FIRST ERC4626 DEPOSIT CAN BE EXPLOITED ON SHARE CALCULATION

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact This is a common attack vector involving shares based liquidity pool contracts. An early user can manipulate the price per share and profit from late users' deposits because of the precision loss caused by the rather large value of price per share. Note:...

MEV searchers can capture slippage tolerance on pool creation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the current Caviar protocol, anybody can supply initial liquidity to a newly created pool. An LP who intends to create a new pool and add liqiduity could execute the following transactions: 1. LP transaction 1: pair = Caviar.create 2. LP transaction 2...

User will often overpay when adding liquidity

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact One of the assets either baseTokens or fractionalTokens will likely be overpaid when the user calls Pair.add liquidity. Proof of Concept The Pair.add function takes baseTokenAmount, fractionalTokenAmount and minLpTokenAmount as inputs. The first two...

Wrong update of stoploss in TradingExtension._limitClose()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact TradingExtension.limitClose returns a wrong stoploss which is favorable for users and it would be a significant loss for the protocol. Proof of Concept TradingExtension.limitClose is used to set takeprofit/stoploss prices for the pending order and execut...

Pool.sol : Lack of slippage protection for swap

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to lack of slippage protection, user may suffer and incur loss of func in adverse condition. Proof of Concept Swap function is used to swap one toke for another token. While the swap function has check to ensure for exactOutput, but it does not have...

Uniswap V3 swaps are vulnerable to a sandwich attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As the amountOutMinimum is always hardcoded with 1 in the AutoPxGmx, then the Uniswap V3 swap is vulnerable to a frontrun / sandwich attack. Proof of Concept Even though the amountOutMinimum may never be 0 because it is prevented against it: if...

Functions like AutoPxGmx.withdraw and AutoPxGmx.redeem do not provide effective slippage control

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As shown below, calling the AutoPxGmx.withdraw and AutoPxGmx.redeem functions would execute compoundpoolFee, 1, 0, true, which uses the hardcoded 1 as the amountOutMinimum input of the AutoPxGmx.compound function to further call the...

Slippage protection on AutoPxGmx::compound calls is insufficient and can result in MEV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of Concept The compound method has the amountOutMinimum parameter, which basically serves as the slippage tolerance parameter. The problem is that everywhere in the code where compound is called, the value of amountOutMinimum is just 1 wei, which basicall...

Unused slippage params

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Unused slippage params. function outboundTransfer in L2GraphTokenGateway both L1 and L2 do not use slippage parameters., making it susceptible to sandwich attacks / MEV. Proof of Concept 'uint256, // unused on L2 uint256, // unused on L2' Tools Used...

Missing slippage control system. Users may lose a lot of funds due to front-running MEV bots.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Missing slippage control system. Users may lose a lot of funds due to front-running MEV bots. It has liquidityDesired or amountRequired but these parameters are only used in output amount calculation. It isn't used to prevent the output amounts from...

The mint function is missing the minAmountOut control, this will cause the user to lose their funds.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The mint function of the SimpleFeiDaiPSM contract receives DAI from the user, mints the FEI and sends it to the user. amountIn argument ; the amount of DAI received from the user, minAmountOut argument ; requests output for the amount of FEI given to the...

Stable/non-stable pair creation mistake could be abused

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Stable and non-stable pair use different formula to calculate the invariant k. If a non-stable pair is treated as stable, or vice versa. $x^3y+y^3x$ behave quite differently compare with $xy$, on the edge of relative stable price range, price volatility...

_postRebalanceChecks doens't properly account for flashloan fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Rebalances that should fall outside of variance requirement are approved Proof of Concept MIMOAutoBalance.solrebalance and MIMOManagedRebalance.solrebalance pass flData.amount into isVaultVariationAllowed. However, in MIMORebalance.solrebalanceOperation...

Upgraded Q -> M from 18 [1656705908645]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 18 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Controlled swapRouter The FeeBurner contract sets the swapperRouter in the addressProvider, so the owner can set any type of swapper, paths or pools, even malicious ones. Since there is no slippage defined in the...

Sandwich attacks are possible as there is no slippage control option in Marketplace and in Lender yield swaps

Lines of code Vulnerability details Swapping function in Marketplace and Lender's yield can be sandwiched as there is no slippage control option. Trades can happen at a manipulated price and end up receiving fewer tokens than current market price dictates. Placing severity to be medium as those a...

sell function does not have minimum threshold on the _minAmtOut

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact During the code review, It has been observed saleReturn value is not resistant to slippage on the minAmtOut. For the protecting value from slippage, the protocol should ensure that minAmtOut is different than zero. Proof of Concept Tools Used Recommended...

In execute() the amount routers pay is what user signed, but in _reconcile() the amount routers get is what nomad sends and this two amount are not necessary equal because of slippage in original domain

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact routers pay for transaction in destination domain then nomad messages come and routers get paid again. but the amount routers pay in execute are what transaction sender signed and the amount routers receive is what nomad sends and handles in reconcile bu...

in reimburseLiquidityFees() of SponserVault contract swaps tokens without slippage limit so its possible to perform sandwich attack and it create MEV

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact when code swaps tokens it should specify slippage but in reimburseLiquidityFees code contract calls tokenExchange.swapExactIn without slippage and it's possible to perform sandwich attack and make contract to swap on bad exchange rates and there is MEV...

Missing slippage protection for autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Autocompounding auraBAL rewards into AURA requires multiple swaps auraBAL - BAL/ETH BPT - WETH - AURA within MyStrategy.harvest. The swaps are at risk of being front-run / sandwiched, resulting in a loss of funds. Since MEV is very prominent I think the...

_harvest() performs market swaps without slippage control and is a subject to sandwich attacks

Lines of code Vulnerability details As a result trades happen at a manipulated price and end up receiving fewer tokens than current market price dictates. Placing severity to medium as impact here is a partial fund loss conditional only on big enough asset amount to be swapped: sandwich attacks a...