In LybraStETHVault.sol (LybraEUSDVaultBase.sol) a user could rigid redeem an amount more than their deposited collateral when the collateral ratio of the user goes below 100% even if they have been super-liquidated.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If the collateral ratio of a user goes below 100%, the user would be able to redeem all of their eUSD for a collateral amount greater than their depositedAssetuser even after they have been super-liquidated. For eg, let us say we have a user X. Now, in...

The broker should not be fully disabled by GnosisTrade.reportViolation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact GnosisTrade and DutchTrade are two separate auction systems where the failing of either system should not affect the other one. The current design will have Broker.sol disabled when reportViolation is invoked by GnosisTrade.settle if the auction's cleari...

RToken.redeem should claim rewards before sending tokens to user

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact RToken.redeem should claim rewards before sending tokens to user. Because after that he will not receive them anymore. Proof of Concept When user mints RToken, then he sends some tokens as collateral and they are stored by BackingManager. Some of...

Blacklisted Address Can Exploit the Exchange

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Addresses that are blacklisted for popular ERC20 tokens such as USDC, USDT can be leveraged to exploit the exchange in a number of ways. These addresses cannot be liquidated in any case where they would be transferred back a leftover collateral amount in...

Custom redemption can be used to get more than RToken value, when an upwards depeg occurs

Lines of code Vulnerability details Custom redemption allows to redeem RToken in exchange of a mix of previous baskets as long as it's not more than the prorata share of the redeemer. The assumption is that previous baskets aren't worth more than the target value of the basket. However, a previou...

Borrowers can be liquidated before default by being based on the borrowBalance from other pools

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Borrower can be liquidated before default based on the borrowBalance from other pools. In the liquidity snapshot, borrows from other pools are added as total borrow but the collateral that is used which might not be used as collateral for the poolfor the...

Borrower can redeem there collateral without repaying debt completely

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A borrower can redeem token in a pool though it has been used as a collateral in another pool without repaying the debt. Borrower can redeem the token as underlying asset even if his/her loan position is in the situation of liquidation. Proof of Concept...

totalBorrows is not deducted properly when Comptroller#healAccount is called

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact TotalBorrowed in VToken is not accounted properly when healAccount is called. Proof of Concept ComptrollerhealAccount intends to forgive the debt of the account if the debt goes far too underwater. When that happens, the collateral is seized, some of the...

A user asset cannot be seized if the supplied market's collateral to seize(vTokenCollateral)is different than the pool(seizerContract) where the liquidateBorrow function is called.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A user asset cannot be seized if the supplied market's collateral to seizevTokenCollateralis different than the poolseizerContract where the liquidateBorrow function is called. Proof of Concept A user asset cannot be seized if the supplied market's...

can launch a challenge without any collateral in MintingHub.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact launchChallenge... function in MintingHub.sol ignores return value by challenge.position.collateral.transferFrom Several tokens do not revert in case of failure and return false. If the token used as collateral return false, the user can launch a challen...

Challenges can be frontrun with de-leveraging to cause lossses for challengers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Challenges, once created, cannot be closed. Thus once a challenge is created, the challenger has already transferred in a collateral amount and is thus open for losing their collateral to a bidding war which will most likely close below market price, sin...

Challenger incentives can be inflated with external transfers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The function notifyChallengeSucceeded calculates the volume of ZCHF to be repaid, which is then used to calculate the reward for the challenger. The challenger can however artificially inflate this value. A challenger can start a challenge on an...

Sound adjusting of a position could fail

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Increasing collateral and decreasing it's liquidation price, such that with new liquidation price and old collateral position is becoming unsound, leads to a revert. Such situation can happen often, imagine position that's fully minted and has market pri...

Attacker can extract unlimited ZCHF by setting a high price for a position and challenging it

Lines of code Vulnerability details An attacker can act as both minter and challenger, and profit by setting an arbitrarily high price for a position way higher than what the collateral really is worth, and then immediately challenging the position. After the challenge succeeds, the attacker will...

Positions can be created to mint unlimited tokens and still run off with the provided collateral.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Brief Introduction A compromised position can be used to mint tokens up to the limit. The attacker can also withdraw this collateral. Hence, the attacker can mint tokens against his collateral and withdraw his collateral at the same time. Explanation...

can open a position without any collateral in MintingHub.sol

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact openPosition... function in MintingHub.sol ignores return value by challenge.position.collateral.transferFrom Several tokens do not revert in case of failure and return false. The require still pass but then, if the token used as collateral return false,...

Position ownership could be transferred to zero address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Ownership of a Position could be transferred to zero address. This is usually caused by mistake but the consequence is loss of collateral. Proof of Concept The position owner calls transferOwnership but accidentally set newOwner address to 0x0. Tools Use...

Position created with BNB as collateral will result in locked collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details withdrawCollateral allows position owners to withdraw collateral from the position - as long as it is still collateralized afterwards. File: Position.sol 263: function withdrawCollateraladdress target, uint256 amount public onlyOwner noChallenge noCooldown 264:...

Attacker can take a loan offer without providing the NFT from requested collection by using function borrowerRefinance()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function borrowerRefinance allows the borrower to repay the previous loan and take a different loan offer. In the codebase, there is no check to ensure that collateral collection of previous loan and new loan offer are the same. It can be abused by an...

Function takeBid() allows attacker to sell any collateral NFT that deposited through function borrowToBuy()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function borrowToBuy is used by the borrower to take a loan offer and uses the funds to purchase NFT. However, even though it sends ETH along when calling function execute to buy the requested NFT, it approves the collateral NFT to Blur for no reason. /...