Users can avoid paying vault fees

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The LPIssuer.deposit/withdraw function charges protocol&management&performance fees through inflating the LP supply in the chargeFees function. However, this LP fees minting is skipped if the elapsed time is less than the managementFeeChargeDelay: if elapsed...

User deposits don't have min. return checks

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The LPIssuer.deposit first computes balanced amounts on the user's defined tokenAmounts. The idea is that LP tokens give the same percentage share of each vault tokens' tvl, therefore the provided amounts should be balanced, meaning, the depositAmount / tvl...

Anyone can remove liquidity

Handle jayjonah8 Vulnerability details Impact In UniswapHandler.sol, anyone can call the removeLiquidity function stealing all the lp tokens in the contract even if they never added liquidity in the first place since the function simply credits the msg.sender with the entire lp token balance of t...

Mixing different types of LP shares can lead to losses for Synth holders

Handle hyh Vulnerability details Impact Users that mint Synths do not get pool shares, so exiting of normal LP can lead to their losses as no funds can be left for retrieval. Proof of Concept 3 types of mint/burn: NFT, Fungible and Synths. Synths are most vilnerable as they do not have share: LP...

VaderPoolV2.mintFungible exposes users to unlimited slippage

Handle TomFrench Vulnerability details Impact Frontrunners can extract up to 100% of the value provided by LPs to VaderPoolV2. Proof of Concept Users can provide liquidity to VaderPoolV2 through the mintFungible function. This allows users to provide tokens in any ratio and the pool will calculat...

Uniswap / Sushiswap prices can be manipulated through flashloans

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The UniswapV2CSSR.getExchangeRatio uses the current reserve to derive the exchange ratio. The fact that it mixes in historic data does not matter because it still uses the current reserves which can be manipulated through flashloans in currentPriceCumulative...

ConcentratedLiquidityPool.burn() Wrong implementation

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details The reserves should be updated once LP tokens are burned to match the actual total bento shares hold by the pool. However, the current implementation only updated reserves with the fees subtracted. Makes the reserve0 and reserve1 smaller than the current...

burn do not burn reserve

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details burn do not burn reserve Impact ConcentratedLiquidityPool.solL263-L266 The dev mistakenly write: reserve0 -= uint128amount0fees; reserve1 -= uint128amount1fees; It should be reserve0 -= uint128amount0fees; reserve1 -= uint128amount1fees; Other users can't min...

Burning does not update reserves

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The ConcentratedLiquidityPool.burn function sends out amount0/amount1 tokens but only updates the reserves by decreasing it by the fees of these amounts. unchecked // @audit decreases by fees only, not by amount0/amount1 reserve0 -= uint128amount0fees; reserve...

IndexPool initial LP supply computation is wrong

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The IndexPool.constructor function already mints INITPOOLSUPPLY = 100 1e18 = 1e20 LP tokens to the zero address. When trying to use the pool, someone has to provide the actual initial reserve tokens in mint. On the first mint, the pool reserves are zero and th...

ConstantProductPool & HybridPool: Adding and removing unbalanced liquidity yields slightly more tokens than swap

Handle GreyArt Vulnerability details Impact A mint fee is applied whenever unbalanced liquidity is added, because it is akin to swapping the excess token amount for the other token. However, the current implementation distributes the minted fee to the minter as well when he should be excluded. It...

Overflow in the mint function of IndexPool causes LPs' funds to be stolen

Handle broccoli Vulnerability details Impact It is possible to overflow the addition in the balance check i.e., balancetokenIn = amountIn + reserve in the mint function by setting the amountIn to a large amount. As a result, the attacker could gain a large number of LP tokens by not even providin...

IndexPool.INIT_POOL_SUPPLY is too large, which may cause a significant amount of fund loss to the first liquidity provider

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details uint256 internal constant BASE = 1018; ... uint256 internal constant INITPOOLSUPPLY = BASE 100; /// @dev Mints LP tokens - should be called via the router after transferring bento tokens. /// The router must ensure that sufficient LP tokens are minted by usin...

Transfer method doesn't consider gained interest correctly,

Handle pants Vulnerability details Impact transfer method doesn't consider gained interest correctly. For example, a user that gained 10% of interest and moves the LP tokens to another user might lose the gained interest. This is a severe bug and all other LP tokens out there manages the interest...

Unsafe cast in IndexPool mint leads to attack

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The IndexPool.mint function performs an unsafe cast of ratio to the uint120 type: uint120 ratio = uint120divtoMint, totalSupply; Note that toMint is chosen by the caller and when choosing toMint = 2120 totalSupply / BASE, the ratio variable will be 2120 and th...

lp-support.com Cross Site Scripting vulnerability OBB-2146407

Following the coordinated and responsible vulnerability disclosure guidelines of the ISO 29147 standard, Open Bug Bounty has: &nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbspa. verified the vulnerability and confirmed its existence; &nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbsp&nbspb. notified the website operator about its existence...

Adding assymetric liquidity in _addLiquidity results in fewer LP tokens minted than what should be wanted

Handle tensors Vulnerability details Impact Because the call in addLiquidity forwards the entire balances of the 3 stablecoins without checking the ratio between the 3, less liquidity is minted than what should be wanted. Furthermore, an attacker can abuse this arbitrage the forwarded balances if...

PostAuctionLauncher's liquidity provision can be exploited

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details The PostAuctionLauncher.finalize function takes the raised payment token amounts and uses previously provided auction token amounts to provide liquidity to a Sushiswap pool after an auction has successfully been finalized. It provides this liquidity at a...

EulerOS 2.0 SP2 : cups (EulerOS-SA-2021-2363)

According to the version of the cups packages installed, the EulerOS installation on the remote host is affected by the following vulnerability : - A Incorrect Default Permissions vulnerability in the packaging of cups of SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11-SP4-LTSS, SUSE Manager Server 4.0, SUSE...

PostAuctionLauncher.sol#finalize() Adding liquidity to an existing pool may allows the attacker to steal most of the tokens

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details PostAuctionLauncher.finalize can be called by anyone, and it sends tokens directly to the pair pool to mint liquidity, even when the pair pool exists. An attacker may control the LP price by creating the pool and then call finalize to mint LP token with unfai...