[H-01] GovernorCountingOverridable.castVoteBySig()/castVoteWithReasonAndParamsBySig(): Possible signature replay attacks to influence proposal execution

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the GovernorCountingOverridable.sol inherited by LivePeerGovernor.sol, users can provide a signature to allow someone else to vote on their behalf using the castVoteBySig/castVoteWithReasonAndParamsBySig function since this functions are not overriden...

excuteProposal can fail due to Wormhole guardian change

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Wormhole governance can change signing guardian sets. If this happens between a proposal is queued and a proposal is executed. The second verification in executeProposal will fail as the guardian set has changed between queuing and executing. This would...

Proposal can executed even when it is in the "Queued" state.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact An attacker can bypass the intended governance process and directly execute proposals that are still in the voting or canceled state. This can result in unauthorized actions being performed on the smart contract, leading to loss of funds Proof of Concept...

Possible overflow in PartyGovernance._isUnanimousVotes()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Proposals can't be executed if totalVotes = 8e24. Furthermore, if emergencyExecuteDisabled == true and rageQuitTimestamp == DISABLERAGEQUITPERMANENTLY, users can't take out the funds from the party forever. Proof of Concept In isUnanimousVotes, it...

Proposal may not be executed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Proposal may not be executed Proof of Concept The protocol allows the member to have the voting power to create a proposal createProposal. Where the action struct in the parameter refers to be consumed by the DAO's execute function resulting in an extern...

No data validation, will result in all funds from the DAO contract stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The vulnerability relies on the proposal creation function which forwards the proposal once accepted for the DAO contract to execute. Each proposal has a set of actions attached. struct Action address to; uint256 value; bytes data; function createProposa...

Malicious party active member can approve malicious contract to spend and steal party ERC1155 nft and ERC20 tokens via arbitrary proposal execution

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Detailed description of the impact of this finding. Let's look into the implementation in ArbitraryCallsProposal.sol // Check that the call is not prohibited. if !isCallAllowedcall, isUnanimous, preciousTokens, preciousTokenIds revert...

Proposals can be submitted and executed sucessfully when VOTES totalySupply is 0.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When all contracts have been deployed and/or initialized, the OlympusVotes contract does not mint an initial token supply. This would allow users to be able to submit proposals, then vote and execute proposals if there has been no token supply totalSuppl...

Calling execute function for one proposal immediately after an ETH transfer to timelock contract, such as for another proposal, can steal the transferred ETH

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The NounsDAOExecutor contract is the timelock for this protocol. It can receive ETH transfer through the following receive and fallback functions. receive external payable fallback external payable Alice can create a proposal that sends certain amount of...

CVE-2022-31198 GovernorVotesQuorumFraction updates to quorum may affect past defeated proposals in @openzeppelin/contracts

OpenZeppelin Contracts is a library for secure smart contract development. This issue concerns instances of Governor that use the module GovernorVotesQuorumFraction, a mechanism that determines quorum requirements as a percentage of the voting token's total supply. In affected instances, when a...

You can vote for proposal already completed

Handle s1m0 Vulnerability details Impact The mapPIDfinalised is set on completeProposal but voteProposal doesn't check it. A malicious user with enough capital and/or together with other people could execute a proposal in his favor e.g. a grant infinitely. Proof of Concept 1 newGrantProposal 2...