Users can't repay their debts if the OmniPool contract is paused which can cause users to fall into liquidation and lose their collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users can't repay their debts if the OmniPool contract is paused which can cause users to fall into liquidation and lose their collateral Proof of Concept The OmniPool::repay function has implemented the whenNotPaused modifier, which will prevent the...

After the market configuration expires or when borrow value greater than deposit value, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount

Lines of code Vulnerability details = Impact After the market configuration expires, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount Proof of Concept After the market configuration expires or when borrow value greater than deposit value, there is no cap for liquidation seize amount when liquidation ...

MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact MEV bot can frontrun user's repayment to liquidate user first when the OmniPool is unpaused Proof of Concept this report tries to combine a few issue 1. when OmniPool is paused, interest is still accuring 2. when OmniPool is paused, user cannot repay 3...

Users will retain possession of their USDe after redeeming collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Users will retain possession of their USDe after redeeming their collateral this can lead to theft/loss of funds. Proof of Concept See belo for the coded POC. The benefactor and the beneficiary in the Order struct containing order details and confirmatio...

Compromised minter can change route to misdirect user funds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current security assumption revolves around the compromise of a minter, wherein they mint 200k USDe tokens for themselves and subsequently redeem them within the contract. Under this assumption, as long as the gatekeeper key remains secure, the minte...

Sanction Bypass Through Depositing to Authorized Borrower's Market

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Wildcat protocol provides lending with lender backed collateral considered as reserves and the ratio must be upheld by the borrower. The protocol team has taken certain steps to prevent interaction with sanctioned users. However, sanction status is only...

ODProxy contract can't grant safeRights (can't change the state of the called contracts) which will disable generating debts functionality

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The protocol implements a proxy mechanism to enable only the Vault721 contract from transferring SAFEs, as each SAFE is represented by a NFV non fungible vault. This contract has only one function execute that makes delegatecalls to other contracts, so...

On repaying and taking collateral there is 2 times modifying tokenCollateral[cType][account/sourse]this lead to a problem

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact when you are repaying your tokenCollateralcTypeaccount is modified 2 times, which leads to incorrect data Proof of Concept On calling repayAllDebtAndFreeTokenCollateral or repayDebtAndFreeTokenCollateral first you are calling modifySAFECollateralization...

Reentrancy during collateral transfer can allow transfer with more debt than expected

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In a separate issue titled "SAFEs can be collateralized with worthless tokens" I outlined how the lack of input verification of the collateralJoin contract in the lockTokenCollateralAndGenerateDebt function allows a user to pass in a malicious contract...

Function _joinCollateral calculates variable wei incorrectly for collateral tokens that do not have 1e18 decimals

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Collateral tokens with decimals other than 1e18 will not work. Proof of Concept Function joinCollateral in CommonActions.sol, which is inherited by BasicActions.sol in scope calculates the collateral token amount wrongly for all non 1e18 decimal tokens...

at _modifyCollateralBalance when locking and generating debt your wad is going to be negative number but at the token Collateral mapping should not have any negative numbers

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact the protocol will not work, all functions will not work Proof of Concept you cannot set negative number to uint256 Tools Used manual Recommended Mitigation Steps change the mapping to : mappingbytes32 cType = mappingaddress safe = int256 wad public...

Rounding Bug in OracleLibrary.consult Impacting Pricing Accuracy and User Costs

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The rounding bug in the OracleLibrary.consult function has a significant impact on applications that rely on this function for price calculations, especially those involving asset swaps, collateral valuation, or other financial transactions. The bug caus...

An attacker can use the flashloan() function without real collateral assets

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function flashloan - allows delegate token owner or approved operator to borrow their underlying tokens for the duration of a single atomic transaction. The function uses Structs.FlashInfo calldata info as an input parameter. However, some parameters fro...

An attacker can use the flashloan function with an invalid collateral asset

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function flashloan - allows delegate token owner or approved operator to borrow their underlying tokens for the duration of a single atomic transaction. The function uses Structs.FlashInfo calldata info as an input parameter. Failure to call...

Attacker can extract value from pool by sandwiching herself at swapAll during close

Lines of code Vulnerability details Attacker can drain the lending pool by leveraging two facts: 1. swapAll allows 1% slippage 2. There is no Health Factor check after close. Alice and Bob are good friends, the steps are in one single tx: 1. Alice deposits 10000 USDT and borrows 7000$ worth of TR...

Potential insolvency risk in dpxETH stablecoin system due to absence of liquidation mechanism

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The dpxETH stablecoin system, as implemented, relies on user deposits as collateral when the stablecoin is minted through bond purchasing. When the bonding process is done, the protocol mints a corresponding amount of Receipt tokens to the user that he c...

User can't redeem from RToken based on CurveStableRTokenMetapoolCollateral when any underlying collateral of paired RToken's price oracle is offline(timeout)

Lines of code Vulnerability details The CurveStableMetapoolCollateral is intended for 2-fiattoken stable metapools that involve RTokens, such as eUSD-fraxBP. The metapoolToken coin0 is pairedToken, which is also a RToken, and the coin1 is lpToken, e.g. 3CRV. And the...

CurveVolatileCollateral Collateral status can be manipulated by flashloan attack

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Attacker can make the CurveVolatileCollateral enter the status of IFFY/DISABLED . It will cause the basket to rebalance and sell off all the CurveVolatileCollateral. Proof of Concept The CurveVolatileCollateral overrides the anyDepeggedInPool function to...

borrowInternal() of BaseTOFTMarketModule.sol has phantom permit functions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious actor could steal funds from a User who has already done his first deposit. Proof of Concept Consider the case where attacker uses a token with phantom permit function as collateral, the most famous ones being WETH, BNB, HEX etc. Let’s consid...

Setting debtStartPoint > 0 breaks many BigBang actions

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If BigBang.debtStartPoint is set to a value 0, many core features will break, e.g. deposits of collateral will be possible, but removal not, which would effectively lock collateral inside the contract. Proof of Concept BigBang.getDebtRate uses the variab...