incorrect commend and/or rounding issues in AutoPxGmx and AutoPxGlp

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The comments on the affected lines state previewWithdraw will round up. However, the implementation, an inner call to convertToShares is made, which actually calls mulDivDown. From further inspection, this pair of functions withdraw, previewWithdraw as...

MINTING OF NFT AT WILL

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact register is an unrestricted public function where any new msg.sender is going to get through the modifier onlyUnregistered. With a non-zero recipient argument passed into the function, a new NFT is going to be minted to the recipient. Consequently, an...

Assign Function Allows for any Other Unknown Contract Address to Assign existing token.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Assign Function Allows for any Other Unknown Contract Address to Assign existing token. Proof of Concept There is no check at all to confirm that the previous token owner allows for the assignment of his tokenId. The assign function only checks the...

Register and assign functions need more validation due to phishing vectors.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Turnstile contract is open for phishing. Since the interaction between the contracts is in atomic construction and the calls can't be controlled at low levels, it might open ways to phishing the contracts. Let's assume that there is a contract that i...

Steal deposit fund in ERC4626 vault by exchange rate manipulation

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Although the PirexERC4626 and AutoPxGlp contract check for 0 shares, the rounding down error can still be used to steal new user deposit. Part of the new deposit could be stolen. The attacker may monitor the pool activities to catch the steal...

The existence of the tokenID is not validated in distributeFees()

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Turnstile contract has distributeFees function which the Canto team/smart contract utilizes to distribute the fees to the tokenID's for the smart contract that is registered through register function. The existence of the tokenID's are checked both in...

Ownership NFT Can be Minted by Anyone

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In Turnstile.sol, register is a public function callable by anyone. Any msg.sender calling this function the first time is going to bypass the modifier onlyUnregistered. As long as a non-zero recipient has been inputted, a new NFT is going to be minted t...

platform should be approved again after it's changed by the admin.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In AutoPxGmx.sol and AudotPxGlp.sol, it doesn't approve properly when platform is changed. As a result, PirexGmx contract can't transfer gmx or gmxBaseReward from these contracts and the main logic won't work as expected. Proof of Concept As we can see...

fee loss in AutoPxGmx and AutoPxGlp and reward loss in AutoPxGlp by calling PirexRewards.claim(pxGmx/pxGpl, AutoPx*) directly which transfers rewards to AutoPx* pool without compound logic get executed and fee calculation logic and pxGmx wouldn't be executed for those rewards

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Function compound in AutoPxGmx and AutoPxGlp contracts is for compounding pxGLP and additionally pxGMX rewards. it works by calling PirexGmx.claimpx, this to collect the rewards of the vault and then swap the received amount to calculate the reward,...

Incorrect fee distribution due to reorg

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact In the PostTxProcessing hook, new events are processed immediately and the addresstokenid mapping is registered to the keeper. The keeper throw an error upon duplicated registration. When there is a chain reorg that changed the registration on the EVM...

evm_hooks ignores some important errors

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact Some contracts and some Turnstile tokens nfts wll not be able to receive CSR fees forever. Proof of Concept In evmhooks.go, the PostTxProcessing will call h.processEventsctx, receipt to handle Register and Assign events from Turnstile contract first:...

Incorrect revenue calculation will lead to revenue theft through proxy attacks

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The incorrect way revenue is calculated can lead to CSR being stolen through proxy attacks, which is likely to lead the ecology into CSR bribery war. Eventually, this feature will translate into reduced gas fees for all transactions, regardless of whethe...

User can redirect fees by using a proxy contract

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact For any given tx, the fees are sent to its recipient To. Anybody can register an address using the Turnstile contract. Thus, a user is able to create a proxy contract with which they execute other smart contracts. That way, the fees are sent to their own...

ETH can get stuck (and possibly be stolen as well).

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The Turnstile contract contains a distributeFees function which can only be called by owner to assign and distribute fee for a tokenId. However the function does not validates the tokenId input value. So it is possible for the owner to provide any uint25...

HIGH : The Giant pools can be drained by any user.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description In GiantSavETHVaultPool.sol, batchDepositETHForStaking is used to deposit held funds to savETHPool vault: function batchDepositETHForStaking address calldata savETHVaults, uint256 calldata ETHTransactionAmounts, bytes calldata blsPublicKeys, uint256...

batchDepositETHForStaking in GiantSavETHVaultPool.sol can be ticked to steal all ETH in the pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact All Eth can be drained by fake vault addresses. Proof of Concept In batchDepositETHForStaking, savETHVault is checked for its validity through SavETHVault savETHPool = SavETHVaultsavETHVaultsi; require...

batchDepositETHForStaking in GiantMevAndFeesPool.sol can be ticked to steal all ETH in the pool

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact All Eth can be drained by fake vault addresses. Proof of Concept In batchDepositETHForStaking, stakingFundsVault is checked for its validity through StakingFundsVault sfv = StakingFundsVaultpayablestakingFundsVaulti; require...

Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky

Lines of code Vulnerability details Single-step process for critical ownership transfer/renounce is risky Impact The following contracts and functions, allow owners to interact with core functions such as: execute, rawExecute and setApproval in OwnableSmartWallet registerKnotsToSyndicate,...

Variable claimed its being resetting instead of adding

Lines of code Vulnerability details Impact The variable claimed that keeps tracking of the total amount claimed per user per token its being being resetting with a wrong value. This impacts on the line due calculation on SyndicateRewardsProcessor.solL61 uint256 due = accumulatedETHPerLPShare...

SLOT owners lose half their value when there is no sETH deposited to the Syndicate.

Lines of code Vulnerability details Description The Syndicate contract uses total balance as collateral for both sETH accumulatedETHPerFreeFloatingShare and SLOT rewards accumulatedETHPerCollateralizedSlotPerKnot. They are updated in the following function: function updateAccruedETHPerShares publ...