Users settings their active admin form legends dynamically may be
vulnerable to stored XSS, as long as its value can be injected
directly by a malicious user.
For example:
name
value dependent on anresource
): form do |f|
f.inputs name: resource.name do
f.input :name
f.input :description
end
f.actions
end
Then a malicious user could create an entity with a payload that
would get executed in the active admin administrator’s browser.
Both form
blocks with an implicit or explicit name (i.e., both
form resource.name
or form name: resource.name
would suffer
from the problem), where the value of the name can be arbitrarily
set by non admin users.
The problem has been fixed in ActiveAdmin 3.2.2 and ActiveAdmin 4.0.0.beta7.
Users can workaround this problem without upgrading by explicitly
escaping the form name using an HTML escaping utility. For example:
form do |f|
f.inputs name: ERB::Util.html_escape(resource.name) do
f.input :name
f.input :description
end
f.actions
end
Upgrading is of course recommended though.
https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/#stored-xss-attacks
Vendor | Product | Version | CPE |
---|---|---|---|
ruby | activeadmin | * | cpe:2.3:a:ruby:activeadmin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |