Doesn’t have proper slippage control.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact For risk management purposes, a swap will fail if the input coin amount exceeds a predefined limit. But it is not a slippage control. It doesn’t consider how many Canto a user wants to swap for. It is possible that the user will swap the token at a very...

Slippage protection minOut autoSwapThreshold is not effective when swapping the token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the current model, the minimum output minOut amount for the auto-swap is set to match the autoSwapThreshold, which is fixed at 4 CANTO. This configuration might result in potential market risks due to fluctuations in the value of CANTO, potentially...

M-07 Unmitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Mitigation of M-07: Issue NOT mitigated Mitigated issue M-07: Incorrect slippage check in the AMO2.rebalanceUp can be attacked by MEV Fix: code-423n4/2023-05-xeth@630114e The issue is that since the pool is rebalanced around an imbalanced ratio with 68%-75% xET...

M-07 Unmitigated

Lines of code Vulnerability details Comments The very first point that needs to be made, is that, according to the Mitigation Review details: In production we have planned to use MEV Protection services such as flashbots rpc The MEV Protection rpc ensure the rebalance and defender won't be affect...

Swaps in Uniswap V3 may be partial

Lines of code Vulnerability details Swaps in Uniswap V3 may be partial Uniswap V3 pools may execute a swap partially, in which case it may leave an unhandled amount of WETH in the JBXBuybackDelegate contract. Impact Swaps in Uniswap V3 can eventually be executed partially, if liquidity is not...

Delegate architecture forces users to set zero slippage

Lines of code Vulnerability details Delegate architecture forces users to set zero slippage The design of the delegate forces users to set a zero value for the minReturnedTokens parameter when calling pay in the terminal. Technical details In order to implement the swap functionality, the...

No deadline for swaps

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact No deadline for swaps allows transactions to be executed later, unfavourably or maliciously. Proof of Concept When tokens are to be swapped rather than minted, slippage is controlled in uniswapV3SwapCallback by minimumAmountReceived which is calculated...

Setting the slippage tolerance incorrectly can result in users losing funds

Lines of code JBXBuybackDelegate.solL156 Vulnerability details Impact Since the slippage parameter is also passed from the frontend, we need to validate the magnitude of the parameter value，if slippage == SLIPPAGEDENOMINATOR ，users may be vulnerable to sandwich attacks during the Uniswap swapping...

JBXBuybackDelegate.didPay() allows for positive slippage theft

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The JBXBuybackDelegate.didPay calls swap which utilizes the Uniswap's swap function. JBXBuybackDelegate incorporates a negative slippage check in uniswapV3SwapCallback. However, it fails to consider the deadline parameter of the transaction. The deadline...

Minting exposes beneficiaries to unlimited slippage while minting the token out, sending back the token in the terminal.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The amount of tokens minted/assets received when minting can be manipulated to an unlimited extent by manipulating the reserves of the pool. Proof of Concept Here the mint function mints the tokens out to the beneficiary. However the Delegate can't speci...

Incorrect slippage check in the AMO2.rebalanceUp can be attacked by MEV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The AMO2.rebalanceUp uses AMO2.bestRebalanceUpQuote function to avoid MEV attack when removing liquidity with only one coin. But the bestRebalanceUpQuote does not calculate the slippage correctly in this case, which is vulnerable to be attacked by MEV...

An expired parameter is required because there may be slippage in the calculation.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to changes in interest rates, failure to process transactions in a timely manner may result in missing out on ideal rewards. Proof of Concept The calculation of the clainRewards function involves interest rates, which are variable. If...

Mitigation of M-12: Issue NOT mitigated

Mitigated issue M-12: No slippage protection on stake in SafEth.sol There were issues with either a lack of slippage protection or a hard set slippage. Slippage protection was missing in deposit for Reth.deposit only if depositing in the Rocket Pool and in Reth.withdraw, as well as in stake becau...

Mitigation of M-12: mitigation error, see comments

MITIGATION IS NOT CONFIRMED MITIGATION IS NOT CONFIRMED Mitigation of M-12: mitigation error, see comments Link to Issue: code-423n4/2023-03-asymmetry-findings150 Comments While the proposed change correctly mitigates the issue, in the sense that it introduces a user controlled slippage for stake...

Chainlink price feed responses are not validated

NEW ISSUE - MITIGATION IS NOT CONFIRMED NEW ISSUE - MITIGATION IS NOT CONFIRMED adriro-NEW-H-02 Chainlink price feed responses are not validated Link to changesets: Impact The protocol team introduced Chainlink price feeds for the Reth and WstEth derivatives in order to mitigate price manipulatio...

Mitigation of M-01: Issue NOT fully mitigated

Mitigated issue M-01: Division before multiplication truncate minOut and incurs heavy precision loss and result in insufficient slippage protection The issue was a loss of precision of three different kinds. 1 a/bc = ac/b in the calculation of mintAmount in SafEth.stake. Mitigation review The...

Mitigation Confirmed for NEW

Note: Issue has not actually been resolved but for some reason I can't get my issues to submit without "Mitigation confirmed no new vulnerabilities detected" checked so I am doing this as a work around Severity Medium Lines of code Impact Contract still assumes 1:1 peg for stETH in WstETHwithdraw...

Mitigation Confirmed for Mitigation of H-06: Issue mitigated with error

Mitigated issue H-06: WstEth derivative assumes a 1=1 peg of stETH to ETH. The issue was that WstEth.withdraw and WstEth.ethPerDerivative assume a perfect peg between stETH and ETH, which may cause the slippage to be inaccurately evaluated. Mitigation review The issue has been mitigated by using...

Hard slippage in Reth.withdraw()

Hard slippage in Reth.withdraw Description A hard slippage has been introduced in Reth.withdraw. This is a new occurrence of part of M-12 not the main report, but e.g. this duplicate, namely that the slippage can be changed only by the owner, which under volatile market conditions or a depegging...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #706 [1682589361421]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 706 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 02 USERS CANNOT SET OWN SLIPPAGE WHEN STAKING AND UNSTAKING Only the owner of the SafEth contract can call the following SafEth.setMaxSlippage function to set maxSlippage that is used in the corresponding derivative...