10 High
CVSS2
Access Vector
NETWORK
Access Complexity
LOW
Authentication
NONE
Confidentiality Impact
COMPLETE
Integrity Impact
COMPLETE
Availability Impact
COMPLETE
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
0.008 Low
EPSS
Percentile
81.1%
A vulnerability in Oracle PL/SQL Export Extensions may allow an attacker to modify privileged database information.
Oracle Extensions, ODCIIndex Interface, and****ODCIIndexGetMetadata
Oracle extensions are used to create customized Oracle database constructs. An indextype is an Oracle extension that allows users to create specialized indexes on an Oracle database. To create a new indextype, the ODCIIndex Interface must be implemented, meaning that certain methods specified in that interface must be defined. The ODCIIndexGetMetadata(…) routine is one such method in the ODCIIndex Interface. When the ODCIIndex Interface is implemented for a new indextype, the ODCIIndexGetMetadata(…)routine is used to specify how metadata for that indextype should be handled.
Oracle DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION
DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION is a built-in Oracle package used to import and export information in an Oracle Database. The DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION package implements the ODCIIndex Interface ODCIIndexGetMetadata(…) routine. Note that this package is owned by SYSDBA, but is accessible to the PUBLIC by default.
The Problem
The DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION package fails to properly sanitize user-controlled input. Specifically, if the GET_DOMAIN_INDEX_METADATA(…)routine is executed with the ODCIIndexGetMetadata(…)routine and attacker-supplied SQL commands, the SQL commands will be executed with SYSDBA privileges.
Based on research into public information, we believe that this issue is Oracle vuln# DB06 in the Oracle Critical Patch Update for July 2006.
Note that exploit code for this issue is publicly available.
A remote attacker with some authentication credentials may be able to execute arbitrary SQL statements with elevated privileges. This may allow the attacker to access and modify sensitive information within an Oracle database.
Apply Oracle CPU
Oracle has released the Oracle Critical Patch Update (CPU) for July 2006. It is unclear from the Oracle documentation whether this issue is addressed by this CPU. Public reports indicate that this issue has been addressed by this CPU, but this has not been confirmed.
Until a patch for this issue can be applied, the following actions may reduce the chances of exploitation:** **
Restrict access to Oracle
Only known and trusted users should be allowed access to Oracle. Additionally, user accounts should only be granted the fewest privileges needed to perform necessary tasks.
Change login credentials for default Oracle accounts
Oracle creates numerous default accounts when it is installed. Upon installation, accounts that are not needed should be disabled and the login credentials for needed accounts should be changed.
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Notified: May 02, 2006 Updated: July 19, 2006
Affected
There have been several public disclosures of vulnerabilities in the dbms_export_extension package. All of them, save one, are fixed in previous Critical Patch Updates. The most recent disclosure was irresponsibly published by a hacker as a “0day”, meaning that there were no patches yet prepared for the issue. We have fixed this latest issue in our main code line, and are working on backports for all affected product versions and platforms. When these are completed, and all customers can obtain a patch for the vulnerability, we will release the patch in a Critical Patch Update.
Currently, there is no workaround that will not potentially affect product functionality. The dbms_export_extension package may be revoked from public, but we would caution that this configuration should be fully tested by customers before implementing in production.
The vendor has not provided us with any further information regarding this vulnerability.
There may be multiple ways to access the DBMS_EXPORT_EXECUTE package. When testing for access to this package consider configurations such as user accounts and roles, besides PUBLIC, that have access to DBMS_EXPORT_EXECUTE and PL/SQL code that may call the DBMS_EXPORT_EXECUTE package with user influenced input.
Note that these are just two examples of configurations that may allow access to the DBMS_EXPORT_EXECUTE package, other access paths may exist.
Oracle has addressed this problem in the Oracle Critical Patch Update for July 2006: <http://www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/critical-patch-updates/cpujul2006.html>.
If you have feedback, comments, or additional information about this vulnerability, please send us [email](<mailto:[email protected]?Subject=VU%23932124 Feedback>).
Group | Score | Vector |
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Base | ||
Temporal | ||
Environmental |
This vulnerability was reported by David Litchfield of NGS Software.
This document was written by Jeff Gennari and Stephen Rhoton.
CVE IDs: | CVE-2006-3702 |
---|---|
Severity Metric: | 18.56 Date Public: |
secunia.com/advisories/19860
www.juniper.net/security/auto/vulnerabilities/vuln3319.html
www.oracle.com/technology/deploy/security/critical-patch-updates/cpujul2006.html
www.red-database-security.com/advisory/oracle_cpu_jul_2006.html
www.red-database-security.com/exploits/oracle-sql-injection-oracle-dbms_export_extension.html
www.securityfocus.com/bid/17699