Hardcoded USD pegs can be broken

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The prices of USDC and USDT, which I assume are the underlying tokens of cUSDC and cUSDT, have been hardcoded to parity. Such practices are highly discouraged because while the likelihood of either stablecoin de-pegging is low, it is not zero. Becau...

getUnderlyingPrice returns an incorrect value for cUSDC

Lines of code Vulnerability details BaseV1Router01.getUnderlyingPricecToken returns the price of cToken in $NOTE. As per the docs, the function is designed so that cStable coins USDC, USDT, NOTE have prices that are statically set to 1e18. The issue is that USDC uses 6 decimal places of precision...

Dividing before multiplying can cause data loss

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Note: I'll use the notation decimals here to represent 10 token.decimals, just like th variable defined in the BaseV1Router.getPriceLP function. In the BaseV1Router.getPriceLP function, the token0 TVL is calculated in terms of NOTE, by multiplying the TV...

setPeriodSize need check for value range

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact If periodSize is mistakenly set too small, 0 or a small value, the price oracle might be easier to manipulate. As a consequence, multiple functionality depending on oracle price feed may lose accuracy, and even incur large fund loss. Proof of Concept The...

Price can be manipulated by flashloan

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The last observation of the TWAP can be manipulated by a flashloan, which thus manipulates the price. Proof of Concept The price calculated in getPriceLP is based on the last 8 observations. As the last observation may be in the current block it is...

TWAP LP price manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The total value locked sum of the pair is used to price the LP. But the reserves of the underlying can be easily influenced by flashloan, then the TVL can vary dramatically.Just like what happened before here Warp. Although getPriceLP use TWAP to calcula...

Strict $1 price for stablecoin

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Stablecoins price is strictly set to 1, this could result in inaccurate and delayed capture of market price, and serious loss to the pool. When stablecoins such as USDT/USDC crashes, the corresponding lending pool will also be affected and become...

LP token price calculation suceptible to oracle attack manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The current calculation of the LP token its no accurate. Currently you formula is a the sum of the underlying asset value; sumPiRi / supply Sumatory of each token prices times reserve, divided by total supply, but this is suceptible to oracle manipulatio...

Sudden price fluctuations occuring at a call to _update() will not be reflected by reserves(), sampleReserves() and sampleSupply() until after periodSize seconds

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Consider the situation where a token suddenly drops drastically in price in the market. Consider a call to BaseV1Pair.swap which makes a very large swap between the two tokens accurately reflecting the change in price and also causes a new observation to...

Lack of minimal sufficient liquidity check can result in unreliable prices

Lines of code Vulnerability details function getPriceCantoaddress token internal view returnsuint erc20 token = erc20token; address pair = pairForaddresswcanto, addresstoken, false; if !isPairpair return 0; // this pair does not exist with Canto uint decimals = 10 token.decimals; // get decimals ...

[M03] Incorrect price calculation for non-stablecoin pairs marked as stable

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Pairs that don't have NOTE token but that are still marked as stable will always have an incorrect price calculated for them. Proof of Concept As it can be concluded from the code, stablecoin pairs are pairs with NOTE token: However, there's a separate...

USE SAME SYMBOL CAN GET FAKED PRICE OF TOKEN

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact it compare symbol to identify token，it can be exploit to produce fake price of token. Proof of Concept attacker can create a token which is like cToken and has symbol of cNOTE .When somebody call comptroller’s liquidateCalculateSeizeTokens ，it will give ...

possibility of front-run on swap()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The user swapper could lose all their money Proof of Concept 1- the user invokes swap with tokenIn == ohm 2- on this line MINTR.burnOhmaddressthis, amountIn; this user send their money to the TRSRY.sol 3- keeper invoke beat to update the price 4- here...

Check additional fields returned by latestRoundData to ensure price data is not stale/incorrect

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Not checking additional fields returned by Chainlink might cause incorrect prices being processed. Proof of Concept The only values being check from latestRoundData are price and updatedAt. File: src/modules/PRICE.sol 161: , int256 ohmEthPriceInt, ,...

_getPriceDecimals() can return wrong decimal

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The decimal returned from function getPriceDecimals is used in function activate to create bond market. If the decimal is not accurate, the price for bond can be wrong, could result in: too low price: abnormal arbitrage opportunity and fund loss to the...

The _movingAverage always have the same value as _movingAverage + (currentPrice / numObs)

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact On updateMovingAverage the calculate new moving average is always movingAverage == movingAverage + currentPrice / numObs Proof of Concept 1- keeper invoke beat on Heart.sol 2- this PRICE.updateMovingAverage; to updating the moving average on the Price...

PRICE's getCurrentPrice() can return zero price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Currently no price validity check is performed in getCurrentPrice. This way zero ohmEthPriceFeed.latestRoundData produced prices will yield zero getCurrentPrice which will be passed over to the logic. Also, negative OHM price or zero / negative reserve...

getLastPrice() return wrong price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact operate and addObservation both of them use PRICE.getLastPrice but it will return wrong price. So all the updates are just random prices Proof of Concept 1- keeper invoke beat on Heart.sol 2- this operator.operate; to trigger price range update and marke...

Cushion bond markets are opened at wall price rather than current price

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Incorrect initial bond market price Proof of Concept uint256 initialPrice = range.wall.high.price.mulDivbondScale, oracleScale; uint256 initialPrice = invWallPrice.mulDivbondScale, oracleScale; In the above lines the initial prices are set to the wall...

Price Reduction - Azure Spring Apps does more, costs less!

We believe in providing the most innovative cloud offerings at incredibly competitive prices. As we operate Azure Spring Apps, we continue to build efficiencies and economies of scale. We are passing those efficiencies to you. Many customers have asked us to lower the size of the base unit to mak...