Able to remove all collateral after borrow

Lines of code Vulnerability details Assuming to borrow asset tokens from a pair contract a user must first deposit collateral tokens. After they deposit collateral tokens their userCollateralBalance increases and they can then call borrowAsset to receive asset tokens from the contract. The...

Approved Borrower can borrow asset without paying collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact When an approved borrower calls borrowAsset , they are able to borrow as much asset as possible without pass the user controlled collateralAmount input as 0. This would allow the borrower to not pay any collateral and receive the borrowAmount Proof of...

repayAsset() but you will not receive your Collateral

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The user will just pay down the debt Proof of Concept By invoking repayAsset you will just pay the Asset Token, on the other hand, he does not send any amount of my Collateral Recommended Mitigation Steps Add a function to send the Collateral after...

maxLTV == 0 shouldn't be solvent but currently always solvent, so borrower can borrow all assets without any collateral.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact maxLTV == 0 shouldn't be solvent but currently always solvent, so borrower can borrow all assets without any collateral since isSolvent always return true. Proof of Concept Assume maxLTV == 0 User call borrowAsset /// @notice The borrowAsset function is...

LinearInterestRate mode has the risk of drastic fluctuation of interestRate by flash borrow attack, make borrower pay more interest

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In LinearInterestRate mode, the minInterest can be as low as MININT=0, and the maxInterest can be as high as MAXINT=146248508681. In getNewRate function, the newRate is determined by utilization. If utilization=1e5, the interestRate can be MAXINT. There...

Users could borrow all the liquidity in the FraxlendPair

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Any user can borrow any amount of Asset without transfer any Collateral Token to the Pair Proof of Concept By invoking borrowAsset and passe collateralAmount = 0 you will be able to borrow all the liquidity in the Pair As we can see they just check for i...

Someone can create non-liquidatable auction if the collateral asset fails on transferring to address(0)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact might lead to systematic debt. Cause errors for liquidators to run normally. Proof of Concept In the function auction, there is on input validation around whether the to is address0 or not. and if the auctioneerReward is set to an value 0 as default, eac...

Incorrect amount of Collateral moves for Auction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact It was observed that the debt and collateral which moves for Auction is calculated incorrectly. In case where line.proportion is set to small value, chances are art will become lower than min debt. This causes whole collateral to go for auction, which wa...

limits_.sum is not increased yet when performing limit check. Collateral may exceed the limit.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact limits.sum is not increased yet when performing limit check. Collateral may exceed the limit. There is a limit on how much collateral can be concurrently put at auction, but it is a soft limit. If the limit has been surpassed, no more vaults of that...

Auctions can be started for same undercollateralized vault using different Witch contracts, which causes vault collateral loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Given that there are two deployed Witch contracts, two auctioneers are calling Witch 1 and Witch 2's auction functions for the same vault at similar times. Both transactions are included in the same block for which the governances of these Witch contract...

The whole collateral can be liquidatedThe whole collateral can be liquidated

Lines of code Vulnerability details The whole collateral can be liquidated Impact According to the current mechanism, if the proportion is set to 100%, and some user's profile barely trigger the liquidation threshold, the whole collateral could be liquidated all at once. However, the user's profi...

Multiple auction can run on same vault - Collateral loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Due to insufficient checks, it is possible to run 2 auctions at same time. This can lead to loss of collateral for this vault as collateral quantity placed for auction will double Proof of Concept 1. User starts auction on vault id 1 which transfer...

Collateral limit can be bypassed in auction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Collateral limit could be bypassed, allowing more collateral to be auctioned concurrently than intended by governance. // There is a limit on how much collateral can be concurrently put at auction, but it is a soft limit. // If the limit has been surpassed, no...

Liquidator cut is calculated incorrectly

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact User can call payBase function to pay debt in return for collateral. But due to incorrect calculation User will obtain lesser collateral than what he should actually receive causing immediate permanent loss Proof of Concept 1. User calls payBase function...

Concurrently auctioned collateral limit can be gamed

Lines of code Vulnerability details Proof of concept: Let’s say for collateral USDT we put a limit that maximum concurrent auctioned collateral can be 100,000 USDT. Now if there are two big vaults, one is 9,999 USDT and other is 100,000 USDT and they are both undercollateralized, now if someone...

Collateral limit can be exceeded on a new auction

Lines of code Vulnerability details Witch's auction checks the total collateral limit before updating the structure with the current auction's data. This way this limit end up not being respected in result of auction call and can be actually breached for an arbitrary big amount as auction.ink tha...

The stable ctoken underlying price quote could be manipulated

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[WP-H3] Lack of liquidation makes it possible for alToken to be undercollateralized

Lines of code Vulnerability details function liquidate address yieldToken, uint256 shares, uint256 minimumAmountOut external override lock returns uint256 onlyWhitelisted; checkArgumentshares 0; YieldTokenParams storage yieldTokenParams = yieldTokensyieldToken; address underlyingToken =...

[WP-H2] Always use a 1:1 ratio for all the underlyingTokens when calculating the collateral value is flawed and can cause systemic failure when one of the underlyingTokens is depegged

Lines of code Vulnerability details function normalizeUnderlyingTokensToDebtaddress underlyingToken, uint256 amount internal view returns uint256 return amount underlyingTokensunderlyingToken.conversionFactor; function totalValueaddress owner internal view returns uint256 uint256 totalValue = 0;...

A well financed attacker could prevent any other users from minting synthetic tokens

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the AlchemistV2 contract, users can deposit collateral to then borrow/mint the synthetic tokens offered by the protocol. The protocol also defines a minting limit that specifies how many synthetic tokens can be minted in a given time period. This exis...