Collect modules can fail on zero amount transfers if treasury fee is set to zero

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Treasury fee can be zero, while collect modules do attempt to send it in such a case anyway as there is no check in place. Some ERC20 tokens do not allow zero value transfers, reverting such attempts. This way, a combination of zero treasury fee and such...

Basis points constant BPS_MAX is used as minimal fee amount requirement

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Base fee modules require minimum fixed fee amount to be at least BPSMAX, which is hard coded to be 10000. This turns out to be a functionality restricting requirement for some currencies. For example, WBTC , 10 in ERC20 token rankings, has decimals of 8...

Fee amount too restrictive

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the fee collect modules like FeeCollectModule, the initializePublicationCollectModule checks if the fee amount that each user needs to pay is at least = BPSMAX = 10000. For certain currencies with fewer decimals this is too restrictive. As an example,...

Cashback on referral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the fee collect modules like FeeCollectModule there is no prevention of someone submitting a second profile they own as the referrerProfileId in processCollect to receive back part of the fees paid. The referral system is essentially broken as all...

Name squatting

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Creating profiles through LensHub/PublishingLogic.createProfile does not cost anything and will therefore result in "name squatting". A whitelisted profile creator will create many handles that are in demand, even if they don't need them, just to flip th...

Unconstrained fee

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Token fee in MasterChef can be set to more than 100%, for example by accident causing all deposit calls to fail due to underflow on subtraction when reward is lowered by the fee, thus breaking essential mechanics. Note that after the fee has been set to...

Consistently check account balance before and after transfers for Fee-On-Transfer discrepencies

Handle Dravee Vulnerability details Impact Wrong fateBalance bookkeeping for a user. Wrong fateCreated value emitted. Proof of Concept Taking into account the FOT is done almost everywhere important in the solution already. That's a known practice in the solution. However, it's missing here see...

OpenLevV1.closeTrade with V3 DEX doesn't correctly accounts fee on transfer tokens for repayments

Handle hyh Vulnerability details Impact The amount that OpenLevV1 will receive can be less than V3 DEX indicated as a swap result, while it is used as given for position debt repayment accounting. This way actual funds received can be less than accounted, leaving to system funds deficit, which ca...

Improper Upper Bound Definition on the Fee

Handle Jujic Vulnerability details Impact The rJoePerSec does not have any upper or lower bounds. Values that are too large will lead to reversions in several critical functions. Proof of Concept function updateEmissionRateuint256 rJoePerSec external onlyOwner updatePool; rJoePerSec = rJoePerSec;...

The amount of tokens received by the pool might be less than expected for feeOnTransfer tokens

Handle UncleGrandpa925 Vulnerability details Impact This issue impacts any pools that use fee-on-transfer quoteTokens. The codebase is inspired by Uniswap, with one important change: the router is built right into the pool themselves. In addLiquidity, after having updated all internal parameters...

SherlockClaimManager: Incorrect amounts needed and paid for escalated claims

Handle GreyArt Vulnerability details Impact When escalating claims, the documentation states that the protocol agent is required to pay and stake a certain amount for the process. If the covered protocol is proven correct, then the amount specified by the claim will be paid out. They will also...

Fee always is zero in the first addLiquidity call

Handle 0x1f8b Vulnerability details Impact Fee always is zero during the first addLiquidity call. Proof of Concept The method MathLib.calculateLiquidityTokenFees is on charge to compute the liquidityToken fee, one of the arguments it's the totalSupply, and during the first call of addLiquidity...

Vaults don't work with fee-on transfer tokens

Handle cmichel Vulnerability details Certain ERC20 tokens make modifications to their ERC20's transfer or balanceOf functions. One type of these tokens is deflationary tokens that charge a certain fee for every transfer or transferFrom. Impact The Vault.addValueBatch functions will recive less...

[WP-M17] Vault.sol Tokens with fee on transfer are not supported

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details There are ERC20 tokens that charge fee for every transfer / transferFrom. Vault.soladdValue assumes that the received amount is the same as the transfer amount, and uses it to calculate attributions, balance amounts, etc. While the actual transferred amount c...

[WP-H2] NonUSTStrategy.sol Improper handling of swap fees allows attacker to steal funds from other users

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details NonUSTStrategy will swap the deposited non-UST assets into UST before depositing to EthAnchor. However, the swap fee is not attributed to the depositor correctly like many other yield farming vaults involving swaps ZapIn. An attacker can exploit it for the sw...

[WP-N7] Vault.sol Tokens with fee on transfer are not supported

Handle WatchPug Vulnerability details There are ERC20 tokens that charge fee for every transfer or transferFrom. Vault.soltransferAndCheckUnderlying requires that the received amount is the same as the transfer amount, otherwise, it will revert at L587. function transferAndCheckUnderlyingaddress...

require check doesnt comply with an underlying token that implemented fee in the transfer and transferFrom function

Handle Tomio Vulnerability details Impact The implementation for the transferAndCheckUnderlying function can revert the transaction if the underlying token is implementing a fee on the transfer and transferFrom function, this can happen because when a token implementing a fee on transfer, it...

Fee-on transfer tokens not supported

Handle pmerkleplant Vulnerability details Impact There exist ERC20 tokens that charge a fee for every transfer. This kind of token does not work correctly with the PoolTemplate::deposit function. Proof of Concept The PoolTemplate::deposit function mints an amount of iTokens based on the function'...

investedAssets ignores fees and can cause insolvency

Handle danb Vulnerability details investedAssets doesn't substract the fees owed to the treasury, this makes the system think that it has more than it really has. Proof of Concept consider the following scenario: perfFeePct is 20%. the system generated 1M dollars yield in aust that it didn't rede...

_transferAndCheckUnderlying doesn't work with fee-on-transfer tokens

Handle harleythedog Vulnerability details Impact There are several ERC20 tokens that take a small fee on transfers/transferFroms known as "fee-on-transfer" tokens. Most notably, USDT is an ERC20 token that has togglable transfer fees, but for now the fee is set to 0 see the contract here: . In th...