Malicious code in 0x-fee-wrapper-contract (npm)

--- -= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=- Source: ghsa-malware 1a9d80927be2fbab050ca79fbed448dcc2058ca5eb8ea27c28fffedc5d6ab3a1 Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be...

Student Registration and Fee Payment System SQL Injection Vulnerability

Student Registration and Fee Payment System is a student registration and fee payment management system. student registration and fee payment system v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL injection, which originates from /scms/student. php is missing SQL data filtering and escaping. An attacker could use this...

Admin can set arbitrarily high exchange fees

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Admins can attack users by frontrunning them Poc In the function setProtocolFeeInfinityExchange.sol function setProtocolFeeuint16 protocolFeeBps external onlyOwner PROTOCOLFEEBPS = protocolFeeBps;@audit medium emit NewProtocolFeeprotocolFeeBps; Admins ca...

_handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. Moreover, if it is failed, fund may be locked forever.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact handleExecuteTransaction may not working correctly on fee-on-transfer tokens. As duplicated fee is applied to fee on transfer token when executing a arbitrary call message passing request. Moreover, the Executor contract increase allowance on that token...

Relayer Will Not Receive Any Fee If execute Reverts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof-of-Concept Connext relies on the relayer to trigger the BridgeFacet.execute function on the destination domain to initiate the token transfer and calldata execution processes. Relayers pay for the gas cost to trigger the execute function, and in return fo...

NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee() CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs

Lines of code Vulnerability details NO TIMELOCK ON setProtocolFee CAN LEAD TO SELLERS LOSING THEIR NFTs In InfinityExchange.sol, there is no timelock on setProtocolFee. This is the fee that is applied in orders, and determines how much the Exchange receives in fee VS how much the seller receives...

Protocol fee rate can be arbitrarily modified by the owner and the new rate will apply to all existing orders

Lines of code Vulnerability details function matchOneToOneOrders OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders1, OrderTypes.MakerOrder calldata makerOrders2 external uint256 startGas = gasleft; uint256 numMakerOrders = makerOrders1.length; requiremsg.sender == MATCHEXECUTOR, 'OME';...

Maker order buyer is forced to reimburse the gas cost at any tx.gasprice

Lines of code Vulnerability details uint256 gasCost = startGasPerOrder - gasleft + wethTransferGasUnits tx.gasprice; // if the execution currency is weth, we can send the protocol fee and gas cost in one transfer to save gas // else we need to send the protocol fee separately in the execution...

InfinityExchange owner can steal user's tokens via front-running

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Contract InfinityExchange.sol charges protocol fee through PROTOCOLFEEBPS. The issue is that owner of the contract is able to change protocol fee at any time without any restriction which puts him in a very privileged position and allows him to steal...

Fee-on-transfer support

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Every time transferFrom or transfer function in ERC20 standard is called there is a possibility that underlying smart contract did not transfer the exact amount entered. It is required to find out contract balance increase/decrease after the transfer to...

Should it transfer underSpentAmount to _msgSender() instead of reserve?

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact underSpentAmount is dust amount, if being transferred to reserve without any state modification. These tokens might be lost. Normally, dust amount must transfer back to only msgSender as a best practice. Proof of Concept unchecked uint256 underSpentAmoun...

CVE-2022-31908

Student Registration and Fee Payment System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scms/student.php...

CVE-2022-31908

Student Registration and Fee Payment System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scms/student.php...

Sql injection

Student Registration and Fee Payment System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scms/student.php...

CVE-2022-31908

CVE-2022-31908 affects the Student Registration and Fee Payment System v1.0. The vulnerability is a SQL Injection via the login/registration endpoint at /scms/student.php, caused by missing input data filtering/escaping. This allows an attacker to inject SQL commands and potentially access/modify...

CVE-2022-31908

Student Registration and Fee Payment System v1.0 is vulnerable to SQL Injection via /scms/student.php...

Upgraded Q -> M from 268 [1654474507101]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 268 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: High feeRate can break core protocol function PROBLEM There is no maximum input value on setFee in Cally.sol. But if the owner sets it to a uint greater than 1e18, the users will not be able to call exercice as...

Upgraded Q -> M from 190 [1654475279061]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 190 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: L-02 Fee in Cally.setFee should be upper-bounded A malicious owner or owner account compromise can set the fee very high, up to 100%, siphoning all profits from the protocol. Consider implementing a reasonable...

Upgraded Q -> M from 286 [1654474962848]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 286 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: No min/max fee rate Line Refrences Cally.solL119-121 Description Limits for the fee rate should be set to avoid mistakes when setting the fee. A fee rate that is over 100% could result in the exercise function n...

Upgraded Q -> M from 294 [1654474576938]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 294 as Medium risk. The relevant finding follows: Owner can frontrun exercise to increase fees A malicious owner account can observe and frontrun calls to exercise and extract 100% of the strike price as a protocol fee. Scenario: A malicious owner observes a ca...