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The Rambus SafeZone Basic Crypto Module before 10.4.0, as used in certain Fujifilm formerly Fuji Xerox devices before 2022-03-01, Canon imagePROGRAF and imageRUNNER devices through 2022-03-14, and potentially many other devices, generates RSA keys that can be broken with Fermat's factorization...

CVE-2022-26320

The issue affects Rambus SafeZone Basic Crypto Module versions prior to 10.4.0, incorporated in certain Fujifilm (formerly Fuji Xerox) devices and Canon imagePROGRAF/imageRUNNER devices. The root cause is insecure RSA key generation in the CLS PK KeyGenMT() routine, due to insufficient randomness...

CVE-2022-26320

The Rambus SafeZone Basic Crypto Module before 10.4.0, as used in certain Fujifilm formerly Fuji Xerox devices before 2022-03-01, Canon imagePROGRAF and imageRUNNER devices through 2022-03-14, and potentially many other devices, generates RSA keys that can be broken with Fermat's factorization...

PT-2022-3152 · Rambus · Rambus Safezone Basic Crypto Module

Name of the Vulnerable Software and Affected Versions: Rambus SafeZone Basic Crypto Module versions prior to 10.4.0 Description: The issue is related to the generation of RSA keys that can be broken with Fermat's factorization method, allowing efficient calculation of private RSA keys from the...

RSA-240 Factored

This just in: We are pleased to announce the factorization of RSA-240, from RSA's challenge list, and the computation of a discrete logarithm of the same size 795 bits: RSA-240 = 12462036678171878406583504460810659043482037465167880575481878888328...

Micali-Schnorr Generator (MS-DRBG) Part III - Zero Knowledge Proof Wanted!!

See also Part I and Part II of this series This is going to be a short blog post about the infamous Micali-Schnorr Random Number Generator MS-DRBG. See Part I and Part II of this series for more information about this topic. WHO: NIST published the specification for Micali-Schnorr Random Number...

How to try to predict the output of Micali-Schnorr Generator (MS-DRBG) knowing the factorization. Part II

See also Part I and Part III of this series tl;dr In the previous article of the same series we tried to predict the output of Micali-Schnorr Generator MS-DRBG knowing the factorization. In this blog post we continue the effort started in part I showing different strategies. If you want to skip a...

Updated opensc_etc packages fix security vulnerability

A vulnerability, dubbed ROCA, was identified in an implementation of RSA key generation due to a fault in a code library developed by Infineon Technologies. The affected encryption keys are used to secure many forms of technology, such as hardware chips, authentication tokens, software packages,...

Serious Crypto-Flaw Lets Hackers Recover Private RSA Keys Used in Billions of Devices

If you think KRACK attack for WiFi is the worst vulnerability of this year, then hold on… ...we have got another one for you which is even worse. Microsoft, Google, Lenovo, HP and Fujitsu are warning their customers of a potentially serious vulnerability in widely used RSA cryptographic library...

How to try to predict the output of Micali-Schnorr Generator (MS-DRBG) knowing the factorization

The article was modified since its publication. Last update was 09/10/2017 See also Part II and Part III of this series tl;dr in this post we are going to describe how to try predict the output of Micali-Schnorr Generator MS-DRBG knowing the factorization of the n value. If this sounds like, "why...

Post-Quantum RSA

Interesting research on a version of RSA that is secure against a quantum computer: Post-quantum RSA Daniel J. Bernstein, Nadia Heninger, Paul Lou, and Luke Valenta Abstract: This paper proposes RSA parameters for which 1 key generation, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification are...