5613 matches found
Incorrect Import Path Directories
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Wrong Import Path Directories of LiquidationPair.sol contract would affect the functionality of the contract as this contract relies of the implementation of this imports Proof of Concept 4. import ILiquidationSource from...
Balancer swap fee is not set and quote properly when Rebalancing
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Rebalance may revert Proof of Concept The rebalance functon tightly integrate with stargate and layezero however, the swap fee is not quoted and calculated the swap erc20.approveaddressrouter, amount; router.swap dstChainId, srcPoolId, dstPoolId, oft,...
Missing access control override in BoringFactory
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact function addBigBang address mc, address contract external onlyOwner registeredBigBangMasterContractmc isMarketRegisteredcontract = true; clonesOfmc.pushcontract; emit RegisterBigBangcontract, mc; allows only onlyOwner to call this function, while deploy ...
Malicious user can drain the Singularity contract of it's liquidity
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The SGLCollateral contract has functionality to allow users to remove and add collateral for the Singularity market. The addCollateral function accepts a skim parameter that, if defined as true, will cause the internal addTokens function to assert that t...
Controlled Delegatecall Vulnerability in Singularity, BaseUSDO, USDOLeverageModule, USDOMarketModule, and USDOOptionsModule
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Singularity, BaseUSDO, USDOLeverageModule, USDOMarketModule, and USDOOptionsModule contracts all use the delegatecall function to call a function in another contract. However, the function id of the function to be called is controlled by the caller...
Broker Address can be Claim by a MEV Bot
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the broker address is a malicious user, he can mint as many OTAP as he wants. Proof of Concept Protocol deploy the OTAP contract A Bot wait until the contract is deployed Then call the "brokerClaim" straight away with his own address. He can then call...
Lack of slippage checks on public withdraw fees function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact function withdrawAllMarketFees IMarket calldata markets, ISwapper calldata swappers, IPenrose.SwapData calldata swapData public notPaused require markets.length == swappers.length && swappers.length == swapData.length, "Penrose: length mismatch" ;...
Setting debtStartPoint > 0 breaks many BigBang actions
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If BigBang.debtStartPoint is set to a value 0, many core features will break, e.g. deposits of collateral will be possible, but removal not, which would effectively lock collateral inside the contract. Proof of Concept BigBang.getDebtRate uses the variab...
The USDOLeverageModule contract's leverageUp function allows for dangerous call delegation
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The USDOLeverageModule contract is a module that is used by the BaseUSDO contract to facilitate functionality for leverage actions. The module functionality is invoked through the invocation of a delegatecall within the BaseUSDO contract's executeModule...
BigBang liquidations causes YieldBox-tokens to be locked in contract
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a position gets liquidated in BigBang the contract will receive YieldBox-assetId-tokens of which some are sent to the liquidator and penrose-fee-receiver. The rest will get stuck in the contract and cannot be claimed as fees in refreshPenroseFees...
Reentrancy vulnerability in USDO.flashLoan() function
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The reentrancy vulnerability in the USDO contract could allow an attacker to withdraw funds from the contract even if the original contract has not yet approved the withdrawal. This could result in a loss of funds for the USDO contract and its users. Pro...
The USDOMarketModule contract's lend function allows for dangerous call delegation
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The USDOMarketModule contract is a module that is used by the BaseUSDO contract to facilitate functionality for market actions. The module functionality is invoked through the invocation of a delegatecall within the BaseUSDO contract's executeModule...
The amount of debt removed during liquidation may be worth more than the account's collateral
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The contract decreases user's debts but may not take the full worth in collateral from the user, leading to the contract losing potential funds from the missing collateral. Proof of concept During the liquidate function call, the function...
Permanent funds lock in StargateRewardableWrapper
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The staked funds might be locked because the deposit/withdraw/transfer logic reverts. Proof of Concept In StargateRewardableWrapper, claimAssetRewards claims the accumulated rewards from the staking contract and it's called during every...
The USDOOptionsModule contract's exercise function allows for dangerous call delegation
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The USDOOptionsModule contract is a module that is used by the BaseUSDO contract to facilitate functionality for oTap actions. The module functionality is invoked through the invocation of a delegatecall within the BaseUSDO contract's executeModule...
Force Expiration Of Ethereum Name Service (ENS)
@ensdomains/ens-contracts is vulnerable to Force Expiration Of Ethereum Name Service ENS. The vulnerability exists due to the integer overflow in the renew function of BaseRegistrarImplementation.sol, which allows an attacker to reduce the expiration time of existing domains...
_claimRewardsOnBehalf() User's rewards may be lost
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Incorrect determination of maximum rewards, which may lead to loss of user rewards Proof of Concept claimRewardsOnBehalf For users to retrieve rewards function claimRewardsOnBehalf address onBehalfOf, address receiver, bool forceUpdate internal if...
Whitelisted profile creators could accidentally break migration for V1 profiles
Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description Profiles that exist before the V2 upgrade are migrated using the batchMigrateProfiles function, which works by minting the profile's handle and linking it to their profile: MigrationLib.solL69-L85 string memory handle =...
tryMigrate() doesn't ensure that followerProfileId isn't already following
Lines of code Vulnerability details Bug Description In FollowNFT.sol, the tryMigrate function is used to migrate users who were following before the V2 upgrade. It does so by updating followTokenIdByFollowerProfileId and followDataByFollowTokenId, which are state variables introduced in the V2...
lack of payable
Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If it is not marked payable, the contract will throw an exception if it receives plain ether without data. Proof of Concept Tools Used Recommended Mitigation Steps fallback function should be payable Assessed type Payable --- The text was updated...