Canon Printer DoS / Secret Disclosure

`The below 3 issues have been tested and verified working on the following  
Canon Printer models (May affect more, but this is all I was able to test  
against):  
MG3100, MG5300, MG6100, MP495, MX340, MX870, MX890, MX920  
  
#1 (CVE-2013-4613): Canon printers do not require a password for the  
administrative interfaces by default. Unauthorized users on the network may  
configure the printer. If the printer is exposed to the public internet,  
anonymous users may make configuration changes as well. This should be  
corrected by requiring a password, even if only a default, but should  
recommend users to change it upon initial setup of the device.  
  
#2 (CVE-2013-4614): The administrative interface on these printers allow a  
user to enter a WEP/WPA/WPA2 pre-shared key. Once a key is entered, when a  
user browses the configuration page again, they can view the current  
password in clear-text. Once a password is configured, it should not allow  
the user to read it again. If the user wants to change the password, they  
should be required to enter a new one, which then overwrites the old one.  
  
#3 (CVE-2013-4615): There is a denial of service condition in the  
administrative interface on the devices. Using specially crafted HTTP  
requests, it is possible to cause the device to no longer respond. This  
requires the device to be turned off, and then back on again, to which the  
printer will display a message about not being properly turned off, on the  
display (if model has a display).  
  
I have disclosed all 3 of these issues to Canon, and unfortunately they do  
not feel it is necessary to fix them (In all fairness, they're not super  
high severity). More details, along with PoC and Metasploit modules are  
available here: *  
http://www.mattandreko.com/2013/06/canon-y-u-no-security.html*  
  
Timeline:  
May 27, 2013: Initial Email to vendor's support  
May 28, 2013: Vendor support emailed for additional details  
May 28, 2013: Sent a proof-of-concept exploit for the DoS vulnerability to  
vendor  
May 30, 2013: Vendor escalated issue internally  
June 4, 2013: Vendor notification that issue has been escalated to  
manufacturer  
June 14, 2013: Vendor notification that they will not fix issues  
June 18, 2013: Public Disclosure  
`