakers. Slashing is rare, and that the current 14 day validation cycle which is typically 1/26 of the minimum amount of GGP staked is unlikely to bump into this...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/02/09 12:00 a.m.24 views

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #510 [1675932827359]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 510 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: In red are the state transitions that can only be performed with special privileges recreateMinipool: The following transitions will be performed Withdrawable-PreLaunch Error-PreLaunch createMinipool: will perform th...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/02/09 12:00 a.m.15 views

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #510 [1675932817801]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 510 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: If the current state is Withdrawable, you can still call createMinipool This will result in: 1:recreateMinipool can be front-run by executing recordStakingEnd to get back the stake first, and then executing...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2023/01/20 12:00 a.m.21 views

A staker might drain the stRST contract slowly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. The stake function relies on the payoutRewards function to calculate stakeRate, which has a round-up error. Then, stateRate is also used to calculate stakeAmount, which also has a round-up error. As a...

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Schneier on Security
Schneier on Security
added 2023/01/04 12:17 p.m.15 views

Decarbonizing Cryptocurrencies through Taxation

Maintaining bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies causes about 0.3 percent of global CO2 emissions. That may not sound like a lot, but its more than the emissions of Switzerland, Croatia, and Norway combined. As many cryptocurrencies crash and the FTX bankruptcy moves into the litigation stage,...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2022/11/18 12:00 a.m.13 views

Slashing can prevent Protected Staking Pool depositors from redeeming their ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details The documentation states that: The Protected Staking Pool is free from any slashing and leaking risk. While the penalties affect the node operator first, then the Fees and MEV Pool stakers, if the slashing amount is higher, it will also impact the Protected...

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Code423n4
Code423n4
added 2022/11/09 12:00 a.m.10 views

BLOCK_PERIOD is incorrect

Lines of code Vulnerability details The BLOCKPERIOD is set to 13 seconds in Config.sol. uint256 constant BLOCKPERIOD = 13 seconds; Since moving to Proof-of-Stake PoS after the Merge, block times on ethereum are fixed at 12 seconds per block slots. . Impact This results in incorrect calculation of...

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