Sql injection

School Registration and Fee System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at/bilal final/edituser.php...

School Registration and Fee System SQL注入漏洞

School Registration and Fee System is a school registration and fee system by hemedy99 individual developer. A security vulnerability exists in School Registration and Fee System v1.0, which is caused by a SQL injection vulnerability in the id parameter of /bilal final/edituser.php...

PT-2023-20914 · Unknown · School Registration/Fee System

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions: School Registration and Fee System version 1.0 Description: The issue is related to a SQL injection vulnerability. This vulnerability can be exploited via the id parameter at the "/bilal final/edit user.php" API endpoint. Recommendations: For...

CVE-2023-27041

School Registration and Fee System v1.0 was discovered to contain a SQL injection vulnerability via the id parameter at/bilal final/edituser.php...

Redemption fee increase can be thwarted

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The mechanism to increase the baseRate during redemptions is moot, up to gas fees. Therefore an arbitrageur can redeem more than what is healthy for the supply of LUSD. This weakens the price floor at $1, and may cause needless volatility. It further...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #356 [1677633435546]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 356 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 ERC4626 does not work with fee-on-transfer tokens in project Impact ERC20 token contract can be deposited with the deposit function. With the following part of the code, the ERC20 transfer from msg.sender to the...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #795 [1677634051278]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 795 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: 01 FEE-ON-TRANSFER TOKENS ARE NOT SUPPORTED This protocol currently does not support fee-on-transfer tokens. For example, for a fee-on-transfer token, calling the following Vault.deposit function with the assets inpu...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #92 [1677633054022]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 92 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-09 ERC4626 does not work with fee-on-transfer tokens Description The ERC4626 deposit/mint functions do not work well with fee-on-transfer tokens as the assets variable is the pre-fee amount, including the fee, where...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #523 [1677626174331]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 523 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: Title Add function for feeRecipient change in MultiRewardEscrow.sol contract Links to affected code Vulnerability details Impact If account feeRecipient would be compromised, or the protocol owner wants from some oth...

Upgraded Q -> 2 from #823 [1677594201547]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 823 as 2 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-01 Low level call result not correctly checked The last adminProxy.execute is not checked for success. function deployAdapter DeploymentArgs memory adapterData, bytes memory baseAdapterData, IDeploymentController...

managementFee is unfair and can be used to steal stakers deposits

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description managementFee is a fee that is taken on TVL and calculated per year: File: Vault.sol 429: function accruedManagementFee public view returns uint256 430: uint256 managementFee = fees.management; 431: return 432: managementFee 0 433: ?...

MultiRewardStaking does not work with fee-on-transfer tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details The way MultiRewardStaking handles deposits does not work with fee-on-transfer tokens: deposit uses convertToShares to compute the number of shares to mint, which returns assets - ie a 1:1 equivalence between shares and the number of asset tokens. 98: function...

Vault creator can prevent users from claiming staking rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Vault creator can prevent users from claiming rewards from the staking contract. This can boost his liquidity and lure depositors to stake vault tokens. He can present a high APY and low fee percentage which will incentivize stakers When the staking...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #619 [1675724566035]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 619 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: The function withdrawRemainingTokens can be changed in a safer way to handle the withdraw from the owner and the protocol fee as well. This prevent risks allocated with the protocol fees. By the docs this function is...

Upgraded Q -> 3 from #664 [1675726078144]

Judge has assessed an item in Issue 664 as 3 risk. The relevant finding follows: L-1 ERC20 Quest: withdrawFee function should only be able to be called once instead of multiple times Issue: The withdrawFee function can be called multiple times by admin after a quest ends, resulting in more than t...

SubprotocolRegistry accepts empty string as protocol name

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The input sanitization statements in SubprotocolRegistry.sol's register function are: function register bool ordered, bool primary, bool active, address nftAddress, string calldata name, uint96 fee external // ... if !ordered || primary || active revert...

User may charge any amount of fees when registering a subprotocol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When registering a subprotocol, the user may enter any amount of fees. There are no checks implemented. Proof of Concept The register function does not have a check for the fee. A limit may be imposed otherwise a user can register a subprotocol with any...

Some ERC20 tokens deduct a fee on transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Some ERC20 token implementations have a fee that is charged on each token transfer. This means that the transferred amount isn't exactly what the receiver will get. A call to ERC20token.transferrecipient, 100 with a fee-on-transfer of 5% will entitle the...

If no association type matched, user will end up paying fee for nothing

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users can add a new entry for the given subprotocol to the provided CID NFT. There are possible three different association types ordered, primary, active that can be used to model different types of associations between the CID NFT and subprotocol. For...

Fee can be transferred to the zero address while subprotocol registeration

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Everytime user register a new subprotocol to the registry contract, the registry contract transfer the fee to the cidFeeWallet from the registrar. There is missing vaildation that the transfer should not goes to zero address. If no address has been set f...