Withdraw all with amount: type(uint256).max in native token (ETH) will always revert

Lines of code Vulnerability details if amount == typeuint256.max uint256 decimal = IERC20Detailedasset.decimals; amount = amountToWithdraw.multhis.pricePerShare.div10decimal; Per the comment: The asset address for collateral asset = 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 means to use ETH as...

Withdrawing ETH collateral with max uint256 amount value reverts transaction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Withdrawing ETH collateral via the withdrawCollateral function using typeuint256.max for the amount parameter reverts the transaction due to asset being the zero-address and IERC20Detailedasset.decimals not working for native ETH. Proof of Concept...

Malicious ERC20 or ERC777 could be used as collateral

Lines of code Cally.solL296 Vulnerability details Impact A malicious ERC20 or ERC777 could be used as collateral and rug the exerciser on exercise through a malicious implementation of ERC20vault.token.safeTransfer. Proof of Concept Any ERC20/ERC777 token is accepted as there is no whitelist. Thi...

User can call liquidate() and steal all collateral due to arbitrary router call

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A malicious user is able to steal all collateral of an unhealthy position in PARMinerV2.sol. The code for the liquidate function is written so that the following steps are followed: User calls PARMinerV2.liquidate PARMinerV2 performs the liquidation with...

VaultCore's withdrawETH uses transfer function, which can be unusable for some smart contracts

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When a user wishes to withdraw their collateral from a WETH vault, the funds are returned to the user with msg.sender.transfer. Using transfer is not recommended anymore, especially for critical operations like withdrawing collateral from a vault as it...

Lender can adjust ltvBPS and instantly sieze collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact After the loan is accepted and is in the LOANOUTSTANDING phase, updateLoanParams allows the lender to update the TokenLoanParams.ltvBPS parameter. The require check allows for the parameters to change as long as they are favorable for the borrower, but...

Loss Of Collateral Via Illegitimate Liquidation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: updateLoanParams allows the lender to change the terms of an in-progress loan to lower ltvBPS. removeCollateral calculates whether liquidation is allowed via requirerate.mulloanParams.ltvBPS / BPS amount, "NFT is still valued";. A low or 0 ltvBPS...

Skim Accidental Transfer of Collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: removeCollateral function does not perform any address checks if the loan status = LOANINITIAL. Consequences: If anyone sends an NFT to the contract by itself, for whatever reason, an attacker can snatch it with removeCollateral. Proof of Concept Someone...

Reentrancy in removeCollateral() / requestLoan()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact There is a potential reentrancy bug they may exist between requestLoan and removeCollateral that allows a user to have requested a loan while maintaining ownership of the collateral. This bug is present in both NFTPair and NFTPairWithOracle. The reentran...

Oracle failure allows NFT to be stolen

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any temporary failure in an oracle relaying a price allows the NFT collateral to be removed by the lender, even if the value of the NFT is still far above the agreed-upon liquidation value. Considering that oracle price retrieval failure is accounted for...

Use Victims Collateral by Frontrunning

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: the require statement in requestLoan doesn't check if the one that provides the collateral is the same address that requests the loan Consequences: If an NFT is transferred to the contract by itself, either on accident or preparing to call requestLoan wi...

Loss of Collateral Via Malicious Oracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Issue: The oracle can be arbitrarily updated at any point in time by the lender. Consequences: A lender can inject a malicious oracle at any time and steal the collateral NFT at the cost of his loaned tokens. Proof of Concept Borrower requests loan with an hone...

Possible to steal collateral during a reentrant collateral transfer

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In NFTPair.sol218 an ERC-721 transfer occurs. Anyone who gains execution during this transfer after the owner of the token is changed can steal the token transferred. Note that it will be applicable only if !skim. Since the exploit makes assumptions abou...

Reentrancy attack in collateral.transferFrom that borrowers can trick lenders to lend but the lenders will never get the collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A borrower attacker can use reentrancy attack to request a loan successfully and the collateral is still owned by the attacker. If a lender victim tries to call lend on the malicious loan which seems normal, the lender will lose money and never get the...

Params.oracle can be changed to a fake one by front running NFTPairWithOracle's lend function

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As neither lend, nor updateLoanParams functions verify params.oracle, the lend call can be front run by a malicious borrower with changing params.oracle to a non-market one. The front run will be an updateLoanParams call where borrower introduces fake...

NFTPairWithOracle's _lend ignores accepted.oracle and allows to start loan with empty params.oracle

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact As lend doesn't require params.oracle to be valid, while removeCollateral does, the loan initiation with an empty oracle can lead to ignoring collateral valuation. As the deals are OTC this can be seen as lender decision. However, lend ignores...

Lender can immediately liquidate valued Collateral in NFTPairWithOracle contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A lender can liquidate a borrower's collateral immediately by calling updateLoanParams in the NFTPairWithOracle contract where the ltvBPS for the params struct is set to 0. This bypasses the checks to make sure that the terms are favourable to the...

Lower LVT is treated as less restrictive, while it's vice versa

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Lender can accept overly restrictive LTV the lowest possible at the moment, with high enough probability being able to seize the collateral after a short time. Lender can set ltvBPS to zero with and immediately liquidate with removeCollateral any loan no...

updateLoanParams can update to any malicious oracle address

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact A lender attacker can modify the oracle address of tokenLoanParams to get collateral directly before expiration. Proof of Concept 1. First a lender attacker lends for a loan, the attacker can use updateLoanParams function and update to a malicious oracle...

Moral hazard of borrower calling liquidate() and potential Oracle manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the InceptionVaultsCore contract, the liquidate and liquidatePartial function can be called anyone. This means that the borrower for a specific vaultId can call liquidate or liquidatePartial on his own vault. Furthermore, the project incentivizes...