LiquidityReserve may break if underlying token is upgraded to have fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact One of the tokens supported by this project is USDC, which is an upgradeable contract, and the code specifically casts addresses to IERC20Upgradeable rather than to IERC20, so the intention is for the code to support upgrades. If USDC ever upgrades to ha...

Fee on transfer tokens not supported

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Fee on transfer tokens would lead to sellers getting more PT than what the pool has received in underlying as the difference in balance is not accounted for, only the a input. This is also true for mintWithUnderlying as minters get more in relation to th...

Yield of LiquidityReserve can be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Using sandwich attacks and JIT Just-in-time liquidity, the yield of LiquidityReserve could be extracted for liquidity providers. Proof of Concept The yield of LiquidityReserve is distributed when a user calls instantUnstakeReserve in Staking. Then, in...

Improper Upper Bound Definition on the Fee

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The feenominator does not have any upper or lower bounds. Values that are too large will lead to reversions in several critical functions or the platform user will lost all funds when paying the fee. Proof of Concept 1. Navigate to the following contract...

Inaccurate fee calculation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The equation in the calculateFee function has a high degree of inaccuracy Solidity use integers, when divide an uint256 for other uint256 the divition take the floor number and ignore the decimal part In example: a = 1999 ETH feenominator = 1000 the retu...

instantUnstake function can be frontrunned with fee increase

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact instantUnstake allows user to unstake their stakingToken for a fee paid to the liquidity providers. This fee could be changed up to 100% any moment by admin. Malicious admin could frontrun users instantUnstake transaction and set fee to any value using...

Call to lend() function can be frontrunned with fee increase

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Malicious admin could frontrun users lend transaction anytime and set feenominator to any value using setFee and bigger fee than user expected. /// @notice sets the admin address /// @param a address of a new admin /// @return bool true if successful...

Fee Was Not Charged When Buying On Secondary Curve

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Per the documentation, the admin and curator fees are charged when buying on the secondary curve. Whenever someone mints and burns tokens on the bonding curve, they need to pay some trading fees which is accrued in ETH Within the NibblVault.buy...

Some users can redeem more reserve tokens after curator redeems accumulated curator fee.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It is possible for some users to redeem more reserved tokens if the curator redeems accummulated curator fee before their redeem action in the case of a boughtOut. This is possible because NibblVault.redeemCuratorFee sets feeAccruedCurator back to 0. So ...

Malicious code in 0x-fee-wrapper-contract (npm)

--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=- Source: ghsa-malware 1a9d80927be2fbab050ca79fbed448dcc2058ca5eb8ea27c28fffedc5d6ab3a1 Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be...

Student Registration and Fee Payment System SQL Injection Vulnerability

Student Registration and Fee Payment System is a student registration and fee payment management system. student registration and fee payment system v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL injection, which originates from /scms/student. php is missing SQL data filtering and escaping. An attacker could use this...

Admin can set arbitrarily high exchange fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Admins can attack users by frontrunning them Poc In the function setProtocolFeeInfinityExchange.sol function setProtocolFeeuint16 protocolFeeBps external onlyOwner PROTOCOLFEEBPS = protocolFeeBps;@audit medium emit NewProtocolFeeprotocolFeeBps; Admins ca...

_handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. Moreover, if it is failed, fund may be locked forever.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. As duplicated fee is applied to fee on transfer token when executing a arbitrary call message passing request. Moreover, the Executor contract increase allowance on that token...

NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee() CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs

Lines of code Vulnerability details NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs In InfinityExchange.sol, there is no timelock on setProtocolFee. This is the fee that is applied in orders, and determines how much the Exchange receives in fee VS how much the seller receives...

Relayer Will Not Receive Any Fee If execute Reverts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Connext relies on the relayer to trigger the BridgeFacet.execute function on the destination domain to initiate the token transfer and calldata execution processes. Relayers pay for the gas cost to trigger the execute function, and in return fo...

InfinityExchange owner can steal user's tokens via front-running

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contract InfinityExchange.sol charges protocol fee through PROTOCOLFEEBPS. The issue is that owner of the contract is able to change protocol fee at any time without any restriction which puts him in a very privileged position and allows him to steal...

Maker order buyer is forced to reimburse the gas cost at any tx.gasprice

Lines of code Vulnerability details uint256 gasCost = startGasPerOrder - gasleft + wethTransferGasUnits tx.gasprice; // if the execution currency is weth, we can send the protocol fee and gas cost in one transfer to save gas // else we need to send the protocol fee separately in the execution...

Protocol fee rate can be arbitrarily modified by the owner and the new rate will apply to all existing orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details function matchOneToOneOrders OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders1, OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders2 external uint256 startGas = gasleft; uint256 numMakerOrders = makerOrders1.length; requiremsg.sender == MATCHEXECUTOR, 'OME';...

Should it transfer underSpentAmount to _msgSender() instead of reserve?

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact underSpentAmount is dust amount, if being transferred to reserve without any state modification. These tokens might be lost. Normally, dust amount must transfer back to only msgSender as a best practice. Proof of Concept unchecked uint256 underSpentAmoun...

Fee-on-transfer support

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Every time transferFrom or transfer function in ERC20 standard is called there is a possibility that underlying smart contract did not transfer the exact amount entered. It is required to find out contract balance increase/decrease after the transfer to...