Governance functions relies on the proposal Id which says nothing about the proposal content

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are submitProposal/endorseProposal/activateProposal functions on the Governance smart contract. The functions accept the proposed, which does not contain any information about the proposal. As a result, transactions of users can be front-ran. Proof...

[NAZ-M2] Centralization Risk with "voter_admin" Has The Ability To mintTo/BurnFrom Any Arbitrary Amount of VOTES

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact "voteradmin" has the ability to mint/burn any arbitrary amount of VOTES. Creating a centralization risk that allows "voteradmin" to pass or veto any proposal. Proof of Concept 1. Alice submits a proposal that benefits the users at an expense of Mallory's...

Olympus votes can be locked in OlympusGovernance contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Olympus votes can be locked in Governance.sol OlympusGovernance contract. Proof of Concept When a user votes for a proposal, their current balance of VOTE is transferred to the OlympusGovernance contract. Those votes can be reclaimed once the proposal is...

Race condition produces DDOS on governance : 20% minority can block the other 80% from passing a proposal.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An account controlling enough voting percentage to endorse a proposal can block an unwanted proposal from being activated. This can be done by frontrunning or by paying more for gas. There can only be one concurrent activated proposal so there is a race...

While it is allowed to create only one proposal per person, you can still create more

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After the creation of one proposal user can send his tokens to another persondelegate votes, so another person will create new proposal using the first user's proposal threshold amount. In propose method there is a condition that one user can create only...

Calling execute function for one proposal immediately after an ETH transfer to timelock contract, such as for another proposal, can steal the transferred ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The NounsDAOExecutor contract is the timelock for this protocol. It can receive ETH transfer through the following receive and fallback functions. receive external payable fallback external payable Alice can create a proposal that sends certain amount of...

Voting power determined by proposal creation block enables inherent voting manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The voting power for a Nouns holder for a given proposal is calculated as the number of Nouns held at the time of proposal creation. This creates an opportunity for voting manipulation by the proposal creator because they can specifically choose the time...

Queued proposals can be blocked from execution by other proposals when using the same actions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NounsDAOLogicV1 and NounsDAOLogicV2, anyone can create proposal with the same actions as other proposal. In that case, if attacker calls cancel on his proposal, then other proposal with the same action cannot be executed. Proof of Concept Function...

in V2 Struct Proposal adds new params - totalSupply & creationBlock. So items in struct can overlap, as the struct consumes more slots.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Possible slot overlapping. Reference: Proof of Concept additing new Proposal structs Tools Used Visual Studio Recommended Mitigation Steps Append new variables that will manage this totalSupply/CreationBlock info stored. --- The text was updated...

Dynamic quorum votes parameters for a proposal (Proposal A) are changed according to another proposal (Proposal B) that proposes to update dynamic quorum votes parameters when Proposal B is executed after Proposal A is created in the same block

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The following writeQuorumParamsCheckpoint function is used to record dynamic quorum votes parameters at a block of interest. function writeQuorumParamsCheckpointDynamicQuorumParams memory params internal uint32 blockNumber = safe32block.number, 'block...

Storage layout collision issue between NounsDAOStorageV1 and NounsDAOStorageV1Adjusted

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Since two new variables are added in the contract NounsDAOStorageV1Adjusted at the end of the struct proposal, the memory layout between the NounsDAOStorageV1 and NounsDAOStorageV1Adjusted is colluding. This affects the variable type and values in the...

User should not be able to use more votes that he has at the moment of voting

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In castVoteInternal function user can vote. And the votes that he has is calculated using the checkpoint when the proposal was created. This is not correct for few reasons. 1.Suppose in time t1 the proposal was created and in that time user1 had 2 tokens...

ONLY ADMIN IS ABLE TO CHANGE THE VOTING PARAMETERS

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In both the NounsDAOLogicV1 and NounsDAOLogicV2 contracts, only admin is able to change the voting parameters which includes : VotingDelay VotingPeriod ProposalThresholdBPS MinQuorumVotesBPS MaxQuorumVotesBPS QuorumCoefficient This will ma...

Votes which guarantee a majority for-vote can still result in a defeated proposal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current quorum logic in NounsDAOLogicV2.sol and NounsDAOLogicV1.sol seems undesirable. High, even complete, voter turnout may still not favour a majority for-vote, while a majority against-vote always wins, no matter how low the turnout is even zero...

NounsDAOLogicV2's state() and proposals() will use initial dynamic params for all V1 proposals

Lines of code Vulnerability details state and proposals call quorumVotesid that utilize initial dynamic params for all V1 proposals by misusing 0 as a proposal creation block. I.e. new field is referenced while it is zero for all V1 proposals. This way all V1 proposals will use the same initial s...

Functions quitLock and delegate fundamentally change game theory of VoteEscrow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Without delegation it is not possible to remove voting power before the end of a lock. Function quitLock now makes this possible, but it does not just affect the user who quits the lock. Any votes that are delegated to them are temporarily lost from the...

CVE-2022-31198 GovernorVotesQuorumFraction updates to quorum may affect past defeated proposals in @openzeppelin/contracts

OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development. This issue concerns instances of Governor that use the module GovernorVotesQuorumFraction, a mechanism that determines quorum requirements as a percentage of the voting token's total supply. In affected instances, when a...

Possible to delegate same token

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It's possible to call delegatetokenId1, tokenId2 using the same token tokenId1 multiple times. The previous delegated value isn't deleted, and all delegations stack up. This way tokenId2 will have all these tokens as delegated:...

User can increase migration's proposal total tokens artificially

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There are two functions that users can use to withdraw deposited ether/tokens from a joined proposal: leave and withdrawContribution. leave correctly decreases the total contribution from a proposal alongside the user's one: // Updates fraction balances ...

Committed Unsuccessful Migration can be settled later on

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When committing a migration proposal, it's status is changed to isCommited = true and the buyout starts. After 4 days, the buyout ends. Considering the case it was rejected, its status goes to INACTIVE. Nothing happens to the proposal in the Migration...